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Abstract 
With over 280 environmental laws designed to regulate econorruc 
activities and tackle pollution problems, EU actors have established an 
impressive environmental policy. While policy-making has been 
impressive, implementation has often been disappointing with the result 
that EU environmental policy now suffers from an 'implementation deficit' 
whereby policy intentions on paper are not carried out properly 'on the 
ground'. Until recently, many EU actors and analysts have focused on the 
initial stages of the policy process, in particular the dynamics of 
bargaining between Member States. Yet, the overall effectiveness of EU 
environmental policies depends upon actors 'on the ground' and how they 
apply the policies in practice. This research moves away from the 
conventional state-centrist approach and focuses instead on the 
subnational regions and their role in the overall success of EU 
environmental policies. 
The research investigates Scotland and Bavaria and assesses to what 
extent the two regions shape EU environmental policy implementation. 
To help with the investigation, the research establishes a 'multi-layered 
implementation map' which best captures the policy 'filtering' process. 
The map helps identify formal and informal determinants within the layers 
which either facilitate or obstruct policy implementation. The research 
not only compares implementation performances between the Member 
States and between the regions. it also compares the regions vertically 
with their 'mother' states and thereby highlights implementation obstacles 
which would remain undetected with the state-centrist approach. 
A case study illustrates in detail the formal and practical implementation 
of the EIA Directive in Scotland and Bavaria. The study confirms that 
subnational regions feature determinants which differ in many respects 
from national determinants and influence the effectiveness of EU 
environmental policies. By highlighting subnational regions and their role 
in the process, the research contributes to a better understanding of the 
implementation deficit and presents a more refined picture of the EU 
environmental policy 'reality'. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Why study EU Environmental Policies in Subnational 
Regions? 
The European Union (EU)l has established an impressive 
environmental policy. Over 280 pieces of legislation are designed 
to regulate economic and other human activities and thereby 
tackle increasingly alarming environmental problems. EU 
environmental objectives include the setting of qualitative and 
quantitative standards (such as emission standards), the protection 
of species and areas of special interest (such as wild birds and 
habitats), and procedural frameworks which integrate 
environmental considerations into econOIl11C and other activities 
(such as environmental impact assessment). However, the 
effectiveness of most EU environmental policies has been 
hampered by the so-called 'implementation deficit' whereby policy 
intentions on paper stand in stark contrast with policy 'reality'. 
The overall success of EU environmental policies depends upon 
implementors' attitudes and resources on the ground. Yet, until 
recently their influence on EU environmental policies has been 
largely under-estimated and under-examined. Many EU 
1 With the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the Member States included two 
policy 'pillars' (Justice and Home Affairs, Common Foreign and Security 
Policy) which are not incorporated into the original treaty framework. The 
whole 'temple' construction was named 'European Union' (EU) which is the 
official term since the ratification of the TEU on I November 1993. 
Environmental legislation is adopted under the 'European Community' (El') 
pillar. The term 'EC' (which was accepted as the general term before TEL; 
ratitication) has now replaced the 'European Economic Community' \ FEC). 
All these changes make the correct use of terms difficult. In this research the 
term 'EC' is applied in the context of activities conducted before 1 1\:lnember 
1993, the term 'EO' is applied in relation to activities thereafter. In l"ase.., 
where policies and activities cannot be categorised under this tillle LTiterion 
the author uses both terms - 'EC\EU. 
practitioners and analysts have focused primarily on the creation 
of EU policies and the national governments' role in the policy-
making process. Any assessment of the effectiveness of EU 
environmental policies, however, must include the evaluation of 
policy implementation within the Member States and their 
regIons. 
This research addresses the implementation deficit by 
contributing a perspective that moves away from the conventional 
state-centrist approach. 2 It moves subnational regions and their 
actors to the fore of EU environmental policy investigation and 
examines to what extent they shape EU environmental policies in 
practice. The research compares two subnational regions, 
Scotland and Bavaria, and their implementation performances 
with EU environmental policies. 3 It offers a 'multi-layered 
implementation map' which guides the reader through the key 
government levels (EU, national, subnational levels), highlights 
obstacles and facilitators in the implementation path, and explains 
why implementation deficits occur. More importantly, the map 
distinguishes between national and subnational government levels 
(or 'layers') and highlights the subnational regions' influence on 
the success ( or failure) of EU environmental policies. By doing 
so, the map provides a more refined picture of the EU 
environmental policy reality. 
This Chapter sets the study in its broader context. It begins by 
2 For a good example of the state-centrist approach, see Alberta Sbragia 
'Environmental Policy: The Push-Pull Policy-making' (pp.23S-.2))) in 
Wallace, Helen; Wallace. William (eds) Policy-making in the European 
Union 1996. 
\ See below t(Jr a justitication of Scotland and Bavaria as comparati\'e 
examples. 
examining the relevance of environmental problems, the role of 
the EU in environmental politics, the problems of meeting EU 
environmental objectives, and the subnational regions' intluence 
on EU environmental politics. The Chapter then formulates two 
key arguments and concludes with a structure outline of the 
research. 
1.2 Considering the wider Context of the Research Topic 
Relevance of Environmental Problems 
Concerns about pollution and environmental deterioration are 
relatively new. Apart from some isolated cases of water and air 
pollution caused by early industrial activity in the 19th Century, 
citizens in industrialised countries became aware of environmental 
deterioration only since the 1950s.4 In Europe, especially, the 
negative impact of industrial activity and intensive farming not 
only shocked those who were directly affected by them; pollution 
and environmental deterioration also proved to know no frontiers 
and time limits. Acid rain caused by emissions of burning fuels 
such as coal frustrated citizens in all European states, so did the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986 which confirmed the 
perception that many environmental problems cannot be dealt 
with within national boundaries alone. 
Environmental problems have been highlighted by alarming 
scientific evidence which responded and contributed to heightened 
public awareness. Environmental problems also recein:d 
considerable attention from the media which highlighted signs of 
pollution and reached areas where 'green issues' had not been 
4 The London "Great Smog" in December IY52 which caused over -U)(){) 
deaths was one of the first major pollution incidents to recei \e \\ ide atlention. 
Lean, Geoffrey 'Where did all the fresh air t'o'" The Independent on Sunda\' 
(The Sunday Review, pp.4-Y) ) March IYY). 
4 
raised before. This new perception coincided \vith the \\'ider 
societal adjustments in attitudes of the 1960s and 1970s which 
were initiated by the younger generation. The resulting '0Jew 
Social Movements' did not entirely change society towards a 
'post-materialist' or 'green' society, but they nevertheless 
succeeded in further raising public awareness on environmental 
issues. s 
While shifts in perception were considerable and occurred in a 
relatively short period of time, they were not sufficient in 
providing the basis for effective solutions to problems of pollution 
and environmental deterioration. To date, the industrialised world 
has seen an abundance of environmental initiatives and legislation 
as well as recycling processes and the development of new 'clean' 
technologies to replace old heavy industries. These efforts, 
however, have borne limited success and the environment 
continues to deteriorate. To illustrate the point, the European 
Environment Agency report of 1995 states that Europe is far from 
moving towards a sustainable environment and is "actually facing 
increasingly acute environmental difficulties".6 Despite optimistic 
.) For further information on 'New Social Movements' see 
Inglehart, R. Culture Shift: in Advanced Industrial Society Princeton 
University Press 1990; Roth, R.; Rucht, D. (eds) Neue Soziale Bewegungen 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bundeszentrale fUr politische Bildung, 
Bonn 1991; Raschke, Joachim Soziale Bewegungen. Ein historisch-
systematischer Grundriss Campus 1988. For a recent critique on 'New Social 
Movements' approach see Koopmans, R. Democracy from below. New Social 
Movements and the political system in West Germany Westview Prcss. 
Oxford 1995. 
6 Mann, Michael 'Widespread condemnation of action programme review 
European Voice (Survey: Environment), 30 May - 5 June 1996 (p.17). 
Previously, the EU Fifth Environmental Action Programme pointed out 
"[s]ome disquieting trends" which, "if not satisfactorily contained, could ha\l~ 
signiticant negati\'t~ consequences for the quality of the environment" in 
Europe. Trends included a 2Wlr increase in EC carbon emissions hy 2() I () and 
a 137r increase in municipal \\aste over a :) year period. Otticial Journal 
(17.5.93) NoC 13S/23. 
findings which indicate a decrease in certain pollution categories -;-, 
the 1980s and 1990s so far have shown slow progress in 
enforcing comprehensive and effective environmental measures. 
Policies and legislation undoubtedly have improved certain 
pollution problems. But the real driving force behind many 
success stories has been production changes from old heavy 
industries to new 'clean' technologies. These improvements have 
not eliminated threats and increases in pollution in other areas, 
neither have they solved the accumulative problem of pollution. 
Three factors contribute to the rather cumbersome nature of 
environmental issues: environmental problems are complex and 
'know no frontiers'; their solutions are influenced by economic 
considerations; and environmental policies have to be processed 
within established and often inflexible societies and state systems. 
With reference to the fIrst factor, pollution and environmental 
deterioration constitute extremely complex problems. They affect 
other policy areas, 'know neither time nor territorial boundaries', 
are ever changing and involve a high degree of uncertainty. 
Moreover, environmental assets such as fresh air and rare species 
are difficult to value in economic terms. 8 These uncertainties 
hamper the tackling of environmental problems by conventional 
political and administrative means and requIre particular 
commitment and determination by politicians and citizens. 
7 Janicke, Martin et al investigate the main pollutant categories and conclude 
that some categories such as 502, CO and to a certain extent fertilisers h .. \\'(: 
shown improvements. Umweltpolitik der IndustrieUil1dcr. El1t\\icklung-
BiJanz-Erfolgsbedin!!ungen edition sigma, Berlin IYY6. 
x For a discussion on attributing an economic \'alue to e[nironmental asseh 
see, for instance, Goldin, Ian: Winters. L :\Ian (eds) The Economics of 
Sustainable Development Cambridge Llni\'ersity Prcss. Camhridge IYY5 Sl'l' 
also ':\n in\'aluable el1\ironlllcnt' (p.IOS) The Economist IX. April IYYX. 
The second factor concerns the dominant perception that 
environmental considerations contradict economic success and 
material wealth. Embedded as a policy priority in post-war 
Europe, economic growth has been an essential objective for most 
citizens despite the 'post-materialist' input of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Today, environmental issues are considered important, but in 
relation to other priorities such as job security, 'green' policies 
continue to be associated with inconvenience and costs. Only in 
recent years, have attempts been made to reconcile environmental 
concerns and economic interests, though with limited success. 9 
Finally, environmental matters are problematic because they 
often challenge existing societal and institutional structures. Past 
experience in the social development of the welfare state suggests 
that the process of accepting a new policy area and integrating it 
into the existing social, political and legal systems is difficult and 
slow. Institutional structures, which reflect and organise societal 
structures and preferences, are arguably slower in adapting to new 
demands. This lethargy is due in part to the administrators' 
perception that policy changes undermine their bureaucratic 
. . 10 E . I posItIons. nVlfonmenta measures often requlfe radical 
changes, for instance in the form of a new Ministry or a law which 
restricts certain economic activities. Therefore, environmental 
issues face similar problems to those faced by other new political 
issues (such as gender equality), namely the resistance and 
l) Chapter 2 discusses the complex relationship between economic and 
environmental considerations in more detail. 
10 Among other implementation researchers, Pressman and \Vilda\'"h.y 
describe the administrators' reluctance to adjust. or ~i \'C up, thcir po"ition" for 
the sake of new policies in Implementation: How ~reat c\pl'l'lation" in 
\Vasilim'.toll are dashed in Oakland 1(1\ Angeles, Llni\'cr"ity of California 
1974. For a detailed account of implementation ohstacles see Chapter 2. 
-I 
opposition of established interests. At the same time. 
environmental deterioration is intensifying and requires action 
which may stand in direct conflict with economic interests. The 
inherent complexity, the conflicting relationship with other 
interests and the urgency to act all make the environmental policy 
. . Issue umque. 
Relevance of the European Union 
In Europe, environmental politics cannot be studied without 
focusing on the EU. The European Union finds its roots in the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1952 which 
signaled the beginning of a complex integration process involving 
quantitative (i.e. an increasing number of Member States and 
policies) and qualitative (i.e. intensifying policy commitments) 
developments. The EU has steadily acquired political and legal 
competencies which significantly affect every-day lives of EU 
citizens. Despite recent discussions on the principle of 
subsidiarity!! and the European Commission's latest strategy to 
minimise the number of new policy proposals, the EU continues 
to shape fundamentally European politics related to the 
. !2 
enVIronment. 
Environmental policies constitute an area which has attracted 
II The EU detines subsidiarity as locating decision-making at the 'most 
appropriate level'. Ideally, decisions should be made as closely as possible to 
the citizens, i.e. at the 'lowest' government level. However, where the "lowest 
level' cannot adequately address policy issues, a 'more appropriate' level (e.g. 
the EU) should act. For a summary and discussion of the EU principle of 
subsidiarity, see Scott et al 'Subsidiarity: A 'Europe of the Regions' \ersu-, 
the British Constitution?' (pp.-1-7-67) Journal of COIllmon Market Studies 
vo1.32, No.1, March 1994. 
12 Bomberg highlights the Commission"s 'do less but do it octter" -,tratcgy in 
ELI en\'ironmental policy: "whereas dozens of new proposal-. \\ere introduced 
durin~ the 19XOs and earh I ()()()s, onlv two ne\\ proposals \\ere introduL'ed in 
L .'
1996" (p.177) Bomberg. Elizabeth; Peterson. John Decision-Illakin~ ill the 
European Union t\\act\lillan, Basingstoke 19()l). 
considerable attention at the EU level. The objective to limit 
environmental deterioration and protect Europe's natural 
resources was formally adopted by the (then) European 
Community (EC) and its Member States with the Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1987. But even prior the SEA, from the 1970s 
onwards, the EC had begun to adopt environmental legislation as 
well as action programmes, initiatives and support funds. Today 
EU environmental policies are numerous and ambitious with an 
impressive number of Regulations and Directives regulating 
environmental matters. 
Political and economic considerations have contributed to the 
adoption of environmental policies at the EU level. The fIrst 
consideration concerns the apparent urgency of environmental 
problems described above. Particularly in times when public 
interest in environmental issues is high, politicians want to be seen 
as (and are expected to be) actively solving environmental 
problems at every opportunity. Inactivity could cost them the 
support of the electorate and would provide targets for criticism 
from political opponents. The EU presents itself as an ideal forum 
for concerted action, especially when problems of transboundary 
pollution are on the agenda. The EU provides a political and 
institutional framework which facilitates the realisation of 
environmental policy objectives and obliges Member States to 
follow their common commitments. 
Economic interests, too, have forced Member States to establish 
the environment as a common policy area. In order to avoid 
econOffilC imbalances caused bv 'environmental dumping' 
\\'herebv lax. environmental standards in one i\lember State loan 
att ract economic act i\'ities awa\, from another i\ kmber Stall' 
9 
which has more stringent requirements, Member States ha\e 
sought to harmonise their environmental policies and adopt a 
common environmental policy basis. This economic imperative 
has contributed towards the adoption of many EU environmental 
policies, among them the LCP Directive which sets common 
emission standards for large combustion plants, which otherwise 
would not have been adopted by EU actors. 
The EU's 'historic commitment' to economic growth 13 has in 
many ways aggravated environmental problems in Europe. In 
particular, the effects of EU policies such as the Trans-European 
Networks and the Single Market have made EU environmental 
objectives even more pressing. In recent years, the EU has tried to 
integrate economic and environmental interests. EU documents 
such as "1992: The Environmental Dimension" 14 and the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme bear the message of sectoral 
policy integration and sustainable development. 15 However, their 
influence on behavioural patterns and attitudes in the EU has to 
date been limited and not effective enough to bring about 
13 Susan Baker uses this description in 'The evolution of European Union 
environmental policy: from growth to sustainable development?' (pp.91-106) 
in Baker, Susan; Kousis, Maria; Richardson, Dick; Young, Stephen (eds) The 
Politics of Sustainable Development. Theory, Policy and Practice within the 
European Union Routledge, London 1997. 
14 Task Force Environment and the Internal Market "1992" The 
Environmental Dimension Task Force Report, 1990. 
15 The Brundtland Report defines 'sustainable development' as a 
development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs. See World Commission on 
Environment and Development Our Common Future Oxford Uni\'ersit! 
Press, Oxford 1987. Similarly, the EU detines 'sustainable development' as a 
"policy and strategy for continued economic and social development without 
detriment to the environment and the natural resources on the quality of 
which continued human activity and further development depend". (p.12) 
5.EAP Towards Sustainabilitv 0.1. CUR, 1993. 'Sustainahility' can he 
detined as the long-term (tinal) objective in achieving a complete merger of 
economic, social and en\'ironmental de\elopments. 
10 
sustainable development in Europe. 16 
Meeting EU Environmental Policy Objectives 
Considering the potential conflict between environmental and 
economic interests and the above described inflexibility of societal 
and institutional structures, developments in EU environmental 
policy-making have been remarkably swift. However, when it 
comes to the actual implementation of EU environmental policies, 
progress has been markedly (and as expected, see above) slower 
and often disappointing. EU environmental policies have been 
confronted with severe obstacles to successful implementation. 
The EU environmental policy area in particular has shown an 
alarming and widening gap between 'good intentions on paper' 
and policy outcomes 'on the ground'. 
The gap between EU environmental policy intention and 'reality' 
is now recognised: several reports provide detailed evidence on 
the problems of implementation. 17 Until the early 1990s, however, 
considerable time was spent investigating EU environmental 
policy-making and the influence of Member State governments on 
policy formulation. This rather restricted perspective was partly 
due to the fact that the ECIEU had been preoccupied with the 
adoption of common environmental policies. In addition, 
16 For a discussion of sustainable development in the EU and case studies on 
Member States and regions' experiences with sustainable development, see 
Baker, Susan et al The Politics of Sustainable Development. Theory, Policy 
and Practice within the European Union Routledge, London 1<)<)7. 
17 Among others The State of Reporting by the EC in Fulfillment of 
Obligations contained in EC Environmental Le~islation Institute for 
European Environmental Policy, London, November 1 <)<)3; The Commission 
Eleventh Annual Report to the European Parliament on monitorin~ the 
Application of Communitv LI\V - 1993 (Section G. Ern-ironment) Ofticial 
Journal (6.1.1994) No C 15-+1-+2. See also Kr~imer, Lud\\i ~ FOCllS on European 
Environmental Law Sweet & Maxwell, London 1<)<)2 and 1<)97; ':\ppendi\ 3: 
L\'idence on EU Environmental Policy Implementation Pertormance:-.'. 
II 
implementation deficits were not as noticeable at the initial stages 
of the EU environmental policy process. However, with the 
adoption of an increasing number of environmental policies at the 
EU level, the contrast between policy objectives and policy 
outcomes has become more evident. In the light of increasing 
pressures to 'complete' policy obligations and questions over the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the EU level as a key policy-
maker,18 EU practitioners and researchers have started to re-
adjust their focus by studying the problems of environmental 
policy implementation and by suggesting ways to consolidate 
environmental policy-making and implementation. 19 The 
European Commission, in particular, has highlighted the ever 
increasing gap between EU environmental policy 'intention' and 
the Member States' policy 'reality' and has sought to close the gap 
through initiatives such as dialogue groups and partnerships.20 
This research follows up the approach of EU environmental 
policy consolidation. It refmes the picture of EU environmental 
policy implementation and highlights implementors 'on the 
ground'. In particular, the research identifies formal and informal 
conditions (or determinants, see below) on the ground which 
18 From a more general perspective, Merkel discusses these questions in 
'Legitimacy and Democracy. Endogenous Limits to European Integration' 
(pp.45-67) Anderson, J (ed) Regional Integration and Democracy Rownan & 
Littlefield 1999. 
19 A similar approach of 'consolidation' applies to policy objectives of the 
Single Market and, indeed, the future Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). 
2() In the 5.EAP Towards Sustainability 0.1. C 138, 1993, the Commission 
introduced three dialogue groups: the General Consultative Forum (since 
1997 European Consultative Forum on the Environment and Sustainable 
Development, in short Forum), the Implementation Network and the 
Environmental Policy Review Group. The 'partnership' between policy-
makers and implementors at EU, national and subnational leH~I-; i-; 
underlined in the Commission's Interim Review (No\'t~mber 199'+). 
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shape EU environmental policies during the implementation 
process. 
Subnational Regions Matter 
One obvious step towards consolidation is to focus on the latter 
stages of the policy process and study the problems of EU 
environmental policy implementation on the ground. Another step 
is to focus on the government level that plays a key function in 
putting most EU environmental policies into practice: the 
subnational level. EU environmental policies such as water and 
air quality Directives, nature protection Directives (e.g. Habitats 
Directive), or procedural Directives (e.g. Directive on 
environmental impact assessment) requITe implementation 
'beyond' the national level - they affect the competencies and 
activities of subnational actors (i.e. actors at regional and local 
government levels) who have to implement and apply the policies 
and act in accordance with EU obligations. However, subnational 
actors do not exist in a vacuum; they are influenced and guided by 
formal-institutional structures as well as informal factors such as 
attitudes, priorities and relationships that exist within their 
subnational frameworks. These determinants21 are not always 
compatible with EU environmental policies with the effect that 
their implementation is either inadequate or ignored completely. 
More importantly, many subnational determinants differ from the 
determinants which shape EU environmental policies in the 
Member States at large. Consequently, subnational 
21 The author uses the term 'determinants' to describe factors which decisi \e1;. 
intluence the implementation process of ELl environmental policies. 
Determinants can either facilitate these policies, alter them, or hinder their 
proper implementation. For a more detailed definition and justitication oj the 
term see below and Chapter 2. 
feature implementation performances and problems with EU 
environmental policies which differ in many respects from their 
'mother' states. The study of subnational regions is therefore 
essential when assessing the overall success (or failure) of EU 
environmental policies. By and large, EU policy-makers and 
researchers have not paid enough attention to subnational regions 
and their role in the EU environmental policy process. This 
research brings the subnational regions and their actors to the fore 
of EU environmental policy investigation. It emphasises the 
importance of distinguishing between conditions at national and 
subnational levels and argues that the problem of the 
implementation gap in EU environmental policy cannot be fully 
grasped unless particular attention is paid to the 'unique' 
implementation conditions and performances inside the 
b . I . 22 su natIOna regIOns. 
22 For a detinition of 'subnational regions' s~~ ·Argument 2' in nc\t section. 
1.+ 
1.3 Setting an Starting Point for Investigation 
Bearing in mind the uniqueness and urgency of environmental 
issues; the significance of the EU as an important environmental 
policy-making level; the need to focus on the implementation 
stage of the EU policy process; and the importance of the 
subnational level in the EU environmental policy process, the 
research investigates the following two key arguments: 
Argument (1): Formal determinants such as political-
administrative structures as well as informal determinants such as 
policy priorities and relationships between actors influence EU 
environmental policy implementation on the ground. These formal 
and informal determinants are inter-related and cannot be studied 
on their own. 
EU environmental policies have to be processed through various 
government levels until they reach the appropriate implementation 
level. In the process, policies are either altered, their 
implementation facilitated, or hindered by certain formal and 
informal conditions at the national and subnational levels. 
Conditions or factors which shape the process decisively can be 
described as determinants. To help identify implementation 
obstacles, the research distinguishes between seven formal and 
informal determinant categories which shape the EU 
environmental policy process In every layer. The formal 
determinants refer to constitutional settings: political-
administrative structures and resources; and legal systems and 
instruments. Informal determinants comprise - relationships 
between actors: attitudes towards environmental protection and 
the EU; policy-makers' priorities and strategies: and policy st vies 
I::; 
and practices.23 
Clearly, successful policy implementation depends upon 
favourable formal determinants. Yet, it would be a mistake to 
assess the policy process without taking into account attitudes 
and relationships between (and among) policy-makers and 
implementors. Even the most favourable formal political-
administrative structure cannot guarantee satisfactory policy 
implementation if implementors are opposed to a policy or if 
relationships between policy-makers and implementors are not on 
constructive terms. On the other hand, relationships and attitudes 
do not develop free from any internal structures and legal 
frameworks, they are often the result of certain formal links and 
rules between political-administrative actors. Therefore, formal 
structures and processes significantly influence the attitudes and 
relationships between policy-makers and implementors. 
The EU environmental policy process is shaped by formal and 
informal determinants which are more complex than determinants 
in any other policy area. Not only do EU environmental policies 
face a longer process chain than national environmental policies 
(Directives in particular have to be transposed into national and 
subnationallegislation and then require practical implementation), 
their objectives also have to fit in with the implementors' other 
(predominantly economic) priorities. In addition, E U 
environmental policies are influenced by the implementors' links 
with, and attitudes towards, EU policy-makers and, indeed, 
attitudes towards the European integration process in general. 
The research therefore takes account of the \yider implications 0 f 
enyironmcntal policies on other policy area" (e.g. econOIllIC 
23 Fur a justiticatioll of the detl'rminant call'gorie,> '>l'e Chapll'r 2 
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competition and transport policies) and identifies EU-specific 
factors which influence EU environmental policy implementation. 
Argument (2): Subnational regions and their actors playa central 
role in the EU environmental policy process. They shape the 
implementation of most EU environmental policies. 
The second argument draws attention to the subnational regions 
and their role in the EU environmental policy process. In order to 
investigate subnational regions, however, it is necessary to defme 
'subnationality'. A universal defmition which applies to all regions 
in the EU is difficult to establish. EU Member States have evolved 
in different manners and feature diverse constitutional structures 
ranging from federal to unitary state systems. Consequently, 
subnational regIons are diverse: they vary depending on their 
subnational regions' history, traditions and attitudes as well as 
their embeddedness within the national contexts. 24 For the 
purpose of this research, subnational regions are defined as units 
immediately below the Member State level whose boundaries and 
identities are recognised by both the national governments and the 
EU. Subnational regions distinguish themselves from their 
'mother' states by featuring 'unique mixes' of formal and informal 
conditions (or determinants). Many of these conditions develop 
independently within the regions and are, for instance, based on 
the regions' own history, culture and constitutional position. 
Other formal and informal determinants are influenced by the 
wider national and European contexts, l.e. events and 
24 Even within the UK there are various forms of 'regions'. In particular. 
Scotland possesses 'regional councils' similar to counties in England and 
Wales, yet Scotland as a whole is treated as one region. See Rhode .... , R.i\\\'. 
llnderstandin!! Governance. Polin Networks, Governance, Retlexi\it\ and 
:\lTountabilitv Open Uni\'ersity Press, Buckingham, 1997. 
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circumstances which affect citizens not just within the regions but 
nation-wide or Europe-wide. Taken together, the resulting mixes 
of determinants are unique for each subnational region, they shape 
policy processes in their own way and should therefore be 
assessed in their own right. 25 
Two subnational regions have been selected for investigation 
which feature sharp differences as well as similarities: Scotland 
and Bavaria. Scotland is part of the United Kingdom (UK) 
centralised state system and although Scotland is recognised as a 
'nation' with a strong identity, it does not yet possess a 
government of its own. 26 On the other hand, Scotland features a 
number of other formal and informal conditions which identify it 
as a region with a distinct political-administrative system. In 
contrast, Bavaria is a federal state (Land) within the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) which possesses its own 
considerable political-administrative powers. At the same time, 
Bavaria shares political competencies with the Federal level and is 
part of an intertwined state system. It would therefore be 
misleading to over-emphasise Bavaria's autonomous powers in the 
federal state system. 
25 For another definition of subnational regions see Udo Bullmann's 'basic 
typology of regional organisation'. He distinguishes between regions 
belonging to either classic unitary states, devolving unitary states, 
regionalised unitary states, or federal states. 'The Politics of the Third Level' 
(pp.3- I 9) Jeffery, Charlie (ed) The Regional Dimension of the European 
Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe? Frank Cass, London 1997. Edye 
lists a number of detinitions (including the Commission's own detinition) in 
Regions and Regionalism in the European Union European Dossier 3X, 
University of North London 1997. Finally, Bomberg and Peterson categorise 
subnational regions along a scale of constitutionally strong and weak SN:\ .... 
(sub-national authorities) in Decision-making in the European Union. 
Implications f()r central-local government relations John Rowntree 
Foundation, 1996. 
2() See 'i\ppendix 5: Scottish Devolution - A Briel Outline' tor more 
information. 
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Referring to constitutional discrepancies between the two 
regIOns, a former Secretary of State for Scotland once 
commented: "We are not Bavaria.,,27 Indeed, Scotland and 
Bavaria differ in terms of their constitutional positions within the 
state systems, their policy priorities and geographical location. 28 
At the same time, Scotland and Bavaria share common 
characteristics such as a strong 'national' identity and relatively 
large natural resources. In addition, both regions represent their 
interests in the EU more forcefully than most of their British or 
German counterparts. 29 The comparison of both Scotland and 
Bavaria's similarities and differences promises valuable insights for 
the research~ it helps defme the subnational political-
administrative systems and identifies those determinants which 
ultimately shape the implementation of EU environmental 
policies. 30 Having stressed that Scotland and Bavaria are 
convenient objects for comparison, the research framework could 
easily be applied to other EU regions. Scotland and Bavaria 
simply serve as comparative examples which illustrate how 
subnational regions process EU environmental policies. 
27 Former Secretary of State for Scotland Ian Lang, at the launch of the 
'Scotland Europa' office in Brussels. Quoted in The Herald ('Opening night 
for Scotland's voice in Europe', p.I), 27 May 1992. 
28 Indeed, while Scotland represents a subnational region at the periphery of 
the EU with its own distinct characteristics and problems (e.g. disadvantage 
in terms of trading links with the EU 'core', comparatively large natural 
resources but a keen interest in economic development), Bavaria is 
geographically at the 'heart of Europe' and faces different problems (e.g. 
economic and environmental pressures caused by immigration and traffic). 
Susan Baker et al focus on peripheral regions and EU environmental policies 
in Protecting the Periphery. Environmental Policy in the Peripheral Regions 
of the EU Frank Cass, London 1994. 
29 For more detailed information on Scottish and Bavarian representation in 
Brussels see Chapter S . 
.10 For a detailed introduction to comparative political analysi" see 'Appcndi\ 
I: Supplement to thc Literature Review'. 
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Research Structure 
In order to address the above key arguments, the research 
applies a synthesis of analytical concepts which combines and 
refmes the wider study areas of environmental politics, the politics 
of the European Union and the study of policy processes. The 
synthesis also introduces new elements to the subject: it highlights 
the subnational level in the investigation of EU environmental 
policy implementation and distinguishes between formal and 
informal determinants which shape the EU environmental policy 
process. A 'multi-layered implementation map' illustrates how EU 
environmental policies are fIltered through essentially three 
government levels and moves subnational regions to the fore by 
examining their influence on, and contributions towards, EU 
environmental policy outcomes. 31 The distinction between formal 
and informal determinants helps highlight facilitators and 
obstacles which lie m the implementation path of EU 
environmental policies. 
The following Chapter, Towards a Multi-layered 
Implementation Map', outlines the synthesis in detail. It examines 
existing theories related to the research topic and draws up a map 
which best encompasses the EU environmental policy process and 
guides the research. Starting with the fIrst layer of the 
implementation map, Chapter 3 focuses on the EU level: it 
31 By focusing on subnational regions, the research borrows insights from the 
'multi-level governance' approach which emphasises the importance of a 
'third tier' (i.e. subnational government tier) in the EU policy process. For 
'multi-level governance' analyses see Hooghe, Liesbet (ed) Cohesion Pol ie\ 
and European Integration. Building Multi-level Governance Clarendon Press. 
Oxford 1996; Gary Marks et al (eds) Governance in the EU Sage, London 
1996. Jeffery, Charles Towards a Third Le\el' in Europe? The German 
Linder in the European Union' Political Studies \01.-1--1-. No.2, IlJlJ6 (pp.253-
266). Jeffery, Charles 'Sub-National Authorities and European Domestic 
Policy' Regional and Federal Studies vol.7, No.3, IlJlJ6 (pp.20-1--2IlJ). 
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introduces the complex EU environmental policy-making process, 
outlines the key EU environmental policy objectives and, fmally, 
contrasts EU policy intentions with the most common problems 
and insufficiencies during policy realisation. Chapter 4 describes 
the environmental policy and politics of the UK and the FRG and 
assesses to what extent formal and informal determinants at the 
national level influence the (non-) implementation of EU 
environmental policies. It concludes that the study of national 
determinants is not enough to explain fully the implementation 
deficit. Chapter 5 contributes the subnational level to the study of 
EU environmental policy implementation. It establishes the 
Scottish and Bavarian political-administrative systems, highlights 
their environmental politics and policies, and identifies 'uniquely' 
Scottish and Bavarian determinants which influence EU 
environmental policy outcomes. The Case Study featured in 
Chapter 6 investigates the process and problems of EU 
environmental policy implementation in detail. It focuses on one 
particular piece of legislation, the 'EC Directive on environmental 
impact assessment', and compares its implementation in the 
national and subnationallayers. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with 
a resume of the research; it addresses the key arguments again in 
the light of the evidence and assesses the usefulness of the 'multi-
layered implementation map' for further investigations. 
Overall, this research seeks to explain why - despite good 
intentions - EU environmental policies fail to be properly 
implemented and why the EU remains a long way from its 
objective of sustainable development. It does not suggest a ne\\' 
theory which predicts policy outcomes, neither does it propose 
ultimate solutions to the implementation deficit. Rather. it offers 
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more refmed insights into EU environmental policy 
implementation practices and contributes towards a better 
understanding of the implementation deficit. The new evidence 
could in turn contribute towards closer co-operation between the 
government levels which could, ultimately, lffiprove 
implementation practices of EU environmental policies. 
Chapter 2 
Towards a Multi-Layered Implementation Map 
2.1 Introduction 
Processing [mdings within a conceptual framework facilitates 
research and contributes to a greater understanding of the subject 
area. This Chapter introduces theories and concepts relevant for 
the study of EU environmental policy implementation. It assesses 
their usefulness and extracts relevant components which will form 
part of the analytical framework. The Chapter concludes with a 
'multi-layered implementation map' which includes key insights 
from existing concepts and adds new elements to the study of EU 
environmental policy implementation. 
2.2 Studying Policy Implementation 
"If Implementation Works - Clap!" 1 
The above comment by a political analyst indicates that the 
implementation of policies should not be taken for granted. In 
fact, over the years many analysts have attempted to address the 
question why policy commitments often fail in practice. 
Implementation analysts have complained that most studies 
concentrate on the study of 'policy-making' while the subsequent 
'implementation' of policies has been neglected as a focus for 
research. 2 Calls for more implementation studies commenced as 
early as the 1970s and the criticism over the neglect of 
I Richardson, Jeremy 'Eroding EU Policies: Implementation Gaps, Cheating 
and Re-steering' (pp.278-294) Richardson, Jeremy (ed) European Union. 
Power and Policy-Making Routledge, London 1996. 
2 See, for instance, Collins and Earnshaw The Implementation and 
Enforcement of EC Environment Legislation' (pp.213-2-+l)) En\ironll1ental 
Politics \'01.1, No.-+, Winter 1992. Sabatier. Paul: Mazmanian, Daniel The 
Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis' (pp.)3S-56()) 
Policy Studies \uI.8, 1980. 
I' 
--' 
implementation as a scientific focus is still continuing ill the 
'-' 
1990s. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s an impressive list of about 
90 'implementation' studies was produced by O'Toole which 
suggests that this study area is not as 'exotic' as many people 
believe.3 What is missing is a comprehensive analytical framework 
which can be applied to a wide range of possible scenarios of 
policy implementation. Some analysts have attempted to establish 
all-encompassing theories, while others have claimed that they 
have found the most important and decisive factor which 
determines policy implementation. While all analysts have 
contributed valuable insights to the discipline, none of them 
provides a framework which adequately addresses the complexity 
of the EU environmental policy 'scenario'. The following review 
outlines relevant implementation concepts and then extracts 
analytical tools which contribute towards a more suitable 
analytical framework for this research. 
2.3 Pressman and Wildavsky's Implementation Theory 
One of the first major studies on policy implementation remains 
in many ways the most valuable contribution to this study area: 
Pressman and Wildavsky's Implementation.4 Even though their 
1974 study describes the implementation efforts of the Economic 
Development Administration Program in Oakland, California 
(USA),5 many of Pressman and Wildavsky's conclusions can be 
1 OToole Jr., Laurence J. 'Policy Recommendations for Multi-Actor 
Implementation. An Assessment of the Field' (pp.18l-2l 0) Journal of Public 
Policy vol.6, part 2, 1986. 
-l Pressman, J.L.; Wildavsky, A. Implementation: how great expectations in 
Washington are dashed in Oakland Los Angeles, University of California. 
1974. 
5 This Program was produced as an employment creation measure in ~I 
predominantly black community facing high unemployment and associated 
problems such as crime and poverty. 
applied to the EU context. 
At the outset both authors assumed that the implementation of a 
well-prepared and popular program such as the Oakland Program 
would be accomplished with no delay and difficulties. However. 
the subsequent failure of the 'Program' showed that a policy - no 
matter how perfect it appears to be in its formulation - does not 
necessarily lead to its complete, satisfactory implementation. 
Surprised by the failure of an apparently popular policy, Pressman 
and Wildavsky decided to identify the reasons for non-
implementation. 
Following their investigations, Pressman and Wildavsky pointed 
out that there are various forms of 'policies' applied by political 
actors. Sometimes policies represent a statement of intention, at 
other times they describe a certain standpoint or behaviour. 
However, if a policy contains a certain objective to be achieved, 
the implementation of that policy cannot be ignored. Applied to 
the EU, environmental policies clearly set out policy objectives 
which require implementation at a later stage. Once adopted, EU 
environmental policies are legally binding and Member States are 
expected to follow their policy obligations. EU environmental 
policies belong to the latter category of Pressman and Wildavsky's 
policy forms. In order to gain a full picture of an EU 
environmental policy, it IS therefore essential to investigate 
'beyond' policy statements and consider their implementation on 
the ground. 
A policy followed through to its actual implementation has a 
starting point and an (ideal) end point. What occurs between 
starting point and end point can be calculated or predicted as 
accurately as possible; neycrtheless a policy at the starting point is 
a mere prediction or hypothesis at that time. The implementation 
of new policies always require new legislation, funding and 
coordination, as well as co-operation at various levels and 
administrative changes. These factors indicate a variety of 
obstacles which have to be overcome in order to reach the policy 
goal. In addition, dealing with one obstacle may influence another 
obstacle. A 'program', for example, is a system of policy stages 
which are related and dependent on each other. If one stage in the 
'program' chain faces difficulties, the following link is very likely 
to be affected. Pressman and Wildavsky labelled potential 
obstacles in the process 'decision points' and 'clearances'. The 
number of 'decision points' and 'clearances' determines the 
likelihood of successful policy implementation; the more actors 
involved in 'clearances', the more difficult it is to implement a 
policy successfully. 
The sheer number of implementors does not always determine 
policy outcomes.6 Nevertheless, Pressman and Wildavsky's 
'decision points' and 'clearances' are useful in so far as they 
illustrate potential obstacles in the EU environmental policy 
implementation process. With the EU as a 'supra-national' 
government level, the EU policy process is obviously more 
complex than national policy processes. The EU policy process 
involves not only an additional government level, it also involves a 
6 OToole; Pag and Wessels argue that the number of actors is insignificant if 
a policy is generally perceived as positive and there are no ob\ious 
administrative or political obstacles. They prefer a combination of 
quantitative and structural-compositional criteria as a measurement. O'Toole, 
Laurence 'Strategies for Intergovernmental Management: Implementing 
Programs in Interorganizational Networks' (pp.-tI 7--t-tI ) International 
Journal of Public Administration voL I I , 19H8. Pag, Sabine; We"el". 
Wolfgang 'Federal Republic of Germany' (pp.165-229) Siedentopf, Heinrich: 
Ziller, Jacques (eds) Making European Policies work. The Implementation oj 
Community Legislation in the Member States Sage. London Il)XX. 
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wider range of actors and interests than in the case of national 
processes. The likelihood of an EU environmental policy being 
blocked by an obstacle is therefore quite substantial. In addition. 
environmental policies tend to be complex and often affect 
econOIll1C, social and other policy areas. Consequently, 
representatives of other interests tend to get involved in the 
process and place obstacles in the implementation path of EU 
environmental policies. 
Following Pressman and Wildavsky's argumentative line further, 
the time span plays an important role in the implementation 
result. The more time is envisaged for a 'program', from policy 
initiation to desired implementation, the more difficult it becomes 
to reach the end point. Too many changes can occur in a period 
of time - circumstances, opinions, scientific evidence etc. can 
change, so can goals or policy objectives themselves. In the case 
of EU environmental policies, most policies are formulated as 
Directives which contain implementation deadlines usually 
effective three years after adoption. While three years may be 
necessary to adjust national systems and constitute a short period 
to put certain environmental obligations into practice (such as 
setting up offices, adjusting national legislation, requiring 
'polluters' to invest in 'clean technologies'), in political terms three 
years can be a long time in which actors tend to forget policy 
obligations and commitments. The large time span between policy 
adoption and implementation deadline can therefore have a 
negative impact on the effectiveness of an EU environmental 
policy. 
Successful implementation also depends upon feasibility. 
according to Pressman and Wildavsky. If aspirations arc set too 
'-' 
1"1 
_I 
high, the objective is unlikely to be accomplished. Goals should, 
therefore, be within reach. If a policy goal had not been reached in 
a previous 'program', the enthusiasm for a subsequent 'program' 
may be negatively affected. The implementation and success of 
previous policies can therefore affect policy-making significantly. 
As far as EU environmental policies are concerned, views differ 
on the feasibility aspect. According to environmental NGOs and 
some Member States (in particular Denmark, the FRG and the 
Netherlands7), most policy goals are set at the lowest common 
denominator level,8 while many industrial lobbyists and other 
Member States consider the policy goals as too ambitious and 
unrealistic. Pressman and Wildavsky miss the point that the 
'feasibility' of EU environmental policies depends upon the 
perception of implementors: if policy goals are seen as 
unattainable, implementors are unlikely to put much effort into the 
policy. Pressman and Wildavsky neglect the importance of 
perceptions but their observation is correct concerning the impact 
of previous policy performances on further policy implementation: 
the success or failure of EU environmental policies influence 
attitudes at a later stage when other policy goals are supposed to 
be implemented. 
Pressman and Wildavsky attended to actors and their 
attitudes in a separate section of their analysis. If the motivation 
7 Yves Meny et al describe the 'push-effect' of the Netherlands, Denmark and 
the FRG on EU environmental policy-making in Adjustin~ to Europe. The 
Impact of the European Union on National Institutions and Policies 
Routledge, London 1996. 
8 The term of 'lowest common denominator' is used hy .\ i\l(lra\scik in 
'Negotiating the Single European Act: National interests and con\entional 
statecraft in the European Community' (pp.19-56) International Or~anisation 
Vol.-l5. 1991. 
and support towards a policy is high, implementation is completed 
without problems or delays. If the perception is critical or even 
negative, implementation is hindered considerably.9 Lack of 
interest in a policy can delay implementation moderately and 
should not be ignored in the investigation. Attention should also 
be paid towards the question of priorities and competing interests 
which have an impact on the policy implementation outcome. If 
the policy is perceived as a major priority, its implementation is 
most likely to be accomplished. If, however, the policy has to 
compete with other interests on the practical implementation 
level, the actual implementation is most likely to fail. Whether or 
not an actor is involved in policy-making is also important for 
implementation. If an actor is instructed to implement a policy but 
had no say in the shaping of the policy, this person tends to fulfill 
his\ her implementation tasks with less enthusiasm or even with 
reluctance. Pressman and Wildavsky stressed that some 
implementors may well agree with the substantive aim of a policy 
but are unable or unwilling to implement the policy in detail. 
Possible reasons include simultaneous commitments to other 
projects, dependence on other actors who are less committed 
towards the policy, and incompatibility with existing policies or 
d 10 proce ures. 
A similar behavioural pattern applies to implementors of EU 
environmental policies. In fact, the implementation of EU 
environmental policies is heavily dependent upon attitudes 
towards the EU and environmental objectives. ImplementoI"s are 
9 Pressman <lnd Wildavsky (p.117). 
10 Pressman and Wildavsky (p.99). 
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required not only to accept policy decisions coming from the EU 
level, they are also required to accommodate environmental 
objectives which may conflict with their existing (economic) 
priorities. The gap between EU policy-makers and implementors 
represents another handicap for the implementation of EU 
environmental policies. Despite the Commission's efforts to 
involve implementors in the policy-making process, the majority 
of implementors at the grass-root level are excluded from the 
negotiating process and consider EU environmental policies as 
'instructions from above'. According to Pressman and Wildavsky, 
this non-involvement can only have a negative impact on EU 
environmental policy outcomes. 
Overall, Pressman and Wildavsky describe the complex 
relationship between policy-making and implementation and 
highlight the gap between the two policy process stages. Their 
study demonstrates that favourable conditions during policy-
making (support for a policy, allocation of resources, etc.) are not 
necessarily met with successful policy implementation. Certain 
factors such as attitudes and the time span can block an 
implementation chain which may then result in a policy's failure. 
While Pressman and Wildavsky's fmdings constitute valuable 
material for this research, their study also shows flaws (such as 
the 'feasibility' argument) and neglects areas which still require 
consideration. In particular, critics such as Sabatier and Elmore 
(mentioned below) have pointed out that Pressman and 
Wildavsky's concept of policy processes IS too linear and 
hierarchical. It concentrates on single 'top-down' instructions 
'from above' while neglecting the influence of 'grass root' actor..., in 
'shaping' policies throughout the policy process. The follo\\1I1g 
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studies attempt to construct more comprehensive implementation 
theories which address the flaws of Pressman and Wildavsky's 
concept. 
2.4 A Discourse of Policy Implementation Studies 
Discussions over the 'right' implementation approach have 
occupied analysts such as Jordan; Hill and Weissert. I I 'Top-
down' analysts such as Pressman and Wildavsky have started their 
investigation with the presentation of a policy decision and then 
addressed questions which concern the consistency between the 
policy objective and policy reality. However, 'top-downers' have 
often neglected pre-decisional factors which determine the policy 
outcome considerably. In many instances, policies under 'top-
down' investigation have appeared to have 'come out of the blue' 
or appeared to have been created by policy-makers without prior 
consultation and co-operation with interested parties. 12 
'Bottom-up' analysts such as Elmore have focused instead on the 
complex, reciprocal relationship between both levels and stressed 
the continuous learning process between policy-makers and 
implementors. Elmore refused to accept the 'hierarchical' 
structure of 'top-down' analysis. 13 This approach, in his words 
II Hill, Jeffrey S.; Weissert, Carol S. 'Implementation and the Irony of 
Delegation: The Politics of Low-level Radioactive Waste Disposal' (pp.344-
366) The Journal of Politics voI.57, No.2, May 1995. Jordan, Andrew 'The 
European Union: Rigid or Flexible Decision-Making. From Brussels to 
Blackpool and Southport. "Post-decisional Politics" in the European 
Community' (pp.1897-1906) Contemporary Political Studies Hampster-Monk 
(ed), PSA Conference Proceeding, 1996. 
12 For a critique see in particular Jordan, Andrew Implementation Failure or 
Policy Making? How Do We Theorise the Implementation of EC Policy at the 
National and Sub-national Level? Working Paper, Centre 1\11 Social and 
Economic Research on the Global Environment, University of Ed"l Anglia 
and Uni versity College of London, 1l)96. 
J.l Elmore, Ril'hard F. 'Backward Mapping. Implementation Research and 
Polin Decisions' (pp.60 1-(16) Political Science OUarll'rl\ \'U1.l)-l, \\'inter 
1l)7l)\SO. 
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'forward mapping', implies a linear downward instruction which is 
neither influenced nor challenged by implementors. However. 
implementors at the lower policy levels influence policy outcomes 
considerably. It would therefore be inadequate to analyse policy 
implementation by concentrating on the transposition of policy 
instructions from above without considering attitudes and 
conditions at the bottom. Elmore argued further that a 'backward 
mapping' approach would not only benefit analysts in their 
analysis. Applied in practice, 'backward mapping' would also 
unprove policy outcomes. Policy-makers should assess 
implementors' abilities, attitudes and resources first before they 
formulate a policy. Considering the 'real' conditions at the bottom 
ensures successful accomplishment of a policy. 
In the light of an increasing gap between EU environmental 
policy objectives and their implementation, Elmore's idea of 
'backward mapping' is attractive for EU practitioners and analysts 
as it suggests a solution to the problem of implementation 
deficit. 14 However, one major problem arises with Elmore's 
concept. His approach does not highlight the discrepancies 
between policy 'intention' and policy 'reality'. Rather, it adjusts the 
research perspective to the implementors' level without 
considering the policy-makers' legitimate position in the process 
and their hopes and expectations. Policy-makers derive their 
legitimacy from direct elections (or other selection procedures), 
they respond to public demands and (urgent) problems and adopt 
policies on behalf of their constituents. It would therefore be a 
I~ In the 1990s the European Commission has adjusted its enyironmental 
policy strategy to allow for implementors' \'ic\\s and problems. f'or furthcr 
details see Chapter J. 
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mistake to neglect their importance in the overall policy process. 
Elmore's concept is useful as it brings implementors' interests and 
behaviours to the fore, but in the case of the EU environmental 
policy implementation deficit, Elmore's 'backward mapping' is of 
limited use because it neglects the EU policy-makers' role in the 
overall process. 
In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive framework for 
the study of policy implementation, Sabatier and Mazmanian 
produced a concept which is almost at breaking point because of 
the weight it carries. 15 Sabatier and Mazmanian established three 
broad categories of factors which shape the implementation 
process and labeled them 'tractability of the problem(s) being 
addressed by a statute', 'the extent to which the statute coherently 
structures the implementation process' and 'non-statutory 
variables affecting implementation'. The lists of items under these 
categories are not always plausible as some items occur in all 
three categories. Particularly, a clear line cannot be drawn 
between the first category (,tractability') and the third category 
(,non-statutory variables'). Moreover, Sabatier and Mazmanian's 
flow chart model of the policy process assumes that a policy 
'problem' suddenly occurs without prior influence of political 
. bl 16 vana es. Despite these shortcomings, Sabatier and 
Mazmanian's study is useful in so far as they suggest a check list 
of ideal conditions for policy implementation which helps predict 
policy outcomes. In an 'ideal scenario', legislation should outline 
\5 Sabatier, Paul A.; Mazmanian, Daniel, A. (eds) Effective Polin 
Implementation Lexington Books, Massachusetts 1981. Sabatier, Paul :\.; 
Mazmanian, Daniel, A. 'The Implementation of Public Policy: r\ Framc\\ork 
of Analysis' (pp.538-560) Policy Studies Journal \"01.8, 1980. 
\6 See 'Appendix I: Supplement to the Literature Revic\\'. 
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clear and consistent objectives, demonstrate causal links bet\veen 
problem and problem-solving objectives, and specify 
responsibilities m the implementation process. Further, 
implementors and target groups should possess the necessary 
means to accomplish policy objectives and should be committed 
towards the policy consistently over the whole implementation 
period. 
Applied to the research, outlining an ED environmental policy 
that is clear and consistent for all involved is a difficult (if not 
impossible) task considering the ED's vast diversity in terms of 
languages, legal traditions and political priorities. Further, 
demonstrating a causal link between environmental problems and 
ED environmental policy objectives is enormously difficult since 
most environmental objectives are complex, involve long-term 
periods and are inter-connected with other policy areas. In many 
cases, responsibilities are not specified in the legislation and ED 
Member State governments tend not to supervise adequately the 
implementation of ED environmental policies. This lack of clarity 
can result in confusion and is occasionally used to avoid 
unwelcome policy obligations. In addition, fmancial and 
administrative resources required for the implementation of ED 
environmental policies are generally not specified in the legal texts 
to allow for national and subnational variances and diversity. 
However, resources allocated at a later stage often prove to be 
insufficient for effective implementation. In addition, the 
commitment of implementors is often missing due to a lack of 
consultation and involvement at the policy-making stage. 
Considering Sabatier and r--..lazmanian's criteria. EU environmental 
policies bee serious implementation ditliculties indeed. The E LT 
environmental policy implementation 'scenario' is therefore much 
further from 'ideal' than are national policy implementation 
. 'scenarios'. 
Sabatier offered another all-comprising theoretical framework 
which merges various approaches and encompasses all directions 
and influences in the policy process. 17 In order to limit the 
enormous complexity of his framework, Sabatier proposed the 
categorisation of 'advocacy coalitions', i.e. groupings who share 
sets of beliefs and seek to realise common goals in a policy 
system. His 'advocacy-coalition' model is useful in so far as it 
takes into account (conflicting) interests and influences of various 
factions within policy systems as well as the role of political-
administrative 'policy brokers'. On the other hand, his model 
implies that influential factors - 'relatively stable system 
parameters' (such as socio-cultural values and basic constitutional 
structures) and 'events external to subsystem' (such as changes in 
socio-economic conditions and government changes) - are on the 
side-line of the policy process. According to the model, 'advocacy 
coalitions' seem to be affected by these influential factors but 
remain outside their framework. However, actors such as 'policy 
brokers' derive their positions from the 'system parameters' and 
are an integral part of them. Sabatier's model is misleading at this 
point. Nevertheless, his 'advocacy coalitions' are useful for the EU 
environmental policy context. They highlight the tensions between 
17 Sabatier, Paul A. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to 
Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis' 
(pp.21-48) Journal of Public Policy vol. 6, part 2, 1986. See Appendix I lor 
his 'conceptual framework of policy change' model. More recently, Sabatier 
confirmed his 'framework' in The advocacy coalition framework: revisions 
and relevance for Europe' (pp.98-130) Journal of European Public Polic, 
\'01.5, No.1, 1998, 
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environmental coalitions and their opponents who fear the costs 
of EU environmental policies. Moreover, Sabatier's model 
describes the Commission's problematic position as a 'policy 
broker' in the EU environmental policy process which negotiates 
between conflicting interests. His model helps explain the 
Commission's behaviour towards poor implementation 
performances; playing the role of a policy 'broker', the 
Commission is often overly tolerant and compromising towards 
'bad' implementors. 
The above studies describe policy processes in general. Other 
analysts have preferred to focus on individual aspects which they 
consider as the key to implementation problems. Some analysts 
have drawn attention to the evaluation of policy implementation 
and its effects on policy-making,18 while others have been 
interested in the clashes of two or more policies and their 
hindering impact on the policies' implementation. 19 Thompson 
concentrated on the interdependent relationships between policy-
makers and implementors which determine policy outcomes. 20 He 
distinguished between 'pooled', 'sequential', and 'reciprocal' 
interdependencies and outlined the advantages and disadvantages 
of each relationship category.21 EU relationships can be described 
18 Comfort, Louise K. 'Evaluation as an Instrument for Educational Change' 
(pp.35-57) Ingram, Helen M.; Mann, Dean E Why Policies Succeed or Fail 
Sage, London 1980. 
19 O'Brien, David 'Crosscutting policies, uncertain compliance, and why 
policies otten cannot succeed or fail' (pp.83- 106) Ingram, Helen M.; Mann, 
Dean E. Why Policies Succeed or Fail Sage, London 1980. 
20 1. D. Thompson's typology of interdependence in O'Toole Laurence; 
Montjoy, Robert S. 'International Policy Implementation: A Theoretical 
Perspective' (pp.491-503) Public Administration Review Nov\Dec 1984. 
~I A 'pooled' relationship between policy-makers and imp\ementors implie\ a 
\imple. straight-for\\drd policy instruction; the 'sequential' category in\'()hc\ 
intermediate steps which can have a hindering impact 011 the policy 
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as 'sequential' and 'reciprocal' interdependencies involving a 
multitude of actors, channels and directions. The 'sequential' and 
'reciprocal' categories are useful in so far as they highlight the 
complexity and interconnectedness of the EU process. They help 
identify the advantages of complex EU relationships (such as 
feed-back on policies and the participation of grass-root actors), 
as well as downfalls (such as delays and possible disagreements) 
in the EU policy implementation process. While Thompson's 
focus on policy process relationships is useful in highlighting 
weak links between EU actors, his concept neglects other 
essential implementation aspects such as the influence of policy 
instruments (or tools) on policy outcomes. 
Ingram and Schneider stressed the importance of studying 
policy tools and proposed the framing of 'smarter statutes' which 
forestall implementation problems. 22 They distinguished between 
four statutory categories: the 'strong statute', the 'grass roots 
statute', the 'support building statute' and the 'Wilsonian statute,.23 
The 'Wilsonian statute' is of particular interest because it 
resembles EU Directives: it combines policy goal specificity with 
implementation; 'reciprocal' interdependence refers to a more complex 
relationship between policy-makers and implementors which requires more 
coordination at all stages of the policy process. 
22 Ingram, Helen; Schneider, Anne 'Improving Implementation through 
framing smarter Statutes' (pp.67-88) Journal of Public Policy voL I 0, 1990. 
23 The 'strong statute' represents a detailed piece of legislation with precise 
instructions ti·om policy-makers to implementors; the 'grass roots statute' 
constitutes a mere encouragement ti·om above to shape and implement a 
policy at the lowest possible government level; the 'support building statute' 
tends to be a complementary piece of legislation which relies upon \oluntar~ 
policy implementation and compliance; the 'Wilsonian statute' can be located 
between the two extremes of the 'strong' and 'grass roots' statutes: the 
'Wilsonian Statute' is strong in goal speciticity but leaves wide discretion to 
implementors on the ways and means in achie\'ing policy goals. 
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discretion over the ways and means in achieving the policy goal. 2-1 
Once a 'Wilsonian statute' has been issued, it is generally 
perceived as a 'depoliticised responsibility' for professional 
administrators. The statute leaves an essential part (i.e. ways and 
means) of policy implementation to the implementors' discretion, 
at the same time policy-makers lack effective control over the 
realisation of policy commitments. The resulting gap between 
policy-makers and implementors, described by Ingram and 
Schneider, is evident in the EU policy process: once EU policy-
makers issue a Directive, they often lack effective control powers 
over implementors at the national and subnational levels. The 
evident gap between EU policy-makers and implementors caused 
by the statute form makes the proper transposition of a policy 
difficult. 
Berman, too, focused on 'statute' forms and their influence on 
policy implementation. 25 He established two broad statute 
categories which can be located at two ends of a scale: statutes 
are either accomplished according to 'pro grammed 
implementation' or 'adaptive implementation'. 'Programmed' 
statutes constitute well-defined policies which allow only limited 
discretion for implementors, provide sufficient monitoring and 
control powers for political decision-makers, outline incentives 
and disincentives, anticipate problems, and are formulated as clear 
and precise as possible. 'Adaptive' statutes, on the other hand, 
24 "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each 
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods." (Art. 189 EC, new: Art.2-lLJEC) 
25 Berman, Paul 'Thinking about Programmed and Adaptive Implementation: 
Matching Strategies to Situations (pp.205-227) in Ingram, Helen M.: t\lann, 
Dean L (eds) Why Policies Succeed or Fail Sage, London 1980. 
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provide only general policy objectives with maximum discretion 
for implementors while policy-makers resume a passive role. In 
contrast to the 'programmed' statutes, 'adaptive' statutes are open 
to modifications and revisions during the implementation process. 
More importantly, 'adaptive' statutes lack a clear line between 
policy-making and implementation as far as policy decisions and 
actors are concerned. 
Like other statute analysts, Berman suggested that the most 
appropriate policy tool should be chosen to suit the policy 
situation. Since policies tend to be complex constructions 
consisting of several political messages and containing legal, 
administrative and resource provisions, a combination of statute 
ingredients should be applied where appropriate. While the 'pick 
and mix' approach is sensible as it allows for complex 
circumstances and objectives, EU environmental policy outcomes 
have shown that complex statutes, carefully formulated to contain 
all aspects (and interests) of the policy matter, do not necessarily 
result in successful implementation. Following Berman's concept, 
most EU environmental Directives are neither 'programmed' nor 
'adaptive' statutes but contain a complex mix of statute 
ingredients. In practice, this mix does not prevent the EU from 
failures in the environmental policy area. Mixed EU statutes are 
sensible but cannot eliminate implementation problems such as 
misunderstandings over requirements, lack of supervisory power 
and lack of discipline. Therefore, the study of statutes forms helps 
identify EU Directive characteristics (i.e. discretionary and 
regulatory elements) which contribute significantly towards policy 
outcomes but does not provide a complete picture of ELI 
environmental policy implementation problems. 
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The above fmdings reflect the state of policy implementation 
studies and their usefulness for this research. In order to complete 
the analytical framework, the following Sections introduce the 
dimensions of 'environmental politics' and 'EU politics'. 
2.5 Adding the Environmental Dimension 
Chapter I introduced the environmental policy area as an area 
which has no counterpart in terms of complexity, urgency and 
inter-relationships with other policy areas. For the study of EU 
environmental policy implementation one of the key 
characteristics of the environmental policy area requires particular 
attention: the inter-relationship between econorruc and 
environmental considerations. 
Offe's 'subsystems' model is a useful starting point in establishing 
the relationship between environmental and economic interests. 26 
Offe investigated the functioning of a state system from a post-
Marxist perspective and highlighted tensions and conflicts 
between economic (or 'capitalist') interests and other interests 
which may exist already or arise in a developed 'capitalist' society. 
According to Offe, modern society evolves around three 
subsystems: the econorruc subsystem, the normative 
(legitimisation) subsystem and the political-administrative 
subsystem. Put simply, the econorruc subsystem stands for 
econorruc or 'capitalist' interests which in many cases exclude 
'moralist' (or environmental) considerations. The second 
subsystem, the normative SUbsystem, represents 'public morale' or 
public pressure. This pressure may be targeted against 'capitalist' 
interests causing tension between the two subsystems. The third, 
211 Ofte, Claus Contradictiolls of the Welfare State Hutchinson. London Il)\-+ 
political-,administrative, subsystem provides the framework within 
which both diverging interests can negotiate and secure as many 
interests as possible. Similar to Sabatier's 'policy broker', Offe's 
political-administrative subsystem plays the role of a mediator or 
referee, seeking to accommodate both sides. 27 According to Offe, 
the domination of one subsystem would inevitably lead to 
instability if not self-destruction of the 'capitalist' state as a whole. 
Therefore, the balancing act between the subsystems is vital. Of 
course, by mediating between economic and 'moralist' interests, 
the political-administrative subsystem has an interest of its own, 
namely to survive and confIrm its own position. It is dependent 
upon the normative subsystem's approval as well as the support of 
the economic subsystem which is essential for fmancing the 
political-administrative subsystem and, in fact, the functioning of 
the state system in general. Crises still occur despite the 
balancing, self-regulatory nature of the developed 'capitalist' state: 
the political-administrative subsystem is often unable to cope with 
the tensions. The reason for this dilemma lies in the dual interest 
of the political-administrative subsystem to please both the 
economic and the normative subsystems. 
Offe's model is useful because it highlights wider 'macro' 
conditions which shape the formulation and implementation of 
environmental policies. His model is also useful in so far as it 
highlights the tensions between two conflicting interest groups as 
well as the political-administrative actors' efforts to mediate 
between the factions. In the case of the EU, environmental 
interest groups often clash with representatives of economic 
27 While Sabatier emphasises the process of learning whil'h results from the 
l'\change of views. Ofte highlights the tensions between the subsystems. 
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interests over EU environmental policies. The Commission. in 
turn, is constantly seeking to reach compromise solutions \\'hich 
accommodate environmental and economic interests. 28 In doing 
so, the Commission itself has to reach a compromise solution as it 
is subdivided into sectoral Directorates-Generals (DGs) which 
constantly guard 'their' policy interests.29 
There are weaknesses in Offe's model which limit its application 
to the study of modern environmental politics. Firstly, Offe's 
model does not explicitly address the idea of sustainable 
development, i.e. the concept to reconcile economic, social and 
environmental developments. True, environmental and economic 
interests often stand in conflict with each other. On the other 
hand, sustainable development is reflected in a number of private 
and public sector initiatives which seek to integrate environmental 
and economic concerns. 3D Secondly, Offe neglects the economic 
cycle and its impact on environmental politics. In times of 
econolll1c receSSIOn, relations between environmental and 
economic interest groups are likely to be tense and environmental 
objectives are pushed to second place in priorities. In times of 
economic prosperity, environmental concerns can be pursued with 
fewer economic obstacles. In other words, during periods of 
28 The Commission pushed hard for Council Regulations (EEC) Nos. 880192 
and 1836/93 introducing 'eco-labeling' and 'eco-management' schemes which 
are initially based on voluntary participation of the industrial sector and 
which promote sustainable products and production as a business 
opportunity. 
29 DG XI responsible for environmental matters has to co-ordinate policy 
objectives with other DGs such as DG VII (transport) and DG XVI (regional 
policy). 
30 One such initiati\\.' is the Ell Task Force which produced a Report on the 
environment and the Internall\Ltrket. "1992" The Environmental Dimension. 
Task Force Report on the Em ironment and the Internall\larket 1l)l)O. 
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economic growth and prosperity, citizens are more receptive to 
environmental concerns and 'can afford' environmental policies. 
while in times of recession, citizens tend to concentrate on 
econorruc (and related social) issues and 'cannot afford' 
environmental policies. Many observers describe this correlation 
as a 'paradoxical' relationship between economic and 
environmental interests.3l 
Finally, modern politics is not easily divided into Offe's three 
subsystems and constrained into a single-state framework. In the 
case of the EU, a line between environmental and economic 
interest groups cannot be drawn at all times, considering the 
complexity and inter-connectedness of EU actors and their 
interests. The EU environmental policy process involves fifteen 
Member States, several government levels and inter-related policy 
areas. While Offe's single-state scenario is difficult to apply to the 
EU context, his macro perspective is nevertheless useful as it 
emphasises the (potential) conflict between economic and 
environmental interests of the EU and the dilemma to try and 
bring the two interests together. The dilemma is particularly 
evident when it comes to the formal and practical implementation 
of EU environmental policies. The following Section specifically 
deals with the EU dimension. 
2.6 Adding the EU Dimension 
The EU provides fertile ground for research and has attracted 
31 Interview with Ken Collins MEP, Chairman of EP Environment 
Committee, 3. February 1995, East Kilbride. 
Martin Hinicke, et al provide empirical evidence t()r the 'paradox' in 
Umweltpolitik der Industrielander edition sigma, Berlin 1996. Gene ~I 
Grossman discusses the complex relationship betweell en\"ironmental and 
economic matters in 'Pollution and growth: what do \\e know')' (pp.19-.+hl in 
Goldin. Ian: Winters, L .\Ian (eds) The Economics ell SU'otainahk 
Development Cambridge llni\l'rsit} Pres.", Cambridge 1995. 
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many analysts who have tried to understand and explain the 
complicated EU policy process. However, in contrast to studies 
on the EU bargaining and decision-making process which exist in 
abundance, the number of studies on EU policy implementation is 
somewhat limited. One obvious explanation lies in the initial 
preoccupation of the EU to produce policies, while their 
implementation at the national and subnational levels has been 
outside EU analysts' field of vision. Only in recent years, in the 
light of an increasing number of unresolved EU policies, have EU 
policy-makers and analysts recognised the widening gap between 
EU policy objectives and policy 'reality' which is now causing 
considerable concern. Many now agree that attention should 
move away from policy production to the implementation of 
existing policies to forestall any further loss in the EU's legitimacy 
and effectiveness. 32 
In order to address the complexity of the EU policy process and 
particularly the problems of EU policy implementation, analysts 
have used vanous analytical approaches. 'Traditional' 
intergovernmentalists have studied EU politics from a state-
centrist perspective and have focused on national actors and their 
influence on the EU policy process. 33 Other analysts have 
resolved to approaches which accommodate more appropriately 
32 In a different context (i.e. in the context of the EU Cohesion Policy). 
Liesbet Hooghe points out that the EU's legitimacy is currently on an insecure 
footing. EU policy-makers find it increasingly difticult to justify their 
capacity to adopt legislation which is later not implemented properly. Hooghe 
describes this dilemma as policy dysfunctionality in 'EU Cohesion Policy and 
Competing Models of European Capitalism' (ppA57--l77) Journal of 
Common Market Studies \'01.36, No.4, December 1998. 
33 See in particular I\lora\'scik, Andrew 'Preferences and Power in the 
European Community: A Liberal Intcrg()\ernmental :\ppro(1ch' (pp-l7 3-:"2-l) 
Journal of Common I\larket Studies \'01.31. No.4, lkcL'Illber 11.)1.)3. 
the increasing complexity of the EU: 'policy networks' analysts 
have tended to ignore governmental levels and have focused 
instead on actors and their interests during the bargaining 'game', 
while 'multi-level governance' analysts have focused on essentially 
three government levels and their influence on EU politics. 
Policy Networks: 
Among the pioneers of 'policy networks' analysis have been 
Rhodes and Marsh who put some order into the complexity of 
UK and EU policy processes by identifying a continuum of policy 
network types ranging from 'policy community/ territorial 
communities' to 'issue networks,.34 To help identify the type of 
network, Rhodes and Marsh suggest three broad criteria: 
1. the relative stability and continuity of network membership; 
2. resource dependencies (resources can be of constitutional-legal, 
organisational, fmancial, political or informative nature); 
3. the relative insularity and autonomy of a network from outside 
influences (i.e. other networks).35 
'Policy networks' identify actors, their interests, positions and 
resources m the policy process. Moreover, 'policy networks' 
highlight the complexity of modern politics characterised by a 
decline in governmental control and an increasing dominance of 
'coalitions' consisting of governmental as well as non-
governmental actors sharing certain interests. These new 
'coalitions' tend to overstep conventional horizontal and vertical 
34 Rhodes, R.A.W Beyond Westminster and Whitehall. The Sub-ccntral 
Governments of Britain 1988. Rhodes, R.A.W: tvlarsh, 0 (eds) Polic\ 
Networks in British Government 1992. Rhodes. R.A. \\' Understanding 
Governance. Policy Networks, Governance, Retlexi\it\ and Accountabilit\ 
Open University Press, Buckingham 1997. For other policy netwmks 
categories see 'Appendix I: Supplement to the Literature RC'\ic\\', 
15 Rhodes and Marsh (p. I I). 
boundaries and create new policy process constellations. 'Polin 
networks' can be applied to the ED context: they accommodate 
the complex patterns of ED interdependencies and enmeshing of 
interests, as well as the emergence of new values and coalitions in 
the ED. In recent years, analysts such as Heritier; Bomberg; 
McAteer and Mitchell; Bressers, et ae6 have discovered the 
usefulness of 'policy networks' for their studies of ED politics and 
policy-making. 
At fIrst glance, 'policy networks' constitute a powerful analytical 
tool. There are caveats, however. In general, there is a danger of 
'policy networks' developing into "giant garbage can[s]",:n 
containing all possible aspects but providing no basis for a clear 
and structured analysis. Another problem concerns the distinction 
between (and defmition of) 'policy network' categories: the line 
between 'policy networks' cannot always be drawn as many 'policy 
networks' are inter-connected or interdependent. As far as 
implementation studies are concerned, 'policy networks' are useful 
in so far as they highlight differences between policy-making elites 
and established 'network coalitions' on the ground which may 
36 Heritier, Adrienne 'Policy-Netzwerkanalyse als Untersuchungsinstrument 
im europaischen Kontext' (pp.432-449) Politische Vierteljahresschrift 
Sonderheft: 'Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung' 24/93. Heritier et al 
Die Veranderung von Staatlichkeit in Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb. 
Deutschland, GroBbritannien, Frankreich Leske + Budrich, 1994. Bamberg, 
Elizabeth 'Protecting the Periphery: Environmental Policy in Peripheral 
Regions of the European Union' (pp.45-61) Regional Politics & Policy \'oIA. 
No.1, 1994. Bressers, Hans et al 'Networks as Models of Analysis: Water 
Policy in Comparative Perspective' Environmental Politics vol.3. NoA. 1994. 
McAteer, Mark; Mitchell, Duncan 'Peripheral Lobbying' The TelTitorial 
Dimension of Euro Lobbying by Scottish and Welsh Sub-central Gmernment' 
(pp.I-27) Regional & Federal Studies vol.6, No.3. 1996. 
37 Quotation from Bressers et al 'Networks as Models of ,\nah "is: \\'ater 
Policy in Comparativl' Perspecti\'t.~' (1-23) Environmental Politic" \0\..'. ",\1.4. 
199--1-. 
oppose and resist new policies.38 However. while 'policy 
networks' by defmition describe actors, their positions, resources 
and interests, they downplay formal institutional factors such as 
statute forms and constitutional structures and neglect other 
circumstances such as events and geographical conditions. 'Policy 
networks' therefore do not constitute an analytical tool which 
covers all major aspects of ED policy implementation. 
Multi-level governance: 
Another analytical approach, promoted by ED analysts such as 
Marks et al; Hooghe; Jeffery; and Scharpf responds to the 
increasing pressures of subnational actors who have sought to 
influence the ED policy process more forcefully.39 Their approach 
offsets the state-centrist perspective40 by attributing weight to 
essentially three government levels in the ED policy process: the 
ED, the national, and the subnational levels. Many of the 'multi-
38 Marsh and Rhodes, et al conclude that many 'Thatcherite' policies failed 
because of the continued importance of policy networks on the ground. 
Implementing Thatcherite Policies. Audit of an Era Open University Press, 
Buckingham 1992. 
39 Marks et al Governance in the European Union Sage, London 1996. 
Hooghe, Liesbet (ed) Cohesion Policy and European Integration. Building 
Multi-level Governance Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996. Jeffery, Charles The 
Emergence of Multi-level Governance in the European Union Conference 
Paper, 8eme Colloque International de la Revue 'Politique et Management 
Public' 1996; 'Sub-National Authorities and European Domestic Policy' 
(pp.204-219) Regional and Federal Studies vo!.7, No.3, 1996; 'Towards a 
Third Level in Europe? The German Lander in the European Union' (pp.253-
266) Political Studies vo!.44, No.2, 1996. Scharpf, Fritz Community and 
Autonomy. Multi-level Policy-Making in the European Union European 
University Institute, Florence, Working Paper RSC No.9411. 
~() For an example of a state-centrist analysis see Moravscik, Andre\\ 
'Preferences and Power in the European Community: .c\ Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach' (pp.-+73-52-+) Journal of COlllmoll .\LlIket 
Studies vo!.31, No.4. December 1993. For a discussion of slate-centrist and 
multi-level governance perspectives see Marks. Gary: Hooghe. llesbet; 
Blank, Kermit Turopean Integration from the 19XOs: State-Centric v. \ lulti-
level Governance' (p[1.3-+ 1-378) Journal of Common i\larket Studies \01.3-+. 
No.3. September 1996. 
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level governance' studies have focused on the interactions across 
government levels during the bargaining process and each 
government level's influence on EU policy decisions. As far as the 
latter stages of the EU policy process are concerned, 'multi-level 
governance' studies exist, however they concern predominantly 
expenences in the EU Structural Policy, a policy area which 
differs in many respects from the EU environmental policy area.-l 1 
In essence, the EU Structural Policy involves the allocation of 
funds to support disadvantaged regions and social groups. One of 
its key principles is the 'partnership' between EU, national and 
subnational actors during both policy-making and implementation 
(i.e. during the negotiation and allocation of fmancial support and 
the subsequent pursuance of regional and social projects). Since 
the Structural Funds regulations explicitly mention (and are 
designed to suit) the 'partnership' of actors at all government 
levels, the EU Structural Policy is a convenient study area for 
'multi-level governance' analysts. The involvement of essentially 
three government levels is less obvious in the EU environmental 
policy area as subnational authorities' responsibilities are not 
outlined explicitly in EU environmental Directives. However, this 
implicit 'partnership' does not mean that the 'multi-level 
governance' approach cannot be applied to the study of EU 
environmental policies and their implementation. While the 
process of EU environmental policies is more complex and more 
difficult to trace than the EU Structural Policy process, the 'mult i-
level governance' approach still promises to be a useful tool for 
.II Studies include Gary Marks 'Structural Policy and ~lultilevel (Jo\ernance' 
(pp.391--tIO) in Cafruny, :\lan: Rosenthal, Glenda (eds) The State of the 
European Community. The I\Ltastricht Ddlates and Bevond \01.2. Lynne 
Riemer. 1993. 
this research area. 
EU Implementation Studies: 
A number of EU studies have focused on implementation 
experiences and have generated some valuable fmdings. However, 
many EU implementation studies have shown limitations: some 
have tended to be descriptive and failed to provide a conceptual 
basis for further research, while others have not followed a 
systematic comparative analysis which could have highlighted 
more forcefully key problems of EU policy implementation. 
The first study is interesting considering the time of publication: 
in 1975 Puchala presented his fmdings on 'EC post-decisional 
politics' which have since been re-confrrmed by more recent 
implementation studies. Puchala emphasised the need to study the 
whole policy process which includes the implementation of EU 
policies at lower government levels.42 According to Puchala, EU 
politics involves the harmonisation of Member States' national 
policies so that a common, mainly economic, ground can be 
established. This harmonisation process inevitably implies changes 
which may benefit some but harm others at the 'domestic' level. 
Member States' governments usually find themselves caught 
between the European Commission's call for compliance of EU 
policy commitments and resistance from various interest groups 
within the Member States. This conflictual situation is even more 
problematic when a Member State's government is divided ovcr 
one particular policy or has accepted reluctantly an EC policy in 
return for other benefits. In the latter case, a Member State may 
exercise a 'second veto' at the later, post-decisional stage whcn an 
~2 Puchala, Donald 'Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonisation in the 
European Communities' (pp.-t96-520) World Politics \01.27, 11.)75. 
EU policy is supposed to be implemented.·n Faced with pressure 
from above (EU) and below (domestic constituencies), Member 
States' governments tend to give way to domestic pressures. 
However, since most EU policies are legally binding, Member 
States will eventually follow their obligations. The European 
Commission recognises the dilemma faced by Member State 
governments and is aware of its own limited enforcement powers. 
It therefore takes a pragmatic position and is careful not to 
demand the 'impossible' from Member States. 
With his study on 'EC post-decisional politics', Puchala made a 
valuable contribution to the research of EU policy 
implementation. He pointed out the unique pressures and 
dilemmas associated with EU policies and the differences of 
interests and motivations depending on government levels and 
policy stages. A policy idea, feasible and attractive at the EU 
policy-making stage, may be unfeasible and unwelcome at the 
practical implementation level. In particular, EU environmental 
policies adopted at the EU level (for environmental and often 
economic 'level-playing-field' reasons) almost always involve costs 
at a later stage and are often perceived as unbearable burdens by 
domestic implementors. The discrepancy between EU policy 
objectives and domestic interests goes some way towards 
explaining the 'implementation gap'. Following Puchala's logic, the 
wider the gap between EU and domestic interests. the less likely it 
is that an EU policy is implemented properly. 
~, In a more recent study Lenearts even suggests that in the past ":--kll1ber 
States did not use the right of veto against legislation whose implementation 
wuuld in any event be weak and lightly monitored". (p,ss~·n Lenearts. Kllen 
'The Principle of Subsidiarity and the En\'ironment in the Ell KL'L'()ing the 
Balance of Federalism' (pp.~46-X95) Fordham Intern'ltional La\\' Journal 
\'01. 17. Part -1.. 1994, 
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However, Puchala's study represents a 'state-centrist' account of 
the EU post-decisional phase. It focuses on national governments 
and their 'sandwiched' position between ED policy obligations and 
domestic pressures as a whole. Puchala neglects variations of 
domestic pressures treating them as homogenous entities. 
Moreover, he is only interested in domestic pressures as they 
affect Member States' bargaining at the ED level. Puchala's 
'domestic' perspective therefore needs to be supplemented for this 
research. In fact, it could be argued that Puchala's approach does 
not provide for an accurate picture of EU (environmental) policy 
implementation because it runs the risk of ignoring those 
subnational variances which significantly shape EU policy 
implementation. 
Following a different approach, Siedentopf and Ziller edited a 
two-volume study in 1988 which lists the (then) twelve EC 
Member States and their implementation performances of 17 EC 
Directives. 44 Their twelve case studies represent the ftrst 
comprehensive attempt to describe, compare and assess ED 
policy implementation results and problems. However, the authors 
of the case studies did not conduct their research in a comparable 
pattern and their investigative structures and approaches differed 
depending on their personal preferences. Nevertheless each 
contribution provides insights into the practice of ED policy 
implementation. For instance, in their case study on Germany, Pag 
and Wessels include an ED-speciftc criterion which cannot be 
H Siedentopf, Heinrich; Ziller, Jacques (eds) Making European Policies work. 
The Implementation of Community Legislation in the I\kmhl?r St~ltl·-;. S.l~I? 
London 1988. The 17 Directives selected for the case studies ran~I?J trom a 
Electrical Equipment Directi\t~ (761117/EEC) to a Company .\l·counh 
Di recti VI? (7S/660/[ I :C). 
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found in other policy systems.45 The criterion "general integration 
attitudes" refers to implementors' attitudes towards the EU which 
can vary over time depending on political and economic 
circumstances. Pag and Wessels' criterion is important because 
favourable attitudes towards the EU can facilitate the 
implementation of EU policies, while critical attitudes can hinder 
the implementation of EU policies. In either case, 'EU integration 
attitudes' influence the process of EU environmental policy 
implementation. 
From a more legalistic perspective, Kramer highlighted the gap 
between EU environmental legislation and Member States' non-
compliance which he considered as more alarming in the 
environmental policy area than in any other policy area. 46 Kramer 
did not formulate an analytical concept which explains the 
alarming gap. Instead, he identified areas of non-compliance, 
differences in formal and practical implementation among the 
Member States, and their limited commitment m EU 
environmental policy obligations. Kramer does not establish a 
conceptual framework but his first-hand insights nevertheless 
stress the importance to further investigate (and solve) the 
problems of EU environmental policy implementation. 
From a more comparative angle, Butt Philip investigated the 
EU environmental and social policy areas.-l7 In comparison with 
.15 Pag, Sabine; Wessels, Wolfgang 'Federal Republic of Germany' (pp.16S-
229) in Siedentopf and Ziller. 
.j() Kramer, Ludwig Focus on European Environmental Law Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1992 and 1997. Kramer, Ludwig The Implementation of 
Community Environmental Directi\'t:~s \\ithin f-,kmber States: Some 
Implications of the Direct Effect Doctrine' (pp.':N-S6) Journal ot 
Elwironmental Law vo!.3, No. I. 1991. 
-17 Butt Philip. Alan Regulating the Sin~k f-,Ltrket: :\ Comparison of the 
Implementation of Social and Environmental Legislation Research Paper 
the EU social policy area, Butt Philip pointed out that the increase 
in complaints concerning environmental policy non-compliance 
had been "spectacular". He blamed inadequate consultation, 
deliberate ambiguities in legal texts, inconsistencies in policy 
objectives, lack in administrative and fmancial resources, and the 
ineffectiveness of existing penalties for inadequate policy 
implementation. Similar to Kramer's studies, Butt Philip's 
comparison emphasises that the implementation (and compliance) 
of EU environmental policies is more complex and problematic 
than other EU policy areas and therefore deserves particular 
research attention. 
Finally, Collins and Earnshaw presented the flaws in EU 
environmental policy implementation across Member States and 
across three broad implementation stages.48 They identified five 
main reasons for the Member States' poor environmental policy 
implementation results: the complexity of the transposition 
process from the EC level to the national level~ misinterpretations 
of legal texts~ structural obstacles~ legislative cultures which may 
be incompatible with EU legislation~ and political considerations 
which may have a hindering impact on the EU legislation. Again, 
Collins and Earnshaw did not establish a conceptual basis tailored 
for this research area. Instead their investigation relies upon the 
analytical approaches of other analysts, in particular Pressman and 
Wildavsky. 
1994. 
48 Collins, Ken; Earnshaw, David 'The Implementation and Enforcement of 
European Community En "ironment Legislation' (pp.213-2-N) En \iron mental 
Politics vo!.l, No...1-, Winter 1992. Implementation stages: Fir"t -
transposition of EU legislation into national law: second - practical result-; 
and impaLts: third - enforcement and monitoring of legislative obligation" 
All of the above studies are relevant and contribute to a better 
understanding of the processes and problems of ED 
environmental policy implementation. However, they do not fully 
cover and conceptualise the research matter. Referring to the 
great difficulties in grasping the EU and its policy process, 
Schumann once commented that "it is necessary to embrace the 
whole elephant".49 In the EU environmental policy area, the beast 
appears to be even more difficult to embrace. The following 
outline is an attempt to do just that by providing an analytical 
framework which synthesises and enhances existing studies. 
1<) Schumann, Wolfganl~ 'EG-Forschung unJ Policy-Analy"c Zur 
Notwendigkeit, Jen ga~ze~ Elefanten zu erfasscn,' (pp,232-2)7) P\lliti",-'!1,-' 
Vierteljahresschrift 32.Jahrgang, Heft 2. 1991, 
---+ 
2.7 Drawing-up a Multi-layered Implementation J\lIap 
The following 'multi-layered implementat ion' map capture. the 
complex EU environmental policy process. 
Figure 2.1: Multi-layered Implementation Map 
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In essence, the map describes the implementation of EU 
environmental policies as a 'filtering' process. Policies are not 
translated directly but 'filtered' through unique political systems, 
or 'layers'. In contrast to other multi-level governance studies 
which focus on the inter-active dynamism between government 
levels and their actors, this map highlights and distinguishes 
between three government 'layers' - the EU, national and 
subnational layers. The layers feature their own mixes of formal 
and informal determinants which either facilitate or hinder EU 
environmental policies reaching their implementation 'targets'. 
The map fulfills essentially three purposes: it guides the 
investigation through the EU environmental policy process and 
provides a comparative framework; it accommodates relevant 
aspects of the process and highlights key determinants; and it 
provides a template for further investigations of EU policy 
implementation problems. The map does not suggest a new 
challenging theory for the discipline which predicts future policy 
outcomes. Rather, by way of focusing on government levels and 
identifying and sorting implementation determinants, the map 
captures the details of the EU environmental policy process while 
at the same time not losing sight of the whole context. Finally, 
with the help of the map, researchers can identify weaknesses in 
the policy process and draw-up lists of 'worst scenario' and 'ideal 
scenario' determinants which help predict implementation 
outcomes. 
The Layers 
Similar to multi-level governance studies by researchers such a" 
Marks, Hooghc and Scharpf, the map distinguishes betwcen 
cssentially threc go\'crnment levcls, Ho\\'c\'cr, in contrast to the 
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conventional multi-level governance perspective which focuses on 
the complex inter-relationships between actors from different 
government levels, this research looks at three political arenas _ 
the EU, the Member States, and the subnational regions - and 
their involvement in (and influence on) the filtering process. In 
this context, the term layers is particularly useful because it 
accentuates the process of 'filtering' policies as well as the inter-
connectedness (or 'overlap') of EU, national and subnational 
competencies and structures. 50 
Subnational regions are part of wider national state systems and 
are influenced by national conditions. Yet, while both national and 
subnational layers are to a certain extent inter-connected and 
feature some similarities m the implementation of EU 
environmental policies, they also feature different conditions 
which shape EU environmental policies accordingly. The 
distinction between layers is therefore important for a refmed 
study of EU environmental policy implementation which generally 
involves actors at both national and subnational levels. In this 
context, the map clearly departs from Puchala's 'domestic' variable 
by distinguishing between national and subnational layers and 
investigating both layers separately. Studying domestic conditions 
as a homogeneous whole neglects and underestimates those 
subnational determinants (geographical, cultural, constitutional 
50 'Concentric circles' were considered as an aIternati \'e to the term 'I ayers'. 
However, since the central theme of this research is the filtering process and 
the distinction between national and subnational implementation 
performances, overlapping layers are more suitable as an illustration of 
government le\'t~ls. In the same context, the author prefers the multi-k\'el 
governance description of political arenas being 'inter-connected' rather than 
'nested'. Marks et al make the distinction in 'European [ntegration from the 
1980s: State-Centric \. f\lulti-k\cl Gmernance' (pp.J-lI-J7X) Juurnal ()r 
Common Market Studies \'0\.3-l. No.3, September 1996. 
etc.) which have an impact on EU environmental policy 
outcomes. Moreover, subnational actors process EU 
environmental policies within their own systems and in their own 
way which may well differ from national practices. The domestic 
perspective would therefore not provide an adequate picture of 
the EU environmental policy 'reality'. 
Strictly speaking, there are government levels below the 
subnationallevel (i.e. regional, local levels). The composition and 
structures of government levels inside the subnational layers 
depend upon the regions themselves and their constitutional 
settings. 51 Subdividing the subnational layer into further layers 
would refme even more the research picture of EU environmental 
policy implementation. However, the purpose of this research is 
to highlight the importance to move 'beyond' the national (or 
domestic) level when investigating EU environmental policy 
implementation and to provide a template for further 
investigation. Expanding the 'multi-layered implementation' map 
to add more layers to the investigation was therefore considered 
unnecessary. 
The Arrows 
EU environmental policies are not static phenomena: they are 
developed, negotiated and adopted, and later reqUlre 
implementation (and enforcement) at either the national level or 
subnational level. Focusing on policy-making factors, the map 
distinguishes between 'external factors' arrows and 'feed back' 
arrows. Firstly, EU environmental policy-making is int1uenced by 
external factors in the form of international pressures (for 
'il Chapters.') ;Illd 6 describe in detail the political-adlllinistratin' "tructurcs 
insilk the Sl'Ottish and Ba\arian layers. 
instance, commitments to UNCED, global environmental 
problems, and international economic agreements) and pressing 
environmental issues such as pollution incidents and problems of 
long-term environmental deterioration. These factors occur 
sporadically and can have an indirect impact on EU environmental 
policy-making. EU environmental policy-making is influenced 
more frequently by the feed-back from actors at the national and 
subnational government levels. From the national level central 
government ministers (in the Council of Ministers), COREPER 
officials, national experts and advisors as well as 'nation-wide' 
interest groups seek to influence EU environmental policy-
making. In addition, subnational politicians, administrators, 
experts and regional or local interest groups seek to channel their 
views on EU environmental policies to the national and EU 
levels. 52 EU institutions themselves (i.e. Council, EP, 
Commission, EEA, EcoSoc, CoR, to a certain extent ECl) 
contribute to the form and content of EU environmental policies. 
All these forces (some are more influential than others) contribute 
towards a complex, and often cumbersome, EU policy-making 
process and influence the form and content of the policies 
themselves. 53 
It is important to consider the complexity of the early stages of 
the EU environmental policy process when studying policy 
implementation and policy outcomes. Conditions which contribute 
towards the adoption of EU environmental policies vary: the 
51 Depending on the Member State and depending on the policy issue, some 
subnational representatives can participate in the Council of Ministers. 
5.' For a detailed Lll'l'ount of the EU policy-making procedures. see ':\ppendix 
2: An Introduction to the EU, its Institutions. Policy-Making Procedures, and 
Lcgi sl at i Oil'. 
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Council in particular, adopts policies either because Council 
ministers support the policy objectives, because ministers accept 
them in order to pursue other policy goals, or because they hope 
to ignore them at the later implementation stage (the latter option 
is known as the 'second veto,54). Implementors observe the 
process of policy adoption and act accordingly; their commitment 
is influenced later by either the policy-makers' whole-hearted 
support or reluctance towards a policy. Whether or not their 
opinions and lessons from past implementation experiences are 
taken into account at a later policy-making stage (indicated with 
'feed-back' arrows) is also an important aspect for implementors 
and their commitment towards ED environmental policy 
objectives. The map acknowledges the complex relationship 
between ED policy-making factors and the dynamism of ED 
bargaining on the one hand and ED policy implementation 
circumstances on the other. 55 
Focusing on the latter stages of the process, the map describes 
the implementation of ED environmental policies as a 'filtering' 
process through the national and subnationallayers. The majority 
of ED environmental policies concern areas which predominantly 
touch upon subnational competencies (for instance planning, 
water and waste management) and therefore requITe 
implementation and compliance at the subnationallevel. Other EU 
environmental policies concern the national level only. The map 
S~ See in particular Puchala, Donald 'Domestic Politics and Regional 
Harmonisation in the European Communities' (pp.496-520) World Politics 
\'01.27, 1975. 
55 The dYI1all1il' relationship between government le\'cls and policy proce'-,ses 
is deslTibed by Weale as a system of European .::()\,ernance in 'FIl\'ironmental 
rules and rule-makin.:: in the European Union' (pp,594-611 ) Journal of 
European Public Polin vol.J. NO.4. December 1996. 
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therefore distinguishes between fIltering arrows pointing towards 
national and subnational layers. Since there are more El' 
environmental policies which require implementation on the 
subnational (and even local) ground, fIltering arrows pointing 
towards subnationallayers should outnumber the national fIltering 
arrows. For the sake of simplicity, however, each implementation 
process is indicated in the map with one arrow only. 
In order to reach the subnational ground, EU environmental 
policies generally have to be fIltered through the national layer 
which, to a certain extent, pre-shapes the policies. However, most 
of the formal transposition (i.e. adjustments of the legal 
framework to accommodate EU Regulations and Directives) and 
practical implementation (i.e. application in practice of EU 
policies' standards and objectives) are conducted within the 
subnationallayer. It is therefore important to study the influence 
of the national layer but pay particular attention to the subnational 
layer and its influence on EU environmental policy outcomes. 
Policy Statements and their Targets 
As is typical for a more traditional implementation study, the 
map highlights 'policy statements' and their 'targets'. In contrast 
to mere statements of political opinions (or 'standpoints', see 
Pressman and Wildavsky), EU environmental policy statements 
combine and accommodate a wide range of interests and 
objectives which require realisation at a later stage. ELl 
environmental policy statements (i.e.Regulations and Directi\'l's) 
are legally binding and should therefore be implemented hy thc 
Member States and their subnational regions. HOWe\'LT. whilc 
Directives (which constitute the majority of Ell cll\'ironmcntal 
policies) outline legally hinding policy ohjective,-, thcy gcnerally 
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leave the ways and means to the Member States and their national 
and subnational implementors. Directives are therefore 
comparable with the above described 'Wilsonian' statutes which 
involve a complex sharing of discretionary powers between 
policy-makers and implementors. This sharing of powers often 
results in policy outcomes which do not resemble the original 
policy objectives as outlined in the statutes (see x in map). 
Given the complexity of powers and interests, EU 
environmental policy objectives or 'targets' (X) are either reached, 
are missed by national and subnational implementors, or EU 
environmental policies result in unexpected and unintended policy 
outcomes.56 In the light of three government layers involved in the 
-EU environmental policy process and the potential obstacles for 
environmental policy objectives from other policy areas and 
interests, the majority of EU environmental policies are most 
likely to 'get stuck' in the fIltering process falling short of the 
policy target 'X'. Or EU environmental policies take shape 
different from their objectives stated on paper (see x). In the latter 
case, EU environmental policies fall short of target 'X' as well. 
Formal and Informal Determinants 
The map identifies determinants which shape EU environmental 
policy outcomes.57 Ultimately, these determinants can facilitate, 
divert or prevent EU environmental policies in reaching their 
targets. The map distinguishes between formal and informal 
56 The 'targets' resemble Pressman and Wildavsky's 'end points' which haw to 
be reached in order for a policy to be effective_ 
57 The author considered other terms such as 'attributes' or "ariable< as 
alternatives to 'determinants' but decided that determinants he"t capture the 
intended description of key factors which shape EU environmenul poliC) 
implementation one \\ay or another. 
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determinants which can be found in 'unique' combinations in each 
layer. In order to gain a structured overview, the map isolates 
seven categories of determinants: 
Formal determinants: 
* constitutional settings; 
* political-administrative structures and resources· 
. ' 
* legal systems and instruments. 
Informal determinants: 
* relationships between actors; 
* attitudes towards environmental protection and the EU; 
* policy-makers' priorities and strategies; 
* policy styles and practices. 
The determinant categories best encompass the research matter: 
they take account of the different government levels (or political 
arenas) involved in the EU environmental policy process and 
accommodate the complex environmental policy dimension which 
tends to involve a multitude of policy areas, interests and 
competencies. The determinants also allow the researcher to 
investigate EU environmental policy implementation from a 
micro-perspective (for instance, the researcher can focus on the 
details of formal transposition of EU environmental policies into 
national and subnational legal systems), while assessing the 
overall and combined impact of all determinants on EU 
environmental policy implementation from a macro-level. 
When EU environmental policies are filtered through the layers, 
they are either blocked by formal and informal determinants, 
facilitated by favourable determinants, or their content and 
objectives are altered by determinants on the ground (scc 
Argument 1). Similar to existing 'ideal implementation scenario' 
check lists (see in particular Sabatier and !\lazmanianL the map 
can be Llsed to assess whcther determinants in the nat ional and 
subnational layers are favourable or unfavourable. Again, by 
following the map, the researcher can investigate details of the 
implementation process while taking account of the process as a 
whole. 
Considering the multitude and complexity of government layers 
and the complexity of environmental issues and their policy 
solutions, determinants which influence EU environmental 
policies during the fIltering process are expected to be more 
diverse and numerous than in other policy areas. Certain formal 
and informal determinants stand out in the EU environmental 
policy process. In the formal determinant category, the 
compatibility of EU legal instruments vis-a-vis national and 
subnational legal systems and administrative structures plays a 
signifIcant role in the success of EU environmental objectives. If 
the form or content of an EU legislation is incompatible with 
national and subnational structures and legal frameworks, the 
transposition of EU environmental policy objectives is likely to 
fail. In turn, if the form or content of an EU policy is compatible 
with national and subnational formal conditions, the EU 
environmental policy is likely to succeed unless there are major 
informal obstacles in the form of hostile relationships between 
actors58 and conflicting policy priorities which prevent the policy 
from being implemented. 
Focusing on informal determinants, both attitudes towards the 
EU and the relationships between EU and national! subnational 
actors can have an impact on EU environmental policy 
implementation. Past implementation studies (such as Pag: and 
5K Thompson argues above thJt relationships between policy-maker" and 
impknwntors playa lkcisi\'e rok in the success of policies 
Wessels' case study mentioned above) have shown that amono 
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other factors, the success of EU policies has depended very much 
upon implementors' attitudes towards the EU and its 'legitimacy' 
to produce common policies. National and subnational 
implementors have also been influenced by their formal links and 
informal relationships with EU actors. Both aspects should 
therefore be taken into account when exploring EU environmental 
policy implementation. 
Another important informal determinant concerns the 
prioritisation of economic interests. Economic considerations still 
play a significant role for actors during environmental policy 
processes (see Offe's argument). In the context of EU 
environmental policies, the economic imperative is particularly 
relevant. During EU environmental policy-making, economic 
considerations either hinder the adoption of 'costly' environmental 
policies, or they motivate the adoption of harmonised 
environmental standards for the sake of an economic 'level-
playing-field'. At the implementation stage, econonuc 
considerations take a different shape: in many cases, the economic 
motivation to harmonise environmental standards in the EU 
diminishes in the light of implementors' (self-) interest to protect 
national and subnational economies. Unless EU environmental 
policies are convenient and complementary to economic priorities 
within the national and subnational layers. economlC 
considerations can become obstacles in the implementation path 
of EU environmental objectives. In any case, economic 
considerations play a vital role in the pursuance of EU 
cnvironmental policies. They either complement and support 
c\1\'ironmcntal objectivcs or do not touch upon el1\'ironmclltal 
objectives. In both cases EU environmental policies can be 
implemented without problems. Economic considerations can also 
clash with environmental objectives. In the latter case, EU 
environmental policies are likely to fail on the ground. By and 
large, economic incentives and 'trade-offs' between EU policy-
makers (especially in the Council of Ministers) which result in the 
adoption of many EU environmental policies are almost absent in 
the minds of implementors at a later stage with the result that EU 
environmental policies often do not receive the necessary backing 
on the ground. 
Comparing Implementation Experiences 
A political analyst once commented that "a person who knows 
only one country basically knows no country well". 59 The same 
rule applies to the study of EU Member States and their 
subnational regions. The map provides for a systematic 
comparison of implementation performances at both national (UK 
and FRG) and subnational (Scotland and Bavaria) levels. A 
thorough investigation and comparison of both national and 
subnational layers is necessary in order to gain a comprehensive 
picture on the overall process of EU environmental policies. The 
map guides the reader: it helps establish the differences and 
similarities between the UK and the FRG first before attending to 
the similarities and differences between Scotland and Bavaria. It 
also compares the subnational regions with their 'mother' states. 
This two-dimensional assessment not only promises to unco\'cr a 
wide range of determinants which decisively shape the 
~9 Lipset, Seymour Martin 'Binary Comparisons. :\merican Exceptional ism -
Japanese Uniqueness' (pp.15)-212) D(l~al1. Mattei; Kazancigil. :\li (cds) 
Comparing Nations, Concepts, Strategies, Suhstance Blackwell. (hford ll)l)--l. 
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implementation of ED environmental policies, it also contrasts 
divergencies between the layers under investigation. 
Possible Caveats and Limitations of the Map 
The map does not establish a new theory or blueprint for 
predicting future policy outcomes. It does not establish a causal 
link between policy statement and target, neither does it predict 
and quantify the effectiveness of ED environmental policies. The 
map is a guiding tool which helps investigate the complexity of 
the filtering process and identify obstacles which hinder the 
implementation of EU environmental policies in the layers. 
Similarly, with the help of the determinant categories, researchers 
can draw-up a list of 'ideal scenario' factors which facilitate the 
implementation of EU environmental policies. 
The map resembles what some researchers would call a 
'traditional' top-down approach towards EU environmental 
policy implementation whereby political outcomes different from 
the original policy objective are seen as negative outcomes or 
failures. True, this research investigates critically the 
shortcomings of EU environmental policy implementation and 
highlights problems and obstacles during the process. Yet, it does 
not point the fmger at one particular government level or one 
particular group of actors. Instead, it aims to contribute towards a 
better understanding of the whole EU environmental policy 
process and the problems associated with implementation. While 
the map resembles a top-down investigation, it nevertheless 
makes some allowance for a more dynamic policy approach by 
includino feed-back arrows and other (external) arrows which 
C' 
influence EU environmental policy as a whole. 
There are some aspects which the map cannot possibly include 
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without causing confusion. Firstly, the map does not describe in 
detail the policy-making procedures that take place within the 
layers. The map is intended to focus mainly on the latter stages of 
the policy process (i.e. policy implementation). It therefore 
includes only policy-making arrows (i.e. external factors and feed-
back arrows) which help explain the style and content of EU 
environmental policies as well as their subsequent implementation. 
Similarly, the map does not highlight the Commission as a typical 
'policy broker' (see Sabatier) and representative of the 'political-
administrative subsystem' (see Offe) during policy formulation. 
The Commission plays a vital role during policy-making process. 
However, when it comes to the implementation of most EU 
environmental policies, the Commission plays a predominantly 
guardian function. It is therefore sufficient to recognise indirectly 
the role of the Commission as part of the EU institutions 
(indicated inside the EU layer) and as a facilitator (or obstacle) 
when investigating the filtering process. The ECl, too, IS not 
highlighted in the map although it plays a central role ill the 
interpretation and enforcement of EU environmental legislation. 
However, in the context of 'filtering' EU environmental policies, 
it is not directly involved in the actual process. It is therefore 
sufficient to acknowledge the ECl as part of the EU institutions 
box and refer to it whenever implementors in the national and 
subnationallayers are affected by its judgments. 
The map does not distinguish between different types of EU 
legal instruments or 'policy statements'. While the form and 
content of legal instruments constitute important factors in the 
'-' 
implementation of policy objecti\'l~s (see Berman, Ingram and 
Schneider), the instruments' categorisation would make the map 
less intelligible. Since the mam focus of this research is the 
fIltering process through government layers, it was decided not to 
include statute categories in the map. 
Finally, the layers themselves are featured in the map as identical 
in terms of shape and size. This does not reflect the differences 
and similarities of the two Member States and their subnational 
regions under investigation. Indeed, focusing on the subnational 
regions, Bavaria and Scotland differ in many respects. They 
provide a stark contrast in terms of their embeddedness in two 
opposite state systems: Scotland is part of a centralised state 
system while Bavaria is part of a federal state system. Bavaria and 
Scotland also feature differences in the way their political-
administrative actors and citizens perceive (and deal with) 
environmental matters and policies. In addition, Scotland and 
Bavaria differ in geographical terms: Scotland represents a 
peripheral region of the EU with its own unique characteristics 
and problems (such as diffIculties in accessing EU markets), 
Bavaria is situated more or less in the centre of Europe coping 
with economic and other pressures from Central and Eastern 
Europe. On the other hand, Scotland and Bavaria feature certain 
similarities such as a strong territorial identity, relatively large 
natural resources (which are of EU significance), as well as 
expanding high technology industries. Obviously, the map's 
uniform layers do not describe the subnational regions fully. 
However, for the purpose of comparative analysis (which can be 
applied to other EU subnational regions), it is sufficient to arrange 
the layers in a simplified and systematic manner. 
On a similar note, the regions feature gO\'l~rnment le\l'ls hclo\\" 
which are structured ditTerently depending on tlll'ir constitutional 
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and political-administrative settings. The map could therefore 
include more layers to take account of the variances inside the 
subnational regions. However, it would be difficult to determine 
exactly how many 'sub-subnational' layers should be added to the 
map. Moreover, the main purpose of this research is to move 
beyond the national government level when investigating EU 
environmental policy implementation. The multi-layered 
implementation map as it stands should therefore provide 
adequate guidance for the researcher. 
The above synthesis of analytical approaches has already 
suggested that the scenario for the implementation of EU 
environmental policies is far from ideal. The map seeks to 
combine all relevant aspects which shape EU environmental 
policy implementation into one comprehensive framework. Its 
strength lies in its potential to guide investigations on EU 
environmental policy implementation at both macro and micro 
levels. It distinguishes between national and subnational arenas 
(i.e. layers) and puts order into the complex mix of formal and 
informal factors (i.e. determinants) that shape EU environmental 
policies in the process. With the help of the map, the following 
Chapters will address the implementation deficit in the EU 
environmental policy area by examining step by step the EU, the 
national and the subnationallayers. The Chapters will identify and 
highlight the layers' key determinants and will assess to what 
extent national and particularly subnational layers influence the 
success, or failure, of EU environmental policies. 
Chapter 3 
Environmental Politics and Policy in the EU 
3.1 Introduction 
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The following Chapter focuses on the fIrst layer of the EG 
environmental policy process. In order to gain a comprehensive 
picture, the Chapter starts with an analysis of the EU policy-
making process before investigating EU environmental policy 
objectives and their implementation problems. The Chapter 
describes EU policy-making as an enormously complex process 
which has been influenced by a multitude of actors with varying 
interests and which has cuhninated in a broad EU environmental 
. policy containing some vague environmental policy compromises 
but also some substantial and ambitious environmental objectives. 
The EU has produced an impressive range of EU environmental 
policies, yet many policies have failed on the implementation 
ground. The Chapter addresses the apparent implementation 
defIcit and investigates the imbalance between EU environmental 
policy Cover-I) production on the one hand and national and 
subnational implementation shortfalls on the other. The multi-
layered implementation map helps identify the key problems in 
implementing EU environmental policies: EU environmental 
policies often fail their targets because their legal instruments have 
limited direct binding force on implementors; their ftltering 
process is enormously complex and implementation links between 
the layers are weak; and [mally the layers and their political-
administrative systems are diverse, complex and feature formal 
and informal deternlinants which are often incompatible with EU 
environmental policies. 
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3.2 The Complexity of EU Environmental Policy-Making 
EU environmental policies derive from a particularly complex 
policy-making process. l EU environmental policy-making 
involves not only EU institutions,2 but also national, subnationaL 
and even international actors who seek to influence the form and 
content of EU environmental policies (see 'feed-back' and 
'external factors' arrows in figure 3.1 below).3 During the process, 
bargaining not only exists between government layers (vertically) 
but also within government layers (horizontally, cross-sectoral). 
In addition, institutions themselves have to come up with 
decisions which may have caused internal conflicts previously.'+ 
In general, the Commission initiates an environmental policy as 
a response to informal pressures, i.e. demands from both 
environmentalists and representatives of economic level-playing-
field considerations. Issued with information from the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) and lobbied by a vast variety of 
national and subnational institutions, interest groups and 'experts', 
the Commission prepares a policy draft which is then referred to 
the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP) for 
1 For further information on key EU actors, processes and legislation see 
'Appendix 2: An Introduction to the EU, its Institutions, Policy-making 
Procedures and Legislation'. 
2 The primary policy-making EU institutions include the Commission, the 
Council of Ministers, the European Parliament (EP), the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) and the Economic and Social Committee (EcoSoc). 
J At the international level, the UNCED Conference in Rio (1992), for 
instance, had a considerable impact on the EU environmental policy. See 
Liberatore, A. 'Problems of transnational policymaking: Environmental 
policy in the EC' (pp.281-305) European Journal of Political Research No.19, 
1991 . 
.j For instance. differences in views often exist between Commission DG Xl 
(environment) and other DGs such as DG VII (transport). The same rule 
applies to single departments: even within Commission DG Xl opinions and 
priorities can clash. 
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consideration and decision-making. In addition, the Economic and 
Social Committee (EcoSoc) and the Committee of the Regions 
(CoR) are consulted whenever proposals affect their policy 
spheres. Depending on Member States' political and constitutional 
backgrounds, subnational representations formally participate in 
the EU environmental policy 'bargaining', toO.5 EU environmental 
policy proposals have been adopted through either the 
consultation and co-operation procedures (where the Council 
plays the key legislative role), or through the co-decision 
procedure (where the Council and the EP share legislative 
powers). The choice of procedures has depended on the nature 
and importance of environmental issues. The Amsterdam Treaty 
(to be ratified by Spring 1999) envisages a more simplified system 
of decision-making: the co-operation procedure will be replaced 
by the co-decision procedure which will be used for most EU 
environmental pOlicies.6 
Throughout the process, politicians, administrators, experts, 
environmentalists and representatives of the farming and industrial 
sectors seek to influence the final policy version to suit their 
particular views and interests. Actors involved in the process 
pursue economic, environmental or political-strategic interests, 
and are influenced by events such as pollution incidents or 
economic crises. Considering the multitude of actors and their 
5 Michael Keating and Liesbet Hooghe provide detailed information on 
subnational participation in EU policy-making and distinguish between 
various forms of regional influence in 'By-passing the nation state? Regions 
and the EU policy process' (pp.216-229) in Richardson, Jeremy (ed) 
European Union Power and Policy-making Routledge. London 1996. 
6 For a detailed account of the EU policy-making procedures see 'Appendix 2: 
An Introduction on the EU, its Institutions. Policy-i'-laking Procedures. and 
Legislation'. 
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backgrounds as well as the variety and inter-connectedness of 
interests, EU environmental policy-making can either giYe way to 
a comparatively strong force in the bargaining process (e. g. a 
Member State or an EU institution) 7, or it results in a balance 
between conflicting sides and compromise solutions. In the latter 
case, the balancing act often leads to vague policy commitments 
which ultimately disappoint the majority of actors.!' Put simply, 
environmental policy compromises are generally perceived as too 
stringent by business representatives, while the same policies are 
considered inadequate by environmental campaigners. 
The search for environmental policy solutions IS further 
complicated by the fact that the EU is equally committed towards 
common policy areas such as transport, trade and energy which 
often compete with environmental objectives. Moreover, the EU 
established the principle of environmental policy 'integration' 
which implies, for instance, that a policy generating industrial 
production cannot be processed without taking into account 
aspects such as pollution, land use and energy efficiency. By the 
same token, environmental policy 'integration' also implies that 
environmental measures quantifying upper limits for pollutants 
cannot be set without taking account of the economic costs . 
. Formulating an environmental policy proposal for consideration is 
therefore a delicate task for all actors involved. 
Having negotiated an EU environmental policy with the EP, 
7 For instance, the FRG was the driving force behind the adoption of the EC 
Directive regulating emissions from large combustion plants. For more 
detailed information see Bohmer-Christiansen, Sonja; Skca, Jim Acid 
Politics: Environment and Engergy Policies in Britain and Germany 
Belhaven Press, London 1991. 
8 The exception, perhaps, is the Commission which mediates bet wcen 
di\'crgint! interests and tends to consider any compromise a succcss 
7..+ 
Council Ministers adopt a policy for a variety of reasons. They 
either fully support the environmental policy as it stands. they 
accept the policy in order to pursue other priorities in a policy 
'package', or they accept the policy knowing that certain 
obligations can be avoided at a later stage. Individual Council 
Ministers may also be outvoted by their colleagues following a 
qualified majority voting procedure. 9 Policy decisions are 
therefore influenced by informal political-strategic calculations 
and formal procedures which are relevant at the time of 
negotiation and may have a significant impact at a later 
implementation stage. 
The adoption of the EIA Directive lO and the preparations for its 
successors (Directive 971l1IEC amending the EIA Directive; the 
SEA Directive ll ) exemplify the continuing battle to find policy 
solutions. The EIA Directive was intended to harmonise and 
strengthen environmental standards in planning, a policy area 
which had previously been an exclusive domain of national and 
subnational actors. It took EU policy-makers ten years of intense 
discussion and considerable opposition from some Member States 
before the policy could be adopted. The UK Government saw the 
Directive as further 'red tape' preventing economic development, 
while the Danish Government was concerned about the transfer of 
their strict planning regulation powers to the European level. The 
9 Votes are allocated as follows: FRG, UK, France and Italy 10 each; Spain 8; 
the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, PortugaIS each; Sweden and Austria ..+ 
each; Denmark, Finland and Ireland 3; Luxembourg 2. Total number of votes 
87, 62 votes required for qualified majority. 
10 Council Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment (85/337/EEC). The EIA Directive is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
11 Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive. 
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EIA version, fmally adopted in 1985, did not resemble the earlier 
policy draft which suggested more radical EIA measures. Instead, 
the Directive included a number of discretionary elements which 
provided the Member States and their implementors with 
convenient planning policy loopholes. 12 Similarly, the 1997 
amendment of the EIA Directive, forwarded by the Commission, 
met with considerable resistance, particularly from the FRG 
Minister for the Environment who rejected the policy proposal on 
the grounds that the new policy would have an 'inflationary' (and 
therefore counterproductive) impact on the original objective of 
the policy. 13 In the meantime, the EP expressed its disappointment 
that the new policy was not 'inflationary' enough - it did not 
comprise all the measures suggested by the EP. The SEA 
Directive has faced problems, too. In the latter case, subnational 
representatives stood at the forefront of opposition: in June 1997 
the FRG Lander (through the B undesrat) asked the Federal 
Government to reject the proposal. The Lander expressed 
concerns over accommodating the SEA policy into their existing 
legal-administrative systems and questioned the necessity to adopt 
a common SEA policy.14 While the Commission and many EIA 
experts (i.e. planning officials and analysts) have insisted on 
further harmonisation in this policy area (which includes strategic 
planning), Lander officials continue with their campaign against 
12 Christopher Wood describes the 'evolution of the Directive' ill 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review Longman, Essex 
1995. 
13 Minister Merkel explained her decision to oppose the amendment in a 
letter of 20. December 1995 sent to the Lander Ministries for the 
Environment. 
1-1 'Bundesrat lehnt UVP fur Plane und Programme ab' UVP-Gesellschalt 
(http://www.laum.uni-hannover.de/u \p/uvp-netzl). 
76 
the SEA Directive. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the FRO Lander will 
succeed with their campaign in a policy-making system which is 
so complex in terms of actors, government layers and interests. 
The above examples illustrate, however, the tensions during 
policy-making and the difficulties in reaching policy solutions 
acceptable for all actors. Despite these difficulties, the EU has 
managed to establish a common ground on which a variety of 
environmental policies have been developed. The following 
. Sections look at the evolution of the EU environmental policy in 
the treaties and Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs) and 
highlight the multitude and magnitude of policy 'obligations' for 
national and subnational implementors. The Sections investigate 
to what extent the concerns and problems of national and 
particularly subnational implementors are taken into account in 
the Treaties and EAPs. 
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Figure 3.1: The EU Layer and Environmental Policy 
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Formal Determinants: 
* EU setting and political-administrative I 
structures open and complex, involving 
multitude of actors representing various 
government levels and interests; 
complicated policy-making procedures. 
* Legal system and instruments include 
Treaties, EAPs and secondary legislation; 
most of environmental policies formulated 
as Directives which set out objectives but 
leave ways and means to Member States 
and their implementors. 
Informal Determinants: 
* Predominantly bargaining relationships 
during policy-making; actors pursue 
varying, often conflicting, interests (econ., 
pol-admin., environ.). 
* Attitudes towards environmental 
protection: perceived obligation and 
urgency to adopt common policies, 
harmonise standards for econ. and 
environ. reasons. 
* Policy priorities and strategies comprise 
some far-reaching objectives but also 
vague compromises to accommodate all 
interests; strategy initially state-centrist, 
later adjustments to take account of 
problems on the ground; recent policies 
focus on voluntary action, partnership and 
more flexible legal instruments. 
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3.3 The ED Environmental Policy in the Treaties 
The manner in which a common environmental policy was 
established in the EU layer confIrms the argument that a complex 
mix of determinants contributes to EU policy processes. 
Environmental considerations were not among the common policy 
priorities at the start of the European integration process, nor was 
the (then) EC the initiator of international co-operation in the 
environmental policy area. A signifIcant international event 
preceded the EC's adoption of the environmental issue: the UN 
Conference on the Environment in Stockholm of June 1972 
acknowledged the problems of pollution and their transboundary 
impacts. While the participants of the Stockholm Conference 
reinforced their sovereign right "to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental policies" as long as damage 
is not caused to other states,15 the conference, nevertheless, 
signaled a starting point in the international co-operation on 
environmental problems. EC Member States felt obliged to follow 
this high profile occasion (see external factor arrow in figure 3.1 
above). In addition, Member States' governments noticed that 
domestic pressures for environmental policies and legislation 
would lead to diverging environmental standards which in turn 
would have an impact on trade within the EC. As a consequence, 
the EC soon adopted an Environmental Action Programme (EAP) 
which outlined a considerable number of environmental policy 
objectives and slowly adapted the treaty framework to 
environmental policy demands. Subnational views were not 
directly involved in the initial stages, neither did EU policy-
l'i Haigh. Nigel EEC Environmental Policy and Britain An [,,":\\ and a 
Handbook 19~4 (p.6). 
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makers pay full attention to possible implementation problems on 
the ground. EC environmental policies were considered at that 
time as foreign policy matters which formed part of the 
harmonisation process of national standards. In other words, EC 
environmental policies were developed and processed in a strictly 
intergovernmental and state-centrist manner. This shortfall would 
later be reflected in many disappointing ECIEU environmental 
policy outcomes. 
It is striking how, in the years preceding the Single European 
. Act, EC Member State governments justified the adoption of 
common environmental policies without changing the actual 
treaty. The EC interpreted liberally a clause in the Rome Treaty 
Preamble which stated that the "essential objective" of the EC was 
to improve living and working conditions for the Member States' 
citizens. Without amending the treaty text, the EC gave "a gloss 
to the words of the Treaty and assume[d] that environmental 
policy was implicit" .16 Environmental legislation was processed 
under the economic provisions of Articles 100 and 235 RT17 
which ensure a well-functioning Common! Single Market. 
Applying Articles 100 and 235 RT, the objective was to 
16 Haigh (p.6). 
17 Article 100: The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, 
regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly 
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market. Article 235: If 
action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of 
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community 
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures. (Since Amsterdam 
Treaty Article 100 has been renumbered Article 94. See 'Appendix. 2: An 
Introduction to the EU, its Institutions, Policy-making Procedures, and 
Legislation' for a complete list ()f renumbered Articles mentioned in this 
thesis.) 
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coordinate and harmonise Member States' environmental 
standards and thereby avoid any distortions in the EC trade. This 
link between environmental measures and economic interests 
frequently resulted in rather curious legislative constructions. The 
Directive on the conservation of species of wild birds, for 
instance, was adopted under Common Market provisions. 18 
The Single European Act 
With the Single European Act (SEA), the (then) EC system was 
formally adjusted to allow for a legal basis for environmental 
policies under Articles 130R, 130S and 130T. Article 130R 
committed the EC and its Member States to the following 
objectives: to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the 
. environment, to contribute towards protecting the human health, 
and to ensure a prudent and rational utilisation of natural 
resources. In this context, the SEA did not mention subnational 
actors and their vital role in the pursuance of these environmental 
objectives. 
Environmental action was based on three principles - preventive 
action~ damage should be rectified at source~ and the 'polluter 
pays principle'. Further, the title stipulated that "environmental 
protection requirements shall be a component of the Community's 
other policies". In pursuing environmental policies, the EC should 
take into account - available scientific and technical data: 
environmental conditions ill the vanous regIOns of the 
Community~ costs and benefits of action\ non-action; and the 
economic and social development of the Community as a whole. 
Paragraph 5 of Article l30R called upon the EC and its t\ lember 
18 David Freestone 'Ee Environmental Policy and Law' 
Journal of Law and Society No.18( I), Spring 1991 (p.137). 
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States to co-operate internationally with third countries ill 
environmental matters. Article 130S identified the environment as 
a specific legislative area and specified that unanimity on 
environmental legislation was required in the Council of Ministers 
unless it was accepted that a 'qualified majority' was sufficient for 
decision-making. 
The SEA recognised diverse interests and conditions in the EC 
in two respects. Firstly, Article 130T allowed Member States to 
adopt more stringent protective measures as long as they were 
compatible with other objectives of the Treaty such as free and 
fair competition. Secondly, and more importantly, Paragraph 4 of 
Article 130R acknowledged the principle of subsidiarity and 
thereby distinguished between different government levels and 
their suitability for vanous environmental policy matters. 
However, the latter Paragraph fell short of specifying in detail the 
competencies for each government level (or layer). Moreover, it 
did not formally acknowledge the importance of the subnational 
level in the EC environmental policy process. In other words, 
whilst the SEA strengthened consistently the EC environmental 
remit, the important role of subnational regions in the overall 
process was not incorporated properly. 
The Treaty on European Union 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), or Maastricht Treaty, 
elaborated on the SEA provisions but also altered the overall 
environmental policy picture. It integrated the environment more 
strongly into the EU formal framework: Article 2 which outlined 
the basic principles of the EU now stressed the promotion of a 
"harn10nious and balanced development of econonuc acti\ities. 
sustainable and non- inflationary orowth c r~specting the 
environment" . 
01 ~') --
One TEU amendment was not directly related to environmental 
considerations but had implications for the EU environmental 
policy. Following increased pressures from several subnational 
governments in the Member States (in particular FRG Lander) 
and (for different reasons) the UK central government. the 
principle of subsidiarity was anchored more strongly into the 
overall treaty framework. The new Article A stated that decisions 
should be taken as "closely as possible to the citizen" and Article 
3B called upon the EU and the Member States to take decisions 
at the most appropriate government levels. 19 In the context of 
environmental policies, subsidiarity has spun off an ongoing 
debate on which government level is 'most appropriate' for 
decision-making in certain environmental policy (and related) 
areas. While subsidiarity has helped underline the importance of 
subnational participation in EU environmental politics, the 
provision did not resolve questions over competencies. Rather, it 
contributed towards greater divergencies of environmental policy 
commitment and performances. In fact, some Member State (and 
subnational) governments have pursued their stringent 
environmental measures, while others could justify their less 
stringent policies on the grounds of subsidiarity and diversity thus 
contributing to the overall implementation deficit in the EU 
19 Art.3B: The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the 
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
this Treaty. 
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environmental policy area. Detailed measures clarifying and 
regulating the principle of subsidiarity were missing from the 
TED. 
The TED's amended Article 130R expanded on key 
environmental objectives. The ED underlined its international 
commitment on environmental protection; reinforced the principle 
to aim at a high level of environmental standards; and integrated 
environmental considerations into other ED policy areas. Article 
130S also provided rather complicated policy-making guidelines 
which specified the different legislative procedures depending on 
the form and content of proposals. 20 Article 130S(4) placed the 
fmancial burden as well as the implementation of environmental 
policies on the Member States unless measures were specified as 
common projects. Article 130S did not address subnational actors 
who actually implement the bulk of ED environmental policies. 
Legally, Member State governments' were to ensure that the 
policies are implemented and complied with by actors within the 
subnational regions. The supervision of subnational regions and 
their responsibilities in the ED environmental policy process were 
not explicitly mentioned in the TED. 
Article 130S(5) indicated a major change m the EU 
environmental policy: if ED environmental measures imposed 
disproportionate fmancial costs on one of the less prosperous EU 
regions (i.e. regions below 75% of the ED GDP average), 
Member States concerned could either derogate from this 
20 Policy-making procedures are mentioned above. As a general rule, the 
more sensitive issues are (i.e. involving financial and economic sacrifices), 
the more difficult it is for the EP to influence the policy and the more difficult 
it is for the Council to reach a decision (in these cases unanimity is required). 
For a detailed description of the procedures see 'Appendix 2: An Introduction 
to the EU, its Institutions, Policy-making Procedures, and Legislation'. 
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measure or apply for fmancial help under the Cohesion Fund. The 
latter provision allowed for more flexibility and acknowledged 
implementation problems faced by poorer Member States. On the 
other hand, the provision represented a potential loophole for 
Member States reluctant to cover the economic costs of EU 
environmental policies. As a fmal provision, Article l30T 
confIrmed the right for individual Member States to adopt more 
stringent environmental measures as long as they were compatible 
with the Treaty. The Commission would have to be notified of 
these measures. 
The Amsterdam Treaty 
The Amsterdam Treaty (AT) of 1997 has made rrunor 
adjustments to the EU environmental policy. The Treaty formally 
acknowledges sustainable development as one of the EU's key 
principles in Article 1. The Treaty also formally recognises 
environmental policy 'integration': new Article 3C states that 
"[ e ]nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into 
the defmition and implementation of the Community policies and 
activities referred to in Article 3, in particular with a view to 
promoting sustainable development".21 Articles l30R, S, T have 
been renumbered into Articles 174, 175 and 176 respectively and 
most EU environmental policies are now processed under the co-
decision procedure. New Article 174 states that "harmonisation 
measures answering environmental protection requirements shall 
include, where appropriate, a safeguard clause allowing Member 
States to take provisional measures, for non-economic reasons, 
21 The objective of environmental integration was previously mentioneo in 
Art.130R(2). Since the new Art.3C covers 'integration', the Art.130R(2) 
'integration' clause is deleted from the Amsterdam Treaty. 
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subject to a Community inspection procedure". Obviously, the 
latter provision is a response to the criticism of EU 'over-
regulation' (or in German: '1Jberreguliertheit')22 and provides 
Member States and their implementors with more discretionary 
room to follow their EU environmental policy obligations. 
On a wider policy scale, a Protocol on the principles of 
subsidiarity and simplification addresses general problems of the 
. EU policy process. The new subsidiarity provision emphasises 
that only those policies are adopted at the EU level which are 
absolutely necessary. The protocol is intended to strengthen the 
legitimacy of EU policies and ultimately implementors' 
commitment towards EU policy objectives. Simplification of 
policy-making procedures and legislation should help EU citizens 
and implementors understand the EU policy process and thereby 
facilitate the implementation of EU policies. Apart from the 
protocol (which is formally separate from the main body of the 
Treaty), there are no other provisions in the AT which specifically 
deal with implementation problems of EU policies in general and 
EU environmental policy problems in particular. 23 
In sum, the EU has responded slowly to environmental 
problems, events and pressures (see 'feed-back' and 'external 
factors' arrows above) and has developed an environmental policy 
which now features some 'lowest-common-denominator' 
22 Among others Demmke describes the problem of 'Uberreguliertheit' in 
Verfahrungsrechtliche und administrative Aspekte der Umsetzung von EG-
Umweltpolitik European Institute of Public Administration, 30. May 1996. 
23 The other Treaty amendment concerns EU decision-making: Art. 130S 
specifies that decisions on Art.130R matters should be taken under the co-
decision procedure as outlined in Art.189B instead of the Art.189C co-
operation procedure. According to the consolidated \'t~rsion of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, Articles are re-numbered as follows: ex-Art. I J()R -
Art.17-l: ex-Art.130S - Art. 175; ex-Art.l30T - Art. 176. 
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compromises but also some far-reaching principles and policy 
objectives. Over the years, the Treaties have adjusted and refmed 
the ED environmental policy with sustainable development now 
playing a central role. At the same time, new measures introduced 
with the TED and the AT which allow for more flexibility and 
discretion have provided loopholes to avoid 'inconvenient' EU 
environmental standards. Both Treaties have briefly touched upon 
the Member States and regions' diversity (evident in the principle 
of subsidiarity and the right to adopt more stringent policies) and 
have recognised some of the difficulties in meeting EU 
environmental policy obligations (the Cohesion Fund and the 
principle of simplification are intended to improve policy 
implementation). But these measures have not tackled the gap 
between policy-making and implementation by matching 
environmental principles and objectives with more systematic and 
legally binding implementation mechanisms tailored for both 
national and subnational layers. Neither have they changed 
behavioural patterns and committed national and subnational 
actors more strongly to EU environmental objectives. 
If the Treaties themselves fail to address the problems of EU 
environmental policy implementation, perhaps ED Environmental 
Action Programmes (EAPs) compensate for this insufficiency. 
The following Section outlines the development of ECIEU 
environmental policy objectives as stated in the EAPs and 
assesses whether they address (and solve) implementation 
problems in the national and subnationallayers. 
3.4 EU Environmental Action Programmes -
Policy Priorities and Objectives 
EU cnvironmental policy priorities and strategies ha\·c bccn 
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stipulated in EAPs from the early 1970s onwards. Following the 
events of the UN Stockholm Conference in 1972, the fIrst EAP of 
1973 established for the fIrst time a common environmental policy 
basis and outlined the main objectives and principles which were 
re-confIrmed in subsequent EAPs and, indeed, in the Treaties. The 
objectives were - to prevent, reduce and as far as possible to 
eliminate pollution and nuisances; maintain a satisfactory 
ecological balance; ensure sound management of natural 
resources; improve the quality of life; and promote international 
co-operation. 24 
Environmental policies followed principles such as pollution 
prevention; the preservation of natural resources; the polluter 
pays principle; international commitments and responsibilities; 
environmental education and awareness; the acknowledgment of 
the diversity of pollution as well as geographical and other 
differences; and the possibility for individual Member States to 
adopt more stringent environmental policies. Depending on policy 
objective and type, some of the EAP's objectives were to be 
carried out at the EC level, while many others required 
implementation within the 'domestic' boundaries of the Member 
States. Member State governments were required to supervise the 
policies' execution within their boundaries, while the Council 
further coordinated and harmonised national policies. The 
Commission was responsible for monitoring EAP compliance and 
for initiating further policy proposals. 
The fIrst EAP clearly focused on the intergovernmental 
2-1 The first EAP was presented by the European Commission in 1973 and 
received strong support from the Council and the f'.lL'mber States in a 
'Declaration' which accompanied the document. OJ. (1973) No. C 11211. 
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harmonisation of national policies and neglected subnational 
variances. Moreover, the EAP was rudimentary in terms of 
structure and content with emphasis being placed on scientific 
research, the development of assessment criteria for future 
legislation and on specific issues such as the pollution of the 
Rhin 25 D . h e. esplte t ese shortcomings, the first EAP represented an 
important starting point in the ECIEU environmental policy 
·process as it formulated for the first time principles and objectives 
which later contributed towards the adoption of common 
environmental policies. 
The second EAP (1977)26 built on its predecessor. One of its 
more significant features was its mentioning of the preventive 
policy approach. It also included specific policy issues such as 
environmental impact assessment (mentioned for the first time) 
and waste management. However, its emphasis on the urgent 
need for research, collection of data and their evaluation, 
indicated that the problems of pollution had not been tackled with 
the first EAP and that considerably more work was required in 
this field. In addition, the second EAP emphasised the need for 
more policy harmonisation: the Commission was requested to 
"compare nationallaws" and "align" laws wherever possible. This 
statement signaled for the first time that environmental po licies 
varied significantly and required increased coordination. While the 
second EAP encouraged a more harmonised environmental policy 
framework, it addressed only variances at Member State level 
while intra-state or subnational variances were not mentioned at 
25 The pollution of the Rhine became evident at the end of the 1950s and was 
high on the political and media agenda throughout the 1960s. 
~6 0.1. (1977) No. C 139/1. 
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all. 
The third EAP (1983)27 differed from its predecessors in style 
and content. It focused on the integration of environmental 
interests into other policy areas and highlighted specific pollution 
problems in the Mediterranean region (as a response to the 
Southern enlargement of the 1980s). This time, Member States 
were noticeably careful to emphasise geographical and social 
differences as well as economic interests. In other words, the third 
EAP recognised the necessity to reconcile national and, indeed, 
regional . . SOClO-econOIIllC priorities with environmental 
considerations. To reassure themselves that environmental 
objectives did not suffer under economic considerations, Member 
States emphasised that environmental policies "must be carried 
out without regard to the short-term fluctuations in cyclical 
conditions" . 
More importantly, the third EAP was the first document to 
openly acknowledge the increasing gap between policy-making 
and implementation. It stated that projects from previous EAPs 
had not been accomplished and that there was still a "discrepancy 
between the scale of the projects and the means available for 
implementing them". The Commission was instructed to progress 
the monitoring of implementation and increase its effectiveness in 
. enforcing environmental legislation. In addition, the third EAP 
considered the development of clean technologies as a way to 
reconcile environmental interests and business opportunities. It 
was hoped that many of the disappointing EC environmental 
policies would benefit from this reconciliation. 
27 0.1. (1983) No. C .+611. 
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The fourth EAP (1987)28 reinstated a more rigorous policy 
approach. It confIrmed long-established objectives and principles 
but also signaled a change in attitude. The problem of inadequate 
-policy implementation was highlighted in the preceding Council 
Resolution: the Council-
underlines the particular importance it attaches to the 
implementation of Community legislation and invites the 
Commission to review systematically the application and the 
practical effects of existing Community policy and to provide 
regular reports on this to the Council and the European 
Parliament so that an assessment of the effectiveness of such a 
policy can be made and, inter alia, useful guidelines for future 
proposals determined. 
Notwithstanding the apparent gap between environmental policy 
objectives and 'reality', the fourth EAP suggested even stricter 
environmental standards and legislation. The document argued 
that measures which closed discretionary loopholes for 
implementors, would benefIt the environment and would also 
provide opportunities for the economy and employment. Stringent 
environmental standards would stimulate the development of 
'clean technologies' and would make the EC as a whole more 
competitive at the global trading level. Apart from environmental 
standards and quantitative limits to pollution in EC legislation, the 
fourth EAP also considered economic instruments in the form of 
incentives and deterrents, and tolerated state aids for 
environmental projects "under certain circumstances". The 
Commission was also asked to develop a liability system, an 
objective which has not been fulfilled to date because Member 
States fear the fmancial costs for their industries. 29 
]X 0.1. (1987) No. C 328/1. 
2') The Commission considered this idea in its 1995 Annual Programme but 
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The fIfth EAP (1993)30 was clearly a response to the criticism 
which had been building up over the years concerning the 
implementation defIcit in the ECIEU environmental policy area. 
The rigorous regulatory tone of the previous EAP was considered 
ineffective and was abandoned with the fIfth EAP. The new EAP 
represented a desperate call for alternatives. Entitled Towards 
Sustainability', the fifth EAP followed the Brundtland Report of 
198731 and the Dublin Declaration of 1990 which adopted 
'sustainable development' as a central theme. 32 
As a lesson from past implementation experiences, the fifth EAP 
highlighted revised environmental policy approaches. For 
instance, the EU should not rely on legal instruments which set 
quantitative levels, rules and standards. The variety of legal 
instruments should be widened to include policy measures sLlch as 
market-based incentives and disincentives (e.g. voluntary eco-
labeling and eco-auditing). Further, the Commission was 
instructed to establish dialogue groups which would gIVe 
interested parties in all government layers an opportunity to take 
part ill information exchange and policy-making (i.e. 
strengthening the 'feed-back' arrows). The strategy was shifted 
has, so far, not succeeded in forwarding a proposal which is acceptable for 
all. Although this idea has been circulating for quite some time, most 
Member States and their private sectors are not prepared to accept a system 
which would imply substantial and unpredictable costs for their economies. 
30 O.l (1993) No. C 138/1. 
JI Our Common Future Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987. 
32 The fifth EAP cites the Brundtland definition of sustainable de\elopment. 
Sustainable development refers to the "development which meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to 
meet their own needs". The document did not provide answers for questions 
such as - who determines or predicts the needs of future generations; who 
safeguards their interests; and what exactly are their needs in the future? 
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from 'thou shalt not' to 'let's work together', a new campaign 
which responded to the criticism by many national and subnational 
implementors that 'Eurocrats' were 'out-of-touch'. Moreoyer, the 
fIfth EAP praised public participation and encouraged Member 
States and EU institutions to consider citizens' complaints 'less a 
nuisance than a resource' for sustainable development. Another 
proposal for improvement, which was formally included in the 
fIfth EAP, was the creation of a European Environment Agency 
(EEA) which today collects and processes information and makes 
data available to interested parties. 
Since its adoption, the fifth EAP has been under intense scrutiny 
by the Commission. In November 1994, the Commission initiated 
an elaborate assessment process culminating in an 'Interim Review 
of Implementation'. 33 The Interim Review examined the 
Programme's implementation progress under six headings: 
'integration' of environmental considerations into other policy 
areas; 'broadening' the range of policy instruments; shared 
responsibility and partnership (for instance through dialogue 
groups such as IMPEL34); changes in attitudes and patterns of 
consumption and production; effective implementation and 
enforcement; and international responsibility. These aspects were 
investigated within the areas of the manufacturing industry (in 
particular SMEs), energy, transport, agriculture, tourism, and 
33 Interim Review of Implementation of the European Community 
Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment and 
Sustainable Development. Towards Sustainability November 1994. COi\l 
(94) 453 final. 
q IMPEL: EU Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of 
Environmental Law, formerly 'Chester Network'. For a detailed discussion 01 
IMPEL see Werner. Julia 'Das EU-Netzwerk fUr die Umsetzung und Vollzug 
des Umweltrechts' (pp.131-138) in LUbbe-Wolff, Gertrude (ed) Der VullzlI£ 
des EuropLiischen Umweltrechts Erich Schmidt Verlag. Berlin 1996. 
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international co-operation. The Commission's study concluded 
with "cautious optimism", at the same time the Commission 
highlighted insufficiencies in meeting policy objectives as well as 
-the necessity for further improvements. The Commission 
complained about the persisting perspective that environmental 
considerations were contrary to economic interests. Businesses 
continued to make use of environmental resources without fully 
covering the costs of pollution and environmental deterioration. 
The conciliation of environmental concerns and economic 
interests, in particular the 'internalisation' of environmental costs 
as part of businesses' cost-benefit analyses, remained one of the 
Commission's key objectives. 
Following the Interim Review, the Commission asked Member 
States' administrators to comment on the fifth EAP progress. 
-Parallel to this consultation, the new EEA was asked to prepare a 
progress report. On the basis of the EEA document of November 
1995 and the consultation report of January 1996, the 
Commission concluded its investigation with a 'Proposal for a 
European Parliament and Council Decision on the Review' of the 
fifth EAP.35 While the proposal restructured priorities, the items 
for consideration remained essentially the same as the Interim 
Review. Apart from key priorities such as environmental policy 
integration, the broadening of legal instruments and 'shared 
responsibility and partnership', other objectives included improved 
collection and distribution of data, changes in production and 
consumption patterns. strengthened local and regional 
35 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Decision on the Revie\\ of 
the European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the 
Environment and Sustainable Development. Towards Sustainability Januar:-
1996. COM (95) 0..+7 final. 
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participation, and reinforced commitment towards en\'ironmental 
themes as outlined in the fifth EAP. 
In essence, the fifth EAP attempted to close the gap between 
policy-making and implementation and sought to apply new 
policy approaches such as 'smart' legal instruments (to use Ingram 
and Schneider's term) and dialogue at an early stage of the policy 
process. The new approaches were considered more compatible 
and acceptable for all interested parties in the national and 
subnationallayers and signaled a strategic change from strict and 
regulatory policies to more pragmatic and flexible environmental 
policies. 
The EAPs, and particularly the fifth EAP, corresponded more 
strongly with the practicalities of EU environmental policy 
objectives than the Treaties. Overall, the EAPs set out EU 
environmental policy objectives, provided policy guidance for all 
actors involved and were influential in so far as they paved the 
way for the adoption of environmental Directives and 
Regulations. On the other hand, the EAPs do not carry the same 
·legally binding weight as the Treaties. The EAPs have not 
generated the changes in behaviour and attitudes (i.e. informal 
determinants) envisaged by EU policy-makers; changes which 
could have contributed towards a more sustainable environment in 
the EU. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of Key EU Legal Instruments 
Treaties (primary legislation): 
Initially, EEC Treaty Articles 100 and 235 were applied for the 
adoption of EC environmental legislation. 
Single European Act Articles 130 R, S, T set environmental 
objectives, principles, policy-making procedures, allowed for 
Member States' stringent measures, acknowledged subsidiarity. 
Treaty on European Union Article 2 included environmental 
objective; principle of subsidiarity was anchored more strongly 
into Treaty framework; new Article 130R expanded on objectives, 
130S introduced more complicated policy-making procedures. 
mentioned responsibilities, introduced Cohesion Fund, confirmed 
the right to adopt more stringent measures. 
Amsterdam Treaty formally acknowledged sustainable 
development as one of the key EU principles in Article 1, stressed 
sectoral policy integration, provided separate protocols on 
simplification and subsidiarity. 
Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs): 
First EAP (1973): starting point, outlined for the first time 
environmental objectives and principles, rudimentary in some 
parts, based on intergovernmental harmonisation of national 
policies. 
Second EAP (1977): followed first EAP, expressed the need for 
further research, included some specific target areas, emphasised 
comparison and alignment of national policies, need for more 
harmonisation. 
Third EAP (1983): included some specific issues such as 
Mediterranean problems, emphasised diversity, acknowledged 
implementation gap and the need to monitor progress, expressed 
hope in clean technologies. 
Fourth EAP (1987): more rigorous approach, stricter quantitative 
standards seen as opportunity to strengthen new technologies. 
focused on economic instruments. 
Fifth EAP (1993): dramatic response to implementation deficit, 
main theme sustainable development: new emphasis on 
partnership, participation and flexible legislative tools: progress 
on Fifth EAP reviewed extensively. 
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Sample Directives and Regulations (secondary legislation): 
-Procedural harmonisation: EIA 
Directive amending EIA Directive 
proposal; IPC Directive (96/61IEC). 
Directive (85/337IEEC); 
(97111IEC); SEA Directih~ 
Setting qualitativel quantitative standards: Directiye 
(761160IEEC) on the quality of bathing waters; Directive 
(80/778IEEC) on drinking water; Directive (85/203IEEC) on air 
quality. 
Protection of species and areas of special interest: Habitats 
Directive (92/43IEEC); Wild Birds Directive (79/409IEEC). 
Other: Regulation setting up the European Environment Agency 
(1210/90). 
3.5 Problems of EU Environmental Policy Implementation 
Considering the complexity of government levels, actors and 
interests involved in the EU policy-making process, the EU has 
developed an impressive environmental policy. On the basis of the 
Treaties and the EAPs, the EU adopted more than 280 items of 
environmental legislation by the early 1990s of which about 200 
Directives specified and formalised in more detail EU 
environmental policy objectives. 36 However, in contrast with the 
creation of EU environmental policies, their implementation has 
been rather disappointing. 37 For a number of reasons, EU 
environmental policies have not been filtered through properly to 
the practical implementation layers with the result that 
implementors have often missed the original policy targets. 
36 Young, Stephen 'Environmental Politics and the European Community' 
Politics Review vo1.2(3), February 1993 (p.6). 
37 For further information on disappointing implementation results see 
'Appendix 3: Evidence on EU environmental policy implementation 
performances' . 
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Despite recent attempts to close the gap (attempts include 
dialogue groups and more flexible legal instruments) the EU is 
facing a serious implementation deficit in the environmental policy 
area. 
According to Ludwig Kramer: 
There is almost no other sector ( ... ) where the gap between 
political statements and legislative commitments and 
obligations on the one hand and the reality [on the other hand] 
is as great as in the field of environment. 38 
Why does the EU environmental policy area suffer from a gap 
between policy intention on paper and policy 'reality on the 
ground'? And why is there no other EU policy sector where the 
gap is as great as in the field of environment? The following 
analysis of key problems addresses the questions and sheds light 
onto the EU environmental policy practice. 
EU Environmental Policies fail to reach their Targets because 
their Legal Instruments are weak 
Starting from the outset of policy implementation, the EU's legal 
. instruments which outline EU environmental objectives (or policy 
statements, see map) imply problems for the policy process. EU 
policy-makers have at their disposal a wide range of EU tools39 
which help accommodate diverse policy matters, objectives and 
circumstances, but also cause confusion and provide loopholes for 
38 Kramer, Ludwig Focus on European Environmental Law Sweet and 
Maxwell, London 1992 (p.219). 
39 A Regulation is directly binding for all "in its entirety"; it should. ideally, 
be clear in its objectives and there should be no room for interpretations or 
legal loopholes. A Directive is binding as far as the final aim is concerned; 
ways and means are left to the Member States and their implementors. A 
Decision is binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed: it is 
used to remind a Member State/ institution of certain obligations. 
Recommendations and opinions ha\'e no direct legal force: they are merely a 
political statement and call upon the addressee to follow EU obligations. 
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implementors. Directives, in particular, outline broader policy 
aims but also provide discretionary room for national and 
subnational implementors over the policies' ways and means. This 
discretionary room has often been used to avoid policy 
obligations. While this problem has been evident in other EU 
policy areas such as competition and social policy, the 
discretionary room for EU environmental Directives has been 
particularly large, partly because the Directives have had to 
accommodate several (long-term) objectives which affected 
several government levels and departments. In the case of 
Directive (761l60IEEC) on the quality of bathing waters, UK and 
FRG legislators used their discretionary room to interpret the 
notion of 'significant number of bathers' in such a way that only a 
small number of bathing waters were identified for monitoring. 
Following heavy criticism from the Commission, both the UK and 
the FRG eventually adjusted the number of their bathing waters 
from 27 to 470 and from 97 to 2000 respectively.40 
Even within the category of Directives, the EU has developed a 
range of legal instruments with different obligations and control 
measures. 41 The variety of instruments allows for the political, 
economic and geographical diversity of the EU as well as the 
. wide range of environmental policy matters. On the other hand, 
the complexity of EU instruments has had the effect that many 
40 Information taken from Kramer, Ludwig Focus on European 
Environmental Law (pp.8/9) Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997. 
41 Rehbinder and Stewart distinguish between three Directive categories: the 
'typical' Directive contains an obligatory goal but leaves the means to the 
Member States, the 'regulation-type' Directive contains detailed substantive 
obligations (standards, provisions for implementation etc.), and the 
'framework' Directive paves the way towards a 'regulation-type' Directiv~. 
Cited in Freestone, David 'EC Environmental Policy and Law' (pp.135-1)~) 
Journal of Law and Society 18( 1), Spring 1991. 
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implementors in the national and subnational layers have found it 
difficult to distinguish between instruments and interpreted their 
. content incorrectly. Implementors have had difficulties with the 
details of EU environmental laws which often contained several 
objectives and affected several policy areas. Moreover, the study 
of EU environmental laws has been time consuming for 
implementors who have rather dealt with familiar matters fIrst 
before attending to complicated, and sometimes 'inconvenient', 
EU environmental policy documents. 42 Aware of implementors' 
difficulties with EU legal instruments, the Commission has 
suggested that documents and legislative processes should be 
simplifIed and streamlined as much as possible.43 However, the 
1990s have seen more complex environmental policy demands 
. such as the integration of environmental considerations into other 
policy areas and the adoption of procedural, cross-sectoral 
policies such as the IPC Directive. These policies have been 
difficult to accommodate in the light of the Commission's 
simplifIcation strategy. The new approach of simplifIcation has 
therefore been limited to certain environmental objectives. 
Another major problem of EU legal instruments concerns the 
actual language used in formulating EU environmental policies 
and their subsequent interpretation. Following an elaborate 
bargaining process, Directives in particular often feature legal 
formulations which are deliberately vague and open to 
.42 In the words of an Environmental Consultant, EU environmental policy 
documents tend to end up at the bottom of the 'in' tray. Interview, 15. 
February 1995, Dalkeith. 
·0 Commission DG XI, interview, Brussels, 7. March 1997: see also 
Commission information document How is the European Union protecting 
our Environment? June 1996; McHugh, Fiona 'Voluntary accord get mixed 
response' (p.18) European Voice 30.May - 5.June 1996. 
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interpretation to suit all interests involved. General terms such as 
'best available technology not entailing excessive costs', 'high 
environmental standards' or 'no nuisance' are not sufficientl\' 
defmed to provide for a truly common environmental policy basis. 
The term 'best available technology not entailing excessive costs' 
(known as the BATNEEC principle), for instance, raises 
questions such as - which technology is 'best'; when are costs 
'excessive'; and who decides whether costs are excessive or not? 
Apart from the problems of defmition and interpretation of certain 
terms, Directives provide large discretionary powers over the 
ways and means of policy implementation. This lack of clarity has 
encouraged Member States and their implementors to interpret 
EU legislation to their own liking with the result that many EU 
environmental policy targets have not been on the ground.44 
The Filtering Process of EU Environmental Policies is enormously 
complex and the Links between Layers are weak 
Focusing on the actual implementation process, EU 
environmental policies require formal transposition by the 
Member States and their national and (depending on Member 
State) subnational legislators. In the case of Directives, national 
and subnational legislators are also required to specify policy 
requirements where the EU legal text provides flexibility and 
discretion. National and subnational administrators should then 
proceed with the implementation by establishing guidelines and by 
applying the policy on the ground.45 Administrators are supported 
.J4 Giselle Bakkenist describes in detail how UK actors interpret liberally 
Directive (90/313/EEC) on access of en\'ironmentai information in 
Environmental Information. Law, Policy and Experience Cameron May. 
London 1994. 
45 Art.S: Member States shall take all appropriate measures. whether general 
or particular. to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treat~ 
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by vanous quasi-governmental bodies and environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) which contribute information 
and know-how. Citizens as well as representatives from industry, 
the farming community and environmental NGOs are expected to 
comply with the policy. Finally, courts within the Member States 
have the task of interpreting EU legislation and, if necessary, 
enforce full compliance with legal obligations. 
Figure 3.2 below describes the fIltering process of EU 
environmental policies as complex in many respects. Firstly, the 
. vast majority of EU environmental policies (e.g. policies 
regulating water and waste management, pollution control 
policies, the EIA policy discussed in Chapter 6) requITe 
implementation at the national and subnational government levels. 
In other words, policies have to be filtered through essentially two 
layers before they reach their implementation target. Considering 
the long distance between policy statement and target, EU 
environmental policies face more potential implementation 
obstacles than, say, national policies. 
Secondly, the filtering process of EU environmental policies 
involves a multitude of actors who are influenced by a variety of 
informal determinants (i.e. attitudes towards environmental 
protection and the EU; policy-makers' priorities and strategies). 
Following Offe's concept of subsystems, EU environmental 
policies tend to suffer from tensions between representatives of 
economic interests (e.g. business and farming communities) and 
or resulting: from action taken by the Institutions of the Community. The) 
shall facilitate achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objecti \"es of 
this Treaty. 
SEA Art. 130R (4) reinforces Member States' responsibility. 
10~ 
environmental interests (e.g. environmental NGOs) while 
political-administrative actors (e.g. Commission officials and 
administrators on the ground) try to mediate between the two 
groups. The 'push-pull' effect of conflicting interests hinders the 
implementation process. In the case of the ErA Directive. 
planning officials in the national and subnational layers have tried 
to consolidate the developers' economic interests with 
environmental concerns of NGOs and citizens affected by project 
applications. During the balancing process, planning officials have 
often opted for the easiest solution and have given way to 
economic interests. As a result, the key objective of the ErA 
Directive (i.e. environmentally sound 'minimum-regret-planning') 
has often been ignored in practice.46 
Thirdly, the filtering of particularly ambitious EU environmental 
policies often requires major adjustments of existing formal and 
informal conditions in the national and subnationallayers. Formal 
determinants such as legal systems and political-administrative 
structures as well as informal determinants such as policy-makers' 
priorities and attitudes towards environmental protection in the 
national and subnationallayers are not always compatible with EU 
environmental policies. In practice, favourable preconditions for 
successful implementation such as the commitment and flexibility 
of national and subnational actors have often been missing during 
the filtering process. Facing the inflexibility of national and 
. subnational political-administrative structures and practices, many 
EU environmental policies have simply failed to reach their target. 
Finally, the filtering process has been hampered by the way 
46 See Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of the EIA Directive and its 
implementation in Scotland and Bavaria. 
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competencies have been allocated and shared between EU , 
national and subnational layers and their actors. According to the 
treaties, the Commission is required to 'guard' the implementation 
of policy obligations as stated in the treaties and EU legislation.47 
The Commission is supposed to 'remind' Member States of policy 
·commitments and, if necessary, threaten Member States with filles 
and court action if they fail to fulfill their tasks or violate against 
legislation. While Member States are required to follow their EU 
environmental policy commitments, national and subnational 
implementors' responsibilities are not specifically addressed in the 
treaties. EU policy-makers have been careful not to dictate the 
allocation of competencies not only because they are so diverse in 
terms of state systems and government structures but also 
because they have feared that the allocation of competencies 
would start a major debate on national-subnational relations and 
power-sharing. 
In practice, the Commission's guardian activities have almost 
always come to a halt at the first stage of implementation (i.e 
formal transposition of EU legislation). Member States and 
(depending on constitutional settings and the policy in question) 
their subnational regions have often ignored deadlines or failed to 
notify the Commission of any changes in national (and 
subnational) legislation. In many cases, Member States and 
subnational regions have had difficulties in interpreting Directive 
objectives or they assumed that their own legal instruments and 
administrative structures and resources were adequate.-+
8 
~7 The Commission has to "ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the 
measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied" (Art. 1.'i5). 
18 Bavarian legislators argued that formal transposition of the El:\ Directive 
was not necessary because existing legal-administrative provisions in Bavaria 
10-+ 
If Member States fail to transpose and implement Directive 
objectives into the national context or fail to put pressure on their 
subnational regIOns to follow their ED obligations, the 
Commission can initiate infringement proceedings under 
169.49 The infringement procedure is divided into three 
Article 
stages. 
First, the Commission informs the Member State of a suspected 
infringement which has come to its notice (,letter of formal 
notice') and requests the Member State to submit its observations . 
. If the Member State's response is not satisfactory, the 
Commission issues a 'reasoned opinion' stating why infringement 
is suspected. If the Member State still does not show any reaction 
to the Commission's concern, the matter is taken to the European 
Court of Justice for judicial ruling. 
In practice, the first stage has often clarified misunderstandings 
and implementation problems. 50 Both the Commission and the 
Member State governments have sought to resolve problems at an 
early stage because they did not wish to rock the boat. However, 
many cases have not been taken further by the Commission out of 
reluctance to 'over-use' the threat of legal prosecution. In 
were adequate. See Chapter 6 for a detailed account of the Directive's 
implementation. 
49 Art. 169: If the Commission considers that a Member State has 
failed to fulfill an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned 
opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to 
submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the 
opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring 
the matter before the Court of Justice. 
50 In general, most disputes are resolved during the tirst stage following the 
'letter of formal notice' (1209 cases). The number of 'reasoned opinion' cases 
for the same period is considerably smaller (3-+2 cases), while the number of 
references to the EeJ is comparatively insigniticant (-+-+ cases). The figures 
refer to Community Law in general for 1993. Source: Alan Butt Philip 
Regulating the Single European Market: A Comparison of the 
Implementation of Social and Elwironmental Legislation Researdl Paper, 
1994. 
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addition, the Commission has been very careful not to appear as a 
dominant power 'from Brussels' for Member States and their 
implementors. Yet, despite this diplomatic approach, the 
Commission has had to initiate several legal proceedings against 
Member States in 1997. Thirteen out of fIfteen Member States are 
currently challenged over their failure to comply with EU 
environmental legislation on water quality, waste management 
and nature protection (in particular the Habitats Directive). 51 
If Member State governments refuse to comply with EU 
environmental policy obligations or are unable to commit their 
subnational regions to EU policy compliance, the cases are 
referred to the ECl which is likely to impose fInes under TEU 
. Article 171. It is debatable whether the Commission's legal 
challenge together with the filles imposed by the ECl have a 
signifIcant impact on the Member States' compliance with EU 
environmental legislation. The moral pressure caused by the 
publication of filles certainly has had some effect on the Member 
States and their implementors. 52 On the other hand, many 
Member States have been prepared to pay the fInes smce 
relatively small amounts of money are considered worthwhile in 
the light of costly environmental standards and economic 
diffIculties. 53 
51 Smith, Michael 'Brussels in environmental clampdown' Financial Times 
18/19. October 1997, (p.2). 
52 In 1997, the FRG faced heavy fines imposed by the ECl for insufficient 
implementation of EU environmental legislation in three instances. The 
'punishment' was seen by observers in Brussels as an embarrassment and 
effective deterrent for the FRG. For more details see Europe Nr.6903 U--:.S.), 
30. lanuar 1997 (p.6). 
53 Butt Philip argues that current penalties are not threatening enough for 
polluters. Regulating the Single European rvlarket.: A. Comparison of the 
Implementation of Social and Environmental LegIslatIon Research Paper. 
1994. 
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In order to fulfill its guardian task and strengthen the fIltering 
links from one layer to another, the Treaties should provide the 
Commission with more effective powers enabling it to control 
and, if necessary, enforce compliance within the Member States 
and their subnational regIOns. Equally, Member State 
governments should have adequate monitoring mechanisms in 
order to check EU policy compliance within the subnational 
regions. However, neither the Member State governments.'i4 nor 
the Commission have shown effective controlling powers. The 
Commission in particular, does not possess adequate staff and 
fmancial resources to monitor the implementation of every EU 
environmental policy in every part of the EU. It does not possess 
'eco-inspectorate' powers similar to the fIsheries inspectorate 
functions under the Common Fisheries Policy. Instead, it has to 
rely upon complaints from environmental NGOs and individual 
citizens who inform the Commission of any alleged infringement 
cases.
55 Complaints, however, are insufficient in monitoring 
overall compliance. For instance, UK citizens have tended to 
complain more than citizens do from Denmark and within the UK 
there have been more complaints from England than from 
54 Reporting by subnational actors on the progress of EU environmental 
policy implementation is predominantly on an informal and voluntary basis 
despite specific reporting requirements outlined in EU Directives. For further 
information on the difficulties associated with reporting see The State of 
Reporting by the European Community in Fulfillment of Obli£ations 
contained in EC Environmental Legislation Institute for European 
Environmental Policy, London, November 1993. 
55 In turn, EU citizens consider the Commission as the most appropriate 
recipient for complaints and advocate of EU environmental objectives. For 
more information on the Commission's relations with environmental NGOs 
see Webster, Ruth 'Environmental Collective Action. Stable patterns of co-
operation and issue alliances at the European level' (pp.176-19) in 
Greenwood, Justin; Aspinwall, Mark Collective Action in the European 
Union. Interests and the new politics of associability Routledge, London 
1998. 
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Scotland. 56 This imbalance contributes to an incoherent picture of 
the whole policy area. 
Member States and their subnational regions have not been 
assessed on their performance in a uniform and transparent 
manner and therefore cannot be properly compared with each 
other. Further, implementors' discipline and commitment towards 
ED environmental obligations has been relatively low. To a 
certain extent, ED policy-makers have acknowledged the problem 
by creating another ED institution, the EEA, which has developed 
a system of uniform and comparable information gathering and 
dissemination. The system has helped to identify cases of non-
implementation and has thereby 'embarrassed' those national and 
subnational actors who did not comply with EU environmental 
policies. However, while the EEA has processed environmental 
information, its tasks have not included an active 'eco-
inspectorate' function. When the EEA was established, the 
Member States deliberately restricted its tasks to the gathering 
and distribution of information. Council Ministers were not 
prepared to have "( .. ) their performances vetted by another tier of 
-'Brussels bureaucrats",.57 Without a control body, however, it is 
not only difficult to gain a coherent and accurate overview of the 
success or failure of environmental policies, it is also difficult to 
fully enforce implementation discipline within the Member States 
and their regions. 
Since the early 1990s, the Commission has sought to 
56 Former DG XI secondment official (complaints department), intenie\\. 10. 
May 1995, Glasgow. 
57 'European En\'ironment Agency gets under way' ENDS Report No 2-W. 
January 1995 (pp.20-23). 
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.consolidate policy-making and implementation by initiating new. 
alternative policy strategies which more strongly involve actors 
from all government levels and interest groups. In particular, the 
Commission has focused on 'working' or 'dialogue' groups which 
include a wide spectrum of actors and their interests. The 
Commission now receives information on implementation 
performances from 'IMPEL', a forum for information exchange 
and dialogue which assesses the practicalities of EU 
environmental policies. Apart from dialogue and partnership 
initiatives, the Commission has responded to discrepancies 
between stated policy objective and 'reality' by setting policy 
expectations at a lower, more pragmatic level. Many new 
environmental policy proposals focus on voluntary, market-
orientated solutions to environmental problems. As a response to 
national and subnational implementors' criticism of EU 
'Uberreguliertheit', the Commission has also considerably reduced 
the number of environmental policy proposals to allow 
government levels below to take their own environmental policy 
decisions (under the principle of subsidiarity). In addition, an 
internal Commission communication has suggested a systematic 
'implementation check' for Commission. This mechanism assesses 
the EU environmental policies' potential costs and benefits as well 
as feasibility and compatibility with national and subnationallegal-
administrative systems. However, some Commission officials have 
already expressed doubts over the necessity and usefulness of 
h 'h k,58 suc a c ec . 
58 During an interview one Commission DG XI ofticial defended the 
proposal, while his colleague opposed the proposal: "We already ~av~ 
consultation procedures ( ... ), the check could be counter-productIve. 
Brussels, 7. March 1997. 
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While the Commission hopes that these and other policy 
initiatives will help establish more acceptable EU environmental 
policies, it remains to be seen whether these efforts can really 
. strengthen implementation links and make the fIltering process 
more permeable. The Member States and their subnational 
regions have repeatedly demonstrated reluctance in accepting 
more binding monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. In the 
light of the weak links between the layers, the gap between policy 
statement and implementation is very likely to remain. 
The Layers involved in the Filtering Process are diverse, complex 
and their formal and informal Determinants are often incompatible 
with EU Environmental Policies 
EU environmental policies require implementation in national 
and subnationallayers which are complex and diverse. In terms of 
formal determinants, constitutional settings, political-
administrative structures and resources as well as legal systems 
(all of which are shaped by policy styles, practices and priorities) 
have varied across and, more importantly, within Member 
States.59 Similarly, informal determinants such as relationships 
between actors, attitudes towards environmental protection and 
the EU, and policy-makers' strategies and practices (all of which 
are influenced by formal conditions) have varied, too. This 
diversity of determinants is understandable and legitimate. 
Nevertheless, the question arises whether some of the national 
and subnational layers can cope with EU environmental policies. 
59 Ludwig Kramer describes the differences in legal cultures in Focus on 
European Environmental Law Sweet & Maxwell, London 1992. Ken Collins 
MEP, chairman of the EP Environment Committee, pointed out differences 
in transposition approaches during an intervie\v. He went so far as to describe 
the Italian attitude towards Directives as merely "something to aim at". 
Interview, 3. February 1995, East Kilbride. 
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Given the wide array of formal and informal determinant 
combinations, the ways in which EU environmental policies haYe 
been implemented (or not implemented) within the Member States 
and their subnational regions resemble a colourful patchwork. 
Many layers have featured an unfavourable combination or 'mix' 
of determinants which have hindered the successful 
implementation of EU environmental pOlicies. 60 National and 
subnational implementors have also tended to amend EU 
environmental policies as much as possible to suit their particular 
'mix' of formal structures and informal priorities. 61 As a result, EU 
environmental policies have often assumed a shape which has not 
resembled the policy intention at the outset of the process. 
Focusing on formal determinants, EU environmental policies 
have often been hindered due to a lack of resources or inadequate 
administrative structures within the national and subnational 
layers.62 Budgetary constraints in particular, have put a damper on 
ED environmental policy obligations and in many cases the EU 
Cohesion Fund did not compensate for the problems of fmancing 
60 See Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Knill and Lenschow also argue that disappointing 
implementation outcomes cannot be explained with incompatible (national) 
administrations alone. Rather, a complex mix of factors shape policy 
implementation. See 'Coping with Europe: The impact of British and German 
administrations on the implementation of EU environmental policy' (pp.595-
614) Journal of European Public Policy vo1.5, No.4, 1998. 
61 Their discretion, of course, depends upon the form of EU environmental 
policy: Regulations have direct effect and are therefore transposed verbatim 
while Directives provide a large scope for interpretation and formal 
transposition. 
(,2 For instance, Baker et al argue that "the weak resource base of peripheral 
regions and Member States limits their capacity to implement policy. [This 
is] especially so in the field of environmental protection, requiring as it does 
hioh levels of scientific and technical expertise (oo.)." (p.9) in Baker, Susan; 
Y;arley, Steven; Milton, Kay (eds) Protecting the Periphery: Environmental 
Policy in Peripheral Regions of the European Union Frank Ca-;s, London 
1994. 
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the implementation of policies which demand, for instance. 
expensive technological standards. In addition, some Member 
States and their subnational regions have featured political-
administrative structures which were less suited than others to 
cope with the requirements of EU environmental policies. For 
instance, they have not been equipped with the institutions and 
technological know-how necessary to measure quantitative 
environmental standards.63 The details of EU environmental 
legislation (e.g. quantitative thresholds and qualitative standards) 
have also clashed with national and subnationallegal systems and 
. instruments. There are, therefore, a number of potential formal 
obstacles (highlighted in figure 3.2 below) which can hinder the 
successful implementation of EU environmental policies. 
In terms of informal determinants, particularly attitudes 
towards the EU as well as policy-makers' economic priorities have 
played a significant role in the implementation of EU 
environmental policies. Firstly, political-administrative actors in 
the national and subnational layers have not received EU 
environmental policies unprejudiced. Often, disputes over 
conflicting interests which had been conducted 'out in the open' 
during policy negotiation have not been resolved with the 
adoption of a policy. Reacting to preceding conflicts, actors have 
not felt obliged to show much enthusiasm towards a controversial 
environmental policy.6-+ In other cases, national and subnational 
63 Lack of administrative staff and resources are highlighted by Kramer in 
Focus on European Environmental Law Sweet & Maxwell, London 1997. Sec 
. . I ( II) In parttcu ar p.~~ . 
6.f For instance, it took the Member States ten years to agree on a common 
policy on environmental impact assessment. Once the EIA Directive 
(85/337/EEC) was adopted. implementors recei \ed no encouragement In 
realising the policy objectin~ and showed limited enthusiasm toward" the 
Directive. Sec Chapter 6. 
112 
actors have reacted towards ED environmental policies with 
either disappointment over 'lowest-common-denominator' 
. 65 
comproffilses, or they have been preoccupied with other policy 
priorities and have not taken much notice of ED environmental 
policies. Often, national and subnational actors have not been 
particularly biased against ED environmental policies but have 
chosen the easiest option which caused the least friction: they 
have avoided 'inconvenient' policy obligations for as long as 
possible. 
In terms of relationships with, and attitudes towards the EU, 
many national and subnational actors have questioned the 
legitimacy with which ED environmental policies have been 
adopted. Particularly subnational implementors have often 
considered ED policies as "imported legislation,,66 and have 
. clashed with ED policy-makers over the question whether a 
certain environmental policy required harmonisation at the EU 
level. Subnational regions with a strong territorial identity such as 
Bavaria have perceived 'policies from Brussels' as a challenge 
against their own political competencies. Reassurances on the 
principle of subsidiarity in the Treaties and other EU documents 
have not eliminated the scepticism over 'unnecessary policies from 
Brussels' by many implementors on the ground. 67 
65 Among others, the term 'lowest common denominator' has been used by 
Michael Mann in 'EU struggles to find right shade of green' (p.13) European 
Voice 30.May - 5.June 1996. 
66 Kramer, Ludwig Focus on European Environmental Law 1992 (p.216). 
Description also used by di Fabio, Udo 'lntegratives Umwdtrecht. Bestand, 
Ziele, Moglichkeiten' (pp.329-337) Neue Zeitschrift fUr Verwaltungsrecht 
Nr.4, 1998. 
(,7 Ludwig Kramer would go as far as describing some of the oppo-;ition 
against 'imported' en\'ironmental pro\isions as 'xenophobic'. (p.ll) Focus on 
European Environmental Ll\\: S\wet 8: Maxwell, London 1997. 
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Not far from the legitimacy question IS the econOffilC 
imperative which influences EU environmental policies. Economic 
motivations which contributed towards the adoption of EU 
environmental policies have tended to differ from the economic 
(self-) interests of national and subnational actors on the ground. 
More specifically, economic concerns over possible imbalances in 
.the 'level-playing-field' caused by diverging environmental 
requirements which compelled Member States' governments to 
harmonise their national environmental policies, have tended to 
evaporate at a later stage in the light of immediate interests in 
protecting and generating national and subnational economies. 
Increased trade has been a desirable but abstract goal. However, 
actors on the practical ground have found it difficult to believe 
that policies which effectively restrict their economic activities, 
not only protect the environment but also benefit their economies 
in the long term. National and subnational implementors and 
business communities have therefore tended to secure economic 
priorities first before attending to the 'inconvenient' harmonisation 
of costly environn1ental measures. Subnational administrators in 
particular have shown a protectionist attitude towards their local 
economies and have been less sympathetic towards the goal of 
EU-wide environmental standards harmonisation (see Chapters 5 
and 6). This discrepancy between the 'level-playing-field' objective 
in one layer and economic self-interests in the other layers helps 
explain why many EU environmental policy outcomes have been 
disappointing and why a wide gap is still evident between EU 
environmental policy statement and 'reality'. It underlines the 
importance to exan1ine the motivations of those who are actually 
charged with the formal and practical implementation of ELi 
EU Layer: 
1 1-+ 
environmental policies. 
Figure 3.2: General Implementation Obstacles for EU 
Environmental Policies 
Formal Determinants: 
*Political-administrative structures and resources often ill-equipped 
:nd un?er-funded t~ acco~odate policy. 
. DetaIls of EU policy often Incompatible with legal systems and 
Instruments on the ground; often disagreement over interpretation of 
legal terms and formal transposition of policy. 
Informal Determinants: 
* In terms of relationships, gaps of communication and coordination 
between EU actors and implementors; difficulties in accepting policy 
from EU layer. 
* Attitudes and policy priorities influenced by immediate econ. 
~nefits wh~ch often clash with EU environmental objectives; 
~lfference~ In strategies and priorities (which depend on formal and 
I~formal CIrcumstances within layers) can hamper EU policy: at 
tImes 'euro-sceptic' attitude towards 'inconvenient' EU 
environmental obligations. 
3.6 Conclusion: Between EU environmental policy 
ambition and reality 
To sum up, EU environmental politics is an extremely complex 
process which involves a vast range of actors and interest'> a:-. \\ell 
as complicated procedures and legal instruments. The l1lulti-
layered implementation map has illustrated the long and complex 
filtering process from policy statement to target. has highlighted 
the discl'l'pi.U1cy het\\'een the \'ariolls layers il1\ohed in the pnKl.''-,'-, 
1 1 :' 
and has already identified formal and informal determinants which 
hinder the implementation of ED environmental policies 
(confrrming Argument 1). 
Since the early 1970s, ED environmental politics has been 
dominated by the 'making' of ED environmental policy 
'statements' (i.e. Directives and Regulations). These statements 
have usually accommodated a complex mix of considerations 
ranging from transboundary and accumulative impacts of 
pollution to economic level-playing-field interests and their 
correlation with environmental matters. Yet, when it comes to the 
implementation of these policies, the ED has tended to neglect 
formal and informal determinants in the layers as well as 
mechanisms which would ensure the policies' implementation and 
compliance. Since the early 1980s, ED policy-makers have 
recognised an implementation deficit in the environmental policy 
area. In recent years, EU policy-makers have attempted to adjust 
their policy approach through alternative strategies outlined in the 
TEU, the AT, the fifth EAP and more recent secondary 
legislation. These strategies, however, have had a limited impact 
on the effectiveness of EU environmental policies and have not 
adequately addressed the gap between policy objectives and their 
implementation. 
One of the mam reasons behind the discrepancy between 
policy-making and implementation has been the rather 
intergovernmentalist, state-centrist approach with which EU 
environmental policies have been adopted and pursued until 
recently. This approach has neglected the practical problems of 
ED environmental policy implementation on the ground as we 11 as 
the l11ulti-facetedness of Member States and their intra-state 
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varIances. Most EU environmental policies requIre 
implementation at all government levels and particularly at the 
regional and local levels. Yet the complexity and influence of 
these levels on EU environmental policies has been to date under-
estimated. Subnational regions are in many ways distinct from 
their 'mother' states and feature formal and informal determinants 
which can differ significantly from determinants which shape 
politics and policy processes in the Member States at large. 
During the filtering process, EU environmental policies can clash 
with incompatible determinants within the subnational regions; 
determinants which would not be detected with a state-centrist 
('domestic') research method. Therefore, in order to gain a more 
accurate picture of the EU environmental policy reality (and close 
the implementation gap), it IS necessary to investigate 
implementation practices more thoroughly and go beyond the 
national (or 'domestic') level to include specifically subnational 
. conditions and obstacles during policy implementation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 refme the study of EU environmental policy 
implementation by investigating the national and subnational 
layers separately. The Chapters assess to what extent subnational 
regions differ from their 'mother' states and to what extent they 
shape the EU environmental policies during implementation 
(addressing Argument 2). Chapter 6 will then examine in detail 
the filtering process through the layers by focusing on one specific 
policy example: the EIA Directive. The following Chapters will 
confIrm that subnational regions and their actors do play a 
significant role in EU environmental politics and that they 
therefore deserve more attention by EU practitioners and 
researchers. 
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Chapter 4 
Environmental Politics and Policy in the UK and the FRG 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter described the complexity of the EU 
environmental policy area and highlighted common difficulties in 
filtering EU environmental policies through the implementation 
layers. It argued that implementation layers are diverse, complex 
and often incompatible with the style and content of EU 
environmental policies. This Chapter takes up the incompatibility 
argument by examining the national layers of the UK and FRG 
and their environmental policies in more detail. In particular, the 
Chapter examines the national environmental policies and how 
they have been shaped by distinctly British! German formal and 
informal determinants. It then assesses to what extent national and 
EU environmental policies differ and highlights those formal and 
informal determinants in the UK and FRG layers which hinder the 
implementation of many EU environmental policies. With the 
national layers in mind, Chapter 5 can then proceed with an 
investigation of the subnational layers, Scotland and Bavaria, 
whose environmental policies and implementation performances in 
the EU environmental policy area heavily depend upon their 
embeddedness within the wider state systems. 
Focusing on the national layers, the FRG and the UK have often 
been described as environmental 'leader' and 'laggard' 
respectively. I Indeed, as far as EU environmental policy-making is 
I Alberta Sbragia identities the FRG as a 'leader' and the UK as a 'laggard' in 
EU policy-making in 'Environmental Policy: The Push-Pull Policy-Making' 
(pp.235-255) in Wallace, Helen ; Wallace, William (eds) Policy-Making in 
the European Union Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996. Sonja Bbhmer-
Christiansen and Jim Skea describe the UK and FRG along simil ar lines in 
Acid Politics: Environmental and Energy Policies in Britain and Germany 
Belhaven Press, London 1991 . 
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concerned, the FRG frequently has put pressure on other Member 
States to set uniform environmental standards, while the UK has 
blocked many EU environmental policies which it considered 
over-ambitious or unnecessary.2 However, the 'leader-laggard' 
analyses miss one important point: in terms of EU environmental 
policy implementation, both the FRG and the UK have failed to 
realise many policy goals. At the beginning of the 1990s, the FRG 
and the UK failed even to notify the Commission about the formal 
transposition of Directives in 10% of the cases. This performance 
improved slightly by 1995.3 The FRG and the UK have failed to 
implement vanous types of environmental policies: the 
Commission has tackled both Member States over the inadequate 
implementation of the EIA Directive (a typical procedural 
framework Directive), the failure to designate areas for 
environmental protection (under the Wild Birds and Habitats 
Directives), and failure to comply with quantitative and qualitative 
environmental standards (in particular water and air quality 
standards).4 Over the years, the Commission referred alleged 
2 For instance, in the early 1980s, the FRG took the lead in adopting 
Directives which regulate emissions from large combustion plants. For 
further information see Bohmer-Christiansen, Sonja; Skea, Jim Acid Politics: 
Environmental and Energy Policies in Britain and Germany Belhaven Press, 
London 1991. 
:1 For details see Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of 
Community Law by the Commission. In particular, Eleventh Annual Report 
(COM (94) 500 final) and Thirteenth Annual Report (COM (96) 600 final). 
4 Among others, Directives 8512031EEC (air quality); 761160lEEC (bathing 
waters); 801778IEEC (drinking water); 79/409/EEC (wild birds); 921431EEC 
(habitats). For more information see Commission Annual Reports as well as 
Demmke, Christoph Verfassungsrechtliche und administrative Aspekte der 
Umsetzung von EG-Umweltpolitik European Institute of Public 
Administration, 30. May 1996. For a British account on the implementation 
of water quality Directives see Ward, Neil; Buller, Henry; Lowe. Philip 
Implementing European Environmental Policy at the Local Level: The 
British Experience with Water Quality Directives University of Newcastle 
upon Tyne. March 1995. 
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infringement cases to the EC] which, III many instances, 
confIrmed the Commission's criticism. 
The following investigation gets to the bottom of the 
implementation problems by examining the national layers and 
their environmental policies in detail. The Chapter argues that 
both Member States feature 'distinct' environmental policies which 
derive from their formal and informal circumstances ( or 
. determinants) and differ in many respects from EU environmental 
policies. The Chapter suggests two broad reasons for the often 
inadequate implementation of EU environmental policies. Firstly, 
EU environmental policies often clash with informal determinants, 
in particular with national policy-makers' priorities and strategies 
as well as policy styles and practices. Secondly, EU environmental 
policies are often incompatible with formal determinants such as 
political-administrative structures and legal systems that organise 
and administrate environmental policies within the national layers. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
4.2 Environmental Politics and Policy in the UK: 
'Forerunner' and 'Dirty Man' 
National environmental policies are shaped by formal 
constitutional settings as well as informal circumstances (e.g. 
policy priorities and relationships between actors) within state 
systems (or layers). In the case of the UK, formal and informal 
determinants have contributed towards a paradoxical 
environmental policy. The UK has often been at the forefront of 
environmental policy, while at other times political and economic 
behaviour in the UK has pointed towards a lack of environmental 
commitment. It is therefore difficult to pin down one straight-
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forward UK policy on the environment.5 
One of the key formal determinants contributing to the 
paradoxical handling of environmental matters has been the UK 
constitutional setting which is highlighted in figure 4.1. The UK is 
a centralised state which evolved over centuries and is composed 
of four former kingdoms. Ultimate sovereignty lies with 
Parliament. The UK does not possess a written constitution. 
therefore legislation derives either from traditional conventions or 
political decisions taken in parliament (with the House of 
Commons playing the central role in decision-making). UK 
policies are formulated as Acts of Parliament, Regulations, and 
. Statutory Instruments supported by administrative Circulars. 
Scotland and Northern Ireland generally require separate bills to 
allow for their legal traditions as well as geographical and other 
diversities. Nevertheless, legislation for England, Wales and 
Scotland stem from the legislative centre in Westminster and 
Whitehall and do not differ significantly from each other in terms 
of content and objective.6 
The UK constitution's combination of ancient traditions on the 
one hand and the potential for radical change on the other is 
reflected in the development of UK environmental policy. In some 
respects the UK has been slow in adopting a strong environmental 
position, while in other instances the UK has taken the lead m 
environmental initiatives. 
5 John McCormick describes the British attitude towards environmental 
matters as rather "curious" in British Politics and the Environment 1991 
(p.8). 
6 The implications of a Scottish parliament are discussed in 'Appendix ): 
Scottish Devolution - A Brief Outline'. 
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The Forerunner 
In terms of informal attitudes towards environmental protection. 
the British have traditionally valued their natural environment and 
. initiated environmental organisations and legislation long before 
other states (and indeed the EU) even considered the problems of 
pollution. The 'Commons, Open Spaces and Footpaths 
Preservation Society', for instance, was founded in 1865 and was 
one of the fIrst environmental NGOs to appreciate the countryside 
and campaign for its access. Modern environmental NGOs in the 
UK continue this tradition; they now enjoy large memberships and 
are among the wealthiest and most influential environmental 
groups ill Europe.7 Building on the early influence of 
environmental NGOs, the UK was the fIrst country in Europe to 
form a Green Party which, however, could not establish itself as a 
. strong parliamentary force mainly because of the UK electoral 
system (i.e. formal determinant constraint).8 
Apart from a traditional interest in the countryside, the British 
were also environmental 'initiators' in Europe because they were 
the fIrst to suffer under the negative effects of industrial activities 
which began in the UK. Industrialisation brought not only material 
prosperity but also problems of pollution. Legislation on the 
environment, dating back as early as 1273, responded to the 
negative effects caused by early industrial activity.9 1863 saw the 
7 Gordon, John 'Environmental Policy in Britain and Germany: Some 
Comparisons' European Environment vol.4, part 3, June 1994, (pp.9-12). 
8 In the first-past-the-post electoral system (or FPTP-system) the candidate 
who secures more votes than his/ her rivals wins the constituency seat. The 
. UK Green Party was founded in 1973 and was named 'Ecology Party' between 
1975 and 1985. 
9 Early environmental legislation included a law prohibiting the burning of 
sea coal. 
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Alkali Act which established a framework to control industrial 
processes that emitted hydrochloric acid. One century later, the 
British were the fIrst to respond to environmental pressures by 
adjusting their formal government structure: in 1970 they 
established a Department of the Environment (DoE). 
The establishment of the DoE (today DETR) was facilitated by 
the UK policy style and in particular by the UK-specifIc defInition 
of the term 'environment'. Under the environment, people in the 
UK understand a collection of issues which include architecture, 
town planning, local government administration and pollution 
control. The DoE was established to accommodate this wide 
range of policy matters. In this sense, the DoE concept resembles 
the EU environmental policy approach of policy 'integration'. 
However, environmental interests in the UK have tended to take a 
subordinate position in relation to other policy priorities such as 
housing and industrial development. lo A similar (integrative but 
also compromising) pattern applies to the territorial Scottish 
Office which deals with environmental policies in Scotland 
(outlined in detail in Chapter 5). EU environmental policy 
objectives have been processed accordingly throughout the UK: 
next to other (economic or social) interests, many EU 
environmental policies have lacked the support by UK actors 
necessary to ensure effective implementation. 
The 'Dirty Man" I 
To a certain extent, the UK has taken the environmental policy 
10 To illustrate the point, only 10% of the DoE staff deal with environmental 
matters. McCormick, John 'Environmental Politics' (pp.267-28--l) Patrick 
Dunleavy et al Development in British Politics 4 1993. 
11 Among others Stl'phen Young describes Britain as a 'dirty man' in The 
Politics of the Environment 199.3, (p.50). 
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lead in Europe, for instance by establishing environmental 
institutions and organisations and adopting legislation on air and 
water quality. However, these initiatives have represented 
piecemeal and 'reactive' rather than comprehensive and 
precautionary measures to pressing environmental problems. 
While UK measures signalled a beginning in the environmental 
policy area, they have never merged into a coherent and 
consistent policy pattern. Several informal determinants relating 
to the UK policy style and practices have contributed to the half-
hearted UK environmental policy. 
Firstly, UK political-administrative actors have followed a rather 
pragmatic policy approach. This short-term, step-by-step 
approach has had the advantage that only realistic goals have been 
envisaged and that UK policy-makers have committed themselves 
only to policies which they could confidently implement. On the 
other hand, UK 'pragmatists' have tended to plan for the 
immediate future only, have been reluctant to take on board 
scientific uncertainties and vague predictions and have found it 
difficult to pursue 'unnecessary' and 'radical' policies just because 
of unsubstantiated worries and public demands. Since many 
environmental problems are difficult to measure and predict, 
environmental policies have tended not to fit into the UK 
pragmatist mould. As far as EU environmental policies such as the 
Directive on large combustion plants are concerned, UK actors 
have perceived many of their preventive and stringent standards 
as unnecessary burdens which overstep UK marks. 'Ambitious' 
EU environmental policies have therefore been pursued bv UK 
actors with a certain reluctance or scepticism. 
Not far from the UK 'pragmatism' lies the often praised 
124 
'impartiality ethos' of the UK civil service. 12 UK administrators 
. have been described as committed professionals who implement 
legislation with a certain 'sense of neutrality'. 13 This professional 
neutrality should be advantageous for the pursuance of 
environmental objectives in general and EU environmental 
policies in particular . Yet, this 'neutrality' has had the effect that 
often the source of legislation, be it British or European, has been 
unknown. As a result, implementors could not clarify and 
coordinate policy objectives with the 'makers' of a policy. In 
addition, the impartiality ethos has been limited when it came to 
the implementation of environmental measures which UK 
administrators perceived as unnecessary or costly.14 Therefore, 
the impartiality ethos may have positively influenced the 
implementation of some individual EU environmental policies, but 
has been more likely to evaporate in the majority of other policy 
cases. 
Another explanation for the half-hearted UK environmental 
policy concerns the preference for voluntary action ill 
environmental matters. UK Governments and Conservative 
Governments in particular, have supported the general view that 
any restrictions to economic prosperity should be avoided and 
that UK citizens as well as the private and public sectors should 
12 Among others, Siedentopf and Ziller describe the UK 'impartiality ethos' in 
Making European Policies work. The Implementation of Community 
Legislation in the Member States 1988. 
13 Heinrich Siedentopf describes the 'Neutralitatsverstandnis' in Die 
Umsetzung des Gemeinschaftsrechts durch die Verwaltungen der 
Mitgliedsstaaten Europa-Institut, Universitat des Saarlandes, Saarbrlicken 
1990. 
14 The case study in Chapter 6 highlights the critical views of Scottish Office 
officials towards the EIA Directive. 
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not be forced to pay for 'costly' environmental objectives. This 
emphasis on voluntary action, however, has secured only a 
relatively small number of 'green' initiatives from individual 
citizens, NGOs, private companies and local authorities. As 
Stephen Young remarks, in the UK leaflets promoting 
environmental interests "are everywhere". 15 These and other 
voluntary initiatives, however, have not provided for consistent 
and effective environmental action in the UK. 
The policy approach of voluntary action together with the 
integrative defmition of the environment is reflected in the UK 
legal system (a formal determinant) and the way in which UK 
legislators and administrators have dealt with environmental 
policies. More recent EU environmental policies which are based 
on voluntary action and policy integration (e.g. 'eco-audit' and 
'eco-labelling' Regulations and the 'IPC' Directive) have been 
more compatible with UK political-administrative structures and 
legal instrument preferences than earlier EU environmental 
policies which focused on quantitative standards and strict 
qualitative regulations. UK administrators have therefore found 
the implementation of more recent EU environmental policies 
comparatively easy. 
With regard to legal instruments containing high quantitative or 
qualitative standards and preventive policy objectives, UK 
administrators and citizens have preferred to trust the self-healing 
potentials of the natural environment, i.e. the capability of nature 
to absorb diluted and dispersed polluting substances. 16 Soil, water 
15 Young, Stephen The Politics of the Environment 1993, (p.76). 
16 For example, UK actors have argued that fast-flowing rivers and the 
surrounding sea can absorb polluted water and that water quality legislation 
is therefore not necessary. 
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and air have been seen as free resources for waste disposal "until 
the moment of unacceptable harm or damage is reached".l? 
Despite an early interest in countryside issues (mentioned above), 
the overall UK policy style and approach towards environmental 
problems has been reactive rather than preventive. Action has 
been taken only when environmental damage became unbearable 
and when pollution incidents became potential threats to human 
health. As a result, many stringent and preventive EU 
environmental policies such as the Habitats Directive and water 
quality Directives have been pursued UK political-administrative 
actors only after considerable pressure from environmental 
interest groups and the EU Commission. 
One key reason why 'green' considerations could not take 
central stage in UK politics can be seen in the political-
administrative actors' inability (and reluctance) to completely open 
long-established lobbying networks to include environmental 
NGOs. Therefore, traditional political-administrative structures 
and informal relationships between actors have played a 
significant role in the setting of political priorities. While 
countryside lobbyists and 'clients' from industry and the farming 
community have maintained strong links with Westminster and 
Whitehall, new environmental NGOs have been generally looked 
upon with mistrust and scepticism. IS Only in recent years have 
17 Bohmer-Christiansen, Sonja 'Emerging International Principles of 
Environmental Protection and their Impact on Britain' (p.109) The 
Environmentalist vol.l 0, No.2, 1990 (pp.96-112). 
18 John Gordon contrasts UK and FRG attitudes towards 'outsiders': at an 
environmental conference, John Gummer (then Secretary of State for the 
Environment) refused to answer a question from the floor on the future of the 
THORP nuclear fuel processing plant. In contrast to his FRG colleague Klaus 
Topfer who did not shy away from controversial questions, Gummer argued 
that the decision concerning THORP was for him alone and therefore not a 
matter for public consultation. See 'Environmental Policy in Britain and 
127 
environmental NGOs gained more access to political-
administrative actors and are currently establishing themselves as 
influential campaigners and advisers on environmental matters in 
the UK. 
In terms of parliamentary representation, figure 4.1 highlights a 
major formal constitutional obstacle: environmentalists have not 
been able to enter the House of Commons due to the electoral 
system (FPTP-system) which has tended to give weight to either 
of the two mainstream parties, the Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party. For this reason, the UK Green Party has 
never gained as much political influence as its European 
counterparts, although it was the first political party in Europe to 
raise environmental concerns. Meanwhile, the Labour Party, the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have responded to the 
campaigns of environmental NGOs and have adopted 'green' 
issues in their party manifestos.1 9 The main parties have adjusted 
priorities and strategies slightly to accommodate environmental 
pressures. Minor changes have included, for instance, a few lines 
in party manifestos and a brief mentioning of environmental issues 
at party conferences. These changes have proven to be sufficient 
to satisfy the majority of party members and voters but have not 
provided for a strong environmental force in parliament which 
monitors the progress and effectiveness of EU environmental 
li · 20 -po cles. 
Germany: A Comparison' European Environment vol.4, part 3, June 1994, 
(pp.9-12). 
19 The main parties also responded to the 1989 European Parliament election 
result. The UK Greens gained 15% of the votes cast, however they did not 
win any EP seats because of the FPTP-system. 
20 For a detailed account see Robinson, Mike The Greening of British Party 
Politics Manchester University Press, Manchester 1992. See also i\laloney 
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Despite its forerunner position, the UK has pursued a half-
hearted environmental policy which has prompted observers to 
describe the UK as a 'dirty man'. Frequently, post-war UK 
governments have blocked the adoption of international and EU 
. environmental policies and have given the impression that 
environmental issues take second place in policy priorities. For 
instance, the UK initially vetoed the 1987 EC Directive on large 
combustion plants, installed only seven nitrogen dioxide 
monitoring stations compared to 200 in the FRG, and opposed 
Directives regulating water quality. The latter were considered as 
unnecessary by UK actors because of the UK's island situation 
and the self-healing potentials of its 'fast-flowing' rivers. 
Internationally, the UK joined the USA and Saudi Arabia to 
produce the worst records in preparation for the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development in Rio (1992), according to a 
consortium of more than 100 NGOS.21 Further, the UK initially 
delayed the signing of the biodiversity treaty and was reluctant to 
promote a new UN environmental body as a follow-up measure to 
the Rio Conference.22 Two UK initiatives, the International 
Conference on the ozone Layer in February 1989 and the 
inclusion of the environment on the G7 agenda in July 1989, 
could not counter the UK's image of a 'dirty man'. 
and Jordan who point out that in relation to other issues, only 4% of British 
adults nominate 'green' concerns as most important. 'Joining Public Interest 
Groups: Membership Profiles of Amnesty International and Friends of the 
Earth' (pp.1137-1153) in Lovenduski, Joni; Stanyer, Jeffrey (eds) 
Contemporary Political Studies vol. 3 , Political Studies Association, 
University of York 1995. 
21 McCormick, John 'Environmental Politics' Patrick Dunleavy et al 
Development in British Politics 4 1993, (pp.267-284). 
22 McCormick (p.276). 
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4.3 UK Governments and the Environment 
The half-hearted attitude towards environmental concerns IS 
reflected in the policy priorities and strategies of consecutive UK 
Governments in the last decades. From 1979 until 1997, 
Conservative Governments concentrated on a 'laissez-faire' 
economic policy which pushed environmental considerations to 
the side-line of UK politics. Avoiding economic obstacles, 
Conservative Governments relied upon voluntary environmental 
measures and tended to 'react' to pollution problems rather than 
innovate policy reforms. 23 This initial perspective did not change 
significantly in the following years; the environmental issue was 
merely accommodated as a low-priority policy area. The formal 
restructuring of UK government (culminating in the loss of many 
administrative powers to the private sector) together with the 
voluntary action approach aggravated pollution control and other 
environmental measures. However, the privatisation process 
implied also positive consequences for the environment. Due to 
public scrutiny and (then) EC alertness the privatisation process 
. of water and electricity could only be pursued in conjunction with 
the adoption of more stringent environmental measures. 
Accommodating pressures from the (then) EC level and UK 
environmental NGOs for more environmental consideration, 
prime minister Thatcher (1979-1992) initiated a moderate shift in 
policy which was taken up by subsequent Conservative 
23 In 'Transition or Transformation? - Environmental Policy under Thatcher' 
Andrew Blowers elaborates on the conflict between the Thatcher philosophy 
of deregulation and privatisation on the one hand and environmental 
problems on the other. Public Administration vo1.65, Autumn 1987. (pp.277-
294). 
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Governments and, indeed, the Labour Government under Tony 
Blair. Learning her lesson from an unpopular comment at the 
annual conference of the Scottish Conservative Party in May 
1982, describing environmental issues as "humdrum", Mrs 
Thatcher stated in 1988 that protecting nature was "one of the 
great challenges of the late twentieth Century". 2.+ She further 
demonstrated her change in attitude by replacing the Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Sir Nicholas Ridley, with the more 
sympathetic Chris Patten. Mrs Thatcher also created and chaired a 
Cabinet committee which prepared a White Paper on the 
environment. The 1990 White Paper titled This Common 
Inheritance' signified the UK Government's half-hearted approach 
towards environmental policies in so far as it contained a mix of 
fundamental as well as minor policy proposals. One of the White 
Paper's key policies was the energy efficiency policy which 
included a ministerial committee dealing with global warming. 
The Paper also included elaborate sections on issues such as 
protecting Cathedrals and abandoned shopping trolleys. As far as 
car traffic pollution was concerned, the Government suggested 
"adopting less aggressive driving habits to save fuel" and "keeping 
cars well tuned". 25 Due to tensions between sectoral interests 
inside the Cabinet and Whitehall,26 the White Paper turned out to 
24 Statement from a speech at the Royal Society, September 1988. 
25 Moreover, the Government considered it necessary to include the following 
statement in the White Paper on the environment: "The Government 
welcomes the continuing widening of car ownership as an important aspect of 
personal freedom and choice. The speed and flexibility of motoring make it 
indispensable for much business travel, which in turn is vital for the 
economy." 
26 In particular, transport and finance interests clashed with e~vironme~tal 
objectives of earlier White Paper drafts. In 1998, John Prescott taced Sl mllar 
problems with his White Paper on the environment which was delayed due to 
internal disagreements on policy priorities. 
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be only a moderate Government policy on the environment. Yet 
despite the shortcomings, the White Paper represented a potential 
stepping stone for more environmental policy commitments. 
John Major followed in Mrs Thatcher's footsteps: environmental 
issues were neither at the top of the political agenda, nor could 
John Major completely ignore pressures for more environmental 
action. One major policy change occurred during his premiership 
with the introduction of 'green' fiscal instruments such as the 
landfill tax. Moreover, less ambitious road building plans towards 
the end of John Major's term in office, i.e. the reduction of road 
building expenditure from over £8 billion (3 year budget until 
1996) to £6 billion (3 year budget until 1999),27 indicated a 
response to increased traffic pollution and heightened public 
awareness. 
Tony Blair's Labour Government has followed its predecessors' 
environmental policy line by taking up the fiscal policy as a 
convenient means to tackle pollution.28 Occasionally, the Labour 
Government has demonstrated a keen interest in environmental 
matters. For instance, in February 1998 the Labour Government 
proposed new housing development plans for 'brown field' sites 
instead of 'green field' sites, thereby avoiding further destruction 
of the countryside. In June 1998 the Labour Government 
published a white paper on transport which proposes charges for 
the use of roads and parking. The charges should deter motorists 
27 'Road Protests. Victory' The Economist 25 January 1997, (pp.31/32). 
28 Fiscal policies are used as another source of public income and as a tool 
which encourages 'green' behaviour. Examples include proposals on 59'r V A T 
on energy saving products for low income families and a tax on water 
pollution for firms. See 'Brown puts focus on pollution and energy' The 
Independent 26.November 1997, (p.18). 
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from using their cars and encourage them instead to use public 
transport. However, other examples such as the Government's 
earlier decision in July 1997 not to oppose major road building 
projects have signalled that the Labour Government is not 
prepared to undertake radical environmental policy reforms in the 
near future. The Labour Government's initiatives have to date not 
merged into a coherent and effective environmental policy which 
takes account of sustainable development. Environmental 
considerations are not fully integrated into other (economic and 
social) policy areas and more recent Labour Government 
initiatives do not signal the beginning of a new stringent UK 
environmental policy that would pave the way for EU 
environmental policies in future. It is therefore not surprising that 
the Labour Government's environmental policy has been described 
by environmentalists and the media alike as 'pale green'. 29 
In sum, a combination of formal and informal determinants have 
influenced the development and conduct of environmental policy 
. in the UK. Environmental matters have been processed in a 
pragmatic manner which has tended to exclude long-term, less 
tangible EU environmental policy objectives. In addition, UK 
policy-makers and administrators have focused on policies which 
react to (rather than prevent) environmental problems. They have 
relied upon voluntary environmental action and have been 
reluctant to open traditional lobbying networks to include new, 
'green' lobby groups. At the parliamentary level, environmental 
interests have received limited support from politicians. On the 
29 Chancellor Gordon Brown's 1998 budget is described as 'pale green' in 
'Environment and transport: Green Gordon' The Economist 21. March 1998, 
(pAl ). 
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other hand, a traditional interest in the countryside and early 
problems with industrialisation encouraged UK citizens to become 
forerunners m a number of environmental policies and 
organisations. While the UK has paved the way in some respects 
for other states and the EU, UK citizens and politicians have not 
utilised their forerunner position to establish a 'model' 
environmental policy which ensures sustainable development. 
Instead, the UK has suffered from the image of the 'dirty man of 
Europe' which was aggravated by the Conservative Governments' 
'laissez-faire' economic policy. Despite attempts by Tony Blair's 
Government to improve the UK environmental policy, more 
commitment will be required to eliminate the 'dirty man' image m 
the near future. 
Figure 4.1: The UK Layer and Environmental Policy 
Fonnal Detenninants: 
*Centralised state system facilitates swift transposition of EU policy; constitution based on 
long evolution, combining tradition and ability to conduct (radical) policy changes; FYrP 
electoral system restricts parliamentary access for environmentalists. 
*Political-administrative structures allow integrated environmental policy approach and 
coordination with other policy areas; however, constraints for pol.-adm. actors who pursue 
radical environ. policies; also closed and traditional lobbying network., restricted access for 
'green' NGOs. 
*Legal system and instruments provide large discretionary room for administrators; 
preference for broad integrative environ. policies. 
Infonnal Detenninants: 
*Traditionall early interest in environ. protection partly because of early pollution incidents; 
however, over-reliance on voluntary and end-of-pipe solutions to environ. problems; not a 
top-priority among electorates. 
* Environmental issues accommodated by policy-makers to a certain extent; often competing 
with other (econ. laissez faire) policy priorities. 
* In tenns of relationships, political-administrative actors coordinate! compromise policy 
areas; closed lobbying network, sceptical towards 'green' outsiders. 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
4.4 Environmental Politics and Policy in the FRG: 
'Latecomer' and 'Green Man' 
Environmental policies in the FRG, too, have been shaped by 
the formal constitutional setting as well as informal circumstances 
within the national layer. The FRG has often been described as a 
state with an activist attitude (and policy) towards the 
environment. 30 However, in comparison with the UK, the interest 
in pollution problems has been a relatively recent phenomenon in 
the FRG. This is partly due to the fact that the German industrial 
revolution commenced after British industrialisation and that 
environmental problems became noticeable in Germany some time 
after the fIrst pollution incidents in the UK. Other explanations for 
-the comparatively recent, but at the same time more rigorous, 
'green' approach in the FRG point towards other formal and 
informal determinants which are listed in fIgure 4.2. 
The Latecomer 
In comparison with UK environmental legislation which dates 
back to the 13th Century, the fIrst German measure to control 
pollution was introduced in 1845 with the Prussian General Trade 
Ordinances (Gewerbeordnung).31 The late adoption of the 
30 Among others, Sbragia describes the FRG's activist position/ image in EU 
environmental policy-making in 'Environmental policy: The push-pull 
policy-making' (pp.235-255) Wallace and Wallace Policy-making in the 
European Union Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996. Heritier et al 
evaluate (and qualify) the conventional perception that the FRG is an acti vist 
state in environmental policy in Die Veranderung von Staatlichkeit in 
Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, GroBbritannien und 
Frankreich Leske + Budrich, 1994. 
31 The environmental measures were part of a general check on trade 
practices and were considered within the local authoritie~' discretionary 
powers. For more information see Weale, Albert et al ContI·.olh~g Pol.lu~lOn III 
the Round. Change and Choice in Environmental RegulatIon In Bntalll and 
Germany Anglo-German Foundation Project 1991. 
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environmental issue was not only due to Germany's comparatively 
late industrialisation, but also due the ongoing dispute over formal 
competencies between the Reich Government and Confederal 
States which prompted polluters to take environmental measures 
in their own hands. Facing severe river pollution, representatives 
from the agricultural and industrial sectors had a commercial 
interest in clean water and established common water quality 
standards which would apply throughout the German Reich.32 
In the fIrst half of this Century, environmental matters did not 
receive much attention due to National Socialism and two World 
Wars which dominated and devastated Germany. Only after the 
alarming side-effects of the 1950s' FRG economic miracle 
(,Wirtschaftswunder') became apparent, did German citizens 
notice environmental problems. Again, initiatives to combat 
pollution came mainly from the Lander level, predominantly from 
North Rhine Westphalia which suffered most under the side 
. effects of industrial activities. The pollution issue was eventually 
taken up at the Federal level: the SPD under Willy Brandt 
campaigned for "blue skies over the Ruhr" during its 1961 Federal 
I · . 33 e ectlOn campaIgn. --
One of the key formal reasons behind the late adoption of an 
environmental policy lies obviously in the traditional separation of 
government levels which has often resulted in disputes over 
competencies and has hindered the progress of many 
environmental policies including EU environmental policies. The 
.12 Water control initiatives such as the 'Emscher Genossenschaft' were set up 
by local authorities and industry. 
33 "Blauer Himmel tiber der Ruhr" cited in Malunat, Bernd [\1. 'Die 
Umweltpolitik der BRD' Aus Politik LInd Zeitgeschichte B49fl)4, 9. Decemh~r 
1994, (pp.3-12). 
136 
separation of political-administrative competencies continues to 
this day: established in 1949, the FRG is based on a written 
constitution which provides for checks and balances between the 
executive, the judiciary and the legislature as well as the Federal 
and Lander government levels. The Federal Parliament 
(Bundestag) shares decision-making powers with the Lander 
which are represented in the regional chamber (Bundesrat). In 
addition to the balancing of Lander and Federal competencies, 
judicial review can scrutinise policies adopted in the FRG. Federal 
as well as Lander legislation is adopted in the form of Acts of 
Parliament (Gesetze), Regulations (Rechtsverordnungen), and 
Administrative Instructions (V erwaltungsvorschriften). 
Focusing on formal political-administrative structures, the FRG 
constitution manifests and emphasises the vertical separation of 
competencies as well the sharing of powers between government 
levels. Consequently, political-administrative actors at subnational 
and local levels have taken a great interest in protecting their 
areas of autonomy. In other words, formal conditions have had an 
impact on informal perceptions. Apart from protecting their 
. autonomy in decision-making, subnational and local implementors 
have tended not to report to government levels above on policy 
performances. 34 For the implementation of EU environmental 
policies, this lack of communication has been particularly 
unfavourable: since most of them have required implementation 
on the ground, EU policy-makers as well as national (and 
q Strictly speaking, they are not required to report to s~perior le\els .. For 
instance when asked about further details concerning the practIcal 
implem~ntation of the EIA Directive, the Bavarian r-..linistry for .. the 
Environment did not have information from regional/ local authontlcs 
Written correspondence, 7. January 1997. 
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subnational) implementors have been left ill the dark over the 
effectiveness of policies. 
Apart from cutting across government levels, EU environmental 
policies have tended to cut across policy sectors which, in the 
case of the FRG, have enjoyed considerable independence from 
each other. In comparison with UK horizontal structures and 
institutions, FRG environmental institutions and agencies in 
particular have been able to pursue ambitious policies without 
compromising environmental objectives and glvmg way to 
immediate pressures from other sectors. On the other hand, the 
independence of sectoral institutions has resulted in a lack of 
. communication and cooperation. In the case of environmental 
policies, this gap has hindered the wide-spread adoption and 
integration of environmental objectives into other policy areas. 
Yet many EU environmental policies such as the IPe and EIA 
Directives explicitly promote the integration of environmental 
considerations into other policy areas. Faced with the fragmented 
nature of FRG political-administrative structures, their 
implementation has been cumbersome and often disappointing. 
In order to function properly, the fragmented and 
compartmentalised FRG political-administrative system has had to 
rely on a policy style which is based on consensus and conciliation 
of policy sectors and government levels. This conciliatory 
approach has not only prevented political paralysis, it also has 
ensured that policies are more acceptable for a wide spectrum of 
actors. On the other hand, the search for consensus has caused 
decision-making and the subsequent implementation of policies to 
be slow. Environmental matters in particular. which tend to affect 
other policy areas such as transport. have had to be proce\ .... L,d 
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through complicated consensus mechanisms. Environmental 
policies from the ED level, too, have had to face the scrutiny of 
'affected' actors. The perceived right to assess and approve (or 
reject) every policy has often delayed the implementation of ED 
environmental policies. Moreover, FRG implementors have 
tended to re-shape 'policies from Brussels' to suit their policy 
preferences. Consequently, the implementation of many EU 
environmental policies has been delayed in the FRG or failed to 
reach policy targets, according to Commission officials and 
environmental NGOs.35 
The Green Man 
Despite the fact that the FRG political system was relatively 
slow in addressing environmental problems, a mix of long-
established formal and informal determinants, highlighted in figure 
4.2, contributed to the establishment of a comparatively rigorous 
environmental policy. Firstly, as part of wider societal changes, 
attitudes towards environmental protection were influenced 
significantly by the 'new social movements' (Neue Soziale 
Bewegungen) of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.36 NSMs raised 
environmental concern and put 'green' issues on the agenda of 
politicians and the media. The new emphasis on environmental 
protection was facilitated further by the FRG electoral system37 (a 
35 See for instance ECl Case C-396/92 where both the Commission and the 
Bund Naturschutz criticise the FRG Government over the late and 
insufficient implementation of the EIA Directive (85/337/EEC). 
36 They highlighted a variety of issues such as acid rain, the construction of 
motorways and airport runways, and the dangers associated with nuclear 
energy. Anti-nuclear protests under the banner of "Atomkr~\ft nein danke" 
targeted nuclear plants such as Whyl near Freiburg, 13rokdorf near Hamburg. 
the 'fast breeder' in Kalkar, and Wackersdorf in Bavaria. 
37 The FRG electoral system combines FPTP and proportional representation 
(PR): one half of MPs are elected \\ithin their constituencies on a direct 
majority basis, the other half are 'party lists' candidates and are eiL'cted \"1<.1 
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formal determinant) which helped the FRG Green Party enter the 
Bundestag in 1983 for the fIrst time with 27 MPS.~8 The Greens' 
success not only shocked the main parties, the Christian-
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social-Democratic Part\' 
(SPD), it also threatened the very existence of the small FOP. 
While the three parties adjusted their party manifestos 
accordingly, 'Die Grunen' changed the political landscape in the 
FRG considerably, forming 'red-green' Lander governments with 
the SPD in Hesse, Berlin, Lower Saxony and North Rhine 
Westphalia. In October 1998, 'Die Grunen' even achieved a 'red-
green' coalition government with the SPD at the Federal level and 
replaced the Christian-Liberal Government under Helmut Kohl. 
Overall, environmental objectives have enjoyed comparatively 
strong public and parliamentary support which has ultimately 
contributed towards some radical environmental policies inside 
the FRG and influenced the EU in adopting some stringent EU 
environmental policies such as the Directive on large combustion 
plants. 39 
The FRG policy style and practices contributed towards a more 
'rigorous' environmental policy. In particular, the FRG-specific 
defmition of the term 'environment' (Umwelt) has meant that 
environmental objectives have been pursued in a 'concentrated' 
manner. However, while the apparent separation between 
PR. The system allows small and new political parties. to enter the 
parliamentary stage or, at least, threaten the positions of established parties. 
38 In order to avoid unnecessary fragmentation and disruption, the electoral 
system includes a '5% hurdle' which small parties have to o\ercome in orLier 
to enter the Bundesta£ or Uinder parliaments. 
39 It has to be said though that environmental considerations were not the 
only motives behind the FRG policy on the LCP Directi\e. E~onolllic Ie\L'I-
playing-field considerations (i.e. committing other .i\kmh~r Statest~) the 
sallle stringent standards) also played a major role 111 the f·RG pO'>ltJon. 
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environmental and other policy areas has facilitated the adoption 
of a number of far-reaching environmental policies, the 
environmental policy as a whole has suffered because 'green' 
issues have often been considered on their own without taking 
into account wider contexts and other (economic) interests. This 
non-holistic perspective has resulted in many environmental 
policies having only limited impact. Nevertheless, the 
discretionary room and 'creativity' of environmental political-
administrative actors has also meant that some radical FRG 
policies have been models for ED environmental policies such as 
the introduction of catalytic converters for cars and lead-free 
petrol. 
More radical environmental policies have been adopted not only 
because of the discretionary room the environmental policy sector 
has enjoyed. Radical policies have also responded to an informal 
attitude towards environmental protection which has been 
described by Bohmer-Christiansen and Skea as 'anxiety' or 'Angst' 
over environmental threats. 40 Concerns over pollution and 
environmental deterioration have been more intense in the densely 
populated FRG than III many other European states. 
Environmental problems such as the Chernobyl accident and the 
much-publicised 'Waldsterben' ('dying forests') hit a raw nerve 
with FRG citizens, leading to vociferous calls for 'green' policic\ 
and increased pressures on political-administrative actors to act. 
This Angst has influenced the development of environmental 
policies in so far as many policy objecti\'t~s ha\'c been more 
.to Bohmer-Christiansen and Skea highlight the FRG pollution · ... \ngst' in ,\,:id 
Politics: Environmental and Energy Policies in Britain and German\ 
Belhaven Press, London 1991. 
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substantial and far-reaching than in other EU Member States (and. 
in fact, the UK). Yet, the FRG's preparedness to adopt stringent 
environmental standards without scientific backing has not 
resulted in a policy that would substantially change behavioural 
patterns in the FRG. That is to say patterns of production and 
consumption that would ensure sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, the FRG 'Angst' has had the advantage that EU 
environmental policies have not faced obstacles of acceptance as 
has been the case in the UK. 
In order to tackle environmental 'threats', the FRG has focused 
on legal instruments which specify regulatory and (subsidised) 
technological policy solutions. The promotion of the 'state of the 
art' (in German: 'Stand der Technik') and the regulatory approach 
(as opposed to voluntary action) continue to dominate the FRG 
-environmental policy. Both approaches are most evident in the 
nuclear sector where FRG citizens have been reassured that 
nuclear accidents are impossible under strict regulations and 
modern technological-scientific management. Over the years, 
political-administrative actors and experts have developed an 
expertise and a certain perfectionism in applying and monitoring 
'end-of-pipe' technologies. On the other hand, FRG actors have 
been reluctant to alter their perspective in favour of a less 
technology-orientated approach. More importantly, FRG actors 
have found it difficult to accept EU environmental standards 
which depart from their own standards. As a result. many' E l' 
qualitative and quantitative requirements (such as water quality 
requirements) have not been implemented properly because of 
technical discrepancies. In addition, FRG implcmentors have 
taken the liberty to fill, what they percei\'ed as, lcgislati\c gaps 
1.+2 
with technical and legalistic details where EU Directih~~ are 
silent. However, by doing so, FRG implementors have tended to 
change the actual character of many EU policies. In the case of 
the EIA Directive, this 'perfectionism' has culminated in the 
criticism that FRG legislators over-shot their marks: in two legal 
cases (C431192 and C396/92) the ECJ pointed out that the FRG 
. specification of project categories was detailed but failed to 
mention many important project types which effectively excluded 
them from FRG legislation. 41 
Despite this and other disputes, the FRG has presented itself 
nationally and internationally as an environmentally conscious 
advocate of high 'green' standards, often much to the annoyance 
of other EU Member States. 42 However, while politicians in the 
FRG have promoted a 'green advocate' image and have 
introduced some of the most stringent environmental measures, 
many environmental policies have originated from econonuc 
'd . 41 cons! eratlOns - or have been a response to obvious 
environmental problems and public pressure. The FRG has not 
been the environmental 'Musterknabe' (paragon) as portrayed by 
many politicians. To illustrate the point, the late establishment of 
the Federal Ministry for the Environment (Bundesministerium fUr 
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, BMU) was not the 
-II C431/92 concerned the extension of a power station in Grol3krotzenburg. 
Hessen; C396/92 concerned the extension of the motor way 'B 15 neu' in 
Bavaria. 
42 Bohmer-Christiansen and Skea describe the UK Government's anger O\'t'r 
the FRG Government's aggressive strategy during negotiations of tht' 'Largt' 
Combustion Plants' Directive in Acid Politics: Environmental and Lnt'r~\ 
Policies in Britain and Germany Belhaven Press. London Il)l) I. 
43 For instance, economic and competition considerations moti\att'd tht' FRG 
to commit other EC Member States to the same standards a" tht' 
'Bundesimmissionsschutz-Gesetz' (Federal Law on Emission Standards). 
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result of a well-planned and fully committed adjustment of formal 
structures to tackle environmental problems. Rather, its creation 
was a 'panic reaction' to a major environmental crisis (the 1986 
Chernobyl nuclear accident) which subsequently caused a political 
crisis (the Federal Government was criticised over its inadequate 
handling of the accident). 
Stringent FRG environmental legislation and standards have not 
concealed the fact that the FRG has been one of the worst 
polluting countries in the world.44 Moreover, the economic strains 
of the 1990s have put a damper on the environmental policy, 
despite the political success of 'Die Grtinen' and NSMs. 
Particularly, German Unification and obligations associated with 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)45 have pushed 
environmental considerations to the side-line of FRG politics. 
Economic and social policy objectives are now at the top of the 
FRG priority list with the effect that many environmental policy 
adjustments of the 1970s and 1980s are watered-down and many 
EU environmental policy objectives are neglected to eliminate any 
obstacles against the 'Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland,.-+6 It 
44 In this context, 'energy consumption' serves as an indicator: with over 30 
barrels of oil per head in 1991, the FRG was just behind the USA (over 50) in 
terms of energy consumption. UN source in The Economist 'A Survey of 
Energy', 18 June 1996. 
45 In order to enter the third stage of EMU (establishing a European Sy"tem 
of Central Banks, a European Central Bank and a single currency), Member 
States must comply with the following criteria: price stability with an average 
inflation rate of not more than 1.5% of the 3 best performing Member States 
over a one year period; no excessive public spending (deticit not more than 
3% of GDP); the total government debt should not be more than 60Ck of ~he 
GDP; a stable currency with an exchange rate tluctuating within the margin" 
of +- 2.25% (within the ERM for at least 2 years); and a\'L~rage nominal long-
term interest rates not exceeding more than 2S'C of the -' best pertllrmlOg 
Member States. 
-1(, English translation: 'Economic location Germany' or 'powerhou"c 
Germany'. 
remains to be seen whether the new 'red-green' coalition 
government under Gerhard Schroder will steer FRG politics back 
to environmental priorities despite continuing economic pressures. 
Considering that the new Federal Chancellor Schroder is adamant 
to boost the FRG's economic confidence, it is unlikely that the 
FRG will return to a (truly) 'green man' position. 
4.5 FRG Governments and the Environment 
Former Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Government 
colleagues were at the forefront of portraying the FRG as a 'green' 
state. Following a Social-Liberal Government initiative, Christian-
Liberal Governments adopted the environmental principles of the 
1971 Environmental Programme47 and took up environmental 
policy ideas which had been in the pipeline at the time of 
government change-over in 1982. The 'large combustion plants' 
legislation, in particular, signalled a start in the Christian-Liberal 
environmental policy and was a response to the alarming media 
coverage of the 'dying forests'. While FRG Governments under 
Helmut Kohl pursued some of the most ambitious environmental 
policies, their environmental commitment was soon questioned by 
the public. Interior Minister Zimmermann's mishandling of the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident m particular, highlighted the 
Governments' inability to cope with major environmental 
problerns.48 Walter Wallmann, the first Minister for the 
.17 The Brandt Government presented an environmental programme in 1971 
which established for the tirst time a set of environmental principles: the 
. precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, and th~ c(~)pe~ation 
principle. For more information see Mi.ill.e~, E~da, SOZial-hberal 
Umweltpolitik. Von der Karriere eines neuen PolItlkberelchs (pp.3-15) \lh 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte 47-48/89, 17. November 1989 . 
.IS The Chernobyl accident caused a political crisis in t~e FRG wl.1ich Wd' 
later resolved with the establishment of a 11l?\\ ministry tor the eIl\'lronment 
(the BMU) in 1986. 
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Environment heading the BMD, was new to the environmental 
policy area and was soon criticised over his handling of incidents 
such as the Sandoz frre. 49 From 1987 onwards, Wallmann's 
successor, Klaus Topfer, assumed a more pro-active approach. 
However, Topfer's symbolic commitment towards the 
environmental cause50 could not disguise the low priority stance 
of his Ministry which received only 0.3% of the Federal Budget. 51 
Nevertheless, while Topfer was in office, the FRG established a 
number of 'green' policies such as the plastic bottle policy (a 
recycling system similar to the recycling policy in Denmark) and 
the 'Griine Punkt' recycling scheme for packaging waste of 
consumer goods.52 The 'Griine Punkt' policy in particular 
encouraged the ED to consider similar policies on waste and 
packaging. 
FRG Governments have established some of the most stringent 
environmental policies in Europe. At the same time, these 
measures have fallen short of a coherent environmental policy 
which controls the negative impacts of the FRG 'power house'. 
Moreover, FRG Governments have tended to react to public 
pressure rather than initiate policies which ensure sustainable 
49 The fire at the Sandoz factory near BasIe posed pollution and health threats 
to citizens living in the Southern part of Germany. 
50 For instance, to demonstrate that government measures had improved the 
water quality of rivers, Tbpfer invited the media to watch him swimming in 
the Rhine. 
51 Data taken from Weidner, Helmut 'Die Umweltpolitik der konscnati\'-
liberalen Regierung. Eine vorWutige Bilanz' (pp.16-28) Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 47-48/89, 17. November 1989. Ministers for the EO\ir.onme~t 
do not enjoy a veto right (similar to the Finance Minister's \ Cll) nght) tn 
policy areas which affect en\ironmental interests. 
52 Under the 'GrUne Punkt' scheme producers are obliged to fund a 'dual 
system' which collects packaging waste and eithcr recycles the 1l);llcrial or 
disposes it in an environmentally sensible way. 
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development in the FRG. Critics of the Kohl Government in office 
until October 1998 would argue that environmental principles 
. existed on paper but not in practice. For instance, many FRG 
policies relied on a technical 'end-of-pipe' strategy which runs 
counter the FRG principle of pollution prevention. Also, in the 
light of an ever growing mountain of waste in the FRG, 'polluters' 
have obviously not paid the price for environmental damage 
despite the introduction of the 'GrUne Punkt' and other recycling 
schemes. Although the FRG possesses some of the most stringent 
environmental standards, the environment itself continues to 
deteriorate. 53 In the light of German Unification and European 
Integration, the Kohl Government focused on other policy 
priorities such as transport. Road and air traffic developments 
. already overstepped forecast marks prior to the Unification. 54 
Despite an alarming increase in traffic and its pollution impacts, 
the Kohl Government committed itself to several large-scale 
projects intended to connect infrastructures in Eastern and 
Western Europe. Investments on public transport technology 
could not counter the fact that the current Infrastructure Plan 
(until 2012) is the most ambitious plan since the end of the 
Second World War. 55 It remains to be seen whether 'Die GrUnen' 
53 For more information see, among others, Malunat, Bernd M 'Die 
Umweltpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' (pp.3-12) Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte B49/94, 9. December 1994. 
)4 The scope of road traffic predicted in the Federal Tra~lic Infra~tructllre 
Plan of 1985 for the year 2000 had already been exhausted In 19~6. hlr more 
details see Wissmann, Matthias (Fed. Minister of Transport) 'Ger~~l11 
Transport Policy after Unification' (pp.453--l58) Transport yol.~S,\. :\(1.6, 
1994. 
)5 With over OM 200 billion the Federal Government is funding 12.()()() km 
of new projects and extensions of roads and motOf\\'ays whidl,. it i~ h(lpC~, 
will further l~enerate and strengthen the FRG economy. Intnrmatlon .trom Dt:r 
Buml Natur:chutz informiert: Verkehrspolitik. Totalschaden~ BU;,\[) kaflet 
(author Richard Mergner, no date). 
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(as partners of the new 'red-green' coalition Go\'ernment) can 
press for more radical environmental policies which will shift the 
FRG's political and economic landscape towards a more 
sustainable society. Given that the FRG political-administrative 
system is so fragmented and that the policy process is so slow in 
. seeking consensus among policy sectors and government levels, it 
is unlikely that the 'red-green' coalition will bring about a 
substantial change in FRG environmental policy. There are other 
obstacles that could hinder a 'deep green' policy. Already, the 
'red-green' Government's policy to phase-out nuclear energy in the 
FRG has faced severe obstacles from the nuclear sector lobby. 
The nuclear sector refuses to cooperate and threatens to re-Iocate 
to neighbouring Eastern European countries. The Government 
has so far failed to solve the problem of nuclear accident threats. 
In sum, the FRG features a complex and to a certain extent 
ambitious environmental policy. Environmental matters have 
received much informal public and parliamentary attention due to 
the perceived environmental threats and the support from NSMs 
and the FRG electoral system. Yet, the formal constitutional 
setting and political-administrative structures have contributed to 
the comparatively slow progress in adopting and, more 
importantly, implementing environmental policies. In addition, 
political-administrative structures have been inflexible to policy 
priority changes as well as 'instructions from outside' (in particular 
from the EU). Horizontal and vertical gaps in the political-
administrative structures have provided environmental actors with 
considerable discretion and non-interference from other ..;cctor", 
The FRG 'compartmentalism' has also been detrimental to 
environmental policy integration into other policy scctors which 
148 
has been one of the main objectives of ED environmental policy_ 
FRG policy-makers have accepted and adopted some ambitious 
environmental objectives without necessarily relying upon 
scientific evidence. However, this preparedness to go beyond 
scientific proof has not always guaranteed the policies' successful 
implementation at a later stage. The FRG's technological expertise 
has been beneficial for the pursuance of some ED environmental 
objectives (such as installing N02 monitoring stations). Yet, this 
. over-reliance on technological solutions has neglected other, non-
technical solutions to environmental problems. Overall, the FRG 
has not fully lived up to its image of a 'green' state. In fact, the 
economic pressures of the 1990s have put a damper on the FRG's 
commitment towards national and ED environmental policies. As 
one observer commented: "the [environmental] situation [in the 
FRG] has improved only marginally, in many respects it has 
d . d " 56 etenorate even more . 
B d M 'Die L1mwcltpolitik der 56 Translation by author. i\lalunat, ern - _ _ - l'.' '. 
d bl -k D t· 'hl'lnd' (pp 1- 1'1) Alls Polluk lind Zeltl,l:sLhlLhte Bun esrepu 1 ell sc L -,-
B49/94, 9. December 1994. 
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Figure 4.2: The FRG Layer and Environmental Policy 
r 
r 
Formal Determinants: 
~ [R] *Written constitution stipulates complicated federal state systems with 'checks and balances' rendering policy changes and EU policy transposition! implementation 
difficult; on the other hand, mixed FPTP-PR electoral system which allows parliamentary 
access for environmentalists. 
* Political-administrative structures fragmented and compartmentalised; complex sharing 
of powers with vertical and horizontal gaps in communication and coordination; 
lobbying network more open to environmental groups. 
Informal Determinants: 
* Attitudes towards environ. protection developed comparatively late but more rigorous 
partly due to 'Angst' and strong influence ofNSMs and 'green' NGOs. 
*Policy priorities and strategies responded to Angst with concept that stringent standards 
imply environ. and econ. benefits; however, with unification and econ. pressures cut of 
environ. 'red tape' to facilitate econ. development. 
*Policy style and practices influenced by 'exclusive' definition of environment and 
technologicall regulatory perfectionism; policies scrutinised at all levels. 
* Relationships rely upon consent, yet often confrontations when receiving policy 
'instructions from outside'. 
4.6 Conclusion: An Assessment and Comparison of EU and 
National Layers 
With the help of the multi-layered implementat ion map and 
particularly the determinant categories, the Chapter has lk"LTibcd 
how two (EU member) states have developed and pur"ued their 
own environmental policies and how these policie" have orten 
been incompatible with Ell environmental policic". Till' '-II',,! 
Il11dil1~ therl'fore cmpha\isL's the di"LTL'P~\I1Cy hL'twccl1 1l~1! lonal and 
'-
I ~() 
National layers ha did ye eve ope and pursued distinct 
environmental policies which have not always been in line with 
EU environmental policies 
It is true to say that the EU, UK and FRO have shared some 
. common ground in the environmental policy area. Actors in the 
EU and national layers have acknowledged the necessity to adopt 
and implement environmental policies. They have been committed 
to more or less the same environmental principles (precautionary 
principle, polluter pays principle etc.) and have sought to 
accommodate environmental interests in a society which IS 
orientated towards economic and material prosperity. Secondly, 
actors in EU and national layers (national government ministers 
and representatives, Commission officials, EU and national 
experts etc.) have participated in the EU environmental policy-
making process and have sought to influence policy decisions as 
much as possible. In this respect, EU environmental policies must 
have been, at least to a certain extent, compatible with Member 
States and their environmental policies. However, the complex 
and diverse dimension of the EU has also contributed an outside 
impetus to national policies (i.e. they 'Europeanised' national 
policies). While the FRO and UK have adapted to EU pressures, 
the 'European impetus' has also brought elements 'foreign' to the 
national layers which were ultimately incompatible with formal 
and informal conditions. As a result, many EU environmental 
policies have faced various formal and informal obstacles inside 
the national layers which have hindered the implementation of Elf 
environmental policies. 
By and large, the UK and FRG have featured their O\\'n, 
distinct, environmental policies which hoWL' <.kpcnded upon, and 
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have been shaped by, complex and unique mixes of formal and 
informal determinants inside the national layers.)7 EU 
environmental policies have therefore faced a number informal 
and formal obstacles which have occurred in the form of different 
policy priorities, strategies and policy styles (i.e. informal 
determinants), as well as incompatible political-administrative 
structures and legal systems (i.e. formal determinants). These 
determinants have made the implementation of EU environmental 
. policies difficult. 
EU environmental policies often clash with informal determinants 
such as policy-makers' priorities and strategies as well as policy 
styles and practices within the national layers 
Actors in the EU and national layers have been involved in the 
balancing of informal policy priorities and strategies which has 
required the coordination of essentially two (conflicting) interests: 
environmental protection and economic prosperity. However, 
while all three layers have sought to consolidate environmental 
and economic interests, the input of economic considerations has 
differed considerably between the layers. At the EU level, the 
'level-playing-field' consideration has played a significant role in 
the production of EU environmental policies. In contrast, UK 
(Conservative) Governments, have pursued a laissez-faire 
economic policy which has by and large pushed the regulation of 
environmental standards to the side-line of priorities. Since the 
57 This research confirms Weale's argument that the national conlnt i" d 
more important influence on environmental politics and POlICY than are 
common secular trends (in contrast, Jaenicke argues that there I" a COl11l11on. 
cross-national pattern in the development of environmental policy) Sl'l' 
Weale et al 'Environmental Administration in si\ European States: Send.ar 
Convergence or National Distinctiveness')' Public Administration \01. I 
Summer 1996, (pp.255-27..1-). 
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early 1990s (and until October 1998), FRG Governments under 
Helmut Kohl focused on the 'Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland' 
policy which put a damper on many environmental priorities. This 
economic priority is unlikely to change in the near future with the 
new Schroder Government. In the light of these divergent national 
economic strategies, many EU environmental policies which were 
intended to harmonise and regulate 'polluting' economic activities, 
have encountered resistance from national actors and have 
therefore failed to reach their implementation target. 
The Chapter has also highlighted the differences in policy styles 
and practices between the EU and national layers. Broadly 
speaking, UK actors have approached environmental matters with 
a certain pragmatism, while their FRG counterparts have often 
pursued ambitious policies based on the precautionary principle 
and technological solutions. EU actors, for their part, have been 
influenced by a mix of Member States' policy styles and have 
developed their own 'European' style which has seen adjustments 
over the years. Since the early 1990s, EU actors and the 
Commission in particular, have tried to bring the EU and national 
layers closer in the environmental policy area by introducing a 
policy style which strengthens the links between EU and national 
actors via 'partnership' initiatives and dialogue groups. In addition, 
the Commission has pursued a less regulatory environmental 
policy which allows for more flexibility and subsidiarity. Whdher 
the policies of partnership and subsidiarity can help overcome the 
dimensional hurdle from EU to national layers remains to be seell. 
The FRG and UK have seen some 'Europeanisation' in their 
national environmental policies, i.e. they have adjusted to E l! 
standards and object ives. Y ct, there still remain formal and 
informal differences between EU and national layers which make 
EU environmental policy implementation difficult. Considering 
the differences between the layers in environmental policy, it is 
. unlikely that the gap between EU environmental policy-making 
and implementation can be closed completely unless the EU 
environmental policy becomes an integral (and exclusive) part of 
the Member States' environmental policies. 
National layers' formal determinants, specifically their 
constitutional settings, political-administrative structures and legal 
systems, have often been incompatible with EU environmental 
policies 
With reference to formal structures, it is striking how the FRG 
process has involved an enormously complex and complicated 
sharing of competencies.58 The preparation, adoption and 
implementation of environmental policies within the FRG layer 
has therefore been a slow and arduous venture. Considering the 
complexity of the FRG political-administrative structures, the 
difficulties associated with the implementation of (and compliance 
with) EU environmental policies come to no surprise. Actors at 
both Federal and Lander levels have felt obliged to add their own 
ideas to EU environmental policies and have adjusted EU policies 
to suit their national (and subnational) priorities and 
circumstances (see also Chapter 5 and case study in Chapter 6). 
According to the Commission and environmental NGOs, these 
58 For discussions on the complex FRG political-administrati\e sy,\ern and its 
intluence on EU policy-making see Rometsch. Dieter The Federal Repuhlic ot 
Germany and the European Union. Patterns 01 . In,litUtlon~d and 
Administrative Interaction University of Birmingham. Dlscuo.,slon Paper In 
German Studies. December 1995. See also JetTer). Cturlie Tu\\ard, ;l Third 
Lewl' in Europe? The German Laender in the European Union (pp.25-'-2()()) 
Political Studies vol.-+-+. No.2. 1996. 
'adjustments' have in many cases contradicted with the original 
objectives of ED environmental policies. 
In comparison, the UK has had the advantage that national (and 
subnational) implementors have been used to processing policies 
from central government in Westminster and Whitehall. In other 
words, ED environmental policies have not faced the same 
scrutiny by legislators and implementors in the UK as has been the 
case in the FRG (see also Chapters 5 and 6). This may change in 
the near future, however, with the devolution plans for Scotland 
and Wales which will provide Scottish and Welsh actors with 
more decision-making powers. These constitutional changes may 
encourage Welsh and Scottish actors to examine 'instructions 
from outside' more closely and shape them to suit their particular 
priorities and circumstances. Until then, actors in the UK 
transpose EU environmental legislation verbatim for England/ 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland without adjusting the actual 
content of policies. 
When it comes to the practical implementation of EU 
environmental policies, UK political-administrative actors have 
enjoyed considerable discretionary powers. This discretionary 
room has let to instances where the UK has not properly followed 
its ED environmental policy obligations. For example, UK 
officials considered the instalment of only seven N02 monitoring 
stations sufficient for the whole UK. This small number, howe\'er, 
prompted criticism from the Commission o\'er the 
inadequate implementation of an air quality Directi\'e. :\1"0. 
measuring water quality standards only in a small number of L'K 
coastal areas not affected by water pollution attracted the 
Commission's attention. Therefore, the LT K has not been ,-pared 
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from criticism over the m' adequate . ot' EL' processmg < 
environmental policies,59 
In terms of legal systems and instruments, both the UK and the 
FRG have demonstrated some advantages as well as difficulties 
with EU environmental policies. Actors in the FRG have often 
complained about the lack of clarity which characterises many EU 
environmental Directives. FRG actors have tended to fill legal 
gaps with their own criteria and have thereby changed the 
character of many EU policies. Where EU environmental policies 
have provided detailed information on qualitative and quantitative 
. environmental standards, FRG actors have faced a different 
problem: often EU and FRG standards have been divergent and 
FRG actors have been reluctant, or unable, to make adjustments. 
The FRG environmental policy has been based predominantly on 
regulations and technological solutions to pollution problems 
which follow a long and elaborate decision-making process, EU 
legislation 'from outside the FRG' has therefore been perceived as 
unnecessary and inconvenient unless they were in line with FRG 
standards (this even includes EU legislation which followed FRG 
initiatives).60 
The UK, on the other hand, has preferred policies which provide 
discretionary room for implementors and focus on voluntary 
environmental action. More' recent EU environmental policies 
59 Heritier et al describe the UK's political-administrativc characteristic~ 
(such as problems of 'soft regulation' and ·secrec.y·) and t.hei~' n~gati\e 
impact on EU environmental policy implementatIon III Ole \ erander~n~ \on 
Staatlichkeit. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland. GroBhntanmen und 
Frankreich Leske + Burdrich, 1994. 
60 For a detailed account on the di\,ergcnt LU-FRG ~landard~. see 
Lindemann. Hans-Heinrich; Dclfs, Stcfan 'Vollzug des Europ~ii~(hen _ 
Umweltrechts. U)sungsans~itze zur Llberprufung und \'crhessl'rung' (pp.2)()-
263) Zeitschrift fUr Ull1\\,cltrecht Nr.6. 1993. 
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such as the 'eco-audit' Directive have therefore been more 
acceptable for UK implementors. UK actors have also followed a 
more 'integrative' approach towards environmental matters 
(demonstrated by the DoE and, for Scotland, the Scottish Office 
which consider environmental matters in conjunction with other 
policy sectors).61 EU policies such as the IPe Directive have 
therefore been easier to implement in the UK than in the FRG. 
The FRG has had considerable difficulties in pressing the IPe 
policy into a compartmentalised political-administrative system. 62 
However, in the case of qualitative and quantitative standards, 
UK administrators have often abandoned their 'sense of neutrality' 
when faced with EU policies which they considered too ambitious 
and stringent (i.e. policies over-stepping scientific marks and 
entailing 'excessive' costs). Moreover, UK actors have pursued 
quantitative and qualitative standards with less technological and 
regulatory perfectionism than FRG actors. In this respect, the 
FRG has had an advantage over the UK. 
Both FRG and UK actors have sought to influence EU policy-
making as much as possible to carry through their environmental 
policy ideas. Both Member States have also dealt with the 
subsequent EU environmental policy implementation III 
61 Another way to describe the UK approach is offered by Heritier et al; they 
use the term 'konsensuelles bargaining' (p.112) in Die Veranderung von 
Staatlichkeit in Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, 
GroBbritannien und Frankreich Leske + Budrich, 1994. 
62 At the time of writin~, FRG legislators prepare a comprehensi ve 
'Umweltgesetzbuch' which encompasses EU 'integrati \"t~'. policies such as the 
IPe Directive. FRG legislators address these poliCies \\Ith a certal.~l 
reluctance; they are still considered as "imported and inclHnpatible pOIIC.Il.''> . 
"outcomes of diplomacy which cover up cuntlict~ng in~erests" an,d "contu,>ed 
but over-ambitious pol icy objecti \"t's". See dl FabiO, Lldo lI~te~rali \ l''> 
Umweltrecht. Bestand, Ziele, M()glichkeiten' (pp.329-337) Neue /eltschntl 
fiir Ver\\"altungsrecht NrA, 199~. Translatiun by author 
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accordance with their informal preferences and formal conditions. 
DK actors have reluctantly accepted ED Directives on air and 
water quality (many of which still require proper implementation), 
while FRO actors have implemented with great difficulty EU 
Directives which contain broad, integrative and procedural policy 
objectives.63 In this respect, both national layers have 
demonstrated neither 'euro-scepticism' nor 'euro-enthusiasm' 
towards ED environmental policies. Another fmding common to 
both layers has been a missing coherent and consistent overview 
on implementation performances which in turn has contributed 
towards a lack of discipline. Conscious of the EU diversity and 
the difficulty m gammg an overVIew, Member States' 
implementors have tended to be lenient with EU environmental 
policy objectives, especially with objectives which affected other 
(economic) policy priorities. Even if all Member States exercised 
a certain amount of implementation discipline, mistrust over other 
Member States' lax implementation practices still remains. 
The success of ED environmental policies has obviously 
depended upon the formal and informal determinants within the 
implementation layers (confirming Argument 1). This Chapter has 
provided a general picture of EU and national environmental 
policies from a wider 'domestic' (i.e. national layer) perspective. 
Yet, a 'domestic' perspective limited to the national layer is not 
sufficient for fully covering the actual ground where the bulk of 
ED environmental policies are implemented. ~ lost Ell 
63 In fact Heritier and Knill notice a shift from FRG-styk ELi policie~ to ELI 
policies ~hich are more compatible with the UK 'i~t~gra:i\l~' a~proa.~h. ~l'e 
'Neue Instrumente in der europjischen Ull1weItpohtlk: Strateglen lur etne 
effektive Implementation' (pp.209-233) Li.ibbe-Woltl Gertrude ~ed) Der 
Vollzug des EuropLiischen UmweItrechts Erich Schmidt \'erlag, BerlIn Il)l)h. 
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environmental policies have to be fIltered through to the regions 
and local communities and affect areas of subnational and local 
government competency such as planning, public health, waste 
and water management.64 It is within the subnational layers that 
the majority of ED environmental policies are implemented or fail 
to be implemented. Subnational regions process policies within 
their own 'distinct' frameworks (or layers) which have to be taken 
into account when considering the ED environmental policy 
deficit. The following Chapter therefore addresses the subnational 
dimension by examining Scotland and Bavaria and their influence 
'on ED environmental policies. It investigates to what extent 
Scotland and Bavaria confIrm the above described characteristics 
of the national layers, modify national determinants to suit their 
subnational circumstances, and to what extent they defy national 
determinants in order to present their own 'distinct' environmental 
policy (testing Argument 2). 
,', d nph·lsl .... C .... the 
64 Graham Ashworth describes these competencies an e~ l" 
. . t I )1 in 'Ire'\ In The Role 01 importance of local government In en\lronmen a p( . ,,< l, ,', •• 
. . I p. t"(l\1 hrst line Ddt:nu: Local Government 111 Envlronmenta 10 eC It, ' ' 
Longman, Essex 1992. 
Chapter 5 
Environmental Politics and Policy in Scotland and Bavaria 
5.1 Introduction 
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The previous Chapter examined EU environmental policies ill 
the context of national (or 'domestic') frameworks. This Chapter 
refmes and magnifies the implementation analysis by focusing on 
the subnationallayer and its role in the EU environmental policy 
. process. To help understand why subnational layers process EU 
environmental policies in a distinct way, the Chapter starts with a 
general analysis of Scotland and Bavaria's political systems and 
their positions in the wider national and EU contexts. The 
Chapter then focuses on Scotland and Bavaria's environmental 
policies and assesses to what extent their formal and informal 
determinants shape EU environmental policy implementation. It is 
not argued here that the Scots and Bavarians are necessarily less 
compliant with EU environmental policy obligations than are UK 
and FRG actors in general. Rather, Scottish and Bavarian actors 
process EU environmental policies in a 'unique' manner and in 
accordance with their particular political-administrative 
structures, policy priorities and practices. 
The Chapter highlights essentially three reasons why Scottish 
and Bavarian policy implementation findings differ from their 
'mother' states. Firstly, actors in Scotland and Bavaria are 
influenced considerably by their constitutional positions in the 
wider state systems (i.e. formal determinant) which in turn 
d ., . t t 'as \\c 1\ as influence formal political-a nul1lstratlve s ruc ures , 
informal policy priorities and practices within the re~lon". 
Secondly, actors in Scotland and Bavaria follow thcir O\\'n 
informal priorities and attitudes towards el1\ironmental protcct ion 
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which are shaped not only by their constitutional embeddedness in 
the wider national systems but also by subnational circumstances 
such as Scotland and Bavaria's geographical location, 
infrastructure, industrial sectors and population density. Finally. 
the implementation of EU environmental policies is influenced 
significantly by the Scots and Bavarians' links with, and attitude 
towards, the EU and the European integration process. 
SCOTLAND 
S.2 'Scotland's Paradox': Scotland's Structure and 
Position in the UK and the EU 
In order to understand the way ill which the Scots have 
perceived and dealt with environmental matters, it is necessary to 
establish Scotland's formal position within the UK. Scotland is an 
integral part of the UK, a centralised state which developed in a 
slow and steady evolutionary manner over the past centuries. 
Scotland's position in the UK is unique: it does not yeti possess 
its own parliamentary sovereignty and is dependent upon central 
government which is situated south of the border; yet, Scotland 
has retained distinctive institutions and enjoys considerable 
independence in the areas of education, law and religion. 2 This 
paradoxical situation will change in the near future with Scottish 
devolution introducing a Scottish Parliament which will take over 
a number of legislative powers for Scotland. 
Scotland's current formal structure and position m the UK 
I For a detailed account of the forthcoming Scottish devolution see 'Appendix 
5: Scottish Devolution - A brief Outline'. 
2 Other aspects in which Scotland retained its national identity i(~clude 
culture, the media and sport. For a discussion on Scotland's POSition In the 
UK see KeIlas, James The Scottish Political SvstClll Il)~l) and. \lld\\lnt~r, 
Arthur; Keating. Michael; Mitchell, James Politics and Public PolIcy In 
Scotland 1991. 
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political-administrative context is unusual: until 1996, Scottish 
local government was divided into 'Regional' and 'District 
Councils' (in contrast with English and Welsh County Councils) 
and has since been re-organised into 29 single-tier County 
Councils. Scottish local authorities co-ordinate their policies 
under the umbrella of the Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities, in short CoSLA. Apart from co-ordinating Scottish 
local authorities' views, CoSLA seeks to counterbalance the 
central government ministry responsible for Scottish matters: the 
Scottish Office. 
Formal representation of Scottish interests at large is conducted 
by the Scottish Office and the Secretary of State for Scotland. 
Due to the UK's history and constitution, both the Scottish Office 
and the Secretary of State for Scotland are somewhat 'hybrid' 
institutions: as parts of central government (i.e. national layer), 
they execute and administer policies which have been legislated in 
Westminster, while at the same time they represent Scottish 
interests (i.e. subnational layer interests) in the UK. This dual, 
reciprocal representation promises close formal ties between the 
UK and Scottish layers. However, promoting two sets of interests 
can be difficult, especially when these interests are opposed to 
each other. CoSLA's perceived task to 'counterbalance' both the 
Scottish Office and the Secretary of State for Scotland confirms 
that the representation of Scottish interests is rather precarious. 
The Scottish Office and Secretary of State's 'juggling' of 
Scottish and UK interests has implications for informal 
relationships betwecn political-administrativc actors :".:orth and 
South of the border. While the Secretary of State f()r Sl'ot land i" a 
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member of the central government cabinet, he3 holds only the 
position of a junior minister and therefore enjoys less political 
power than his colleagues. The Scottish Office, on the other hand, 
suffers from a lack of communication with other, sectoral 
departments. Complaints from civil servants on both sides 
illustrate this communication problem. Whereas London-based 
. civil servants say about their Scottish counterparts: "We don't 
know what they do up there - you'll have to ask them",4 a Scottish 
Office official remarked: "We always have to remind London that 
we exist".5 Geographical problems contribute towards this gap: 
the vast majority of Scottish Office civil servants are located in 
Scotland while fewer than 1 % are based in Whitehall. There are 
also differences in responsibilities: the Scottish Office pursues 
territorial interests in an integrated, cross-sectoral manner, while 
other government departments such as the Department for 
Transport or the DoE pursue sectoral interests. The same division 
between territorial and sectoral responsibilities applies to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland and his Cabinet colleagues. 
There is, however, another reason for the precarious situation in 
Scottish representation: until the general elections of May 1997 
the majority of Scots did not appreciate their 'Scottish' 
representation in Westminster. Three-quarters of the Scottish 
voters did not vote for Conservative Governments and therefore 
felt that their interests were not represented adequately by 
3 Scotland has never had a woman Secretary of State for Scotland, 
4 Quoted in Butt Philip, Allan; Baron, Christina 'UK Repl~rt' (p,~57) 
Siedentopf, Heinrich; Ziller, Jacques (ed) f\lakin~ European POIt:'IL'S \\ ork, 
The Implementation of Community Legislation in the \kmber StatL's \01.1 
and II, 1988. 
5 IntL'rview, 30. May 1995, Edinburgh. 
Conservative Secretaries of State and a Conservatiyc-led Scottish 
Office. 6 From 1979 until 1997, Conservative Governments 
introduced policies such as the council tax and privatisation 
policies in education, health, energy and housing. These policies 
met with strong opposition in Scotland. 
The discrepancy of informal perceptions dominated relations 
between the UK and Scottish layers and shaped the political-
administrative process significantly. Similar tensions between 
central government and subnational regions are evident in every 
state system. However, in the Scottish case, the dissatisfaction of 
the Scottish public and many Labour-run (former) Scottish 
District and Regional Councils towards the UK central 
government has been more explicit. Apart from electoral 
discrepancies, relations between the centre and Scottish local 
governments were tense for two other reasons. In certain policy 
areas, Scottish local authorities have possessed few consultative 
and discretionary rights and have been obliged to receive and 
execute (unwelcome) Conservative Government policies. 7 In 
other policy areas such as planning, Scottish local authorities have 
been able to pursue their (economic self-) interests regardless of 
the UK-wide impact their decisions may have had. This lack of 
co-ordination on both accounts has had a hindering impact on the 
transposition of policies in general. 
As far as links with Brussels are concerned, formal contacts 
between Scotland and the EU have been largely dominated by. 
(, At the general election in 1992 three quarters of the S\.:ottish electorate 
voted for opposition parties - the Labour Party, the Liberal DeIluKrah and the 
Scottish National Party. 
7 The Council Tax and the creation of 'qLl~lll~OS' in S\.:lltland ... er\'t.~ ;I'" 
examples. 
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and have been conducted within, the national layer. As a central 
government minister, the Secretary of State for Scotland 
participates in Council of Minister meetings whenever the EU 
agenda affects Scottish interests. The same rule applies to the 
Scottish Office and its influence in Brussels. The Scottish Office 
has sent delegates to the UK Permanent Representation (UKREP) 
and has been consulted on Commission proposals which 
concerned Scotland particularly (such as the Habitats Directive). 
In addition, UKREP introduced an information practice which 
involves sending short progress reports to the Scottish Office. 
Individual (Scottish) UKREP officials have also maintained 
regular contacts with the Scottish Office.8 Despite these formal 
and informal means of Scottish representation, co-operation 
between Scottish and other UK actors on EU matters has been 
influenced by suspicion and sometimes mistrust. 9 Following the 
persistent perception that Scottish interests do not receive 
adequate attention, Scottish Office officials have often felt that 
their colleagues in other (sectoral) departments ignore Scottish 
concerns when bargaining in Brussels. Therefore, the Scottish 
Office has maintained links with the Commission by regularly 
sending 12 to 18 officials to Commission Directorates General 
(DGs) on secondment. This secondment practice, however, has 
been the result of a voluntary and informal agreement between the 
Scottish Office and the Commission and does not constitute 
Scottish representation at the EU level as such. 
8 In particular the UK Deputy Representative who is a Scot. Intmmation Irolll 
UKREP official, interview, 5. March 1997, Brussels. 
9 A UKREP official described the mistrust between S,-·()ttish and UK offiCIals 
in an interview, 5. March 1997, Brussels. 
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Over the years, other Scottish actors such as local goyernment 
officials have sought independent channels of influence in Brussels 
and, in contrast to the rest of the UK, have promoted a more 
, f' dl' . 10 euro- nen y 1ll1age of Scotland. Today, various regional, 
commercial and educational representations lobby EU policy-
. makers directly and actively. I I The privately-funded Scotland 
Europa office, established in 1991, facilitates private and public 
sector links with Europe. Scotland Europa Ltd represents and 
informs 45 subscribing members at the EU level. Apart from 
lobbyists associated with Scotland Europa, other Scottish actors 
seek to influence EU policy-making through European 
Parliament l2 and through other EU institutions such as the 
Committee of the Regions. Many Scots working for EU 
institutions or lobbying for Scottish interest groups maintain 
contacts, for instance, via the 'lock Tamson's Bairns' Index which 
lists Scottish officials and employees working in Brussels. 13 
Despite a number of well-functioning European 'feed-back' links 
(see figure 5.1), Scottish EU representation has been fragmented 
and has relied upon informal contacts. All official matters 
affecting Scotland, for instance complaints about non-compliance 
10 Many Scots have considered EU actors and institutions such as the 
Commission as allies in the campaign for devolved powers for Scotland and 
have used EU links to 'bypass' Westminster. 
II Among them CoSLA, East of Scotland European Consortium (ESEC), 
Edinburgh's Telford College, Eurodesk Brussels Link, Highla~ds l\:. lslal:ds 
of Scotland European Office, Maclay Murray & Spens (law tlfln), Scottish 
Enterprise, West of Scotland European Consortium. 
12 Until the next EP elections in June 1999, eight MEPs represent Scotti"h 
constituencies; among them David Martin (EP Vice-President) and KL'n 
Collins (Chairman of the EP Environment Committee). 
I:l For an account of Scottish representation at the Eli !eyel see Bomberg, 
Elizabeth 'PoliC\' Net\\orks on the Periphny: IT lllyironmental PolICY and 
Scotland' (pp,..t.S--61) Re!!ional Politics and Policy volA. !'\().I, Spring Il)l)..t., 
166 
with EU policy obligations in Scotland, are processed \'ia the 
national layer. Many Scots, however, have questioned the 
legitimacy of central government representing Scottish interests. 
The new Labour Government and the prospects of devolution 
may ease the tensions between Scottish and UK interests at the 
EU level. However, recent opinion polls in Scotland indicate that 
many Scottish voters re-establish a traditional opposition against 
Westminster by supporting the Scottish National Party (SNP). 14 It 
remains to be seen to what extent a future Scottish Parliament will 
change Scotland's party political landscape and its influence in UK 
and EU politics. 
5.3 Environmental Politics and Policy in Scotland 
Environmental politics in Scotland has been shaped significantly 
by Scotland's formal structure and position within the UK and EU 
contexts. Scotland's paradoxical position in the UK (and the EU) 
and questions surrounding Scottish self-determination and 
devolution have had an impact on informal perceptions and policy 
priorities. Scottish devolution has preoccupied political minds in 
Scotland with the effect that other issues such as environmental 
problems have received not as much attention in Scotland as in 
-other UK (and European) regions. Only recently have Issues 
associated with 'green' movements attracted public and media 
attention in Scotland. 15 The process of adopting and integrating 
14 According to 1998 opinion polls conducted in Scotland by MORI.. s~ "tem 
Three and others, SNP support for the next Scottish Parliament elections ha" 
been almost equal to the support of the governing Labour Party, See The 
Scotsman website, in particular webpages 'Scotland could go it alone by 2() 13' 
and 'Labour gets new poll warning'. 
15 See Eleanor McDowell 'The Environmental l\1o\cIl1ent in Scotland: :\n 
Empirical Analysis of Leading Group .\ctivists' (pP~II54.~116_'\I,n 
L()\'cndusky, Joni; Stanyer, Jeffrey (eds) Contemporary lolltlLdl Sludlt:" 
Vo1.3. Political Studics :\ssoL'iation, Uni\'ersity of York. 1995. 
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environmental concerns in education, the media and at work has 
just started and many Scots are aware of the need to catch up 
with other Europeans in terms f . 
o enVIronmental policy 
experience. 16 
Scotland's constitutional position has also had an impact on the 
way (EU) environmental policies are processed within Scottish 
political-administrative structures. Playing a dual role, the 
Scottish Office has pursued environmental policy instructions 
'from Westminster' while at the same time responding to Scottish 
priorities and interests. As far as EU environmental policies are 
concerned, their formal transposition has been conducted by the 
Scottish Office in line with its 'hybrid' position in the UK state 
. system. Scottish Office has generally followed Westminster and 
adopted 'Scottish' versions of DoE Statutory Instruments. While 
Scottish Statutory Instruments have taken account of Scottish 
circumstances (such as the large agricultural and fisheries 
sectors), they have not differed significantly from their DoE 
counterparts (see in particular case study in Chapter 6). The 
Scottish Office has traditionally been careful not to depart from 
central government policy and has relied upon the guidance from 
'down South' on the transposition of EU policies. By and large, 
the study (and assessment) of EU legislation has been neglected 
by Scottish Office implementors. For instance, when asked about 
the EIA Directive (85/337IEEC), one Scottish Office ofticial 
responsible for environmental and planning matters replied that he 
16 "The Scottish Parliament otfers an opportunity to start afresh and learn 
from not just the UK experience, but from our sister countril'" in Europe, 
some of whom have a longer and more thoroughgoing appr()aC~l ~1l.1d strategy 
from which we can learn." Working for Sustainabilit\ •. \11 I:nVl~o~mental 
AlTenda for a Scottish Parliament Final Report. The Gmernance ot Scotland 
t> 
Project. John Wheatley Centre, August 1997. 
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had "never read that thing".17 This transposition practice has been 
advantageous for ED policies in so far as Scottish implementors 
have not questioned or 're-written' ED legislation. On the other 
hand, DoE transposition documents have been copied 
. automatically by Scottish implementors without much 
consideration for the original ED policy texts and without 
establishing additional measures in support of the policies. 
The Scottish Office Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries 
Department has been formally responsible for environmental 
matters in Scotland translating central government policies into 
the Scottish context. However, while the Department has 
exercised considerable influence in the policy areas of agriculture 
and fisheries, it has shown less determination in pursuing 
environmental objectives. On the surface, environmental matters 
have been an integral part of the Scottish Office machinery with 
one Department covering the environment and two other related 
policy areas. One Scottish Office official argued that he and his 
colleagues have the advantage of discussing certain policy issues 
internally and consulting department colleagues on an informal 
basis. In contrast, the DoE has to reach out and approach other 
departments whenever co-operation and consultation IS 
required. 18 In this sense, it appears that environmental matters and 
ED integrative environmental policies in particular, are processed 
more effectively in Scotland than in the rest of the l TK. In 
practice, however, the Scottish Office's approach toward" the 
environment has not exactly been 'holistic' as environmental 
17 Scottish Office official, telephone intenie\\', :" April 199:" 
18 Scottish Oftice official, interyie\\'. 30. f\lay 19\):", hlinburgh. 
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objectives have tended to compete (often full unsuccess y) \\' ith 
other interests. On many occasions, the Scottish Office has 
demonstrated a lack of interest in environmental matters which do 
not carry the same immediate and lucrative benefits as economic 
policies. 19 The Scottish Office has had the internal means to 
integrate environmental and other policy matters, but it did not 
utilise this advantage to provide for a strong policy of sustainable 
development. 
Despite the low-priority stance of environmental issues, the 
Scottish Office has begun to respond to informal public pressures 
demanding more environmental action. While Secretaries of State 
have shown no particular interest in the environment (on no 
occasion has the environment been at the top of their political 
agenda), environmental concessions have indicated that the issue 
cannot be ignored completely. For instance, the postponement of 
the decision in 1996 to build a second Forth road bridge by Ian 
Lang (the Secretary of State for Scotland until May 1997) 
suggests that the Scottish Office has adjusted to 'green' pressures. 
Scottish Office Ministers for the Environment have not been 
enthusiastic towards the 'green cause'. In particular, Sir Hector 
Monro refused to open traditional lobbying networks to include 
environmental NGOs in Scotland. His successors, the Earl of 
Lindsay and Lord Sewel, signalled a change in attitude by 
showing an interest in environmental issues and initiatin:s.
2
() 
19 For instance, the Scottish Office was responsible for setting up the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency and was blamed by environmental ~~o}u~s 
for not including 'integrated catchment management' (lcr--.n as one lltS[~1 .\ S 
responsibilities. Among other aspects, ICM takes into accou~t ~he .e,ttect.s. ~)t 
intensive farming and intensi\t~ torestry methods on \\atcl It:s\lUllt:\ 
En\'ironmental gr~ups claim that ICM was left out deliberately to pleasl' the 
farming community. 
20 The Earl of Lindsay initiated a Scottish OffiCl' publication docullll'nting 
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Considering that a Secretary of State and two Scottish Office 
Ministers for the Environment have felt obliged to respond to 
increasing pressures from Scottish environmentalists. it can be 
deduced that slight policy changes take place in Victoria Qua},.21 
In order to accomplish environmental policies successfully, 
formal and informal links between the Scottish Office and Scottish 
local authorities should ideally be close and co-operative. 
However, as in most other areas, environmental policy links 
between the government levels have been dominated by an overall 
mistrust and can be described as non-cooperative. For instance, in 
. the 1980s the Conservative Government deprived Scottish local 
authorities from an effective environmental policy tool by 
privatising bus services in Scotland. According to a (former) 
Regional Council official, local authorities effectively lost the 
control over public transport which could have been used to 
" establish an environmentally-friendly, sustainable infrastructure.~-
The precarious relationship between central government and 
Scottish local authorities has influenced the practical application 
of EU environmental policies. While Scottish local authorities 
have enjoyed considerable discretionary room over many 
practicalities of EU environmental policies (such as determining 
environmental initiatives. Common Sense, Common Purpose. Sustainable 
Development in Scotland 1996 is a colourful yet superficial statemen.t. Lord 
Sewel is committed to "place sustainable development at the ~eart ot polIcy, 
making". Quoted from The Herald 'Scottish Office and Cosla In new accord 
22. August 1997, (p.7). 
21 Victoria Quay is the new Scottish Office Headquarters in Leith. Edinburgh. 
22 Regional Council official, interview, I I January 199). Edinburgh. :his 
. . '11 h I'n the near future The Labour Go\ernment \\ hill' SItuatIOn WI c ange . . 
T "t t' 1998 proposes more discretionary powers tor loed Paper on ranspOl 0 . ' .' . 
authorities. For instance, local authorities will be allowcd to charg~ ll1~)t(lII:'I~ 
for the usc of roads and parking. 'Train. planes. hut not automobiles (p .. ,4) 
The Economist. 6. June 1998. 
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EIA projects, see Chapter 6), the Secretary of State for Scotland 
has retained his ultimate right to over-rule local authorities' 
decisions. Due to the discretionary powers, implementation 
performances have been less co-ordinated and have depended on 
priorities and relationships between actors inside local authorities. 
The implementation of ED environmental policies has depended 
upon individual administrators and their interpretation of Eli 
legislation and Statutory Instruments unless the Secretary of State 
interfered with their decisions. 
CoSLA has not been able to provide an effective link of co-
operation between the Scottish Office and Scottish local 
authorities in the environmental policy area. For example, 
together with the Scottish Office, CoSLA representatives 
'published a Local Environment Charter for Scotland2:1 which met 
with harsh criticism from environmental officers within the 
Councils. Many Council officials were outraged over the 
perceived arrogance with which the Charter was put forward and 
criticised the fact that only a small number of Council ofticials 
were involved in the Charter's preparation. Reactions such as 
these confirm that the working relationship between the Scottish 
Office and Scottish local authorities (and even CoSLA) in the 
environmental policy area has been marked by mistrust. This 
relationship may change in the near future. Following the Labour 
victory of May 1997, Labour-run Scottish local authoritics ha\'c 
already supported CoSLA in its 'sustainable Scotland' partncrship 
with the Scottish Office. 24 This new 'partnership' could pro\'l~ 
23 Local Environment Charter for Scotland Published by The S,-'ottish Ott!,-',-' 
and the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities. Sq11ember IYYJ, 
~~ The Herald 'Scottish Office and Cosla in ne\\ accord' 22, f\UgUS! 1997. 
(p,7). 
beneficial for the implementation of (EU) environmental 
objectives as actors at the Scottish and local 
community leyds 
express their interest in close co-operation. 
Environmental politics and policies at the Scottish local 
government level have shown strengths and weaknesses. 
Environmental objectives have suffered under formal constraints: 
the 1996 local government re-organisation in Scotland which 
involved a major administrative shake-up from a two-tier to a 
single-tier local government system occupied local administrators 
for several months. The shake-up and redundancies caused by the 
merging of responsibilities of former Regional and District 
Councils pushed many policies to the side-line of local politics. 2'1 
Similarly, the implementation of EU environmental policies did 
not receive top-priority attention during the shake-up. 
Prior to re-organisation, the majority of the District and 
Regional Councils produced environmental programmes (or 
charters) wpjch outlined the Councils' commitment in protecting 
the environment. 26 These documents usually listed internal 
measures, for example energy saving and recycling schemes, and 
measures which promote environmental awareness outside the 
Councils.'27 While environmental initiatives and contacts with 
25 For example, 'Local Agenda 21' plans, which follow up the UN Agenda 21 
initiative, had to be abando'1ed at the time of local government reform. 
Contacts with environmental actors could not be maintained during the 
shake-up_ CoSLA spokesperson for Local Agenda 21, intcrview, 25 .. \pril 
1997, Stirling. 
26 Examples: Environmental Action in Strathclyde. Cha.rtcr. fur ~he 
Environment Strathclyde Strc.thclyde Regional Council, Chief L\C(Ut\\L' 
Department, 1994; Environmental Strategy City of Ld.inburg~ District 
Council, Department of Strategic Services. 1995: Ch'.lrter tur. :\((lOn, on tl~e 
Environment. 3rd Environl1.cntal Action Plan Lothian Regional (ounc". 
1994' Environmental Chaner Ceilt! al Regional Council, IYY-l. ,~~~~~~~~
27 Former I.othian Regional Coullcil. for example, promoted and ti.nanci;d I~ 
supported 'LEEP' (Lothian anJ Edinburgh FIl\ironlllcntal Partner"hlpl which 
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environmental organisations were disrupted by the local 
government shake-up, many informal initiatives and contacts have 
been maintained (or have been taken up again) by environmental 
officers within the Councils. Environmental officers have 
consulted NGOs such as Friends of the Earth Scotland 
(FoEScotland) and have maintained close links with 'green' 
groups in Scotland. However, environmental officers have often 
felt isolated and have complained about their colleagues' lack of 
interest in 'green' issues. 28 Today, environmental officers enjoy 
considerable freedom in producing environmental charters and 
programmes; they also participate in the 'Local Agenda 21' 
initiative which continues the objective of the 1992 UN 
Conference on the environment in Rio to promote environmental 
protection at the local community level. As far as influencing 
other local government departments is concerned, environmental 
officers play only a minor role in local authority activities; they are 
'tolerated' but not integrated as influential actors in Scottish local 
politics. 
One environmental officer argued that Scottish local authorities 
follow a low key environmental policy approach because public 
opinion in Scotland does not put enough 'green' pressure on 
them. 29 The public debate over Scottish devolution provides one 
explanation for the somewhat half-hearted interest in 'green' 
issues. Another explanation can be seen in the fact that Scotland's 
advised businesses and citizens on recycling and energy efficiency. 
2~ Regional Council ofticials, interviews, II. January 1995 (Ldinburgh) and 
7. August 1995 (Glasgow). 
29 Former Regional Council environmental ofticer, interview, II. Januan 
1995, Edinburgh. 
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natural resources have been taken for granted by many Scots. 
Because of its relatively low population density and an abundance 
of natural resources, pollution problems have been less visible in 
Scotland and therefore appeared to be less urgent. At the same 
time, Scotland's natural resources have supported large economic 
sectors such as the wool and whiskey industries and tourism. For 
this reason, many Scots have been "unconsciously aware,,30 of 
environmental issues and have shown an interest in natural 
resources (such as water) mainly because they constituted 
essential components for their economy. 
. A 1995 public opinion survey has shown that while the majority 
of respondents in Scotland were generally concerned about 
environmental problems, they quite strongly favoured economic 
interests over other considerations. 31 Many respondents were not 
prepared to restrict economic development such as the building of 
out-of-town shopping centres. 73% of respondents agreed that "if 
people want to go shopping in their car, it's up to them". 32 The 
Brent Spar controversy of 1995 also suggests that the majority of 
Scots have been less worried about environmental problems than 
other Europeans. The planned disposal at sea of the 'Brent Spar' 
Shell oil rig caused more public opposition in other European 
regions than in the region most directly affected by the plan: 
Scotland and particularly the north west of the Hebrides. 33 One of 
3() Description used by Scotland Europa Ltd Spokesperson, interview,S. 
March 1997, Brussels. 
31 McCaig, Ewen; Henderson, Charlie (The MVA Consultancy) S.ustaina~le 
Development: What it means to the general public The ScottIsh Ottlce 
Central Research Unit, 1995 . 
. 12 McCaig and Henderson (p. 10). 
33 The dumping plan caused boycott protests throughout Europe with an 
immediate 2()S~ decrease in Shell's retail figure in the FRlI. In contrast, car 
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the key reasons behind the Scots' reluctance to challenge a large 
company (and employer) can be found in Scotland's economic 
conversion from old heavy industries to new industries such as 
North Sea oil exploitation. Enjoying material wealth, many Scots 
have been reluctant to restrict immediate economic development 
for the sake of less tangible environmental benefits. 
More importantly, Scots have perceived Scotland's peripheral 
situation in the Single Market as a disadvantage which has to be 
compensated with lenient environmental standards and the 
promotion of economic development. 34 Indeed, many Scottish 
actors from the public and private sectors have opposed EU 
environmental policies which seemed to threaten economic 
opportunities in disadvantaged regions and imposed fmancial and 
administrative costs which appeared to be disproportionally high 
. for Scotland. 35 In fact, many officials at both Scottish Office and 
local authority levels have abandoned their 'euro-friendly' attitude 
when faced with 'expensive' EU environmental policy obligations. 
For instance, the Drinking Water Directive and the 'voc Stage l' 
policy of 1984 (which regulates the capturing of emissions at 
petrol stations) has met with strong opposition in Scotland. 
Scottish Office officials and those affected by the policies (such as 
farmers with their own water supplies and petrol station owners) 
drivers in Scotland continued to buy their petrol at Shell petrol stations, 
according to a BBC Scotland Today TV news report, 16. June 1997. 
34 Susan Baker et al confirm the peripheral regions' concern that so-called 
'core regions' are more economically advanced and that they enjoy. better 
trade links with the rest of the ED. See Protecting the PerIphery. 
Environmental Policy in Peripheral Regions of the European Union Frank 
Cass, London 1994. 
35 Bomberg describes Scotland's 'peripherality' and gi\'es examples on the 
(perceived) disproportional costs in 'Policy Networks and th~ ~eriphery ~l' 
environmental policy and Scotland' (pp.'+5-() I) Regional PolitiCS and PoIIL'\ 
vol.4, Spring 1994. 
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have felt that the periphery situation of the Highlands has been an 
unacceptable disadvantage as remote areas cannot afford the 
changes to drinking water supplies and petrol stations. 36 
Pragmatic economic (self-) interests have therefore influenced key 
actors' perceptions towards EU environmental policies. Faced 
with 'inconvenient' EU obligations, many Scots have tended to 
complain as much about the costs imposed by "bright-eyed, 
bushy-tailed junior Commission officials" as their colleagues in 
other EU regions. 37 Therefore, the above described close informal 
relations between EU and Scottish actors dampen as soon as 
policy details over potential economic restrictions and sacrifices 
come to light. Unless they fit conveniently into existing 
procedures and priorities, EU environmental policies face a lack 
of commitment, if not down-right resistance, from many Scottish 
implementors. Comments such as "the most endangered species in 
the Highlands is man" illustrate this concern over EU-imposed 
burdens and therefore come to no surprise. 38 
However, it would be misleading to assume that the Scots are 
. only interested in economic benefits. A number of Scottish 
institutions and organisations fulfil key monitoring, educationaL 
informative and advisory functions in the environmental policy 
area. Since 1996, the quango 'Scottish Environmental Protection 
Agency' (SEPA) has pursued the tasks of pollution control and 
36 Information from British COREPER official. Interview, 5. March 1997, 
Brussels. 
37 The comment was made by a representative from the Scottish whiskey 
industry at an Environmental Group meeting organised by Scotland Europa. 
Glasgow, 26. February 1997. 
38 The comment was made by a Scottish business representative at an 
Environmental Group meeting organised by Scotland Europa, GlasgO\\. 26. 
February 1997. 
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waste regulation.39 SEP A has been criticised for being an over-
centralised institution, for not ensuring the representation of local 
authorities and for neglecting vital monitoring tasks such as 
ICM.40 SEPA officials have responded to the criticism by 
stressing that the agency is still in a process of learning and 
identifying pollution control criteria. Some SEPA officials have 
continued with the former HMIPI and RPBs' neutral and passive 
approach while many others have taken a more 'green-activist' 
position (at least at public meetings) in Scottish environmental 
pOlitics.41 In terms of EU environmental policy implementation, 
. however, SEPA has played an important monitoring and control 
function in the areas of air quality control as well as waste and 
water management. 
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) has fulfilled advisory and 
monitoring functions in Scotland and has entertained close ties 
with the Scottish Office. SNH has been criticised by 
environmental activists, however, for acting like a central 
government agent and adopting (former) Conservative 
Government terminology such as 'efficiency' and 'value for 
money,.42 Nevertheless, SNH has contributed towards 
39 Prior to 1996 these functions belonged to Her Majesty's Industrial Pollution 
Inspectorate (HMIPI) and the River Purification Boards (RPBs), as well as 
. Scottish local authorities. 
40 ICM (,integrated catchment management') takes into account the effects of 
intensive farming and intensive forestry methods on water resources. 
41 Examples: Environmental Law Lecture .at University of Edinbu.rgh (~5. 
January 1997) and Scotland Europa EnvIronmental Group meeting (_h 
February 1997). 
42 In fact, SNH is financially dependent on central government fundi.n g 
Quotations from Scottish Natural Heritage Third Operational Plan - Re\I~\\ 
of 1993-94 and Work Programme 1994-95 and Corporate Plan IYY-l\Y) -
1996\97. 
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environmental awareness in Scotland and has taken the lead in a 
number of environmental initiatives.43 With regard to EC 
environmental policies, SNH has contributed towards the 
implementation of the 1979 Wild Birds Directive and, more 
recently, has played a leading role in the fIrst implementation 
stage of the EU Habitats-Directive (92/43IEEC).44 
The environmental NGO 'Friends of the Earth Scotland' 
(FoEScotland) has regularly attracted public and media attention 
with campaigns such as 'Slow down Scotland' in 1994 and has 
maintained contacts with the EU Commission on a number of 
environmental issues.45 FoEScotland have utilised their links with 
the Commission as "headline grabbers" and have thereby 
strengthened the 'green cause' in Scotland. 46 FoEScotland and 
other NGOs have welcomed the environmental input from the EU 
'layer and have put pressure on Scottish implementors to comply 
with EU environmental obligations. 
Finally, there are a number of organisations in Scotland which 
have fulfilled informative functions. For instance, the Scottish 
Environmental Education Council (SEEC) has co-ordinated the 
work of REEFs, informed children 10 Scotland about 
environmental issues and raised 'green awareness' in Scottish 
43 Examples include the SNH's 'Countryside around Towns' programme, the 
'Coastal and Marine Task Force', and the 'Cairngorms Project'. 
44 SNH has prepared a list of areas for environmental protection which fall 
under the Habitats Directive. 
45 In 1995 FoEScotland informed the Commission about the M77 road 
extension project which caused controversy and media attention, i~ :'lcotlan(!. 
Commission DG XI replied promptly and sympathetically to h)LSc()tla~d s 
claims that the M77 project did not comply with requirements o~ thl? UA 
Directive. FoEScotland spokesperson, interview, 17. April 1995, Edll1burgh. 
46 FoEScotland spokesperson, interview, 17. April 1995. Edinburgh. 
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schools.47 The Centre for Environment and Business in Scotland 
(CEBIS), which has been funded by Scottish Enterprise and 
membership fees, has informed interested businesses of the latest 
developments in UK and EU environmental legislation which 
affect Scottish industry.48 By doing so, CEBIS has made a 
valuable contribution towards the implementation of (and 
. compliance with) EU environmental policies. 
Figure 5.1 summarises the Scottish layer and its formal and 
informal determinants which have shaped (and continue to shape) 
(EU) environmental policies in Scotland. Scotland has featured 
some favourable determinants (such as economic sectors 
depending on 'healthy' natural resources) as well as unfavourable 
determinants (such as a 'half-hearted' public opinion towards 
environmental problems) for the environmental policy process. 
Recent years have seen a moderate shift towards environmental 
awareness in Scotland. Representatives from a wide spectrum of 
institutions and interest groups now seek to strengthen policy 
links between actors and government levels and establish a 
'Scottish' environmental policy.49 It remains to be seen whether 
Scottish devolution and the latest environmental initiatives can 
contribute towards a coherent environmental policy which 
accommodates (and complements) EU objectives and ensures a 
47 'REEFs' stands for 'Regional Environmental Education Forums'. The SEEC 
also collaborates with many other institutions concerned with environmental 
education such as teacher training colleges and the Scottish Office. 
48 With the binder Environmental legislation and policy for the mana~er. 
CEBIS regularly update Scottish businesses about new standards and 
requirements in the environmental field. 
-19 For a discussion on a future Scottish environmental policy see \\'orkin~ tor 
Sustainability: An Environmental Agenda for a Scottish Parliament. Final 
Report The Governance of Scotland Project, John Wheatley Centre, August 
1997. 
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sustainable environment in Scotland. 50 
In terms of EU environmental policy implementation, some 
Scottish actors (such as Scottish NGOs) have welcomed and 
actively supported EU environmental policies while many others 
(such as government officials and private sector representatives) 
have openly expressed concern over the additional costs and work 
associated with EU environmental obligations. These 'burdens' 
have been perceived as particularly unfair for Scotland, a regions 
which is at the periphery of the Single Market. While EU 
environmental policies have benefited from a swift and 
. uncomplicated transposition process, they have also faced 
resistance from conservative (economic) priorities in Scotland. 
These priorities have often been incompatible with EU 
environmental obligations and have presented obstacles in the 
implementation path. 
51l Environmental activi sts already express their fears that a future Scottish 
Parliament will focus on "jobs at all costs" while neglecting the environment. 
'View from the Mill' (p.3) FoEScotland What on Earth Issue 20, Spring 1998 . 
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Figure 5.1: The Scottish Layer and Environmental Policy 
f ~ " \ \ \ EULayer: 1 \ I Fonnal Detenninants: 
*Paradoxical position in centralised state system: enjoying some autonomy but also direct control from 
national level; Scotland at large represented by Scottish Office and Secretary of State for Scotland who 
also represent central government; fonnal transposition relatively swift. 
*Political-administrative structures affected by paradoxical position; Scottish local authorities organised 
differently from the rest of the UK; although part of centralised state, communication gaps between 
Scottish Office and Scottish local authorities, CoSLA mediator with limited success; horizontal gaps also 
inside local authorities; in Scottish Office environ. policy more integrated. 
*Separate transposition for Scotland (mainly in the form of SIs), processed by Scottish Office, by and 
large in line with DoE, but adjusted to allow for Scottish conditions and interests. 
"-4 ~ 
Infonnal Determinants: 
*Relationships between actors affected by constitutional setting and internal structures; filtering hindered 
by scepticism and mistrust between government levels. 
* Attitudes towards environ. protection increasingly favourable; some individual 'green' initiatives and 
econ. sectors dependent on natural resources; on the other hand, emphasis on conservative values (job 
creation, econ. growth) and competition with 'core' EU regions in Single Mark~ attitudes towards the 
EU generally favourable, however, when faced with costly and 'unfair' EU obligations, Scots are less 
'euro-enthusiastic' . 
*Policy priorities and strategies reflect public attitudes towards environ. issues and econ. interests: 
environ. issues comparatively new and often competing with econ. objectives; emphasis on econ. 
competition in Single Market periphery region. . 
* Policy style and practices signified by discretionary room provided for administrators who apply poltey 
requirements on a minimalist case-by-case basis. 
BAVARIA 
5.4 'Bayerische Offensive': Bavaria's Structure and 
Position in the FRG and the EU51 
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In order to understand how Bavaria IS processing EC 
environmental policies, it is necessary to investigate the Bavarian 
layer and its formal and informal determinants. Bavaria's formal 
constitutional position in the FRG state system can be described 
as 'verflechtet' (interconnected) yet confrontational. The 'Free 
State' of Bavaria52 is part of a federal state system which shares 
political-administrative competencies with the national layer. 5) 
Once the Federal level (i.e. the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) 
adopts a Federal Law, the Lander are obliged to execute the 
policy according to the principle of 'federal loyalty' (Art.83). In 
return, the Federal level respects the legislative and executive 
powers of the Lander. This careful balancing of Federal and 
Lander powers has placed formal and informal obstacles in the 
policy path. Bavarian political-administrative actors in particular, 
have insisted on their autonomy in certain areas and have 
. maintained a strong and well-functioning political-administrative 
system which has resisted many 'instructions from above,.5-1 
51 The title 'Bayerische Offensive' of a Bavarian State Government economic 
initiative best describes the Bavarian 'confrontational' position and attitude 
towards FRG and EU actors. 
52 For a general introduction to the politics of the 'Free State' of Bavaria see 
Peter James The Politics of Bavaria - An Exception to the Rule A \'ebury, 
Aldershot 1995. 
53 The FRG constitution provides a clear framework: in policy areas such as 
defence the Federal level enjoys exclusi\'e decision-making powers 1.\Il.73), 
'concurrent' or shared powers exist in areas which concern both g()ve~nrnenl 
levels such as social services (Art. 7..+), and in areas such as educatIOn the 
Federal level only provides framework guidance while respecting the 'cultural 
diversity' of the Lander (Art.75). 
'\4 A German COREPER official descrihed the Ba\'arian administration :I' ,[ 
'MusterverwaItung', a perfectionist 'model' administration which i, not 
Parallel to the FRG constitution, Bavaria established its own 
constitution in December 1946 which stipulates the principles of 
democracy and self-determination as well as the Bavarian national 
heritage and Christian (i.e. Catholic) values. Policy-making in 
Bavaria has been an elaborate democratic process of several 
readings, involving the Bavarian State government, a lower 
chamber (i.e. the Land parliament or 'Landtag'), and an upper 
chamber (i.e. the Bavarian 'Senat,).55 In some specific cases which 
involve substantial reforms, the Bavarian policy-making system 
even allows for referenda, a measure which is unusual for FRG 
. politics. 56 The Bavarian State government consists of a 
'Ministerprasident' and nrne government ministers. The 
'Ministerprasident' who is supported by the 'state chancellery' of 
about 330 officials, has traditionally enjoyed a powerful position, 
with the other nine ministers and their sectoral departments57 
following his political lead. Despite the two chamber system, 
prepared to accept instructions from outside. Interview, 5. March 1997, 
Brussels. 
55 The 'Senat' has no counterpart in any of the other FRG Linder. It consists 
of 60 members representing social, economic, cultural and local community 
interests who must be older than 40 years of age. Among other sources, for 
more information about policy-making in Bavaria see Internet 
(http:\www.bayern.landtag.de\wissen\gesetz\gesetz.htm). 
56 To date, 5 referenda have been conducted in Bavaria. One referendum 
concerned the question whether Bavaria should align its electoral system to 
. the FRG system. Following the 1970 referendum, Bavaria changed its' lOSt 
electoral hurdle' to the FRG '5% hurdle'. Most recent referendum I. October 
1995: 'Volksentscheid Uber neue kommunale Mitwirkungs- und 
Entscheidungsrechte der Btirgerinnen und BUrger' (referendum on citizens' 
participatory powers in local authority decision-making). 
57 Apart from the Bayerische Staatskanzlei, the other nine goverr~mellt 
departments are: Staatsministerium fUr Bundesangelegenheiten;. Bayen:-.chL's 
Staatsministerium des Innern; B.S. der Justiz; B.S. fur Untemcht, KLlltu\. 
Wissenschaft und Kunst; B.S. der Finanzen; B.S. fur \\'irtschaft. Verkehr 
und Technolm.!ie; B.S. fUr Ernahrung. Land\\irtschaft lind Foro.;t, en; B"S lur 
~' B Slur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Familie, Frauen LInd CJesundhelt: .. ' 
Landesentwicklung und Umweltschutz, 
IS-+ 
Bavarian Ministerpresidents have tended to be charismatic and 
powerful politicians who have enjoyed the backing of their 
political party, the CSU. The CSU has been, for German 
standards, an unusual political party as it represents only 
territorial (i.e. Bavarian) interests and secures vast majorities at 
every Bavarian election.58 
In contrast to the Scottish Office's 'dual' representation of 
central government and Scottish interests, Bavarian State 
governments have tended to compete with Federal Government 
and have not shied away from occasional confrontations with the 
Federal level and other Lander. 59 Although constitutional 
obligations have been followed with 'federal loyalty', Bavarian 
politicians have tended to perceive 'outside' obligations as 
disturbances to Bavarian affairs. The CSU Government 10 
particular, has promoted the idea of Bavaria's self-sufficiency and 
has been reluctant to commit Bavaria's resources to projects 
outside its range of powers. Co-operation with other European 
regions has been generally welcome, however policy 'instructions' 
from the national and EU layers have been perceived as 
unnecessary 'burdens' which should be avoided. 60 
58 For an empirical analysis of the Bavarians' unusual electoral behaviour see 
Falter, JUrgen 'Bayerns Uhren gehen wirklich anders. Politische Verhaltens-
und Einstellungsunterschiede zwischen Bayern und dem Rest der 
Bundesrepublik' (pp.504-52I ) Zeitschrift fUr Parlamentsfragen Nr.13, 1992. 
Bavarian elections in September 1998 have confirmed that the Ba\arian 
electorate differs from the rest of the FRG: the CSU secured an ahsolute 
majority while the general elections conducted one week later resulted in a 
red-green coalition government at the FRG level. 
59 For example, Franz Josef StrauB' regular disputes with Federal Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl. An example for Lander quarrels is Stoiber's criticism in 19.97 
over the 'lax' handling of anti-nuclear protests by the L()\\l'r S~l\(ln} police 
force. 
6() For a Bavarian critique of EU environmental 'in\tructio!ls \l'e In 
. I I"k I l~(" 11 SpanllllIl,'\!cld particular Wegner, Hans-A 'Ole Ulll\\l' tpo It I . l er -:. , II. c 
. I H . . d S bSl'dl"trl't l!s'prl'nz,'p' Sl>nderdruck au'> ZWISC len armOlllslerungszwang un u. < ,. • 
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Along similar lines, local authorities in Bavaria haye enjoyed 
discretionary powers based on the Bavarian constitution. The 
Bavarian 'Free State' is organised in a three-tier government 
system with the Bavarian State government level at the top of the 
ladder, the seven Districts CRegierungsbezirke,)61 at the 
intermediate level, and the County (71 'Landkreise') and Town 
. (25 'Kreisfreie SUidte') Councils at the bottom of the system.62 In 
order to extract a common position which represents policy 
interests and opinions, each local government level has organised 
itself within umbrella organisations CSpitzenverbande,)6J 
equivalent to the Scottish CoSLA. 
In contrast to CoSLA, Bavarian 'Spitzenverbande' have been in 
the formal position to ensure that no government level 'above' 
oversteps political-administrative boundaries. Occasionally, 
Bavarian local authorities have had to protect their 'autonomy' 
when confronted with a dominant Bavarian State government.64 
Consequently, informal relations between Bavarian local 
Berichte der Bayerischen Akademie fOr Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege 
Nr. 17, 1993. 
61 Unterfranken, Oberfranken, Mittelfranken, Oberpfalz, Niederbayern, 
Oberbayern, Schwaben. 
61 The Counties themselves are divided into smaller communities, totalling 
2052 'Gemeinden' in Bavaria. District presidents are appointed civil servants; 
members of the District assemblies CBezirkstage') are elected. County 
presidents CLandrate') as well as County Councils CKreistage') are elected by 
their constituents; the same applies to Town Councils, town mayors, and 
community Councils CGemeinderate'). 
63 'Spitzenverbande' in Bavaria: Verband der Bayerischen Bezirke (regions). 
Bayerischer Landkreistag (districts), Bayerischer Stlidtetag (towns l. 
Bayerischer Gemeindetag (municipalities). 
64 The following statement indicates that Bavarian 10ca.1 authorities hav~ t(l 
'guard' their constitutional rights: "constitutional reality IS utten not IdelltiCal 
wi th constitutional right." ("Den n \' ert assungsanspruch , und 
, I' ,. d 't" ' del' ausel'n'lllder ") (p 7) Bawnscher Vertassunosrea Itat n ten Immer Wle ,c ' ' b 
Stadtetag, Aufgaben, Organisation, Mitglieder 1991. 
186 
authorities and the Bavarian State government have not been 
entirely co-operative. In fact, a former Bavarian local authority 
spokesperson described relations between the Bavarian State 
government and local authorities as 'stiefmutterlich,.65 This 
relationship has been worsened by economic and financial 
pressures following German unification, the recession and 
economic targets associated with the EMU.66 The Bavarian State 
government has responded to these pressures by shifting a number 
of 'expensive' responsibilities to lower government levels. 67 
Bavarian local authorities in turn have had to cope with public 
criticism over unpopular and stringent economic decisions. As a 
result, communication between the Bavarian State government 
and local authorities has deteriorated further. 68 
Apart from disputes between the Bavarian State government 
and Bavarian local authorities over competencies, both levels have 
pursued different objectives. The Bavarian State government have 
focused on the formulation of legal texts for Bavaria, while 
Bavarian local authorities have been occupied with the subsequent 
practicalities of policy obligations. While this sharing of tasks 
makes sense, the difference in perceived objectives has constituted 
a psychological gap between 'instructors' and 'implementors' 
which does not facilitate the policy process in Bavaria. 
65 'StiefmUtterlich' _ behaving like a 'stepmother'. Comment made by a former 
official of the EuropabUro der Bayerischen Kommunen, interview. 6. \ Lm:h 
1997, Brussels. 
66 For details on EMU convergence criteria see Chapter 4, footnote ·n 
d · t \ po\ic.\ 67 For instance, some social security pro\isions an en\lronlllen a 
tasks were shifted to local authorities. 
(8 E b" d,c>f' B.'lyef'f'c.··c'hefl K(l[nmunen, intt.'I\'icw, -l 
l Official of the uropa uro -' 
March 1997, Brussels. 
Tensions between government levels have also been evident in 
Bavaria's formal and informal links with the EU. The Bavarian 
State government has been one of the key campaigners for 
increased subnational participation at the EU level. Bavaria hosted 
a number of Lander and European regions conferences69 \\'hich 
contributed towards the adoption of policies such as the principle 
of subsidiarity and the establishment of the Committee of the 
Regions.70 Following Lander pressure, the Federal Government 
had to accept constitutional adjustments in the form of a new 
Article 2371 which has allowed Lander formal representation at 
Council meetings whenever Lander competencies are affected. 72 
While Article 23 has strengthened the Lander's formal position in 
the EU process, a clearer line still has to be drawn establishing 
exactly which government level participates at which Council 
. meeting. In addition, Lander governments have already signalled 
their continuing dissatisfaction with the inadequate participatory 
powers at the EU level. 73 It remains to be seen whether Bavaria 
69 Lander representatives met in 1987 to adopt the 'Ten Munich Theses on 
European Policy'; Bavaria initiated and hosted the first Conference on 
'Europe of the Regions' in 1989. 
70 The four key demands of the regions: formalisation of the 'subsidiarity' 
principle; subnational representation at Council meetings; a 'regional 
chamber'; a right of appeal for subnational governments to the European 
Court of Justice. Apart from the latter, all demands were met with the 
subsequent TEU. 
71 Article 23 was included in the constitution without, however. ameIldil1~ 
Articles 24(1) and 32(1). For an English translation of Article 23 see 
'Appendix 4: Extracts from the Federal German Constitution'. 
72 Lander representatives participate on behalf of the FRG as a \\hole. Article 
23 is further strengthened by a more ~etai.led Federal LI\\'.of 12 r\larl:~ I :~3 
,and an 'Agreement on the Co-operatIon In European Unll~n t\Lltters ot -Y 
October 1993. Prior to these changes. the FRG constItutIon prmlded the 
Federal level with exclusive decision-making powers at the LU le\el; the 
Lander could only observe de\'t~lopments from a distance (th~ only I ,tinder 
--. . h 'B b' -ht - d'I' L:l' nder' ('obsef\ er ) who"e ta"~" ofhclal In Brussels was t e eo ac eI c c • 
\\ere restricted to the collection of EC information for the Lander). 
and the other Lander can utilise their new powers and shape EU 
policy-making effectively. So far, the 'fusion' of Federal and 
Lander representation at the ED level has resulted in 'confusion' 
over competencies and interests and could well lead to a slow-
down of the ED environmental policy process. 7.+ 
Both the Bavarian State government and Bavarian local 
authorities have maintained well-resourced quasi-representation 
offices in Brussels: the 'Informationsburo des Freistaates Bayern' 
and the 'Europaburo der Bayerischen Kommunen,.75 The 
'Preistaat' office lobbies ED institutions on behalf of the Bavarian 
State government and focuses on economic interests and formal 
implementation problems, while the 'Kommunen' office represents 
Bavarian local authorities and their every-day practical problems 
with ED policies. Apart from the two Bavarian offices in Brussels, 
two members (out of 24 FRG members) of the Committee of the 
Regions (CoR) represent Bavarian State interests, while one CoR 
delegate (out of three 'Kommunen' delegates) represents Bavarian 
'Kommunen' interests and fourteen MEPs come from Bavarian 
'constituencies.76 Bavarian lobbying techniques have been 
73 According to a Bavarian Government official, the current situation is 'not 
satisfactory': Lander can send delegates to the Council but still have no 
independent representation. Written correspondence, 13. March 1996, 
Munich. 
74 Terms used by Dietrich Rometsch in The Federal Republic of Germany <.~nd 
the European Union. Patterns of Institutional and Administrative InteractIOn 
University of Birmingham Discussion Papers in German Studies, December 
1995. 
75 Bavarian interests are also pursued by Members of the Eumpe~1I1 
Parliament, Members of the Committee of the Regions, and, of course, 
Bavarians who work within EU institutions, A similar index to 'Jock 
Tamson's Bairns' does not exist for Ba\'aria, but indi vidual l'ontacts are 
maintained on an informal basis. 
76 CoR Bavarian State representatives: Thomas Goppel (\linister. tl)r the 
E · t) R' h Id Backlet (lI.lt'nister for i\"IlcultUIl' and l·ole..,try). nVlronmen, em 0 1\. ::- , ' 
CoR 'Kommunen' representatin:>: Otto Neukum (Landrat KreiS Bamberg). 
criticised by officials from ED institutions and FRG 
representations as 'awkward' and sometimes even 'intimidating,.77 
~ 
Bavarians have enjoyed comparatively strong formal links \\'ith 
the ED (see 'feed-back' in figure 5.2) and have had the (financial) 
resources to be heard at the ED level, but their 'awkward' 
informal lobbying has often hindered successful Bavarian 
participation in ED politics. 
5.5 Environmental Politics and Policy in Bavaria 
An often-quoted phrase - "in Bayern gehen die Uhren anders,,78 
- not only describes Bavaria's unique position and internal 
structures in general, the phrase also applies to the unique 
features of Bavaria's environmental politics and policy. In contrast 
to Scotland, Bavarians have been interested in 'green' issues from 
an early stage and have used their formal means to establish an 
environmental policy which has differed in many respects from the 
FRG policy. In fact, the Bavarian 'Free State' included 
environmental protection as one of its state objectives79 long 
before the Federal level decided to amend the FRG constitution. 80 
Generally, German MEPs do not represent constituencies as such due to the 
mixed FPTP/PR electoral system, However, fourteen MEPs are elected as 
Bavarian members under the FPTP section. Information from Europa-Pass 
fUr Bayern Europaische Kommission, Vertretung in Deutschland (no date), 
77 For instance, a Commission DG Xl official complained about the 'most 
severe intervention' ("massivste Intervention") tactics by Bavarian 
representatives during the preparation of an environmental policy proposal. 
Commission DG XI official, interview, 7. March 1997. Brussels, 
78 English translation: in Bavaria the clocks run differently, 
79 Constitutional reform in 1984. Article 3(2) commits the 'Free State' to 
protect the natural resources and cultural traditions~ Article 13l(2) 
establishes a 'sense of responsibility towards the environment' as nne 01 the 
key objectives in Bavarian education; Article l-ll (I) obliges the 'Free State' 
and its citizens to protect the environment in a sustainable manner tor tuture 
generations. 
so Since 1994 the FRG constitution includes a new, \rtick 2(),\. the "tatc 
, t' t' . I'n dL'L'ordance \\ith the protects the em'ironment tor uture genera IOns 
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Apart from the 'green' amendment of Bavaria's constitution, 
Bavaria established an additional principle of "environmental 
precedence": environmental concerns shall take precedence oyer 
other considerations such as planning. 8 I Other Bavarian 
forerunner initiatives include the fIrst school curriculum which 
mentions environmental education (1976), the fIrst systematical 
assessment of natural habitats CBiokartierung') from the mid-
1970s onwards, and the fIrst comprehensive and systematic 
measuring networks in the areas of air quality, soil and nuclear 
energy. 82 Since Bavarians have been able to establish an 
independent environmental policy at an early stage, it should be an 
easy task to identify a 'Bavarian' environmental policy and a 
'Bavarian way' of EU environmental policy implementation. 
At the Bavarian State level, the 'Bayerische Staatsministerium 
. fur Landesentwicklung und U mweltfragen' (StMLU),83 
established in 1970 and the fIrst ministry of its kind, has played a 
central if not dominant role in Bavaria's environmental policy. 
Untypical for the FRG and Bavaria's compartmentalised policy 
approach, the StMLU was established to accommodate two vital 
constitution and legislation. For a detailed account of Bavaria's development 
and adoption of the environmental objective see Mauritz, Markus Natur u.nd 
Politik: Die Politisierung des UmweItschutzes in Bayern Andreas Dick 
Verlag, Neustraubling 1995. 
81 This principle, however, is limited to cases where economic and other 
considerations have 'long-term and fundamental impacts'. 
82 For further information see Umweltschutz in Bayern '<')-l, Information: 
Umweltschutz und Landesentwicklung in Bayern both: Baycrisch~" 
Staatsministerium fUr Landesentwicklung und Um\\,cltfragen, I<')<')-l and 1<,):6 
respectively; 1m Dienste des Umweltschutzes Bayerisches Lande"aml tur 
Umweltschutz (UU) (no date). 
8.1 English translation: Ba\'arian State Ministry for Planning, y~\L'lopml'nt 
d EL. t'll Matters The StMLU fultils functions sunllar to the an nVlronmen < < , . 
Scottish Oftice Agriculture, En\'ironment and Fisheries Department. 
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interests: economic develop t h men on t e one hand and rural-
d· . 1 I 84 tra ltIona va ues on the other hand. To a certain extent. this 
underlying concept continues to apply to this day as St~lLU 
officials still consider their role as balancing and combining 
environmental protection with economic development. In this 
sense, the StMLU has been the fIrst government department in 
Europe to apply the approach of environmental policy 
'integration'. However, in terms of EU environmental policy 
implementation, the StMLU has not been a 'truly integrative' 
institution. In particular, the StLMU has had serious difficulties 
with broad and cross-sectoral policies such as the EIA Directive 
or the IPC Directive. These integrative policies have been 
processed in a fragmented, piecemeal and even technocratic 
manner. Communication and co-ordination between the StMLU 
and other sectoral departments and government levels over the 
implementation and effectiveness of these and other EU 
environmental policies have been almost non-existent. 85 A 
coherent picture (and further strengthening) of EU environmental 
policies is therefore difficult to achieve. 
Over the years, the StMLU managed to give equal weight to 
environmental and economic aspects. At least, citizens and 
environmental NGOs in Bavaria appeared to be satisfied with the 
handling of environmental matters. However, since the early 
1990s, the economic-environmental balance has drifted towards 
84 Bavarian political-administrative actors thereby responded to the .negative 
impacts on the environment of post-war econor~ic .reconstructlon and 
mi aration from Central and Eastern Europe, both ot which v.·ere completed 
I:> 
by the late 1960s. 
~5 One StMLU official commented that other gmcrnment lkp;lrtr.nents a.nd 
h· 'd h'I' collea,TuL's on \- L \ (1oIlL"\ local governments do not report to 1m.1I1 S eo' . • 
compliance. Intervic\v, 19. August 1996, l\lunich. 
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economic priorities and the StMLU has been criticised by 
environmental NGOs for compromising the 'green' policies of the 
1970s and 1980s in favour of economic deregulation of the 
1990s.
86 
The Bavarian Development Programme of 1993, for 
instance, deleted key clauses such as "a healthy environment 
should not be sacrificed for the sake of economic growth". In 
addition, statements such as "policy objectives are to be 
implemented" were replaced by vague formulations such as 
"should be pursued if possible". 87 The high-profile initiatiye 
'Umweltpakt' of 1995 also signalled a major policy change. 88 
.Following a new 'substitution and deregulation' approach,89 the 
StMLU now "eases the fmancial burden" for businesses caused by 
environmental control. In return, private sector representatives 
commit themselves towards a number of 'voluntary' environmental 
obligations listed in the 'pact' document. 
While the StMLU has conducted a strategic change from a 
stringent to a more flexible and lenient environmental policy, it 
continues to supervise and co-ordinate a variety of environmental 
activities in Bavaria. Its role in Bavaria's environmental policy is 
86 BN-Position. Okologisches Landessanierungsprogramm. Stellungnahme 
zur Fortschreibung des Landesentwicklungsprogramms Bayern Buml 
Naturschutz in Bayern e.V., 1993. 
87 "1st zu" (1976 Programme) is replaced by "soli", "moglichst" and '\u\\eit 
moglich und vertretbar" (1993 Programme). Information taken from BN-
Position. Okologisches Landessanierungsprogramm. Stellungnahme zur 
Fortschreibung des Landesentwicklungsprogramms Bayern Bund 
Naturschutz in Bayern e.V., 1993. 
88 Umweltpakt Bayern. Miteinander die Umwelt schlitzen Bayerische 
Staatskanzlei (publisher) 1995. English translation: 'Pact Oil the 
Environment'. 
89 For a summary of the 'substitution and deregulation' approach -"l'L' Bilhm-
Amtmann, Edeltraud Cooperative Enforcement SUL'L'l'''''L'-'', Il1lpedlllll'l~h. 
Solutions Conference Paper at the United States IIl\ironmental PrllteL'l10n 
Agency, Washington, 21-22. January 199X. 
193 
so central that policies from the EU and national la\'~rs are 
received with considerable reluctance. In fact, the StMLU ha~ 
made no secret of its opposition against policies from 'outside' 
which it considers unacceptable and incompatible with Ba\'arian 
standards.90 This rather defensive behaviour of the StMLU has 
represented an obstacle in the path of environmental policies 
which derive from the national and EU layers. The complex 
sharing of powers between the Federal and Bavarian levels has 
contributed towards the perception that every EU environmental 
policy has to undergo a scrutiny process. In the process, EU 
environmental policies are shaped to fit Bavaria's existing legal-
administrative system. 
Following the above described tradition to 'confront' other 
government levels, the StMLU has tried to resist many 
'inconvenient' EU environmental policy obligations. StMLU 
officials have tended to wait until Federal and Lander colleagues 
completed their EU policy tasks and have frequently blamed the 
Federal level for their own transposition delays.91 Arguing that the 
implementation of most EU policies lie within their exclusive 
domain, Bavarian implementors have also considered it 
unnecessary to inform Federal and EU actors on their 
transposition performances and have insisted that both EU and 
Federal levels are not in the position to supervise Bavaria's 
compliance with EU obligations. 92 The Ba\arian SUte 
90 These views were openly expressed during a research interview. St~1LU 
officials, 19. August 1996, Munich. Further, see Wegner, H~I~S-.\ "Ole 
Umweltpolitik der EG im Spannungsfeld zwischen HarmoOislerungsl\\ang 
und Subsidiaritatsprinzip" Sonderdruck aus Berichte der Bayerlschen 
Akademie fUr Landesptlege und Naturschutz Nr.17, 1993. 
91 StMLU written correspondence. 26. Febru~lry 199X. fvlunich. 
92 Neither the Treaties nor the FRG constitution pnl\ide for speL'ifiL' mea,>ures 
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government has been adamant to maintain this 'umvritten rule' and 
has opposed any form of instruction concerning the transposition 
and practical implementation of ED policies. Bavarians have also 
questioned the necessity of many ED policies on the grounds of 
subsidiarity.93 This 'euro-sceptical' attitude, an attitude which is 
unusual for the FRG as a whole,94 is unlikely to change in the near 
future and will continue to influence relations between Bavarian 
and ED actors during environmental policy-making and 
implementation.95 
Despite the StMLD's central co-ordinating position, links 
between the StMLD and government levels below have suffered 
from the above described tensions over competencies. The 
Bavarian State government has responded to the economic 
pressures of the 1990s and has shifted the burden of financing 
many environmental policies to Bavarian local authorities which in 
turn have had to deal with expensive pollution control measures in 
which monitor and control implementation performances within the Lander 
and Bavaria in particular. 
93 For instance, Thomas Goppel (Bavarian State Government Minister for the 
Environment) opposes the EU 'dirigism' during a speech at the Peutinger-
Collegium, 23. April 1997, Munich. 
94 One exception is, perhaps, Thuringia which followed Bavaria's 'Euro-
sceptic' example. The Thuringia Land government cla.she.d wi~h the 
Commission over subsidies for declining industries in ThurIngia whICh the 
Commission considered as distorting the Single Market. 
95 The Bavarians' scepticism does not stop at the EU (Commission) le\"el: 
apart from recent complaints by StMLU Minister Tho~las Goppel about t~le 
Commission's inactivity in monitoring regions' pertormances .. other LU 
reaions have been criticised for not complying with EU en\"lronmental 
le~islation (Press Release PM-Nr.126/97). StMLU Minister Goppel's re.[~la.rks 
as
b 
well as strong critical views expressed to the author by St\lIY (~ttlcIah 
indicate that Bavarian pol iticians and administrators are. not mcillled tll 
adjust their informal attitudes in order to co-operate more ett~c~I\L'IJ With. the 
Commission on the implementation of EU en\'ironmental poliCies (lIl1erncw. 
19. August 1996, Munich). 
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areas such as noise, air, soil, waste and water.96 Not surprisingly. 
Bavarian local authorities have considered these responsibilities 
and further environmental instructions from 'above' not so much a 
necessity rather a punishment which causes considerable financial 
and administrative problems. 
The Bavarian 'Spitzenverbande' have taken a passive stance in 
the co-ordination of environmental policies. One of the few inter-
regional initiatives was taken in May 1997 when a private 
marketing company was commissioned by the Bavarian 
'Landkreistag' to survey local authorities' environmental activities 
and prepare a comprehensive overview of environmental policies 
in Bavaria.97 While this and other initiatives have been intended to 
strengthen policy co-operation between the regions (and 
government levels), local authority officials still prefer to 
compartmentalise environmental matters along horizontal and 
vertical lines. For instance, the pollution control of a river is 
divided into sections according to size and relevance for 
infrastructure, with different government levels taking care of 
different parts of the river. This sectoralisation and fragmentation 
has implications for the pursuance of many environmental 
policies: efforts to comply with environmental objectives are not 
. co-ordinated between government levels and departments and 
there is a general lack of transparency over policy results. 
Ultimately, inadequate information and lack of transparency 
contribute towards implementors' lack of commitment In 
96 According to an official of the Europabtiro der Bayerischen K()l11mUnl'll.-l. 
March 17, Brussels. 
97 The survey Die umweltbewusste Gemeinde \\as cl~ndllclL'd hy B.A.l \ 1 
Consult Mtinchen GmbH. Findings are assessed at the tllne ot \\l"IllI1g. 
1l)6 
environmental policies and particularly policies which require a 
joint effort and affect several policy areas. 
The fragmentation and lack of a coherent overview is reflected 
in local authorities' environmental programmes and charters. Few 
policy documents are available in Bavaria and those which are 
available, are not comprehensive but instead focus on either 
nature protection
98 
or the technological side of pollution 
prevention and control. 99 Apart from these specialised areas, there 
are also a number of leaflets in circulation which outline individual 
local community initiatives for the environment. 100 In many 
instances, local authority officials referred the author to StMLU 
publications such as Die Umweltbewusste Gemeinde, an 
information pack which had been compiled with the help of 
.Bavarian local authorities and which provides information on 
existing environmental initiatives and gives advise on setting-up 
new initiatives. 101 To date, Bavarian local authorities have not 
produced a common environmental strategy which would help co-
ordinate and strengthen cross-boundary and cross-sectoral 
environmental policies. 
Considering Bavaria's overall environmental policy, not only 
formal structures have influenced environmental institutions and 
policies, other determinants such as informal attitudes towards 
98 Example: Informationen zu Naturschutz und Landschaftptlege Ne\\sletter, 
Regierung voh Oberbayern (no date), 
99 Examples: Umweltschutz im Regierungsbezirk Unterfranken .\pril 1l)l)6: 
. Umweltschutz im Regierungsbezirk Mittelfranken October 1l)l)5. 
100 Examples: Landschaftsplanung Gemeinde Kirchdmf im \\'ald (no date); 
Gemeinde Hunding Arbeitsergebnisse: Kommunale Strukturpolitik Il)Y5: 
BU[l~erinformation Landschaftsplan der Stadt Ahensberg (no date). /;' 
101 Die Umweltbewusste JemeIn e. 1 a G . d Le'tt' dell t'l'j'l' eille IlJ(hhalll~e 
Kommunalentwicklung May 1l)l)6. 
IlJi 
environmental issues, traditional values, economic priorities and 
geographic location have shaped institutions and policies. 
Environmental awareness has been particularly influenced hy 
Bavaria's traditional values which constitute an essential part of 
Bavarian politics. Bavaria has often been described as a 
. 'FHichenstaat' - a state with large rural and agricultural resources 
as well as forests and parks. 102 In addition, traditional economic 
sectors such as farming, tourism and beer brewing have relied 
upon a healthy environment. In comparison with Scotland, 
Bavaria's 'conservatism' has combined successfully rural traditions 
and nature-orientated values with more recent 'green' issues such 
as problems of air pollution. 
The combination of traditional and new environmental concerns 
contributed towards the early establishment the 'Bund 
Naturschutz in Bayern e.V. tl03 in 1913. Over the years, the 'Bund' 
has fulfilled informative and advisory functions similar to the 
Scottish SNH. However, in contrast to SNH, the 'Bund' has been 
financially independent from government and has played a more 
confrontational role. With its campaigns such as the promotion of 
small-scale farming methods which allow for biodiversity and the 
preservation of rural communities, the 'Bund' has merged 
. IO-l Th Bavarian trqditional-rural values with new 'green' Issues. e 
102 88% of Bavaria's land mass is used for forestry and agriculture. 
Hinterstoisser, Franz 'Umweltpolitik in Bayern - h ligen fLir die 
Landwirtschaft' (pp.25-33) Landwirtschaft und Umweltpolitik Nr.30, 1996 
103 English translation: Federation for Environmental Protectio~ i~ Ba\;lrid 
(e.Y. abbreviation for 'eingetragener Verein' - registered organIsa~IOn). The 
'Bund Naturschutz in Bayern' has 130,000 members and IS as'ooCIateJ \\lth 
the FRG-wide BUND (Bund fUr Umwelt und Naturschutz). 
11l-l BN Position: Zukunft fUr die LanJ",irtschaft. Aktualisierte a~rarp(ll~(i .... (he 
Forderungen des BN Bund Naturschutz in Baycrn e. \ .. , :-\()\ ember 199) 
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'Bund' has also campaigned for the protection of the Alpine and 
Danube regions which represent valuable parts of the Bavarian 
heritage. lOS The 'Bund' has collaborated with other environmental 
NGOs such as the 'Landesbund fur Vogelschutz in Bayern e.V.' 
(LBV).106 The LBV, too, has promoted the protection of 
Bavaria's natural heritage, in particular the protection of Bavaria's 
wild birds such as the kingfisher. 
The 'Bund' and LBV have co-operated with the EU Commission 
on a number of occasions and have used EU institutions and 
policies to support their 'green' campaigns. IO? Both NGOs have 
sought to influence the implementation of EU environmental 
policies such as the Habitats Directive and sometimes have had to 
initiate legal proceedings against the Bavarian State government. 
For instance, the 'Bund' was involved in a legal case against the 
Bavarian State government which concerned the question whether 
the 'B 15 neu' motorway project was compliant with the EIA 
Directive. LBV complained bitterly about the last-minute 
consultation by the StMLU on the list of protected areas for the 
Habitats Directive. 108 Bavarian environmental NGOs possess 
comparatively large membership and financial resources but their 
quasi-exclusion by the Bavarian State government from the 
P 
105 Rettet die Donau! Stoppt die Kanalisierung! Bund Naturschutz in Baycrn 
e. V. leafiet, December 1993. BN-Position. Das Alpenprogramm des Bundes 
Naturschutz Bund Naturschutz in Bayern e.v., 1989. 
106 English translation: Federation for the Protection of Birds in Bavaria. 
107 Information provided by two 'Bund' activists during research intenicw. 
19. August 1996, Landshut (Bavaria). 
lOS The list had already been published by the time the LBv was con"L~lted hlr 
final comments. Information from LBv written correspondence. 2. I'cbruary 
.' . N ,\ '1 97' I 'lndesbund tilr \ o"chdlUtl I 998 and 'Pressellltormatlon r. .~u - . ,L. c-
, . .' -,-, J I IYY7 (LBV) fordert: Schutzgebietnetz NATURA 2000 cr\\'Cltel n . --. lJ! 
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'implementation process can only be disadvantageous for EU 
environmental policies. 
Another key actor in Bavarian environmental politics lS the 
'Bayerische Landesamt fur Umweltschutz' (LfU) \\"hich 
exemplifies the Bavarians' preference for measuring and assessing 
pollutants and environmental impacts in Bavaria (see informal 
determinant in figure 5.2). The measuring of qualitative and 
quantitative environmental standards has been elaborate and 
extensive in Bavaria. Particularly the LfU, Bavaria's equivalent to 
SEP A, has monitored environmental standards in great detail and 
has provided information for the public and private sectors as well 
,as interested citizens. The LfU has collected data on air, soil, 
water, noise, waste, nature, and nuclear safety, and has prepared 
assessments and environmental reports such as the 
'Biokartierung'. It was the first agency to set up a centralised air 
quality monitoring network in 1974 and now supervises 73 
monitoring stations. In addition, the LfU today runs 30 stations 
specifically measurmg radioactivity III alf. A new LtU 
Headquarter for 430 employees is expected to be completed in 
Augsburg by 1999. With the new Augsburg LfU Headquarters, 
the Bavarian State government intends to create a centre of 'green 
technology' which provides information and know-how 
particularly for the industrial sector. 109 
The attribute of technological perfectionism has been quite 
pronounced in Bavaria, perhaps even more pronounced in 8a\'aria 
than in the rest of the FRG (and indeed the rest of the EU). 
109 For further information Sec Jm Dienste des Urnweltschutze" B~I}l'n"che" 
Landesamt flir Umweltschutz (no date); UIl1\\l'ltschutz und 
Landesentwicklung in Bayern Baycri",-'hcs Staatsrninistl'riull1 fur 
Landesentwicklung und Umweltfragen, 10196, 
Bavaria has been one of the wealthiest regions ill the EU; ih 
citizens have been able to accept and afford stringent 
technological standards. llo On the other hand. the focus on 
. 'water-tight' technological standards has also meant that many EU 
environmental policies which are less measurable (i.e. policies 
such as the EIA policy) fell in the 'incompatible' category and 
were neglected by Bavarian implementors because they did not fit 
into Bavarian standards and practices. 
Since the early 1990s the Bavarians' vIgorousness with 
environmental standards has taken a turn with increasing 
economic pressures. German unification together with the 
opening towards Central and Eastern Europe, the ongoing 
recession and tough EMU targets have changed informal policy 
priorities in Bavaria. While other EU regions and FRG Lander 
have faced the same or similar economic pressures, Bavarians 
have perceived these problems as particularly burdensome and as 
the most difficult problems since the Second World War. The 
prospect of economic instability partly caused by economic and 
political changes in neighbouring countries to the East have 
compelled the Bavarian public and politicians to consider 
substantial economic policies. The Bavarian State government has 
responded to economic fears by launching initiatives such as the 
'Bayerische Offensive' (which invests public money in new 
businesses) and the above mentioned 'Umweltpakt,.111 The 
110 Of the EU GDP average 100, Bavaria scores 127. 
Bavaria's wealth has been one of the key reasons for Bavaria's strong 
environmental policy stance, according to a representativ(' of the Bavarian 
local authorities office in Brussels. Interview, 4.March 1997. 
III The policy of derogation and deregulation is outlined in Bavarian 
Government documents such as Inti.mnation: U!11\\\~ltschutz In ILl\wn 
(10/96) and Umweltpakt Bayern. i\liteinander die Ul11welt schutzen 191.)5. 
Bavarian State government now relies heavily upon the 
sector's 'voluntary' self-discipline CEigenverantwortung') 
environmental pollution and develop clean technologies. 
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to limit 
With the economic pressures of the 1990s, Bavarian political-
administrative actors and representatives from the private sectors 
have distinguished more carefully between 'welcome' and 
,'unwelcome' EU environmental policies. 'Inconvenient' policies 
involving administrative changes and adjustments of threshold 
criteria have caused headaches for Bavarian administrators, while 
policies based on voluntary action such as the 'eco-audit' Directive 
have been looked upon favourably in the light of Bavaria's 
'deregulation' measures. Nevertheless, the majority of Ell 
environmental policies are still perceived as unnecessary. 
incompatible with Bavarian standards, and 'imposed by outsiders' 
who do not have a legitimate right to do SO.112 Comments such as: 
"Brussels does not even have a proper sewage plant, so who are 
they to set high standards for us?!" are typical for the Bavarian 
State officials' attitude towards EU institutions and EU 
. I li' 111 envlfonmenta po cles. -
Bavaria has been at the forefront of some radical environmental 
initiatives and has often shown a stronger commitment towards 
environmental objectives than other FRG Lander. Bavaria has 
invested substantially in environmental technology, in particular 
the monitoring of environmental standards. On the other hanlL 
EG ' S n T't'eld zwischen 112 In 'Die Umweltpolitik der UTI pannu ~s 
'd" ", Hans \ \\'c,~l1cr Harmonisierungszwanu und Subsl lanUitspnnzlp ',-,' , -hi~hlights incompatibilities between EU and Bavarian, st~nd,ards and 
~ "R" k h tt, (b'lCkwlrd describes many EU environmental policics as uc '-';l' rt l "," ' .. 
') t' B 'S()nderdruck aus Berichte del' B;I\l'II"Lhcl1 .\~;tdcI1lle tur steps or avana, C • 
Naturschutz und Landschaftsptlege Nr.17, 1993, 
111 LU t't- , I' ' Il) r\lI,~ust 1996, \Iunich, 
, Bavarian StM 0 ICIa, \Iltt'r\'lC\\, ' -
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Bavarian technological perfectionism together with Bavarian sdf-
determination has often resulted in a reluctance to pursue policies 
from outside the Bavarian layer. In addition, the 1990s' economic 
difficulties and associated problems such as high unemployment 
have caused Bavarian political-administrative actors and the 
public to view their (old) environmental policy practices as a 
luxury which cannot be maintained in the near future. Since the 
late 1990s, Bavarians have embraced a strategic policy change of 
deregulation which now threatens to undermine many Bavarian 
environmental achievements and indeed many EU environmental 
-policy objectives. 
Figure 5.2 highlights formal and informal obstacles in the 
Bavarian layer which make the implementation of EU 
environmental policies difficult. Bavarian political-administrative 
actors have scrutinised every EU environmental policy and have 
relied upon their own media-specific and technological standards. 
Since the early 1990s, the StMLU in particular has focused on a 
strategic change towards environmental policy 'deregulation'. 
Bavaria's 'deregulation' may have been in line with those EU 
policies which are based on voluntary action. However, other EU 
environmental objectives have suffered from a lack of discipline 
and co-ordination. The 'voluntary approach' has been welcomed 
by the private sector, but environmental NGOs in Ba\'aria h~l\'e 
opposed the new emphasis on voluntary action quite strongly. 
NGOs have tried to support EU environmental policies but their 
involvement in the implementation process has been rest ricted hI' 
. rTIllch as possible. Their Bavarian admimstrators as 
conti"ontational position in Bavarian environmental polit ic" h~h 
hindered them from forming a partnership \\ith the puhlic and 
EU Layer: 
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private sectors which could have supported th' I ._ 
e Imp ementatlon ot 
ED environmental objectives. 
Figure 5.2: The Bavarian Layer and Environmental Policy 
*Complex (i.e. verflechtet yet confrontational) position in federal state system. allowing autonomy and 
competency to scrutinise policies 'from outside'; Bavaria at large represented by Bavarian State 
Government and Ministerpraesident, StMLU responsible for environ. matters in Bavaria 
*Political-administrative structures complex and fragmented; Bavarian local authority structure 
fragmented, too; fragmentation hinders communication and coordination; competencies protected by 
constitution; comparatively large financial resources and technology. 
* Legal system fragmented, transposition shared by Federal and Bavarian legislators: relying heaVily on 
technological and regulatory standards, often neglecting cross-boundary and integrative aspects of EU 
policy; more recently, move towards voluntary action and de-regulation. 
[R] 
Infonnal Determinants: 
*Relationships between actors often confrontational, emphasis on subsidiarity; sceptical towards policy 
'instructions from outside'; relationship between Bavarian State Government and local authorities oftL'll 
'stiefrnuetterlich' . 
*Attitudes towards environ. protection favourable, traditional interest in natural heritage combined Wllh 
new 'green' issues; however, also over-reliance on technological/ regulatory sol~.~ons; recently concern 
over econ. 'threats' caused by econ. recession. EMU criteria and competition from CEE neighhours 
Attitudes towards the EU generally sceptical and confrontational; 'instructions from EU' considered 
inconvenient and not legitimate; interested more in EU policy-making rather than cooperatlOon in EU 
L-------r-_..I policy implementation. 
*Policy priorities and strategies have seen U-turn in early 1990s from rigorous and stringent environ 
policy standards to more lenient and flexible approach facilitating econ. growth and competitivene" 
* Policy style and practices influenced by perception that every policy has to be scrutinised; also 
technolo!!ic;Jl oerfectionism. often ne!!lectinl' cro.,s-hollnrbrv imnncts 
5.6 Conclusion: Subnational Layers are important in the 
ED Environmental Policy Process 
With the help of the map, this Chapter has described how t\\'O 
'distinct' subnational layers feature their own 'unique' mixes of 
formal and informal determinants and develop their own 
environmental policies. The Chapter has also shown how 
'distinctly Scottish and Bavarian' formal and informal determinants 
have shaped EU environmental policies in both regions 
(confIrming Arguments 1 and 2). In the following conclusion. 
three key insights are highlighted again. 
(EU) Environmental policies have been shaped by the subnational 
regions' formal constitutional position in the wider national state 
systems 
Subnational regions' formal constitutional positions in the wider 
national context constitute an important determinant in the 
implementation of EU environmental policies. In the Scottish 
case, environmental policies have been influenced by Scotland's 
paradoxical position: on the one hand, Scotland has enjoyed 
-autonomous spheres which have allowed Scotland to develop 
some distinct environmental policy features, while on the other 
hand, Scotland has been an integral part of the UK centralised 
state system and has therefore followed the national lead in many 
other environmental policy instances. This paradox is reflected in 
the way Scottish actors, and in particular Scottish Otllee ofticiah 
as representatives of both central government and Scottish 
interests, have followed (and percei\'t~d) their roles and 
relationships in the EU environmental policy proce,,"- \\'hilc 
responsibilities for formal transposition of EU policies ha\'l' been 
kept comparatively simple (the Scott ish Orfice has temkd to 
adopt a Scottish version of DoE documents), formal and informal 
relationships at a later implementation stage have often suffered 
from the Scottish paradox as it contributed towards a lack of co-
operation and even mistrust between government levels. 
Scotland's paradoxical position has generated an ongoing debate 
about Scottish devolution which has dominated Scottish politics 
for the past decades. The environmental policy area has suffered 
under this debate in so far as many Scots have neglected 
environmental issues and have shown limited interest in the 
pursuance of EU environmental policies. Nevertheless. 
environmental problems have not been ignored completely and 
there are indications that many Scots consider them increasingly 
important. Scotland currently prepares for a devolved Scottish 
Parliament which will provide the Scots with more decision-
making powers. In the process, the Scots may well develop their 
own independent environmental policyll.f and may well strengthen 
their commitment towards EU environmental policies. The next 
steps in the devolution process will determine the future of (EU) 
environmental policies in Scotland. 
In contrast, the Bavarians have enjoyed substantial political 
powers in the federal state system and have therefore been able to 
establish their own independent environmental policy. Arguably, 
. Bavaria has been the FRG Land most committed to the 
environment and has stood at the forefront with a number of 
environmental initiatives. Bavaria has managed to accommodate 
114 See Workin{T for Sustainability The Governance of Scotland ProjeL't. 
mentioned abov~, FoE Scotland urge enyironmentali-;rs to keep lip the 
. ' ,. 'S tl' d th'lt "n\ironmentJI conl'L'rn" pressure and remlOd polltlclJns 10 co .In e ~ . ' 
, , . S"h p. I· '1lllent 'Scuttlsh P,lrliall1ent -should be conSIdered 10 a future CottlS elr Ie " . 
Green for Go?' (p.6) What on Earth Issue I X. Summer 1l)l)7. 
206 
traditional values and 'new' environmental concerns (such a~ 
nuclear safety and air pollution) as matters of central importance. 
However, with similar vigorousness, Bavarians have conducted an 
environmental policy 'U-turn' in recent years. The new lenient and 
flexible approach has proven to be more substantial and radical 
than the environmental policy adjustments of the FRG as a whole 
(see Chapter 4). Bavaria's relative independence In the 
environmental policy area has not left much room for 
environmental ideas and instructions from 'outside', In fact, every 
EU environmental policy that entered Bavaria's fragmented and 
legalistic political-administrative system has faced senous 
implementation difficulties. Bavarian political-administrative 
actors have protected and maintained their competencies and have 
demonstrated a rather confrontational attitude towards 
instructions from 'above' or 'outside', This sceptical and 
confrontational attitude has meant that EU environmental policies 
have had to overcome (and sometimes have failed) 
constitutionally protected hurdles of Bavarian scrutiny and 
approval. 
(EU) Environmental policies have been influenced by 'distinctly 
Scottish and Bavarian' Informal Determinants 
While formal determinants are paramount, it would be 
misleading to place too much emphasis on Scotland and Ba\aria\ 
constitutional positions and internal formal structures, There are 
other, informal determinants such as policy-makers' priorities. 
attitudes towards environmental protection. and policy style--
within the subnational layers which ultimately shape LL: 
, I 1" S tl' d Il'ts' been in some respects. envrronmenta po lCles, co dn L, , . 
'greener' than the UK as a whole: Scotland\ unique natural 
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environment has been an integral and much valued part of 
Scotland's national heritage. In addition, important economic 
sectors such as tourism and the wool and whiskey industries have 
depended upon a healthy environment in Scotland. Therefore, 
commercial considerations have contributed towards an interest in 
environmental matters in Scotland. On the other hand, there are 
indications that the majority of Scots have been less concerned 
about environmental problems (such as water pollution) than 
other EU citizens. This half-heartedness has been partly due to an 
abundance of natural resources which make environmental 
problems less visible and economic priorities which have been 
more pronounced in Scotland because of its peripheral situation. 
While economic priorities have distracted many key Scottish 
actors from environmental issues and the implementation of EU 
environmental policies, recent years have also seen an upward 
trend in the Scots' environmental awareness. This new 'green' 
interest can only benefit EU environmental policy implementation. 
Informal determinant differences are also evident between 
Bavaria and the FRG: Bavaria was the first FRG Land to 
formulate an environmental policy. The Bavarians' motivation to 
pursue an environmental policy as early as 1970 derived mainly 
from Bavaria's 'FHichenstaat' characteristics (large rural, 
agricultural and forestry areas) and the traditional values 
associated with them, as well as the desire to promote economic 
development without compromising Bavaria's natural resources to 
an unacceptable level. While the Bavarians combined succ~ssfully 
traditional and 'new' environmental \·~t1Ll~S, they ha\~ also r~acted 
to the economic challeng~s of the 1990s with a policy change 
more radical than in the rest of the FRG. The Ba\'arians' 
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perceptions and attitudes, which obviously change over time and 
depend on political-economic circumstances, influence the way in 
which EU environmental policies have been processed. Since the 
early 1990s, Bavarians have pursued a policy of 'substitution and 
deregulation' which is compatible with 'voluntary action' EU 
environmental policies. Bavaria's new strategy, however, is less 
compatible with regulatory and procedural EU environmental 
policy obligations. While Bavarian political-administrative actors 
have reassured critics that deregulation will not lead to lax 
environmental policy compliance, the risk still remains that 
. implementors and practitioners will not follow EU policy 
requirements by the book. 
Formal and informal links between the EU and subnational 
reglOns have influenced significantly EU environmental policy 
implementation 
Finally, the subnational regions' formal and informal links with 
the EU have influenced EU environmental implementation 
performances. Both Scottish and Bavarian links with the EU have 
varied. While the Bavarians have enjoyed stronger formal links 
with Brussels and have had the fmancial and administrative means 
to channel their views to the EU level, the Scots have participated 
. either through the national layer or through well-functioning 
informal lobbying bodies in Brussels. Bavarians have campaigned 
for, and have maintained, strong formal links with the EU in order 
to influence the formulation of EU policies. Indeed, their rigorous 
campaign for more participation has occasionally backfired as EU 
actors often perceived Bavarian lobbying as intimidating. 
Bavarians have been less interested III close ties with the EU 
(Conumssion) when it comes to the implementation of EU 
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environmental policies. This discrepancy suggests that Bavarians 
are not particularly interested in the success of EU environmental 
policies. Although this may be true to a certain extent, the main 
reason for this discrepancy lies in the Bavarians' confidence that 
they fully comply with EU obligations and that they do not wish 
to be supervised by another government level. This attitude. 
however, prevents any critical self-assessment on the part of 
Bavarian implementors which, ultimately, would be beneficial for 
EU environmental objectives. 
The Scots have appeared to be more 'euro-cooperative' than 
their Bavarian counterparts. Until the Labour victory of May 
1997, particularly Scottish local government officials have 
considered the Commission as an ally against the 'mighty' central 
(Conservative) government and have therefore participated at the 
EU level in a less confrontational manner than the Bavarians. A 
. 'truly euro-friendly' position, however, is difficult to establish 
because Scottish links with Brussels have been maintained 
through central government and informal channels. Disagreements 
between Scottish and EU levels have therefore been less obvious. 
A less 'euro-enthusiastic' attitude is noticeable in Scotland when it 
comes to the implementation of EU environmental policies. Faced 
with 'inconvenient' practicalities of EU environmental policies, 
many Scots (particularly those affected by 'unbearable' 
administrative and economic costs imposed on their already ailing 
economies) have turned out to be as 'euro-sceptical' as their 
Bavarian colleagues. Therefore, the implementation of EU 
environmental policies in Scotland has not been guaranteed by the 
Scots' apparent 'euro-friendliness'; instead it has depended upon 
Scottish pragmatism and economic (self-) intere"ts In a 
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competitive Single Market. 
The difference in EU attitudes between subnational and national 
layers is striking. In contrast to the FRG 'driving force' in the 
European integration process, Bavarians have taken an overall 
'euro-sceptical' stance and have defended their powers and 
interests at every opportunity. The Scots, on the other hand, have 
departed from the UK position of an openly 'awkward EU 
partnertl15 and have presented themselves as 'euro-friendly'. This 
image, however, has not prevented occasional criticism against 
"bright-eyed bushy-tailed Commission officials" 116 by Scottish 
actors who have faced 'inconvenient' EU environmental 
obligations which placed a disproportionally heavy burden on the 
peripheral region Scotland. 
Looking at the overall process of EU environmental policy 
implementation, the question remains whether EU environmental 
policies are compatible with the Scottish and Bavarian political-
administrative systems. If both subnational layers feature 
determinants which are favourable to EU environmental policies, 
policy implementation should take place without major 
difficulties. However, if subnational determinants are incompatible 
-with EU environmental policies, problems of implementation are 
almost inevitable. Focusing on formal and informal links between 
government levels, both Scotland and Bavaria have featured 
unfavourable weaknesses and gaps m the EU environmental 
policy filtering process. Tensions caused by political and 
liS Stephen George uses this description in An Awkward Partner: Britain in 
the European Community 1990. 
116 
. t' th SCl1ttl'S'h \\,hiskc\.' The comment was made by a representative 0 e , 
industry, see above. 
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constitutional circumstances exist in both political-administratiye 
systems. In the Scottish case, vertical communication and co-
. operation links have been dominated by mistrust and political 
differences (especially between the Scottish Office and Scottish 
local authorities). Horizontal links between policy sectors have 
been more integrated in Scotland but have also shown problems in 
co-ordination (especially within local authority administrations). 
The UK centralised state system in its current form implies one 
advantage for the implementation of EU environmental policies: 
since the Scottish Office and the Secretary of State are part of UK 
central government and since Scotland does not yet possess a 
parliament and government of its own, policy instructions do not 
require political approval in the subnational layer. The lack of a 
subnational authority which scrutinises every policy entering its 
territory can therefore be seen as beneficial for the implementation 
of EU environmental policies. 
In contrast, the transposition of EU environmental policies III 
Bavaria is bound to be difficult. The FRG constitution (and the 
Bavarian constitution for that matter) emphasises the sharing of 
competencies between government levels. While Bavarian 
implementors are required to follow their obligations under the 
FRG constitution and under the Treaties of the EU, they also 
consider it legitimate to assess and shape every policy which 
enters their 'territory'. Their interpretation and 'additions' to 
policies 'from above', often in the form of technological and 
-legalistic details, can result in the inadequate implementation of 
EU environmental policy objectives. In this respect, B.waria 
appears to be in a disadvantage as far as the FRG 
'Politikverflechtung' is concerned (see also Chapter -+). In 
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addition, the FRG and Bavarian political-administrative systems 
and their environmental policies ill particular are 
compartmentalised and fragmented. While horizontal 
fragmentation ensures a certain independence for environmental 
actors to pursue ambitious policies, it also has the effect that 
integrative ED environmental policies such as the EIA Directive 
are not co-ordinated and implemented properly. Despite these 
gaps, one Bavarian determinant is favourable for the pursuance of 
ED environmental policies: Bavaria possesses impressive financial 
and administrative resources (although perhaps less impressive in 
the 1990s) as well as technological 'know-how' in the 
environmental field and should therefore be able to meet EU 
environmental policy obligations even if ED qualitative and 
quantitative standards are slightly different from Bavarian 
standards. 
This Chapter has highlighted the Scottish and Bavarian layers 
and assessed to what extent their formal and informal 
determinants have shaped ED environmental policies on the 
ground. The following case study on the implementation of the 
. EIA Directive (85/337 IEEC) examines the Scottish and Bavarian 
layers and their experiences with the policy. In order to highlight 
more clearly the discrepancy between national and subnational 
layers, the case study compares and contrasts Scottish and 
Bavarian performances with the implementation findings of the 
DK and FRG at large. 
Chapter 6 
Case Study: Implementing the EIA Directive In Scotland and 
Bavaria 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapters investigated the three government layers 
involved in the fIltering process of EU environmental policies. The 
Chapters highlighted key problems which contribute towards the EU 
environmental policy implementation defIcit. The following case study 
examines the EU environmental policy 'reality' further by focusing on the 
filtering process of one particular piece of legislation: the Council 
Directive of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain 
public and private projects on the environment (85/337IEEC) (in short 
'environmental impact assessment' or 'EIA' Directive).l 
The EIA Directive has been selected for several reasons. Firstly, the 
EIA Directive serves as a useful case study because it features 
characteristics common to other EU environmental policies such as the 
Habitats Directive and water quality Directives. For instance, it has 
included a 3-year deadline by which Member States were required to 
adjust their standards to achieve the environmental objective of 
'minimum-regret-planning'. As is typical for EU environmental Directives, 
the EIA requirements were not met by the deadline by most Member 
States for political, legal-administrative and economic reasons. Having 
stressed some of the similarities with other Directives, the ErA Directive 
stands out in other areas and has been described by many as one of the 
most complex and controversial EU environmental policies to date. 2 With 
the EIA Directive, (then) EC policy-makers entered new territory by 
10.1. No L 175 (5/7/85). 
2 Among others see Christopher Wood for a detailed discussion of the EIA Dire~tive. 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review Longman, Essex 199~. 
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setting environmental standards in the planning policy area, an area that 
had previously been the exclusive domain of national and subnational 
actors. The EIA Directive has affected a variety of planning projects 
which fall within the competency of subnational (and! or local) 
government. Not only has the EIA Directive challenged existing national 
and subnational planning policies and competencies, it has also tended to 
clash with economically motivated projects such as road construction, 
housing developments and the construction and operation of 
manufacturing plants. All these factors have rendered the Directive's 
implementation difficult. The EIA Directive is therefore a particularly 
useful case study because it promises to uncover some interesting and 
unique [mdings as well as fmdings that can be applied to EU 
environmental policies in general. 
The following case study outlines and compares the formal (legal) and 
practical implementation of the EIA Directive in the national and 
subnationallayers and assesses its chances of enforcement in the Member 
States and their regions. In particular, it contrasts the implementation 
performances in the national and subnational layers and identifies 
distinctly subnational determinants which shape EIA policy practice in 
Scotland and Bavaria. The study supports the argument that Scotland and 
Bavaria shape the EIA policy decisively and that their input is distinct 
from the wider, national context.3 
6.2 The EIA Directive: Origin and Objective 
The EIA Directive has been one of the most discussed EC 
environmental policies. Many analysts have highlighted the complexity of 
the policy, discussed its legal and practical implications and described the 
subsequent difficulties with which practitioners have proc('ssed t h(' 
3 For detailed information on the research methods and interviewees see 'Appendi\ 6: 
EIA Case Study - Field Research Information', 
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policy.4 Indeed, the EIA Directive has been controversial and a tough nut 
to crack. 
The adoption of the EIA Directive in 1985 followed a long and 
cumbersome negotiation process. Initially, all actors agreed that a 
common EIA policy was paramount for both environmental 
considerations (i.e. restricting environmentally damaging project 
developments) and economic considerations (i.e. level-playing-field as 
opposed to 'environmental dumping' in the planning policy area). At the 
same time, concerns were raised about a further loss of discretionary 
powers, the potential administrative and fmancial costs associated with 
environmental assessments, and the prospect of more 'red tape' on 
business developments. The Danish and UK Governments in particular, 
found it hard to accept a European policy which interfered with 
traditionally national and subnational decision-making. 5 The adoption of 
the EIA Directive was therefore complex (see Chapter 3) involving 
various actors and interests from different government levels in a 
complicated bargaining process. Consequently, the end product of the 
intense bargaining was a Directive which represented a more 'digestible' 
compromise of considerations. 6 
The EIA Directive in its current form7 consists roughly of four 
4 See in particular Hien, Eckart 'Die Umweltvertraglichkeitsprlifung in der 
gerichtlichen Praxis' (pp.422-428) Neue Verwaltungsrecht Zeitung Heft 5, 1997; 
Jessel, Beate Die Umweltvertraglichkeitsprlifung auf dem Prlifstand Bayerische 
Akademie fUr Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege, Presse Information Nr.17, 25 April 
1997; Macrory, Richard 'Environmental Assessment and the 'direct effect' doctrine' 
(pp.44/45) ENDS Report No.228, January 1994; Wood, C~ristopher; .Jones, .Cary~ 
'The Effect of Environmental Assessment on UK Local Plannmg Authonty DecIsions 
(pp.1237-1257) Urban Studies vo1.34, No.8, 1997. 
5 For a more detailed account of the EIA Directive's adoption see Wood, Christopher 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review Longman, Essex 1995. 
6 Christopher Wood provides a list of earlier, more ambitious, EIA poli~y proposals in 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review Longman, Esse\ 1995. 
7 In 1997, the EU adopted 'Council Directive 971111EC amending Cou.ncil Dire.clive (lj 
27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and pnvale proJect ... on 
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procedural stages: Firstly, projects which are potentially harmful for the 
environment and therefore require an EIA have to be identified. Under 
Annex I, the Directive provides a list of projects which have "signifIcant 
effects on the environment" and which "must as a rule be subject to 
systematic assessment". The Directive also contains an Annex II which 
refers to projects which "may not have significant effects on the 
environment in every case" but "should be assessed where the Member 
States consider that their characteristics so require". Secondly, once it is 
established that an EIA is necessary for a project application, the 
developer seeking planning permission is required to provide relevant 
information on the project in the form of environmental statements. 
Annex III of the Directive outlines a detailed list of environmental 
information items which developers are required to produce. Thirdly, 
having provided all the necessary information, interested parties and the 
public have the opportunity to participate in the planning process. 
According to the Directive, Member States shall ensure that "any request 
for development consent and any information ( ... ) are made available to 
the public, and that the public concerned is given the opportunity to 
express an opinion before the project is initiated." And finally, a planning 
decision can only follow after the three stages of identification, 
environmental statement and information! consultation have been 
accomplished. 
The EIA Directive's main purpose is to oblige Member States' planning 
authorities to consider environmental aspects in planning procedures as 
early as possible whenever a proposed project is likely to have a major 
effect on the environment. The idea behind environmental impact 
the environment (85/337/EEC)' which is intended to bin~ Mem?er States in~ll a. mor~ 
harmonised framework of EIA project identification. Its formal ImplementatIOn IS dUl 
in 1999. 
211 
assessment is to conduct 'rninimum-regret-planning' which involyes the 
identification, evaluation and incorporation of environmental externalities 
during the planning process so that 'unreasonable' environmental damage 
can be avoided. The Directive itself does not provide for specific 
environmental criteria; it does not require Member States and their 
planning authorities to change their policy priorities and 'become green'. 
The Directive requires planning authorities to adjust their formal 
procedures and thereby integrate environmental interests more strongly 
into planning considerations so that 'environmentally sensible' decisions 
are taken. Legally, the Directive establishes a right for the public to be 
consulted before permission is given to projects which may have 
damaging implications for the environment. In practice, however, 
political-administrative actors and the judiciary have been unable (and 
often reluctant) to bind developers and planning authorities into a 
coherent EIA system. The EIA Directive leaves much of the ways and 
means to achieve 'minimum-regret-planning' to the Member States and 
their implementors. It provides considerable scope for interpretation, 
particularly in areas such as time limits and methods of consultation. 
Consequently, the effectiveness of the policy depends upon the national 
and subnational implementors' ability and willingness to implement and 
enforce the policy within their political-administrative systems. 
The EIA Directive requIres formal transposition, practical 
implementation and (if necessary) legal enforcement within the Member 
States and their subnational regions. Accordingly, the following Sections 
investigate the three steps of implementation in the national and 
subnational layers and assess how and to what extent implementors in 
Scotland and Bavaria have processed and influenced the ElA Directive. 
The Sections compare implementation performances in Scotland and 
Bavaria and contrast their performances with experiences in the UK and 
218 
FRG at large. 
6.3 The UK National Layer and the EIA Directive 
Considering that the UK Government initially opposed the adoption of 
the EIA Directive, the fIrst stage of the implementation process, i.e. the 
formal transposition of the Directive, was conducted relatively swiftly and 
problem-free within the national layer (for favourable determinants see 
figure 6.1). The EIA Directive did not require parliamentary scrutiny and 
approval. In addition, the policy's integrative approach to consider a wide 
range of inter-connected environmental impacts during planning fitted-in 
well with the UK's broad defmition of the environment. The Directive 
text was therefore adopted promptly and verbatim by the two central 
government ministries DoE and the Scottish Office into existing planning 
policy frameworks in the form of Statutory Instruments. 8 
Although part of a centralised state system, Scotland required separate 
transposition from the rest of the UK for several reasons. Scotland's legal 
system differs in many respects from the system in England and Wales. In 
addition, policy matters such as environmental policies are dealt with by 
the territorial Scottish Office and the Secretary of State for Scotland. 
Scotland also differs from the rest of the UK in terms of natural habitats, 
infrastructure, population density and industrial output. Its environment is 
particularly affected by sectors such as salmon farming and wind 
generation which cannot be found in England and Wales in such a large 
scale. While all these aspects necessitated separate formal transposition of 
the EIA Directive for Scotland, Scottish Office officials did not obstruct 
(or divert from) the fIrst stage of the filtering process. In fact, the 
Scottish Office followed the DoE lead and adopted an EIA Statutory 
8 Statutory Instruments are legally binding but do not require appro\a\ by parl.iament. 
The EIA Directive's implementation deadline was 3. July 1988; the UK tormally 
implemented the Directive on 15. July 1988. 
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Instrument (SI) which differs only marginally from the England! \Vales 
documents.
9 
While differences are only marginal, the Scottish Office 
nevertheless translated the EIA policy into the subnational (i.e. Scottish) 
context and gave the policy its 'personal touch' (the details of the Scottish 
Office SI and Circular are outlined below). By doing so, the Scottish 
Office followed its 'hybrid' function as a central government ministry 
representing both UK and Scottish interests. In this sense, both national 
and subnationallayers 'overlapped'. 
While the formal transposition of the EIA Directive was relatively swift. 
practical implementation of the policy in the UK proved to be more 
problematic. Planning applications have been processed on a case-by-case 
basis and planning authorities have enjoyed almost limitless discretionary 
room in determining EIA cases. A number of UK-wide EIA policy 
studies lO have revealed insufficiencies in the quality of EIAs (e.g. many 
vital environmental criteria were not mentioned in environmental 
statements) as well as quantity of EIAs (e.g. many potentially harmful 
projects were not identified). Certain formal and informal determinants 
represented major obstacles for the EIA policy in the UK: the above 
studies identified as the main problems in EIA policy implementation 
insufficient expertise, lack of resources, limited interest and lack of 
commitment. More recent studies have shown that the EIA practice has 
9 For England and Wales see Statutory Instruments The Town and Country Planning. 
Assessment of Environmental Effects Regulations 1988 (SI 1988 No.1199); The Town 
and Country Planning (Assessment of Environmental Effects) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1990 (SI 1990 No.367); The Town and Country Planning (Assessment of 
Environmental Effects) (Amendment) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994 No.677). 
10 See 'Annex - UK' of Commission Report on the Implementation of Directl ve 
85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of public and private projects on the 
environment Com (93) 28 final - vo1.l3; Wood, Christopher; Jones. Carys Monitoring 
Environmental Assessment and Planning DoE Planning Research Programme, ll)l) 1; 
Treweek et al 'Ecological Assessment of Proposed Road Developments' (pp.29S-J07) 
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management vo1.36, No.3, 1993; Lee. N.: 
Colley, R. Reviewing the Quality of Environmental Statements Occasional Paper 24. 
EIA Centre, University of Manchester, 1992. 
improved only marginally since 1988. 11 While initial EIA policy results 
have been disappointing, the DoE has been adamant to provide detailed 
guidance for planners and developers to improve EIA standards and has 
thereby demonstrated a supportive and positive attitude towards the EIA 
policy. By and large, this supportive attitude has been missing from the 
Scottish Office (see Section be10w).12 
In terms of legal enforcement, UK judges have generally been uneasy 
about the EIA policy. More specifically, they have been reluctant to 
support the policy with additional criteria and guidelines where the 
Directive and its national legislation have been 'silent'. For England and 
Wales, Ward and Alder observed that courts have not interpreted the EIA 
Directive in a 'sympathetic' light, i.e. they have not taken account of the 
wider concept and idea of the Directive and have not established a 'direct 
effect,.13 It is therefore up to the planning authorities to pursue and 
implement the objective of 'minimum-regret-planning' within their local 
communities. 
In sum, the UK national layer has featured some favourable formal and 
informal conditions (or determinants outlined in figure 6.1) for the 
filtering of the EIA Directive. The centralised political-administrative 
system as well as the legal framework of the UK have accommodated the 
II For a more recent study see Wood and Jones 'The Effect of Environmental 
Assessment on UK Local Planning Authority Decisions' (pp.1237-1257) Urban 
Studies vo1.34, No.8, 1997. 
12 See Scottish Office leaflet Environmental Assessment - a guide 6/90; for DoE see 
Environmental Assessment. A Guide to the Procedures 1989; Environmental 
Assessment. Evaluation of Environmental Information for Planning Projects. A Good 
Practice Guide 1994; also DoE Planning Research Programme Monitoring 
Environmental Assessment and Planning A Report by Christopher Wood and Carys 
Jones for the DoE, 1991. 
13 Alder John 'Environmental Impact Assessment. The Inadequacies of English Law' 
(pp.203:220) Journal of Environmental Law vo1.5, No.2, 1993; Ward, A~geb The 
Right to an effective Remedy in European Community L~w and Env~ronmental 
Protection: A Case Study of UK Judicial Decisions concerning the Envlronmentd 
Assessment Directive' (pp.221-244) Journal of En\'ironmental Law \ol.:'i. No.2. \\)\)-,. 
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integrative environmental policy without major difficulties. In addition. 
the DoE played a pro-active role in the implementation of the policy. 
However, the policy has faced other formal and informal determinants 
which have hindered its the successful implementation into the UK 
planning policy practice. These determinants concerned mainly problems 
of commitment and resources on the part of planning authorities. The UK 
legal system has been unable (and arguably unwilling) to back up the EIA 
policy~ the judiciary has not filled legal gaps were the Directive and 
Statutory Instruments have been silent. 
Figure 6.1: The UK National Layer and the EIA Directive 
/~-
EU Layer: 1 
Fonual Detenninants: 
*Centralised state system facilitates fonnal transposition of Directive; no parliamentary 
approvall scrutiny required. 
* Political-administrative structures integrative, accommodating policy into existing 
planning policy framework; initially lack of resources, in recent years moderate 
improvements. 
* Legally, policy adopted verbatim as SIs, leaving large discretionary room to EIA 
practitioners; judiciary not prepared to fill in legal gaps, not 'sympathetic' towards policy 
objective. 
Infonual Detenninants: 
* In terms of policy priorities, DoE comparatively receptive to, supportive of, policy. 
* In tenus of relationships, planning officials left to interpret policy in line with own 
priorities and practices. 
I 
6.4 The Subnational Layer: Scotland and the EIA Directive 
Formal Transposition 
On paper, the Scottish Office followed the DoE lead and did not divert 
substantially from the rest of the UK. However, close examination of the 
Scottish Office Circular (13\1988) (a document which accompanies, 
explains and summarises the Scottish SI) reveals that the Scottish Office 
has perceived and processed the policy in a manner distinct from the rest 
of the UK. In essence, the Scottish Office has been reluctant to adjust 
Scottish planning practices and restrict economic development in Scottish 
local communities for the sake of an EU policy which promotes an 
environmentallevel-playing-field in planning (see informal determinants in 
figure 6.2). 
According to the Circular, the development control system already in 
place in Scotland covers the main objectives of the Directive and only 
minor additions have been necessary to implement the Directive fully. I,) 
Instead, the Scottish Office places great emphasis on the date of 
applicability of the EIA policy (i.e. project applications in progress at the 
time of the Directive's formal transposition were excluded) and the 
developers' means of appeal against EIAs. The Scottish Office Circular 
elaborates in great detail the question whether a planning application 
requires an EIA, indicating that the impact of the policy on costs and 
administration should be kept to a minimum. Once a planning authority in 
Scotland is informed by a developer about a forthcoming planning 
application, the planning authority has four weeks time to investigate 
whether the proposal in question falls within the project categories of 
Annex I and II. If the proposed project is listed under Annex L an EIA is 
mandatory. If the project can be found in the Annex II category, the 
14 For instance, the planning permission procedure was extended from 8 weeks tll 16 
weeks to allow for the new information and consultation obligations. 
223 
planning authority has to decide whether the project is likely to haye 
significant effects on the environment and therefore requires an ErA. The 
advice given on Annex II criteria is only indicative: an ErA is required if 
the project is of more than local importance; the project is situated in a 
"particularly sensitive or vulnerable location"; or if a project is "unusually 
complex" and has "potentially adverse environmental effects". The 
indicative thresholds suggested by the Scottish Office in Annex C of the 
Circular do not provide further guidance for planning authorities. As a 
result, Scottish planning authorities are free to consider Annex II projects 
on a case-by-case basis and can take decisions in accordance with their 
(economic) policy priorities and strategies. 
Once the planning authority comes to the conclusion that an ErA is 
required, it has to provide reasons for its decision. The planning authority 
is not obliged to give reasons if it is of the opinion that a project does not 
significantly affect the environment and does not require an EIA. 
Developers are therefore in an advantage over environmentalists. They 
have the opportunity to fmd out why planning authorities are asking for 
environmental statements and can change their application strategy 
accordingly. Opponents of project applications do not enjoy the same 
early access to information which would strengthen their position in the 
process. 
The Scottish Office Circular elaborates on the developer's right of 
appeal against an ErA decision which enables him to refer his case to the 
Secretary of State for Scotland for direction. The Secretary of State can 
either confrrm the planning authority's opinion that an EIA is necessary, 
in which case an environmental statement is obligatory. He can also 
disagree with the planning authority, in which case the developer is not 
obliged to produce a statement. Therefore, as a central government 
minister (representing the national layer), the Secretary of State plays a 
significant role in the planning process in Scotland: he can over-rule any 
decision taken by a Scottish local authority. 
Environmental statements are covered in only one comparatiYelv small 
section of the Circular which provides much discretionary room for 
developers. The briefness of the section suggests that the fmancial and 
administrative burden for both developers and planning authorities should 
be kept at a tolerable level. The Circular's guidelines do not mention all 
the requirements listed in Annex III of the EIA Directive. They do not 
include an outline of the main alternatives considered by the developer, 
neither do the guidelines include a description of the developer's research 
methods and process. IS Instead, the Circular emphasises that "[t]here is 
no statutory provision as to the form of an environmental statement". In 
other words, planning authorities are not in the position to make any 
judgements on the form and quality of developers' environmental 
statements; they can only 'request' more information if a statement does 
not provide sufficient information for an EIA. 
Following the submission of the environmental statement by the 
developer, the planning authority is required to inform the public and 
statutory consultees about the planning application. The planning 
application together with the environmental statement are advertised in 
the local press and the 'Edinburgh Gazette'. The notices must indicate 
where and when the environmental statement can be inspected by the 
public. Statutory consultees receive copies of environmental statements 
free of charge, while other interested parties may request copies and pay 
15 While the SI outlines the items of Annex III of the EIA Directive in detail (in 
Schedule 3), the document more likely to be consulted, the Circular,. prov,ides 
inadequate Annex III information: "[t]his statement must include a deSCrIptIOn of th,e, 
project; a description of the measur,~s envisaged in o~der to, a\ol~: ~edu~e. ~nd It 
possible remedy significant adverse ettects; the data reqUIred to ,Identlt) and clSSlSS the 
main effects which the project is likely to have on the envIronment; and a non-
technical summary of this information." 
a 'reasonable charge' to cover the costs of production. The list of 
statutory consultees is restricted to 'relevant bodies' such as adjoining 
planning authorities, Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), and the Secretary 
of State for Scotland who should be informed whenever proposals are 
likely to affect water supplies, waste disposal, noise and air pollution, 
trunk roads and special roads, historic buildings, and Royal Parks and 
Palaces. 16 Statutory consultees and other interested parties have the 
opportunity to comment on planning applications by submitting written 
representations about the proposed development within four weeks. 
The Circular states that planning authority should inform the developer 
which bodies have been consulted and should send copies of the planning 
application and the environmental statement to the Secretary of State for 
Scotland. Again, the discrepancy between applications with and without 
environmental statement is striking: planning authorities are required to 
send only applications which have environmental statements attached, 
they are not required to forward applications where environmental 
statements were considered as unnecessary. Many potentially harmful 
projects can therefore fall through the net of EIA scrutiny. 
Having accomplished the formalities of the preceding three stages, 
authorities can attend to the actual planning decision. Taking into account 
the environmental statement and any comments from consultees and 
interested parties, planning authorities should take a decision within 16 
weeks, according to the Circular. If the information provided is not 
adequate, planning authorities can request further information within the 
16 weeks time limit. Once a decision is taken, planning authorities are 
required to notify developers, the Secretary of State for Scotland, and 
16 Other bodies include the Health and Safety Executi ve and the Scottish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The list has been up-dated by the a~thor: 
the 1988 circular mentions the Countryside Commission for Scotland and the .:\~\lure 
Conservancy Council which ceased to exist in 1991. 
statutory consultees. The Circular does not mention in which form the 
planning authorities notify interested parties of their decisions, i.e. 
whether or not reasons for the decision are included. Further, only 
appeals to the Secretary of State for Scotland by developers are 
considered at a 'post decision' stage; possible appeals put forward by the 
public are not mentioned in the Circular. And, again, the Secretary of 
State can over-rule an authority'S decision if he disagrees with the 
planning authority. 
Although the policy's preventive objective is mentioned in the 
introduction of the Scottish Office Circular, the concept of 'minimum-
regret-planning' is not evident in the remaining parts of the document. 
Throughout, the authors are almost apologetic about additional work and 
costs resulting from the EIA policy. They emphasise that "no unnecessary 
burden" should occur for planning authorities and developers and that 
"additional costs imposed on developers by the requirement to provide 
information about environmental effects should be kept to a reasonable 
minimum". The text lacks any similar sensitivity towards advocates of 
environmental concerns and their problems in representing 'green' 
interests. 
In 1994, the Scottish Office had to up-date the list of Annex II projects 
as a response to amendments made by the DoE for England and Wales. 
Three new project categories (wind generators, motorway service areas, 
coastal protection works) were adopted with considerable reluctance. In 
Circular (26\ 1994) the Scottish Office stresses that other categories 
(salmonid farming, water treatment plants, non-motorway service areas 
and golf courses) were discussed but not included. A combination of 
considerations explain the Scottish Office's behaviour: the Scottish Officc 
followed both the national layer's (i.e. the then COl1scrvati\'c 
Government's) policy of deregulation and the economic interest'- of 
certain private and public sectors in Scotland. In this case. the 
representation of national and subnational interests by the Scottish Office 
was not paradoxical (see Chapter 5), but merged into a convenient 
combination of economic interests in both layers. The adoption of three 
new categories was the only concession the Scottish Office was willin a to 
c 
acconunodate environmental considerations. Although the other four 
categories were not included in the Annex II list, the Circular 
nevertheless advised planning authorities to consider 'voluntarily' their 
environmental impacts. 
In comparison with the DoE, the Scottish Office has taken a minimalist 
and defensive approach towards the EIA policy. Apart from an 
apologetic Circular, the Scottish Office produced a two-page leaflet 
which does not match up with the DoE documents which guide planners 
and developers in the rest of the UK.17 Figure 6.2 describes the formal 
determinants as favourable to the transposition of the EIA Directive in 
Scotland. Although Scotland transposed the policy separately from the 
rest of the UK, the centralised state system and legal framework allowed 
Scottish implementors to transpose the EIA Directive verbatim without 
parliamentary scrutiny and policy amendments. On the other hand, 
unfavourable informal determinants were evident right from the beginning 
of the Directive's transposition into the Scottish context. Informal 
obstacles occurred mainly in the form of economic considerations, in 
particular the fmancial costs and fears over more 'red tape' for Scottish 
business developments. These considerations compelled Scottish Office 
officials to keep additional and supportive measures for the EIA Directive 
to a minimum and apologise for any 'inconvenience' caused by the policy. 
17 See Scottish Oftice leatlet Environmental Assessment - a guide 6/90. 
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Practical Implementation 
At fIrst glance, EIA policy implementation in Scotland did not diverge 
significantly from the implementation in the rest of the UK. But a closer 
look at the details of practical implementation reveals key differences in 
the Scottish EIA practice. Smith,18 for instance, pointed out that Scottish 
planners and developers already had considerable experience in the 
'environmental assessment and management' of North Sea oil projects, 
but also noted that this advantage was not utilised for other planning 
sectors.
19 
More importantly, Smith observed that Scottish Office officials 
made no secret of their criticism over the costs and additional work 
resulting from the EIA Directive's requirements. Many Scottish 
practitioners (i.e. planners and developers) would later confIrm this 
attitude by applying only a bare minimum of EIA requirements. 
The author's own research fmdings reflect the Scottish OffIce's open 
dislike of the EIA policy as one of the policy's main informal obstacles. In 
fact, considering the initial response to research enquiries, the EIA 
Directive did not appear to have a good start in Scotland: one Scottish 
OffIce key offIcial described the Directive as "an awful thing" but also 
admitted that he had "never read that thing".20 Nevertheless, local 
planning authorities received brief EIA policy guidance from the Scottish 
18Smith, James A Critical Appraisal of the Performance of the Environmental 
Assessment (Scotland) Regulations since their Introduction MSc Dissertation, 
University of Stirling, 1990. Smith used a research format developed and applied by 
the EIA Centre, University of Manchester. For his study, Smith selected 25 
environmental statements submitted to the Scottish (Office) Development Department 
between 1988 and 1990. In addition, Smith conducted 14 interviews wi th planning 
authorities, developers, consultants and consultees in Scotland. 
19 For an appraisal of high standards in North Sea oil environmental assessment :Ind 
management in Scotland, see Nelson and Butler 'Assessing, planning and 
manaaement of North Sea oil development effects in the Shetland Islands' b 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review vol. 13, NoA. July 1993. 
20 Quot'ltions from a telephone interview with the Scottish Office official. 5 .. \pril 
1995, Edinburgh. 
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Office.21 In return, local planning authorities provided the Scottish Office 
with a list of planning procedures requiring EIA and thereby generated a 
rough overview of the Scottish EIA practice. 
Scottish planning authorities viewed the EIA policy with mixed 
feelings. Some planning authority officials complained about the 
increased bureaucracy and high expectations on the part of 
environmentalists, some were indifferent about the policy, while others 
approved of their 'new' strengthened authority to request environmental 
information from developers. Although planning authorities consulted the 
Scottish Office Circular on a regular basis, implementation practice 
depended very much upon informal determinants, in particular planning 
authorities' attitudes and preferences with individual planning officers 
leading the EIA process.22 As a result, one of the policy's aims, namely 
the harmonisation of environmental standards in planning, has not been 
achieved inside the Scottish layer. 
The SI and the Circular have left Scottish planning authorities with 
considerable discretionary room concerning the 'screening' and 
identification of potentially harmful projects. Consequently, many 
planning officers have tended to avoid obstacles to economic or other 
developments in their communities which they perceived as inconvenient 
and unnecessary. The number of EIAs was therefore limited to project 
applications which were 'obviously' harmful. Taking rough estimates of 
the project's size and location, planning officers checked whether 
applications belonged to either Annex I or Annex II. Potentially harmful 
and controversial projects such as quarries, incinerators. or \\'aste 
21 One Scottish Office official stressed that the advice given is only "indicati.ve", i.e~ it 
is for the local authorities to apply the criteria mentioned in the Scottish 01 t ICC 
Circular. Written correspondence, 4. December 1997, Edinburgh. 
22 One plannin a oft'icial stressed that the style and content of EIAs depended upon his 
"own requirem;nts". Written correspondence, 21. April 1997, Perth. 
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disposal plants were considered for EIA, while other, less obyious but 
equally harmful, projects were not checked at all. Environmental interest 
groups and other consultees who could have helped identify harmful 
projects, were not consulted by planning authorities during the screening 
process. Enjoying considerable discretionary powers, planning officers 
were reluctant to hinder economically lucrative developments in their 
local areas. This situation was worsened by the fact that planners showed 
a lack of experience and resources23 in identifying potentially harnlful 
projects. 
There were differences in opinion concerning the information provided 
by Scottish developers. Generally, Scottish planning authorities were 
satisfied with the content and quality of environmental statements, 
although one planning officer admitted that statements were biased and 
focused on information in favour of the projects. 24 In contrast, 
environmental interest groups and some observers considered the quality 
of environmental statements as generally poor. 25 The most disappointing 
results were found in the Annex III sections 'alternatives' and 'remedial 
solutions', aspects which hardly received any consideration. Aware of the 
statements' insufficiencies, planning authorities nevertheless avoided 
additional work and only rarely returned applications to developers with 
the request for more information. 26 Therefore, (self-) interests in 
23 Lack of experience was mentioned by one local authority (Linlithgow, 17. April 
1997), lack of resources by another local authority (Aberdeen, 28. May 1997). 
24 Planning officer, interview, 16. June 1997, Glasgow. 
25 See Smith James A Critical Appraisal of the Performance of the Environmental 
Assessment (Scotland) Regulations since their Introduction 1990; al~o intel"l~st groups 
commented on inadequate environmental information during plannIng proced,ures. at 
the 'People and the Environment: A Common Cause' Conference, held b) S(ottlsh 
Wildlife and Countryside Link, 14. February 1997, Perth. 
26 Only one planning otticer stated that two or thr~e en \'ironmental statements Wefe 
returned. Telephone interview, 2. June 1997, Lochgllphead. 
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minimising the work-load have prevented planning officials from pursuing 
a more rigorous approach towards environmental statements. 
Scottish planning authorities have made full use of their discretionary 
powers in determining the list of consultees. Consequently, potential 
opponents of project applications have had to rely upon the 'Edinburgh 
Gazette' and local papers to fmd out about planning applications. 
Statutory consultees and 'affected' parties were informed properly, 
according to Scottish planning authorities. Interestingly, the majority of 
consultees contacted by the authorities did not represent environmental 
interests as such but interests of traditional lobby groups, local 
communities and economic sectors.27 Planning authorities were generally 
reluctant to open the EIA process to 'outsiders'. Among other reasons, 
planning officers feared the increased work load caused by a wider 
audience. At the same time, planning authorities were also aware that 
environmental interest groups could jeopardise projects through increased 
public and media pressure. As a response, environmental interest groups 
were allowed to participate, but only if they explicitly requested so (see 
'relationships between actors' in figure 6.2). 
Since the formal transposition of the EIA Directive, Scottish planning 
authorities have rejected a number of planning applications. However, it 
is difficult to establish exactly what impact the EIA policy had on these 
planning decisions. Again, some planning officers stated that the 
introduction of the EIA policy has had a positive influence on planning 
decision-making. The EU policy provided planning officers with more 
authority to demand environmental information and highlight 
27 In the case of the motorway M74 Northern Extension, the following bodies \vere 
consulted: Historic Scotland, Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executi\t~. Royal Fine 
Arts Commission, Coal Authority, Scottish Power, British Gas. Clydeport. Railtr~~ck, 
The Mineral Valuer, British Telecom, Clyde Calders Project, Str~thclyde ~ollce, 
Scottish Office Environment Department, Historic Scotland and the Sl,()ttlsh \\ t1dllft' 
Trust. Written correspondence. 23. July 1997, Glasgow. 
environmental dangers of a project. In some cases, the information 
generated by EIA contributed towards either the projects' modification 
or even the refusal of planning applications. 28 Other planning officers, 
however, noticed no difference in decision-making following the 
introduction of the policy.29 In some cases, planning authorities openly 
supported planning applications for economic reasons, with the result that 
EIA [mdings were ignored completely during decision-making. 3o Overall. 
there was no coherent (level-playing-field) pattern in the application of 
the EIA policy in Scotland. The policy depended very much upon 
individual planners and their priorities and attitudes towards the EIA 
policy objective of 'minimum-regret-planning'. 
Enforcement 
In terms of EIA policy enforcement, court decisions in Scotland have 
not differed significantly from decisions in England and Wales. Figure 6.2 
indicates that the Scottish legal system, too, has been 'unsympathetic' 
towards the EIA policy. In one particular instance, a Scottish judge 
stressed that the EIA Directive and its Scottish Statutory Instrument do 
not provide clear-cut provisions to determine the question whether a 
project listed in Annex II requires EIA. 31 Planning authorities in Scotland 
28 EIA information contributed towards moderate changes of the M74 Northern 
Extension application (Planning Officer, interview, Glasgow, 16. June 1997); EIA 
information contributed towards the refusal of two wind farm applications (Planning 
Officer, telephone interview, 2. June 1997, Lochgilphead). 
29 The EIA policy "did not make a big difference" when two applications for sewage 
treatment plants were refused planning permission, according to one planning otlicer. 
Written correspondence, 31. March 1997, Elgin. 
30 In an EIA 'related' case (the case was in progress at the time of the Directive's 
formal transposition, the policy was therefore not legally binding), the M77 'Road 
Route Extension' was pushed through the planning process by the Scottish Office, 
Strathclyde Regional Council and Kilmarnock District Council. The I~tter planning 
authority was particularly interested in housing development and trade IlI1ks generated 
by the new motorway. Strathclyde Regional Council official, inten'iew, 7. Allgll"l 
1995, Glasgow; Strathclyde Regional Councillor, interview, 29. August jl)L)S, 
Glasgow. 
31 For further information see Williams, Rhiannon 'Direct Effect of EC Directi\t~ un 
,"" 
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(and indeed the UK in general) have traditionally enjoyed independence in 
local planning. Since vital elements of the ErA Directive (such as the 
question whether an Annex II project requires ErA) are left to the 
implementors' discretion, it is difficult, if not impossible, for project 
opponents to legally challenge planning decisions on the grounds that an 
ErA was inadequate. 
Overall, the ErA Directive has been fIltered through the layers, however 
most of its practical implementation has taken place within the Scottish 
layer. True, the Directive's formal transposition was conducted by central 
government ministries: the Scottish Office and the DoE. While Scottish 
Office officials have followed the national layer's policy line, they have 
also translated the policy into the Scottish (i.e. subnational) context. In 
this sense, national and subnationallayers have overlapped. The Scottish 
OffIce has made no secret of its reluctance to adjust planning processes 
and shift (economic) priorities. Accordingly, the EIA Directive has 
altered Scotland's planning practices only moderately and has depended 
upon individual planning officers' attitudes towards environmental 
considerations and other interests such as housing and economic 
development. Some planning officers used the EU policy as a means to 
take 'enviro nment ally-friendly' decisions. 32 Other planning officers have 
taken a more critical view of the policy and have been able to minimise 
the policy's impact on planning decisions. 33 In either case, a level-playing-
fIeld of minimum-regret-planning is not evident inside the Scottish layer. 
Local Authorities' (pp.382-384) The Cambridge Law Journal vo1.50, Part 3, 1991. 
32 The same planning officers, however, have also pointed out the policy's weaknc,sses 
which still require improvement. For instance, one planning ofticer stated that l:IA" 
and environmental statements "struggled to gain public confidence because they are 
not seen to be impartial, being funded and on occasions prepared by applicants". 
Written correspondence, May 1997, Melrose. 
JJ One planning officer stated that the EIA Directi\'t~ was. not r~~lIy Ilccessary and that 
he was not interested in further guidance from the Scottish Ottlce and the E~ u.nk·"" 
these contacts led to a reduction of work. Written correspondence, t\by \l)lJ? EIglll. 
EU Layer: 
Figure 6.2: The Scottish Layer and the EIA Directive 
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...................... 
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-.b- Ponnal Detenninants: 
I 
*'Hybrid' Scottish Office transposes policy separately for Scotland but in line with DoE. 
* Territorial (and integrative) Scottish Office ensures swift transposition; loose infonnal contacts between 
Scottish Office and planning authorities on EIA cases; authorities enjoy discretion over policy, 
detennining EIA case-by-case; however, Secretary of State in position to over-rule 'controversial' 
decisions. 
*Scottish SI and Circular do not require fonnal approval by Scottish actors; no major adjustments and 
additions to existing planning legislation; judiciary clearly 'unsympathetic'. 
Infonnal Detenninants: 
*Relationships between Scottish Office and planning authorities comparatively cooperative; traditional 
lobby groups consulted, 'green' NGOs tolerated; developers in favourable position. 
* Scottish Office follows sceptical, minimalist approach, reluctant to transpose EU policy which implies 
administrative and fmancial costs; on the ground, policy dependent on plarmers' attitudes towards 
environ. protection and local community (econ.) priorities. __ _ 
* Policy style and practices depend upon individuals: many tend to ignore policy for other (econ) 
interests, while others adjust their plarming practices to integrate environ, consideration. 
6.5 The FRG National Layer and the EIA Directive 
In comparison with the UK and Scotland, the FRG constitutional 
setting, political-administrative structures and legal system rendered the 
formal transposition of the EIA Directive extremely difficult (for formal 
determinants see figure 6.3). In fact, the transposition turned out to be a 
legal nightmare involving long deliberations over the form and content of 
both Federal and Lander legislation. Among other issues, discussions 
surrounded the question whether the EIA Directive deserved a separate 
piece of legislation or whether the EIA policy should be integrated into 
the existing legal framework. Following a heated debate (the Bundesrat 
forwarded 59 amendments to the EIA Federal Law proposal of which 
only 30 were accepted by the Bundestag), the EIA Directive was formally 
transposed two years after its deadline. The national layer (i.e. the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat) adopted a Federal EIA law, 'Gesetz tiber die 
Umweltvertraglichkeitsprtifung' (UVPG),34 and amended sixteen existing 
Federal Laws affected by the new requirements. 35 Some amendments of 
these sectoral laws only came into force in 1992 (amendment to the 
Federal Emission Law) and 1994 (amendment to the Nuclear Safety 
Law). Apart from the UVPG and amendments to existing legislation, 
Federal legislators felt that the EIA policy further required detailed and 
complementary guidelines in the form of 'Verwaltungsvorschriften' 
( administrative regulations) which were eventually formalised in 1995.36 
34 English translation: assessing the natural environment's 'ability to absorb' projects 
and their damaging impacts. 
35 The sixteen Federal Laws include areas such as emission control, nuclear safety. 
infrastructure, and nature conservation. For a detailed list see Vedder, Ed~,ll 'D~r 
aktuelle Stand der UVP-Gesetzgebung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und 111 
Bayern' (pp.32-35) Inhalte und Umsetzung der Umweltvertraglichkeitsprtifung (UVP} 
Laufener Seminarbeitraege 6190, Akademie fUr Naturschutz und Landschattsptlege. 
36 See 'All uemeine Vorschrift zur AusfUhrung des Gesetze" tiber die 
Umweltvertra~ichkeitspri.ifung (UVPGVwV) vom 18. September 1995' (l'p.h 71-6(4) 
Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt Nr.32, 1995. 
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The fIrst stage of the Directive posed major difficulties for Federal 
legislators. While the project list of Annex I was adopted verbatim from 
the EU Directive text, the Annex II list proved incompatible with German 
legal-administrative tradition. Federal legislators found it difficult to 
transpose a measure which provides flexibility and discretionary 
judgement instead of water-tight rules and regulations. It was therefore 
decided to include separate paragraphs regulating matters such as 
airports, nuclear safety and mining in the UVPG, and transfer other 
Annex I and some Annex II items to one comprehensive and detailed list 
of projects which must, as a rule, undergo EIAs. 37 In effect, these 
departures from the EU Directive caused not only a delay in the 
implementation of the EIA policy for certain categories, but also 
excluded projects from the Federal legislation list which, according to the 
EIA Directive's Annex II, should be considered by planning authorities as 
potentially harmful. 38 
In line with the German legal tradition to 'regulate' environmental 
standards, much attention was drawn to the formulation of 'scoping' 
standards, i.e. EIA items to be considered by developers and planning 
authorities. UVPG Paragraph 5 and supplementary administrative 
regulations elaborate on 'scoping' and the content of environmental 
statements. If applied correctly, the regulations do not provide much 
room for manoeuvre for developers. On the other hand, some of the 
environmental statement items are required only if their inclusion is 
37 The separate paragraphs in the UVPG referred to changes of ?ther Federal Laws ~~t 
a later stage and provided transitional derogation measures which would apply until 
the laws in question were amended. 
38 Annex II cate(Tories not mentioned in the UVPG list include. the ma~ufacture and 
bly Of m~or vehicles and manufacture of motor vehicle englOes; storage assem . d . I t 
facilities for petroleum, petrochemical and che~ic~1 products:, 10 ustna 1 l·~la. e 
development projects. For a detailed list see CommissIOn Report CO\l (93) _8 tlOal 
(Annex - Germany). 
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'zumutbar' ('reasonable') for developers. Requested information on 
environmental surroundings, project alternatives and research difficulties 
should therefore not exceed 'unreasonable' quantitative and qualitatiye 
thresholds. The question remains where to draw the line between 
'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' information. It is up to administratiye 
courts to determine the adequate quantity and quality of environmental 
information in each case. 
Federal information and consultation procedures remained unchanged. 
According to Paragraph 9 of the UVPG, public consultation should be 
conducted by following the procedures of existing legislation, in 
particular Paragraph 73 of the Law on Administrative Procedures 
(,Verwaltungsverfahrens-Gesetz' or 'VerwverfG'). The latter states that 
planning authorities should inform the public one week prior the actual 
consultation process that planning application documents are available for 
inspection. The documents are displayed for the period of one month in 
the local communities affected by the projects, after which the public has 
two weeks to comment. The subsequent consultation process excludes 
the general public: the planning authority invites to a consultation 
meeting only parties directly affected by the project, i.e. individuals who 
have a legal or material interest in a project application. Therefore, 
challenges against a project can only be made on the grounds of material 
damage (for instance, a motorway running through private property) or 
infringement of legal rights. Other project opponents such as 
environmental interest groups can advise 'affected' individuals but have no 
formal right to participate in the consultation process. Only in 'high risk' 
areas such as nuclear energy, the Federal legislator considers 'anybody' 
('jedermann') 'affected' and eligible to participate at every stage of the 
consultation process. This restricted access for the public can result in the 
neglect of certain environmental aspects, but is in accordance with the 
':38 
EU Directive which leaves the details of consultation to the Member 
States. 
Once the consultation process is completed, the planning authority is 
required to summarise the evidence within one month. The authority then 
assesses the application together with the information provided by 
vanous parties. The assessment should be conducted strictly ill 
accordance with quantitative thresholds established in Federal (and 
Lander) Laws and in line with the detailed guidelines of administrative 
regulations which supplement the UVPG. Aspects which fall outside 
threshold criteria, such as cross-media and accumulative impacts, are not 
specifically mentioned in Federal (and Lander) legislation. Once a 
planning authority has decided to permit a project, it must include the 
reasons in favour of the project. In the case of planning refusal, the 
decision itself is sufficient for information. Similar to the consultation 
process, only 'affected' parties who commented on the project application 
are informed about the planning authority'S decision. 
Federal legislators accepted the objective of the EIA policy and 
specifically referred to it in the first Paragraph of the UVPG. However, 
the EU Directive's integrative elements rendered the policy's ftltering 
process almost impossible in a legal-administrative system which is 
compartmentalised and sector-orientated. Legislators in both national and 
subnational layers conducted a difficult transposition whereby the EU 
Directive was scrutinised by parliament and shaped to fit Federal and 
Lander legal-administrative preferences. However, unfavourable formal 
determinants were not the only obstacles during the filtering of the policy. 
Weber and Hellmann commented that the formal transposition of the EIA 
Directive in the FRG could have been "gemeinschaftsfreundlicher" ('more 
euro-friendly,).39 This assessment indicates that Federal and Ljnder 
39 Weber, Albrecht; Hellmann, Ulrich 'Das Gesetz 
tiber die 
~39 
legislators also lacked the informal political cOmmitment to adjust their 
planning systems to accommodate the EIA Directive (Bavarian 
legislators' lack of cOmmitment is described below). 
The complicated formal transposition of the ED Directive is reflected in 
the FRG's EIA policy practice. The practical implementation of the ErA 
policy has been fragmented, legalistic and technocratic. For these reasons. 
it has been difficult to gain a comprehensive overview of the policy's 
practice. From the information available, it is evident that the UVPG 
project list has excluded certain categories mentioned in the EU 
Directive. In addition, the information provided by developers has often 
been too detailed and difficult to understand (a situation made worse by 
the fact that Federal legislation does not require developers to produce a 
non-technical surrunary). Further, the consultation process has been 
restricted to certain groups with material interests and planning decisions 
have been predominantly based on quantitative thresholds while many 
cross-media aspects of pollution and environmental deterioration have 
been neglected by Federal practitioners.4o 
In terms of enforcement, FRG legal experts have taken stock of the 
EIA policy and its prospects of enforcement since the rnid-1990s. One 
conclusion has been that neither the high expectations of environmental 
interest groups nor the EIA critics' fears of unreasonable costs have 
proven to be correct. Today, ErA experts view the state of the policy 
Umweltvertraglichkeitsprtifung (UVP-Gesetz)' (pp.1625-1633) Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift Heft 27, 1990. 
40 For FRG-wide studies on EIA practice see 'Annex - Germany of the Commission 
Report COM (93) 28 final; Schwab, Joachim 'Die Umweltvertr~~glichkeitspri.ifung in 
der behbrdlichen Praxis' (ppA28--1-35) Neue Verwaltumrsrecht Zeltung 1997; Kollmer, 
Norbert 'Die verfahrensrechtliche Stellung der Beteiligten nach dem ll\'P-Cll''-l'I/ 
(pp.1057-1061) Neue Verwaltungsrecht Zeitung Heft II, 199-L K.ol\me~, Norbert '~:r 
bffentliche Anhbrungstermin im UVP Verfahren (Paragraph 9 lVPG) (ppA~9--l).~) 
Bayerische Verwaltungsblatter 1. August 1995; see also UVP-Ges~lIschatt tntl'rIll'l. 
pages (http://www.laum.uni-hannover.de/uvp/uvp-netz/) and CommIssIon Report ot 
1995. 
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with a· certain 'soberness' CErnlichterung,).41 Two problems, however. 
remam the subject of legal discussions. Firstly, h t ere IS no 
'Popularklagerecht' (i.e. a legal right of appeal for the general public) to 
challenge decisions in all project categories which means that statutory 
consultees are restricted to those who tend to pursue economic (self-) 
interests. In order to establish a right of appeal, some envirollll1ental 
interest groups have resolved to purchasing land affected by the project. 
However, not all environmentalists have the fmancial means to undertake 
these legal challenges. As a consequence, many controversial projects are 
completed without proper EIA. Another problem concerns the burden of 
proof for opponents of projects: planning permission can only be annulled 
if there is a 'defmite possibility' Ckonkrete Moglichkeit') that a formal EIA 
would have produced condemning evidence necessitating planning 
refusal. In 1997 the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin CBundes-
Verwaltungsgericht' or 'BVerwG') has put another damper on EIA 
'sympathetic' court rulings and opponents of 'harmful' projects will 
continue to face major difficulties in EIA enforcement.42 
In sum, formal determinants in the FRG layer such as its federal 
constitution, its fragmented political-administrative structure and 
sectoralised legal system have hindered the fIltering process of the EIA 
policy (see figure 6.3). In other words, the Directive has been in many 
respects incompatible with German legal tradition and its media-oriented 
processing of environmental matters. Not surprisingly, the commitment to 
adjust long-established standards has been limited. The 'direct effect' of 
the Directive and the prospects of enforcement have been limited also, 
41 For an assessment of the EIA enforcement practice in the FRG see Hien, Eckart 'Die 
Umweltvertraglichkeitsprtifung in der gerichtlichen Praxis' (pp. ..+22-..+28) :\l'lIl' 
Verwaltungsrecht Zeitung Heft 5, 1997 . 
.n For further details on the BVerwG's reaction to Lander court rulings. see Bavarian 
enforcement section below. 
and experts now View the effectiveness of the EIA policy with a certain 
'soberness'. Although, FRG practitioners have enjoyed expertise and large 
resources with environmental policies that set quantitative and qualitatiyc 
standards (e.g. emission limits), the cross-media EIA policy has had a bad 
start indeed in the FRG. 
Figure 6.3: The FRG Layer and the EIA Directive 
EU Layer: 
~ ~ L----=---r' l' 
r 
Fonnal Determinants: 
"'Federal state system hampers fonnal transposition; complex process involving several 
levels and departments; after intense scrutiny of EU policy. adoption! amendment of 
several Federal and Laender laws. 
"'Political-administrative structures fragmented and sectoralised. making transposition 
and implementation of integrative EU policy difficult. . . . . 
'" Piecemeal changes to existing legislation which focuses on quantItatIve and qualitative 
thresholds; legal system unable to take account of cross-sectoral aspects of polley; 
enforcement difficult because burden of proof remains with project opponents. 
Infonnal Detenninants: 
"'Due to fragmented. sectoralised structures. problems of communication and 
coordination of policy. . . 
'" In general supportive of policy objective. in detail reluctant to change eXlstmg 
standards. instead focus on legalistic details. 
6.6 The Sub national Layer: Bavaria and the EIA Directive 
Formal Transposition 
Bavaria's handling of the EIA Directive reflects in many ways the FRG's 
general difficulties with the policy. At the same time, as figure 6.4 
illustrates, Bavaria has featured 'unique' informal obstacles which made 
the filtering process of the Directive even more difficult. Sharing 
legislative powers with the Federal level, Bavaria was required to 
formally transpose parts of the EIA Directive within its boundaries of 
competency. In particular, Bavaria and other Lander were asked to clarify 
which authorities are in charge of EIA procedures and provide threshold 
criteria for Annex II projects which belong to the Lander level. To date, 
Bavaria has followed its obligations only to a certain extent: the Bavarian 
'Verordnung' (ordinance) of 20. July 1990 regulates which authority is in 
charge Cfederfuhrend') of EIA procedures.43 In addition, a 1993 
'Verordnung' confrrms already established EIA standards for the 
reparcelling of agriculturalland.44 
Bavarian legislators have failed to meet one important obligation: they 
have not specified Annex II criteria for projects which are not covered by 
Federal Laws but fall within Bavarian competencies. Bavarian legislators 
have claimed that measures equivalent to the EIA policy have already 
been in existence since 1978 and that the formal establishment of EIA 
criteria was unnecessary.45 Bavaria's standpoint does not necessarily 
imply that 'environmentally harmful' projects are not assessed at all. 
43 See 'Verordnung zur Bestimmung der federftihrenden Behorde und ihrer Aufgaben 
gemaB Paragraph 14 Absatz 1 des Gesetzes tiber die UmweltvertraglichkeihprUfung' 
Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt Nr.14, 1990. 
44 See 'Bayerische Vollzugsrichtlinie Umweltvertr~iglichkeitsprUfung in der 
Flurbereinigung' (p.l044) Allgemeines Ministerialblatt 6. August 1993. 
45 See Information Umwelt und Entwicklung in 811\\:'[[1:. Die 
Umweltvertraglichkeitsprtifung Bayerisches Staatsministerium fUr Lalldesent\\\cklung 
und Umweltfragen 1/95. 
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However, whether or not Bavarian measures are really compliant with the 
Directive, remains to be a question for legal clarification by Courts at 
either the Bavarian, Federal or European level. 
Bavarians have traditionally opposed 'instructions from outside' and. in 
the case of the EIA Directive, have considered the ED policy a major 
infringement on Bavarian affairs. Indeed, one Bavarian state ministr\' 
official confIrmed that the EIA Directive clashed with the ED principle of 
subsidiarity and that planning matters should remain within subnational 
boundaries.
46 
Arguably, Bavaria has not accomplished all its obligations 
concerning the EIA policy for informal determinant reasons (e.g. an 
aversion to instructions from outside). Formal determinants such as a 
fragmented political-administrative structure and a sectoralised legal 
system have certainly contributed towards transposition difficulties in 
Bavaria. But they cannot explain Bavaria's inactivity because the Federal 
level and, indeed, some of the Lander (Baden-Wurttemberg and North 
Rhine Westphalia) were able to accomplish their EIA policy obligations. 
Obviously, Bavaria has also lacked the informal commitment to follow 
'inconvenient and unwelcome' ED instructions which hindered the EIA 
policy's implementation right at the initial stage of legal transposition. 
Practical Implementation 
At frrst glance, fmdings on the EIA practice in Bavaria do not divert 
signific-antly from EIA fmdings in the FRG as a whole. Bavarian EIA 
experts, too, have focused on the legal and technical implications of the 
ED Directive on planning procedures in Bavaria.-n While FRG and 
46 Wegner, Hans-A. 'Die Umweltpolitik der EG im Spannungsfeld .zwischen 
Harmonisierunaszwang und Subsidiaritatsprinzip' Sonderdruck aus Benchte del 
Bayerischen Abdemie fur Naturschutz und Landschaftsptlege Nr.17, 199). 
47 For Bavarian studies see in particular Vedder, Edgar 'Der aktuelle Stand Lin U\'P-
Gesetzgebung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Bay~rn' (pp.3~-)5) ~n~alte und 
Umsetzun a der Umweltvertraglichkt'itsprufung (UVP) Lautent'r Se[TIlnarhcttra~c 6/90, 
AkademiecfUr Naturschutz und Landschuftspt1t'gt': Weber, 1. En\'ironrn~ntal Plannl.ng 
as a Part of Urban Planning in the Federal Republic of German\' - The (1\\ ()! \!unIch 
Bavarian fmdings are similar, there are distinctly Bavarian characteristics 
which have shaped the EIA policy in Bavaria in their own way. They 
concern in particular Bavaria's informal resistance to co-ordinate 
'unwelcome policies from outside', as well as a lack of communication on 
the progress and effectiveness of the policy. This lack of co-ordination is 
partly due to shortage of staff and insufficient resources. -+8 However, 
there are two other, more substantial, reasons for the lack of co-
ordination. Firstly, both Federal and Bavarian constitutions emphasise the 
principle of checks and balances which has resulted in a fragmented, 
sometimes confrontational, political-administrative system (see formal 
determinants in figure 6.4). Although the Bavarian StMLU has enjoyed a 
strong and central role in the environmental policy area, this principle has 
meant that colleagues in other sectoral ministries and local governments 
have resisted StMLU intervention. Secondly, in the light of the 1990s' 
economic pressures (i.e. the recession, increased competition from 
Central and Eastern European neighbours, pressures associated with the 
convergence criteria of EMU) Bavarians have feared the costs and 
economic constraints of the EIA Directive and have therefore been 
reluctant to co-ordinate the implementation of the policy. Instead, 
Bavarians have reacted to economic pressures more rigorously than the 
Federal level (and other Lander) with investment and deregulation 
measures which, to a certain extent, clash with the objective of the EIA 
Directive and its 1997 amendment which seek to bind planners at all 
government levels to a framework of 'minimum-regret-planning' .~9 
as an Example Paper, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 1993: Seidel, Re~ner UVP hl'j 
Industriestandorten am Beispiel eines Kraftwerk-Genehmigungsverfahrens nach 
BlmschG (not date). 
48 Bavarian Ministry official, written correspondence, 7. January 1997, Munich . 
.jl) For a summary of Bavaria's deregulation policy Set? B()~m-An~tmann, Edcltraud 
Cooperative Enforcement: SucceSseS. Impediments, SolutIOns (onk~'encc Paper. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 21. January 1998, \\ ashlIlgton. 
Asked about the fIrst stage of the EIA process, Bavarian planning 
authorities stated that the 'German legislator' ('der Deutsche 
Gesetzgeber') identifIed EIA projects for them. In other words. legislators 
at the Federal level provided them with a project list which included 
'water-tight' threshold criteria. Most projects requiring EIA under the 
UVPG concerned roads, waste management (disposal and processing) 
and pipelines (for gas, water and oil). However, by focusing on the 
UVPG text only, Bavarian planning authorities effectively excluded many 
Annex II projects which are not specifIcally mentioned in the Federal and 
Bavarian laws. These included projects which still require clarification at 
the Bavarian level and projects whose transboundary impacts are difficult 
to measure. Moreover, Bavarian State government officials have been 
preoccupied with the formulation of policies which allow planning 
authorities to derogate from EIA project categories and concentrate on 
'exceptional cases' only.50 In combination, the exclusion of certain Annex 
II categories and the proposed derogation measures can only result 111 a 
decreasing number of EIAs conducted in Bavaria. 
Bavarian planning authorities had no complaints concerning the quality 
of environmental statements. Developers were acquainted with EIA 
obligations and often commissioned professional environmental 
consultants with the production of statements. In fact, in order to avoid 
obstacles in the planning process, developers often provided too many 
project details which in turn contributed to the heavy workload of 
planners. In contrast, environmental interest groups complained about the 
inadequate and biased content of environmental statements and demanded 
50 For instance, one Bavarian proposal concerned the speeding-up of road building 
projects. The Bavarian state government argued that the 'old' Lander shoul~ adopt the 
same derogation measures as the 'new' Lander. These temporary me.asure~ were 
intended to lift the 'new' Lander economies to the 'old' Linder level. See \ te~rod~. J,an 
'Beschrankunuen der UVP in der Verkehrswegeplanungsbeschleuntgung (pp.l).,l)-
942) Neue Zeitschrift fUr Verwaltungsrecht II. Jahrgang, 1992. 
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the inclusion of questions on the wider (even global) environmental 
implications of projects. The developers' study of two or three project 
alternatives were considered insufficient. Instead, environmentalists 
wished to discuss 'moral' questions whether to tolerate and promote 
economic development at all in a sustainable society. Planning authorities 
preferred less time-consuming 'simplified' approaches, focusing either on 
one proposal and its alternative or on a 'zero sum calculation' (i.e the 
study of the environment before and after a project is completed). In 
many cases, environmentalists put enough public pressure on developers 
and planners to adopt a wider perspective. 51 
In terms of information and consultation, the EIA policy has hardly 
made a difference in Bavaria. Guidelines on information and consultation 
procedures derived from existing Federal Laws on environmental 
protection and pollution control as well as administrative regulations. 52 In 
general, project applications were made public through official notices, 
the local press and 'Amtsblatter' (German equivalent for gazette). 
'Affected' parties and the public have had four weeks time to comment on 
project applications. Despite the fact that existing Federal legislation 
allows only indirect participation for environmental interest groups, 
Bavarian planning authorities have been conscious of the 'green' pressure 
and therefore involved as many parties as possible. 53 In some cases, 
51 For instance, the project 'Franken II' (power station extension) was delayed 
following demands for more information by the public. Planning ~ermission wa~ 
eventually given after intense public scrutiny. See Sei?el, Retn~r UVP bel 
Industriestandorten am Beispiel eines Kraftwerk-Genehmlgungsverfahrens nach 
BImschG (no date). 
52 See in particular Paragraph 73 of the 'VerwverfG', also Paragraph 29 of the Federal 
Nature Protection Law. 
53 For instance, the Schwaben planning authority involyed -+6 p~r~ies in the 
consultation process of Bundesautobahn A8: among them local. commUnIties, tar~ner~ 
associations, environmental agencies, priyate sector representatIons, nattonal henta~l' 
societies and environmental interest groups. See Regierung \'on Sch\vaben Ncubau der 
Ortsumfahrung Gundeltin~en Lauingen der Bundesstralk 16 
Planfeststellungsbeschluss vom 28. NO\'e\l1ber 1996. 
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Bavarian environmental interest groups which generally enJoy large 
memberships and fmancial resources, bought property affected by 
planning applications and thereby created a legal right to be consulted. 
Some of them even succeeded with their legal challenges as 
administrative courts confIrmed their claims. Consequently, Bavarian 
planning authorities have accepted environmental interest groups as a 
'necessary evil' and an influential force in the planning process and haye 
adopted a more approachable attitude towards consultees and the public 
in general. 
According to Bavarian planning officials, existing Federal and Bayarian 
laws (in particular the Federal Emission Law of 1974) have had more of 
an environmental influence on planning decisions than the EIA policy.:i-f 
Many planning officers stated that the EIA Directive influenced decisions 
only in so far as additional costs, 'unnecessary' work and delays occurred. 
For instance, the planning permission for the nuclear research station 
'Mlinchen II' was delayed by nine months as a result of EIA 
requirements. 55 On the other hand, Bavarian planning officers could not 
deny that the 'inconvenient' extension of environmental investigation 
generated relevant evidence for consideration. Overall, however, 
Bavarian planning officers stressed that the policy did not significantly 
change planning behaviour. 
Enforcement 
In terms of enforcement, Bavaria's administrative courts have appeared 
more 'sympathetic' towards the policy. In particular, they attempted to 
shift the burden of proof and require planning authorities to successfully 
.'i-f Among others, officials from the StMLU (19. Augus~ 1996), Schwabe,n (\lay 199~): 
Niederbayern (5. June 1997) and Oberbayern (24. Apnl 1997) stated that the LlA has 
hardly had an influence on planning decisions. 
55 StMLU official, written correspondence, 2'+. July 1997, Munich. 
deny that formal EIA compliance would lead to a different planning 
decision. They have also considered the EIA Directive a step towards 
widening the legal right of appeal. However, the Federal Adrninistrati\'~ 
Court in Berlin has rejected this 'sympathetic' interpretation.56 
Consequently, project opponents in Bavaria have faced serious difficulties 
indeed in challenging planning decisions on EIA grounds. 
In sum, Bavarian implementors have taken a lukewarm and pragmatic 
view of the EIA policy. Incompatibilities between the EU Directive and 
Bavaria's formal determinants (i.e. its administrative structures, its legal 
system and environmental standards, see figure 6.4) rendered the 
implementation of the EIA policy difficult. With the exception of 
Bavarian environmentalists, EIA practitioners in Bavaria have also 
demonstrated informal resistance over the policy's implementation. While 
many planning authority officials agreed that an EU-wide harmonisation 
of planning standards (and EIA standards in particular) was important, 
the same officials also believed that Bavarian standards were already set 
at a high level and that the policy was not necessary in Bavaria. In fact, 
the EIA policy caused 'inconvenient' and 'avoidable' work for 
practitioners. When asked about the EIA Directive, one planning official 
complained about the "flood of legislation coming from the EU".57 The 
latter comment confirms the Bavarians' attitude to pursue their own 
policies without disturbances from 'outside'. All Bavarian officials who 
replied to research enquiries, stated that they had not been consulted by 
56 One well-publicised example is the Bavarian administrative court (VGH) ruling of 
the B 15neu motor way (15 February 1996). The court dismissed the Bavarian "tate 
government's decision to permit the B 15neu on the grounds th.at a proper EL~ had not 
been conducted. In April 1997 the BVerwG dismissed the rulIng but also reterred the 
case back to the VGH for further consideration of other legal aspects. A final decision 
on the B 15neu was still in progress at the time of writing. Bund Naturschutz in 
Bayern e.V., written correspondence, 30. July 1996, Landshut. See also Bund 
Naturschutz e.V. website. 
57 Planning ofticial, written correspondence, 4. June 1997, Schwei nfurt. 
EU actors or the Federal government on the ErA policy and its 1997 
amendment. They had little interest in consultation with (and guidance 
from) Federal and EU actors. Instead, Bavarian planning officers were 
confident in their Own EIA expertise and were interested only in 
information exchange with other partner authorities. 
The EIA Directive faced major obstacles during the fIltering process in 
Bavaria. Even the German term for EIA, 'Umweltvertraglichkeitpriifung' 
or 'UVP', was criticised by Bavarian officials. UVP implies that projects 
can only be accepted if negative effects on the environment are fully 
absorbed. According to StMLU officials, this interpretation has raised 
false hopes which cannot be fulfilled. 58 In the end, the UVPG of 1990 has 
made one difference: Bavarian officials perceived ErA formalities as 
expensive and time-consuming.59 These burdens have not been welcome 
at a time when Bavaria attempted to cut red tape in planning after the 'fat 
years' of economic success. 60 Campaigns such as the 'initiative for the 
speeding up of planning procedures in Schwaben' exemplify the trend 
towards more lenient environmental standards. 61 This trend, however, 
runs counter the Commission's efforts to harmonise environmental 
planning standards (see EIA Directive amendment of 1997 and more 
recently proposals for a 'strategic environmental assessment' Directive). 
58 Another point of criticism was the measuring of cross-media im~acts, ~ulminating 
in the question how cultural goods and fauna (two areas mentl??~d 10. the ~lA 
Directive) could possibly have an impact on each other. StMLU otfIclals, InterView, 
19. August 1996, Munich. 
59 Regional authorities such as Oberfranken complained about additional work and 
costs associated with the EIA policy. Written correspondence, 26. i\ larch 1997, 
Bayreuth. 
60 One StMLU official stated: "die fetten Jahre sind vorbei" (the gmxJ days are over). 
Interview, 19. August 1996, Munich. 
1 S h b Schwabeninitiati\'e Beschleuni!!.ullC' VOIl 6 Regierung von c wa en 
Genehmigungsverfahren 1996. 
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Figure 6.4: The Bavarian Layer and the EIA Directive 
(/~~~"\\ 
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Fonnal Detenninants: 
*Bavarian Land autonomies and discretionary powers hinder (full) formal transposition 
*Political-administrative structures fragmented and sectoralised; StMLU on the one hand dominant. on 
the other hand unable (and unwilling) to interfere with other departments and government levels on 
compliance with policy; comparatively large resources but aimed at technological standards and 
measures. 
*Legal system fragmented with emphasis on long-established qualitative and quantitative thresholds; 
reluctance to integrate cross-sectoral (and less measurable) impacts; judiciary comparatively 
'sympathetic' . 
Infonnal Determinants: 
*Due to fragmented and sectoralised structures, lack of communication and coordination; comparatively 
influential environ. NGOs but confrontational relationship with StMLU. planners and developers. 
*Bavarian State Govemementl StMLU's attitude towards EU policy strikingly critical; in principle 
interested in environ. protection; however, 'euro-sceptic' towards 'instructions' t~at diverge from own 
standards; since early 1990s policy strategy of de-regulation and econ. development which runs counter 
EIA policy objective. 
* Policy style and practice over-reliant on 'Gennan legislator', focus on measurable thresholds, often 
L------"T""--' neglecting cross-sectoral impacts. 
I 
6.7 Conclusion: Sub national Regions playa Key Role in the 
Implementation of the EIA Directive 
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The Case Study on the EIA Directive has illustrated in detail the 
complex and often problematic filtering process of a typical EU 
environmental policy. The EIA Directive followed a cumbersome 
bargaining process which involved a wide range of actors pursuing a 
variety of (conflicting) interests through formal and informal 
communication channels (see feed-back arrows in map). Yet, EU policy-
makers entered new territory by agreeing that a harmonisation of 
planning standards at national and subnationallevels was necessary which 
takes account of environmental impacts. EU policy-makers followed 
environmental as well as economic level-playing-field motivations in their 
quest for a common policy. However, this harmonisation also implied 
that national and subnational competencies in the planning policy area 
would be affected, an aspect which was considered unwelcome by the 
UK and Danish governments in particular. Moreover, a common EIA 
policy would also have the potential to restrict economic development 
and consequently clash with economic self-interests on the ground. The 
policy fmally adopted was therefore a comproIl1lse between 
considerations for and against a common EIA policy and provided 
considerable discretionary room for national and subnational 
implementors. The conflicting interests at the outset of the bargaining 
process would later re-occur during the filtering of the policy through the 
national and subnationallayers. 
In order to be filtered through properly, the EIA policy required 
adjustments of legal-administrative systems, the adoption of new la\\"s 
which would set the policy into the national and subnational contexts. the 
practical application of the policy in planning procedures, and the 
enforcen1ent of the policy whenever planning practice" wen.' not 
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compliant with the Directive. The policy affected planning procedures in 
a wide range of project categories and therefore involved all goyemment 
layers and their actors throughout the implementation process. The case 
study has illustrated how actors in all layers have perceived, interpreted 
and accommodated the policy according to their particular formal and 
informal circumstances. In the filtering process, national and subnational 
actors have, for instance, kept the policy's impact to a bare minimum, 
have been eager to fill legal gaps (and often misinterpreted the policy, see 
the FRG's comprehensive project list), have welcomed the policy as a 
tool to support sustainable development, or they have perceived the 
policy as an 'invasion' to their own competencies. Considering the 
divergent conditions and attitudes, it comes to no surprise that the EIA 
Directive has been filtered differently in each layer. 
Although the national layers have set the initial tone for implementation, 
it was mainly planning officials in the subnational regions who filtered the 
policy further by implementing and applying the EIA policy on the 
ground. In the process, the subnational regions have featured a number of 
implementation similarities with their 'mother' states but also some 
distinctly Scottish and Bavarian determinants which have influenced 
significantly the EIA policy in practice. It is therefore important to 
distinguish between national and subnational layers and study them 
separately in order to gain a more accurate and comprehensive picture of 
the whole EU environmental policy process. 
The implementation of the EIA Directive has, first of alL depended 
upon formal determinants inside the layers. With regard to the 
subnational regions, their constitutional position in the Member States as 
well as their legal traditions and their internal political-administrative 
structures have influenced the policy. In the case of Scotland. the first 
part of the filtering process was comparatively swift and uncomplicated, 
even though Scotland required a Statutory Instrument separate from the 
rest of the UK. Scottish Office officials simply followed their DoE 
colleagues and adopted the Directive verbatim. The Scottish Office SI left 
many discretionary powers of planning authorities untouched but also 
confIrmed the Secretary of State's ultimate power in determining fmal 
planning decisions. In contrast, the Federal and Bavarian political-legal 
systems compelled legislators to transpose the EIA Directive through a 
complicated and, to a certain extent, controversial process. While UK and 
Scottish implementors transposed a bare minimum of the policy without 
considering further clarifying provisions (they thereby avoided legal 
disagreements with the Commission), their Federal and Bavarian 
counterparts scrutinised and interpreted the policy in detail, creating a 
fragmented and technocratic policy framework. In certain areas (such as 
Annex II projects) this framework departed from the original EIA policy 
and resulted in disputes with the Commission over the Federal and 
Bavarian laws' compliance with the Directive. 
Overall, the formal determinants such as the constitutional position and 
the legal systems of the subnational regions have shaped their ability to 
implement ED environmental policies. Examining only formal 
determinants would therefore suggest that as long as constitutional and 
legal settings are favourable, EU environmental policy implementation 
should be smooth and successful. But EIA policy implementation has also 
been shaped by informal determinants such as the subnational regions' 
policy styles, attitudes, priorities and relationships. In Scotland, the ElA 
Directive was not welcomed with open arms. In fact, Scottish Office 
officials made no secret of their scepticism towards the policy, partly 
because the policy was seen as a 'red tape' brake on economic 
development in Scotland. It was therefore left to the discretion of 
individual planning officers to decide whether or not to apply the El:\ 
policy effectively. Some planners considered the policy as a useful tool 
from ED policy-makers to integrate environmental considerations more 
forcefully, while many others ignored the policy as much as possible for 
other (economic) priorities. The Bavarians, too, were reluctant to restrict 
economic development in their communities, especially at a time when 
the recession (and other pressures) hit them hard. However, in Bavaria's 
case the key informal obstacle in the implementation of the EIA Directive 
could be found in the Bavarians' attitude towards 'instructions from 
outside'. In particular, the EU was seen as an 'illegitimate' policy-making 
level in the planning policy area. The Bavarians have been (over-) 
confident in their own standards and their extensive environmental 
expertise and resources. On the other hand, Bavarian officials at all levels 
have traditionally focused on quantitative and qualitative standards and 
have resisted integrative environmental policies such as the EIA 
Directive. As a result, Bavarians have been criticised by Commission 
officials over their non-compliance with many EU environmental policies. 
A complex mix of formal and informal determinants in the subnational 
layers have therefore determined EIA policy implementation 
performances in Scotland and Bavaria (confirming Arguments 1 and 2). 
Scotland and Bavaria have featured divergent political-administrative 
systems with different formal and informal determinants. Yet, despite 
these differences, their EIA policy implementation outcomes have been 
strikingly similar. In both regions, the EIA policy has had a moderate 
impact on planning practices and the key objective (i.e. a level-playing-
field in minimum-regret-planning) has not been fully achieved. The case 
study has carved out two reasons for this shared disappointing result. 
Firstly, EU environmental policies are enormously complex and often 
involve policy objectives which are based on environmental and economic 
'd t' In order' to be realised the E U environmental policie" 
conSI era Ions. . 
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require the full commitment of key implementors. In the case of the EIA 
Directive, commitment was required from legislators at the national and 
subnational levels, planning officers and, to a certain extent, developers 
and the public (in particular environmental NGOs and other consultees). 
This commitment, however, was often missing from officials and 
developers. The study has demonstrated that ED environmental 
objectives such as 'environmentally sensible' rninimum-regret-planning 
can later clash with implementors' more immediate economic and 
administrative considerations on the ground. The economic argument for 
the harmonisation of planning standards at the outset of the process may 
have been plausible for actors on the ground, but when it comes to 
economic (self-) interests, subnational implementors in particular have 
demonstrated a protectionist attitude towards their local economies. 
The study has also revealed a certain 'euro-scepticism' towards 
'instructions from outside' among subnational implementors, an attitude 
which .can only dampen the pursuance of ED environmental policies. 
Subnational regions have been important in the process, yet they have 
been almost absent from ED policy-making which produces legislation 
they then are left to implement. Obviously, the exchange of views on the 
EIA policy practice (indicated in the map with 'feed-back' arrows) have 
been rather limited between the layers. It remains to be seen whether the 
more recent ED environmental policy strategies of 'partnership' and 
'dialogue' can consolidate this (perceived) gap between EU policy-makers 
and subnational implementors and thereby contribute to more acceptable 
and effective ED environmental policies. The new strategies have not 
prevented more controversies surrounding the adoption in 1997 of 
Directive (97/11/EC) amending the EIA Directive. The amendment 
includes an Annex IIa which is intended to harmonise idcntitlcation 
criteria for Annex II projects. Already, reactions from nat ional and 
particularly subnational actors during and after the policy's adoption have 
signalled that the new EIA policy is perceived as an 'EU-imposed' 
constraint on planning policies and economic objectives. 62 The concept of 
partnership and dialogue therefore appears to be ineffective in closing the 
gap between EU environmental policy-makers' intentions and the 
implementors' 'reality'. 
The case study has provided detailed evidence on the EU environmental 
policy implementation deficit by focusing on subnational actors and their 
policy performances on the ground. The [mal Chapter draws together the 
key [mdings of the research. It re-addresses the key arguments, assesses 
the usefulness of the multi-layered implementation map for further 
investigations and, [mally, presents an outlook of the future of the EU 
environmental policy. 
. .' UVP-Gesellschaft website (http:\\\w\\.laum.uni-
tJ2 For further detaIls see. tor mstance, 
hannover .de\uvp\uvp-netz) 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion: Sub national Regions Matter in the Implementation of 
EU Environmental Policies 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to move away from the analysis of 
national governments and their role in EU environmental policy-making 
and highlight instead subnational regions and their influence on the 
success, or failure, of EU environmental policies. In particular, the 
research argued that the study of subnational regions and their actors can 
help explain why the EU is suffering from an implementation deficit in the 
environmental policy area. By distinguishing between national and 
subnational government levels the aim was to contribute new and vital 
insights to the study of EU environmental policy implementation, insights 
which have been hitherto neglected by 'state-centrist' analyses. 
To help investigate the EU environmental policy process, the research 
combined and synthesised relevant study areas and approaches into a 
heuristic framework. The 'multi-layered implementation map' introduced 
in Chapter 2 built on the evidence of existing policy process and 
implementation studies, and incorporated the complex EU and 
environmental policy dimensions. The map highlighted, and distinguished 
between, three government levels or 'layers' involved in the 'filtering' 
process of EU environmental policies and categorised influential factors 
into 'formal' and 'informal' determinants. The latter distinction helped 
identify potential obstacles in the implementation path and explained why 
many EU environmental policies either failed on the ground or took a 
different shape in the latter stages of policy implementation. 
Figure 7.1: The Multi-layered Implementation Map Revisited 
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The research confIrmed a number of well-publicised studies which 
highlight an implementation defIcit in the ED environmental policy area, 1 
a defIcit which is arguably more alarming than in other ED policy areas. 
Indeed, the author's own research evidence (gained from interviews, 
questionnaires and primary sources) confIrmed that at every stage of the 
implementation process - from the formal transposition and progress 
report to the enforcement and monitoring of policies - ED Member States 
have demonstrated difficulties (and often reluctance) in meeting ED 
environmental obligations. While many studies have contributed valuable 
insights to the research matter and suggested measures which would 
solve some of the implementation problems,2 this study has sought to 
construct a more comprehensive framework which takes account of 
specifIc implementation factors while maintaining an overview of the 
wider (macro-) context of ED environmental politics. This was primarily 
done by categorising factors that influence EU environmental policy 
implementation into formal and informal determinants and by 
distinguishing between EU, national and subnational government levels. 
The [mal Chapter addresses the key arguments and then evaluates the 
I Among others see Butt-Philip, Alan Regulating the Single European Market: A 
Comparison of the Implementation of Social and Environmental Legislation Research 
Paper, 1994; Demmke, Christoph Verfahrensrechtliche und administrative Aspekte 
der Umsetzung von EG-Umweltpolitik European Institute of Public Administration, 
30. May 1996; Institute for European Environmental Policy The State of Reponing by 
the European Commission in Fulfilment of Obligations contained in EC 
Environmental Legislation London, November 1993; Kramer, Ludwig Focus on 
European Environmental Law Sweet & Maxwell, London 1992 and 1997; various 
Commission reports, for instance Interim Review of Implementation of the EC 
Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the Environment a~d Susta.inable 
Development November 1994, COM (94) ..J.S3 tina\. See also 'AppendiX J: EVidence 
on EU Policy Implementation Performances'. 
2 See in particular Collins, Ken; Earnshaw, David The ~ ll1~plernentation and 
Enforcement of EC Environmental Legislation' (pp.213-2..J.9) EIl\\f(mrnental Pol i tiL'" 
vol.l, No.4, Winter 1992; Butt-Philip, Alan Regulating the Sin,'k FUruPl'~lll \L\rket: 
A Comparison of the Implementation of Social and En\ironrnental Ll'~I"I~ltIlHl 
R ,. 'h P e 10 9 t. Kra"mer Lud\\iu Focus on European I:n\'lronmental La\\ Sweet esedlC ap r, "7""t, , ~ 
& Maxwell, London 1992 and 1997. 
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map m the light of the research fmdings. It concludes with a short 
outlook on the future of EU environmental policies and assesses to what 
extent the EU can act as an environmental 'problem solver'. 
7.2 Addressing the Key Arguments 
Argument (1): Formal determinants such as political-administrative 
structures as well as informal determinants such as policy priorities and 
relationships between actors influence EU environmental policy 
implementation on the ground. These formal and informal determinants 
are inter-related and cannot be studied on their own. 
National and subnational actors have processed EU environmental 
policies in accordance with their particular formal and informal conditions 
or circumstances. EU environmental Directives have, by their very 
nature,3 provided considerable discretion for implementors. They have 
been formulated in a way that would allow for national and subnational 
variances. While this discretion has been necessary, it has also provided 
'loopholes' (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) for implementors whereby 
policy objectives were either avoided or policies were shaped to fit into 
implementors' political-administrative frameworks. As a result, many 
environmental policy targets have often been missed. 
The study categorised the most influential factors in the implementation 
process into formal and informal determinants shown in figure 7. 1. The 
formal determinants referred to - constitutional settings; political-
administrative structures and resources; legal systems and instruments. 
The informal determinants comprised - relationships between actors; 
attitudes towards environmental protection and the EU; policy-makers' 
priorities and strategies; and policy styles and practices. Proper 
3 EU Directives outline common objectives but the leave the details (i.c. thc ways and 
means) to national and subnational implementors. Sec 'Appendix 2: j~n. Introduction 
to the EU, its Institutions. Policy-Making Procedures. and LegIslation tor details on 
EU legal instruments. 
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implementation of ED environmental policies was often hindered by 
incompatible legal systems, complicated political-administrati\'e 
structures or a lack of fmancial and administrative resources. In addition, 
informal obstacles such as divergent policy priorities, contradictory policy 
styles and strategies have often clashed with ED environmental policies. 
In different combinations or 'mixes', these formal and informal 
determinants have generally rendered the implementation of EU 
environmental policies difficult. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have all demonstrated the extent to which both 
formal and informal determinants have shaped EU environmental policies 
at different government levels. The inclusion of both formal and informal 
determinants was crucial: an examination of only formal or informal 
determinants alone would have led to inaccurate conclusions. In fact, the 
Chapters have illustrated how formal and informal determinants are inter-
related and cannot be studied on their own. It was therefore important to 
're-assemble' the formal and informal determinants and assess their 
combined influence on EU environmental policies. 
If formal determinants were to be studied only, the centralised state 
system of the UK and Scotland (i.e. formal constitutional setting) would 
appear to be ideal for the implementation of EU environmental policies. 
Indeed, in comparison with the FRG and Bavaria, 'instructions from 
outside' have been processed automatically and in a more integrated 
manner without much political scrutiny (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). On the 
other hand, the UK state system featured gaps in co-ordination and co-
operation which were particularly evident in the Scottish casco The gap" 
were mainly due to Scotland's paradoxical position in the centrali"ed state 
system and associated questions concerning Scottish representation and 
devolution (see Chapter 5). Therefore the formal constitutillnai "dting or 
the UK and Scotland has had an impact on informal attitudes and 
relationships between actors which in turn influenced the way in \\'hich 
policies have been processed. 
In comparison, the complexity of the federal state system proved to be 
problematic for the fIltering of EU environmental policies in both the 
FRG and Bavarian layers (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Political-
administrative structures have been fragmented and provided horizontal 
and vertical gaps that rendered the co-ordination of policies difficult. In 
addition, the constitutional checks and balances contributed towards the 
general perception that policies 'from outside' should be scrutinised, and if 
necessary adjusted, at every government level and in every sectoral 
department. Bavaria in particular fostered this perception with the result 
that many EU environmental policies, welcome or not, were hindered 
during the implementation process. However, focusing on formal 
determinants only would have neglected those informal determinants in 
the FRG and Bavaria that have eased the implementation of EU 
environmental policies. Favourable informal determinants included strong 
public (grass-root) support of 'green' issues and the FRG government's 
campaign for stringent qualitative and quantitative environmental 
standards (e.g. water quality standards and emission thresholds). Again, 
formal and informal determinants have to be examined together in order 
to gain an accurate picture of the policy 'reality'. 
In terms of informal determinants, until the early 1990s the FRG 
government pursued the idea that stringent environmental standards 
would provide German producers with a competitive advantage in 'eco-
friendly' products and markets. This strategy facilitated thc 
implementation of many EU environmental policies (such as policies on 
large combustion plants, catalytic converters and lead-frec petrol). 
However, in recent years, the strategy has gi\'cn \\<1)' to an ecolHHnic 
1· "t t'the late 1990s whlch resemhles the UK's lais,>ez-fairc po ICY pnon yo· . 
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approach. Before the Schroder Government took over, the Christian-
liberal coalition Government had moved away from its EU position as a 
'green man' demanding the highest environmental standards, and moved 
instead towards a lenient environmental policy with 'more affordable' EU 
targets. It remains to be seen whether the new red-green coalition 
Government at the FRG level will return to a 'green man' policy in the 
light of continuing economic pressures. There is bound to be some shift 
re-emphasising environmental policy priorities. However, given that the 
FRG political system relies heavily upon consensus especially between 
political parties and interest groups (in other words, formal determinants 
set the framework) and given that the new Federal Chancellor, Gerhard 
Schroder, has to reassure German businesses and voters that economic 
conditions will improve in the near future, it is very unlikely that the new 
FRG Government will introduce 'deep green' policies which would 
improve EU environmental policy implementation and secure sustainable 
development in the FRG.4 
In comparison, the formal determinants (in particular the centralised 
state system and the FPTP electoral system) allowed Conservative 
Governments to pursue a laissez-faire economic policy in the 1980s and 
1990s. This policy priority has been in line with EU 'voluntary action' 
policies such as the 'eco-audit' but has been less compatible with EU 
policies specifying and controlling qualitative and quantitative standards 
(such as water and air emission standards). Although the new Lahour 
Government has pursued some radical environmental policy objectives 
(particularly in the area of infrastructure and transport, see Chapter -+), 
substantial changes in attitudes and priorities are not expected in the nc~\r 
.j The' hasin "'-out' of nuclear energy in the FRG is arguably an attempt t~) (re-) install 
, p ~ t t The new 'ph'lS\'nlT-f)ut' policy ho\\cn:r. has taced alrcady 
a green man s ra egy. c ' C' '-' • 
severe resistance from the nuclear sector lobby. 
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future. It is therefore unlikely that the new Labour Go\"ernment will 
ensure the effective implementation of EU environmental objectives and 
establish a policy sustainable development in the UK. 
Scotland and Bavaria have featured informal determinants that have 
differed in many respects from their 'mother' states. Arguably, policy 
priorities and strategies in Scotland and Bavaria have responded more 
vigorously to changes in public attitudes and priorities on the ground (see 
in particular Chapters 5 and 6). As a Federal Land, Bavaria has been able 
to pursue its own policy strategies and conduct policy changes that have 
been more radical than in other Lander. In this sense, the formal 
constitutional setting has helped Bavaria to establish its own set of 
priorities. Having formulated an environmental policy at an early stage 
with stringent qualitative and quantitative requirements, Bavarians 
conducted a political U-turn in the early 1990s towards a policy of 
voluntary action and de-regulation (see in particular the 'Umweltpakt' in 
Chapter 5). This new policy was intended to facilitate and encourage 
economic development and counter-act trade competition 'threats' from 
the rest of the EU and Eastern European neighbours. In the light of this 
strategic change, any EU environmental policy which implied fmancial 
and administrative costs as well as restrictions to economic development 
in Bavaria has been processed with considerable reluctance if not 
downright opposition by Bavarian implementors (for Bavarian reactions 
to EU environmental policy obligations see in particular Chapter 6). 
Although Westminster has influenced considerably the political process 
North of the border (e.g. Conservative governments introduced 
privatisation and de-regulation policies), Scotland has featured some 
distinct informal determinants. Priorities in Scotland have been by and 
large conservative: next to economic stability, prosperity and growth. 
environmental considerations have remained low-priority issLles for the 
public and political-administrative actors in Scotland. True. there are 
indications that environmental issues have been considered increasingly 
important in recent years. Some important economic sectors in Scotland 
such as tourism and the wool and whisky industries have conveniently 
combined economic and environmental interests, and a number of more 
recent environmental initiatives in Scotland have demonstrated that the 
Scots could not ignore environmental matters completely. However, 
these adjustments have not been substantial enough to ensure the proper 
implerrientation of EU environmental policies. Scotland's 'paradoxical' 
position (i.e. its formal constitutional setting, discussed in detail in 
Chapter 5) has contributed towards this emphasis on economic priorities. 
It has allowed Scottish local authorities to pursue economic self-interests, 
while (former Conservative) central governments have been able to 
implement economic policies of de-regulation in Scotland. EU 
environmental policies have been implemented accordingly in Scotland: 
the Scottish Office has tended to transpose a bare minimum of 'costly and 
inconvenient' EU environmental policies, while local administrators have 
enjoyed considerable discretion when applying the policies on the ground. 
They have either followed the Scottish Office's example and limited -
often severely - the impact of EU environmental policies as in the case of 
the EIA Directive, or they have welcomed the 'green' input from the EU 
as useful environmental tools. In both Scottish and Bavarian cases, 
informal interests and formal circumstances have proven to be 
intertwined, influential and distinct from that of their 'mother' statcs. 
It is striking how policy-makers' economic priorities ha\'e int1ucnced the 
implementation process of EU environmental policies in all layers. 
Economic level-playing-tield motives which in it ially compelled L U 
policy-makers to adopt many EU en\'ironmental policies ~"ee ('harter -' 
and the EIA Case Study featured in Chapter 6) ha\c tcnded to c\aporate 
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during the latter stages of the ED environmental policy process, 
Depending on the political parties in power and their strategies towards 
temporary economic pressures, Member States and subnational regions 
have pursued their own economic advantage, much to the detriment of 
ED environrnental policies which often required economic and financial 
concessions. In all layers informal determinants have influenced the \vay 
in which ED environmental policies have been implemented. Yet informal 
priorities and relationships have not developed in a vacuum, they have 
been shaped by formal constitutional circumstances which have, in turn, 
influenced the way in which ED environmental policies have been 
received and processed by implementors on the ground. Again, it is true 
to say that formal and informal determinants are inter-related and cannot 
be studied on their own. 
Argument (2): Subnational regions and their actors playa central role in 
the ED environmental policy process. They shape the implementation of 
most ED environmental policies. 
This Chapter has highlighted already the importance of investigating 
determinants in the Member States at large as well as determinants within 
the subnational regions. Indeed, the separate investigation of ED, national 
and subnational layers has provided a more accurate overview of the 
divergent determinants which shape the development and implementation 
of EU environmental policies. This research compared national and 
subnational conditions and examined in detail the subnational regions and 
their influence on the ED environmental policy implementation process, It 
concluded that subnational regions play a vital role in the success or 
failure of most EU environmental policies, 
, h 0' t',,."ttl'ng \\'atcr Ilualit\_' ED environmental poliCIes suc as lrec IVCS,,,, "1 
d d 'd t'fyI'n{Y and protcctin{Y areas of cnvironmcntal interest. ,md stan ar s, I en 1 0 0' 
procedural Directives which affect decision-making in policy arc~I" sLlch 
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as planning require implementation at all government levels. The policies' 
success therefore depends upon national and subnational actors and their 
capacities and willingness to realise EU environmental objectives. 
Although the national governments take the initial steps of formal 
transposition, it is mainly the subnational regions which are concerned 
with any further details of legal transposition and, more importantly, the 
subsequent practicalities of most EU environmental policies. In practice, 
subnational actors have shaped EU environmental policies decisively; in 
the implementation process they have accommodated (or failed to 
accommodate) the policies into their own political-administrative 
frameworks. This research has emphasised that subnational actors do not 
live in a vacuum but are influenced by circumstances (i.e. formal and 
informal determinants described above) which differ in many respects 
from the circumstances which shape environmental politics in the 
Member States at large. The detailed study of subnational regions and 
their implementation performances is therefore of vital importance for an 
accurate picture of the EU environmental policy practice. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provided detailed evidence of Scotland and Bavaria's 
'unique' implementation conditions and performances with EU 
environmental policies. In the Scottish case, it was admittedly a central 
government department (i.e. a national layer institution), the Scottish 
Office, which has transposed EU environmental policies into the 
subnational context. However, the Scottish Office has processed the 
policies separately from the rest of the UK and has taken into account 
Scottish characteristics and interests such as its infrastructure and certain 
economic sectors such as the wool and fishing industries. In this sense. 
the Scottish Office has already influenced EU environmental policies in a 
hi h ' 'd' 't'nctly Scottish' For instance the FL\ Direl'tin' was way w c IS IS I ,." 
d ' ., t\' "ly swiftl\' lw Scottish Office nffil'ials and followed transpose compal a Ie, __ 
the DoE example, yet the tone of the Scottish Office policy documents 
departed in many respects from the documents applying to the rest of the 
UK. In comparison, Scottish Office officials were almost apologetic 
about the 'inconveniences' caused by the EU environmental policy. This 
reaction reflects a general reluctance to restrict economic development 
for the sake of 'European' environmental objectives in a region which is 
trying to come to terms with its peripheral disadvantage. 
While the Scottish Office has played a significant role in the way EU 
environmental policies are processed in Scotland, the effectiveness of EU 
environmental policies such as the EIA Directive has depended upon 
individuals' attitudes and priorities on the ground. In other words, 
Scottish local authority officials have enjoyed large discretionary room 
over the policies' application (unless, of course, the Secretary of State 
intervened) and have, in practice, implemented EU environmental policies 
according to their own local priorities and practices. In the EIA case, 
some Scottish practitioners have welcomed and applied the Directive as a 
long-overdue instrument which enhances environmental planning in 
Scotland, while many others have followed their economic priorities and 
have feared the costs, economic restrictions and administrative burdens 
associated with the Directive. Overall, the implementation of EU 
environmental policies such as the EIA Directive has depended upon the 
subnational layer (i.e Scotland) and its actors who have filtered the 
policies in line with formal and informal determinants. Although the 
Scottish Office has been in a somewhat hybrid position between national 
and subnational layers, the subnational layer's role in the overall filtering 
process of EU environmental policies has been nevertheless striking. 
Bavaria's handling of EU environmental policies has heen different 1Il 
t F'rstly Bavaria has had considerahle formal difficultil'" in many respec s. 1, c • 
transposing EU environmental policies due to the fragmenkd kdeLt\ 
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state system and sectoralised legal framework. However. in contrast with 
the Federal level (and indeed with other Federal Lander) Ba\'arian 
political-administrative actors have shown considerable reluctance in 
complying with 'inconvenient and unnecessary' EU standards. Ba\'arians 
have resisted adjustments to their legal-administrative standards and 
procedures as much as possible. Environmental policies that affected 
other policy sectors (such as the EIA Directive) as well as policies with 
environmental targets and thresholds different from Bavarian standards 
have faced informal obstacles in Bavaria. In the EIA case, StLMU 
officials followed their obligations by transposing only parts of the 
Directive (in the form of two ordinances) and thereby demonstrated their 
opposition against 'inconvenient instructions from outside'. In principle, 
Bavarians have supported objectives similar to EU environmental 
policies. Bavarians also have had the financial and administrative means 
(and the know-how) as well as a strong environmental lobby to support 
EU environmental policies. However, recent policy practice has shown 
that EU environmental policies have been confronted with both a 
strategic change towards environmental policy 'lenience' and a 'typically 
Bavarian' resilience against instructions from outside. In comparison with 
the FRG at large, the Bavarians' 'euro-scepticism' has been striking. 
Political-administrative actors have been confident in their own standards 
and challenged the legitimacy of the EU as a policy-making level in this 
policy area. These Bavarian characteristics have made the filtering 
process incredibly difficult. 
Comparing the two subnational regions, the research has identified and 
highlighted substantial formal and informal determinant difference" 
between Scotland and Bavaria. Yet despite these difference". the regions' 
implementation performances have been strikingly similar. One immediate 
1 . . th t the Sllccess of EU em'ironmental policic" has lkpcnded conc uSlon IS a . . . 
upon th ' . , f d . e rrux 0 eterrrnnants and that EU policy-makers have to accept 
that even the 'best tailored' or 'smartest' (to use Ingram and Schneider's 
term) policies face complex determinant combinations and are therefore 
most likely to 'get stuck' during the fIltering process. Both Scottish and 
Bavarian layers have featured complex mixes which included favourable 
determinants facilitating policies as well as unfavourable determinants 
hindering the policies' implementation (and vice versa). For instance, the 
strong environmental lobby in Bavaria, which has been very much in 
favour of EU policy objectives, has not been able to compensate for the 
serious difficulties in pressing especially cross-sector policies into a 
fragmented and often confrontational political-administrative system. 
Similarly, in the case of Scotland the most integrative and centralised 
structure has not prevented informal reluctance by political-administrative 
actors whose policy priorities clashed with EU environmental policies. 
Another explanation for the similar implementation performances can 
be found in certain informal determinants which both regions share. True, 
Scotland and Bavaria have been different in terms of constitutional 
settings, political-administrative structures and policy styles and 
strategies. But the research has also highlighted that economic 
considerations as well as tensions between government layers have 
mattered considerably in both Scotland and Bavaria. As far as the 
economic imperative is concerned, the regions' strategies and policy 
styles have differed over the years, but the paradoxical relationship 
between economic and environmental interests has proven to be a 
dominant factor in the pursuance of EU cl1\'ironmental policies 
(confirming the 'environmental dimension' argument in Chapters 1 and :2), 
By and large, environmental objecti\'es ha\l~ been (and continuc to hc) 
perceived as contradicting economic interesh on the ground, Often. 
. tid econonl1'c considerations which ha\'e moti\atcd 
enVlronmen a an ' 
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Member State governments to adopt EU environmental policies haH~ not 
been filtered through to (or shared by) actors at the subnational level. As 
a result, ED environmental policies have lacked the necessary support by 
implementors on the ground. 
In the case of Scotland and Bavaria, EU environmental policies have 
been particularly susceptible to economic considerations: both regions 
have shown a more protectionist attitude towards their local economies 
than the national governments for whom a European level-playing-field 
appeared to be a more immediate, plausible and desirable policy 
objective. Scotland has had to compensate for its peripheral disadvantage 
in the Single Market, while Bavaria has had to deal with increased 
competition from its Eastern European neighbours who have attracted 
businesses away from Bavaria. The UK and the FRG at large have faced 
these economic pressures as well, but not to such a decisive extent as 
their subnational regions. Comments such as "the fat years are over, we 
cannot afford stringent environmental standards any longer" (Bavarian 
StLMU official) and "we don't want any more environmental policies 
from Europe, the most endangered species in the Highlands is man" 
(Scottish business representative) illustrate the subnational regions' 
concern over EU environmental policy restrictions on economic 
developments. 5 
As far as tensions between government levels are concerned, both 
regions have shown gaps in communication and co-ordination bet\veen 
government levels. For different formal and informal reasons (i.e. the 
impact of Scotland's 'paradoxical' embeddedness in a centralised state 
system and Bavaria's 'verflechtet' yet confrontational position in a federal 
state system), actors in both regions have had internal communication 
5 The comments were made by an StMLl! official in .\lunich (19.;\ugu"t 1l)l)6)l,~"d a 
member of the Scotland Europa EIl\'ironment Group In Glasgow (_6 fehruary I ))7). 
difficulties as well as weak external links with national and EU actors. 
This was reflected mainly in terms of weak formal contacts and informal 
attitudes towards each other which often culminated in scepticism, 
mistrust and conflict. Relations between the two subnational regions and 
the other layers have not been favourable. Indeed, both Bavarians and 
Scots openly complained about 'inconvenient' and 'unwanted' policies 
from the EU. This suggests a general dissatisfaction of subnational actors 
over their restricted access and involvement in the 'making' of EU policies 
which affect their competencies considerably. 
One obvious solution to the perceived communication gap and poor 
record of implementation would be to adjust the EU policy-making 
process so that subnational regions and their important role in the overall 
process is taken into account. In other words, the rapport between EU, 
national and subnational actors (indicated with feed-back arrows in figure 
7.1) should be strengthened. To a certain extent, the EU and the 
Commission in particular, have already recognised the problem and have 
attempted to consolidate the layers by introducing 'partnerships' and 
'dialogue groups' (such as IMPEL). Indeed, recent Treaties, 
Environmental Action Programmes, secondary legislation and other EU 
environmental initiatives (outlined in Chapter 3) have attempted to 
involve subnational actors more closely in EU environmental policy-
making and thereby commit them more strongly to an environmental 
level-playing-field. These attempts, however, have thus far yielded only 
limited success. They have not prevented new criticism over E L~ 
environmental policy proposals (such as the EIA follow-up Directivc of 
1997 and the SEA Directive) and have not solved old prohlems of 
communication and co-ordination between actors \\hen dealing wit h L Li 
environmental policies. In other words. formal adjustment s u\ tilL' 
. I A tOo 1 Pro.~raIl1Il1es and cnvironmental law ... Treaties, Envlronmenta c I I ~ 
have not (yet) altered informal relationships between actors. policy 
priorities and attitudes towards environmental protection. 
Apart from the attempts of involving subnational actors m El' 
environmental policy-making, subnational regions themselves haye to a 
certain extent contributed towards closer co-operation between the 
layers. They have succeeded with some of their demands for more 
political competency at the national and EU levels. As a result, Scotland 
can now look forward to a devolved parliament in Edinburgh,6 while 
Bavaria has succeeded with its campaign for increased and formalised 
subnational participation at the EU level. With the process of Scottish 
devolution and more formalised EU decision-making powers for Bavaria, 
both regions may enjoy greater influence on EU policy-making which in 
turn will result in EU environmental policies more acceptable to these 
regions. However, this trend towards government 'fusion' may also make 
relationships between political-administrative actors more complicated 
which could result in 'confusion' and wider gaps of communication.7 
More importantly, with increased participatory powers and a stronger 
'national' identity and self-confidence, subnational regions may now 
oppose policies or adjust them to their liking with the result that one of 
the EU's key objectives, the economic and environmental level-playing-
field, may be ignored completely. It remains to be seen to what extent the 
two divergent developments of regionalisation and European integration 
(which includes the implementation of, and compliance with, common 
6 H . emphasised Scotland's prospects of having its own parliament in Edinburgh. 
avmg . . d I' I'U 
its links with the EU will not be formallY strengthened With Scottish ~\'O L1tl~m: .: 
links will remain primarily the domain of Westminster. See 'Appendix 5: SLuttish 
Devolution - A Brief Outline' for further details. 
7 Dietrich Rometsch uses the terms 'fusion' and 'confusion' in The Federal R~p.uhlic. ot 
d h E 1 Ulll
"m P'ltterns (ll Institutional and .\dI11InI~tratlve Germany an t e uropeal ,. < .'. • ." • 
, U' "t t' B'lrminl~h'll11 DISCUSSion \\Ipcr" In Germ.m StUdlt:", InteractIOn mversl y 0 to' < ' 
December 1995. 
policies) can be accommodated so that common environmental policies 
can be implemented effectively and successfully in every part of the EC" 
Already, Bavarian political-administrative actors have shown more 
interest in EU policy-making links and markedly less interest in EU policy 
implementation links. Substantial improvements in relationships between 
the layers and their actors are therefore unlikely. 
The potential conflict between economic and environmental interests 
and the tensions between government levels constitute problem areas for 
the EU environmental policy process which cannot be eliminated 
completely by the EU's current environmental strategies. Arguments such 
as: energy efficiency measures cut fmancial costs for businesses, 'green' 
technologies are lucrative in the long-term, and 'partnerships' and 
'dialogue' groups between government levels, have had some impact on 
attitudes and behaviours on the ground. They have appealed 
predominantly to the voluntary commitment of political-administrative 
actors," businesses and citizens. However, they have not brought about 
the substantial changes necessary for the successful and effective 
implementation of EU environmental policies. Implementation outcomes 
will therefore continue to be strikingly similar and often disappointing. 
Considering the multitude of obstacles and resistance by many 
implementors on the ground (particularly when economic and 
environmental interests clash), the implementation of EU environmental 
policies and sustainable development in general will remain a tough and 
long-term objective in Europe. 
7.3 An Assessment of the Map and its Usefulness for future 
Investigations 
The research has demonstrated that the study of subnational region'> in 
the EU environmental policy process is important for a more rl'linL'd a" 
II h sl"ve 'lnalY"l"s B\" t'oclisin
o on the 'third' ~O\ernll1L'nt we as compre en. ~ ., . "_ . 0 ~ 
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level, the research has followed an approach similar to that of 
'conventional' multi-level governance studies. However, in contrast to 
studies by Marks, Hooghe et aI, this research has not aroued that 
b 
subnational actors are (increasingly) on an equal footing with actors from 
ED and national levels, especially during EU policy-making. Rather, it 
has used the 'multi-level' perspective to investigate the involvement of 
three government levels and to highlight subnational regions as political 
arenas where most of ED environmental policy implementation takes 
place. The research has used a 'multi-layered implementation map' which 
describes ED environmental policy implementation as a 'ftltering' process 
whereby ED environmental policies have to go through various 'layers' 
before they reach their actual implementation target. The term 'layers' 
(highlighting the government levels involved in the process) has been 
particularly usefut it has helped to illustrate that the EU and national 
levels are not the only levels that shape ED environmental policy 
implementation. In fact, applied to the study of Scotland and Bavaria, the 
map has helped to demonstrate that subnational regions and their actors 
have played a vital role in the process. Moreover, with the help of the 
map, the research has uncovered 'mixes' of subnational determinants 
which have been distinct from their 'mother' states and which have shaped 
significantly the implementation of EU environmental policies. 
With the 'multi-layered implementation map', the research has not 
presented a new theory or model able to predict EU environmental policy 
outcomes. Rather, the map has provided a guidance tool which helps 
identify implementation determinants without losing sight of the o\'crall 
policy process and the government levels invol\'l.~d. The map can he 
applied for the study and comparison of other suhnational r~gions and j" 
not restricted to Scotland and Bavaria. Similarly. the map can hL' u"ed for 
, t d wId generatc similar policy areas other than the enVlronmen an Ct -
[mdings on other implem t t' d fi' . en a Ion e ICltS III ED policy areas such as 
transport where the subnational regions' role is equally strong. 8 Yet, the 
map is particularly suitable for the environmental policy area because it 
tends to involve a vast range of inter-related yet conflictual aspects (i.e. 
formal and informal determinants) which may not be found to the same 
extent in other ED policy areas (e.g. cohesion policy) where interests 
between the main actors are (arguably) clearer or more harmonious. EU 
environmental policies also tend to require major adjustments and 
concessions, often involve compromises between a multitude of actors 
who pursue conflicting interests (i.e. adjustments of informal 
determinants), and fmally know neither time nor geographical boundaries. 
In addition, ED environmental policies affect actors at all levels: actors 
from ED institutions, national government representatives and experts, 
subnational administrators, local communities and interest groups. The 
map encapsulates (and distinguishes between) government layers and 
implementation determinants and is therefore particularly useful and 
suitable for the study of ED environmental policies. 
There are, however, shortfalls with the map. The map (and the research 
itself) resembles an 'old-fashioned' top-down approach whereby EU 
environmental policy implementation is investigated in a linear manner 
and focuses mainly on obstacles along the way. While this may be true to 
a certain extent, the author nevertheless has been careful to take account 
of the whole policy process and other 'directions' that contribute to the 
dynamism and complexity of EU environmental policy.9 In addition, the 
8 Obviously, if the map is applied to other policy areas, the informal determinant 
'attitudes towards environmental protection and the Ell' should be replace~ by an 
equivalent determinant such as 'attitudes towards the Trans-European Net\\ork . 
9 F . t the rese'lrch h'lS outlined how actors t1\)111 different ~oVl'rnll1ent level-.. or InS anee, ,<. <. , . .'
d . t· shave soulTht to intluence EU en\lronmental poIIL'Y-l1lakll1~ and an Interes gloup. . b . . . ... 1 b . I 
h I·, I' . nd experiences from e\.istil1
tl poliCies ha\e been ku ad, 1\) t lC ow po Itlea views a ." :0-
EU level. 
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research has not proposed an 'instructivist' solution to implementation 
problems as some top-downers would suggest. 'Instructivism' would 
ignore implementors' legitimate interests in their own affairs and 
conditions as well as the 'real' problems in dealing with EU environmental 
policy obligations. By the same token, the research has avoided a bottom-
up approach similar to that of Elmore's 'backward mapping' where 
implementors' feed-back (see feed-back arrows in figure 7,1) plays the 
most dominant role in the whole process. Indeed, Elmore argues that 
policy-makers should assess implementors' abilities, attitudes and 
resources first before they even consider a new policy (see Chapter 2). In 
contrast to Elmore, this research has argued that implementors' interests 
and behaviours should not be accepted as unchangeable or a yardstick by 
which future policies should be measured. Future EU environmental 
objectives need not be set at a low, pragmatic level just because it is 
convenient for economic and political-administrative actors at the 
national and subnational levels. Backward mapping would ultimately 
defeat the legitimacy of the EU environmental objectives themselves (they 
are supposed to tackle pollution and prevent further deterioration) and 
the legitimacy with which EU policy-makers have adopted the policies, 
After all, EU policy-makers have been 'instructed' (though indirectly) by 
their electorate and interest groups to pursue common policies,lo 
There appears to be a third option which seeks to combine bottom-up 
and top-down approaches. This option describes EU politics as a 
complex and dynamic system of European governance \\'here national 
(and subnational) policies are influenced by the EU and "icc \crsa,' i 
10 Liesbet Hooghe refers to the legitimacy question (a~d the problel1~ (~t poli(~ 
d t· , I't)' 'EU C()hesion Polin and Competing ~ looel" ot l:uropean ys unctlOna I y In c. - ~. .' ,. • • • . 
C . I' '( t 57-477) Journal ot Common Market Studies \ol..'h, :\0,4. Dntlllber aplta Ism pp.--t. 
1998. 
II F d' . ()t' all elller ll l'n l' Eurol)ean ~O\crnanCL'. "cc Wt.'ak. :\Ibt.'n or a ISCUSSlon c- c- ' ~ 
, ' . I "1 ., .1 I '-l1lukin ll in the European Union' (ppY>4-61 1) .Il1urn~d III 
'Envlronmenta ru es dnu ru L c-
27S 
While this third option is useful in so far as it highlights the 'unique' (and 
increasing) complexity of ED environmental politics, it does not tackle 
the immediate problem: the discrepancy between EU environmental 
policy 'ambitions' and policy 'reality', a 'reality' that has been described by 
many as disappointing. To this day, ED researchers and practitioners such 
as Kramer raise the issue of (and complain about) the implementation 
deficit in ED environmental policy. In order to address the issue, policy 
practice on the ground has to be investigated and compared with policy 
objectives as outlined in the Directives and Regulations. This inevitably 
involves a top-down perspective. The research has responded to the 
much publicised implementation deficit and has sought to shed more light 
onto the differences in formal and informal conditions (differences that 
are legitimate and often unavoidable) which render EU environmental 
policy implementation difficult. Moreover, this research has gone one 
step further than many other studies by disaggregating national and 
subnational government levels, by investigating implementation 'layers' 
separately and by comparing their differences (and similarities) in formal 
and informal circumstances. The distinction between government layers 
has helped to illustrate how varied formal and informal circumstances are 
and how these circumstances have shaped EU environmental policies 
differently. In this context, the research has shown how subnational 
regions have differed in many respects from their 'mother' states. 
Of course, this research is by no means complete. Firstly. the research 
could have explored in more detail the aspect of feed-back from the 
national and subnationallayers to the EU layer. Feed-back descrvcs more 
attention in the near future considering the recent initiati\'cs of 
d d· I whl'ch havc contributcd towards thc partnership an Ia ogue 
European Public Policy \'01.3, NoA, December lYY6. 
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establishment of groups such as IMPEL While thO . h h ak 
. IS researc as t, en 
account of some of the national and subnational responses to EC 
environmental policy-making, a specific and direct link between an EU 
policy and its feed-back has not been established. In its defence, it was 
not the purpose of this research to establish such a link. Ne\'erthel~ss, 
implementors' response and its impact on the overall EU environmental 
policy process is an under-researched area that could benefit from further 
investigation. 
The research could also include more case studies on EU environmental 
Directives other than the EIA Directive. On its own, the EIA Directive 
case study has generated valuable insights that have confirmed the overall 
concept of 'multi-layered implementation'. The EIA case study has 
illustrated how complex the 'filtering' process is, how it involves all 
'layers' and how 'mixes' of formal and informal determinants can influence 
implementation on the ground. The question remains whether the 
comparison of different types of EU environmental Directives (or 
Regulations) would generate similar (or different) findings. This research 
has defended its choice of case study and has argued that the study of the 
EIA Directive is sufficient to highlight typical (and unique) problems of 
EU environmental policy implementation on the ground. Still, a 
comparison of two or several EU environmental policies could contribute 
more valuable evidence to this research. 
Similarly, the research could be extended to include policy areas other 
than the environment. This could help assess to what extent LU 
environmental policy is more complex and difticult to implement than are, 
for instance, the competition policy or the CAP. There are already "t udie" 
by Butt-Philip and others that compare the E U environmental policy wit h 
other EU policy areas. More comparatl\'l? studies could confirm and 
underline the argument that the EU environmental polil} arL'a I" ~I 
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problematic one and that ED environmental b' , o ~ectl\'es require more 
commitment and determination by implementors than in any other policy 
area, 
Focusing on subnational regions, further comparison of regions other 
than Scotland and Bavaria could also be useful. While Scotland and 
Bavaria were carefully selected for their striking differences as well as 
similarities (for a justification see Chapters 1 and 2), other regions could 
contribute aspects of formal and informal determinant differences that 
have not been found in the Scottish and Bavarian layers, Again, this 
research should serve as an encouragement for further investigation, 
Finally, the map itself has shown limitations during the research, Apart 
from its tendency to guide researchers top-down, the map has proven to 
be too "simplistic in some areas, especially when dealing with EU policy 
tools, institutions and government levels, These weaknesses have been 
acknowledged in Chapter 2 as minor and unavoidable, The problem of 
distinguishing between government layers, however, was particularly 
apparent in Chapters 5 and 6, For instance, the Scottish Office could not 
be confidently ascribed to one of the layers because of its somewhat 
hybrid position representing both national and subnational interests, 
Nevertheless, the author was careful to acknowledge this hybrid position 
and argued that the Scottish Office represented in many respects the 
'overlap' between UK and Scottish layers, Moreover, both Chapters .5 
and 6 have shown that there are government levels below the subnational 
level that have shaped EU environmental policy implementation in their 
own way, Chapter 2 already suggested that adding further layers below 
the subnationallevel could contribute to an even more retined picture of 
EU environmental policy implementation, \\'hile this may he the Cil-.;e, the 
'to 'enlal'ns as to how many lavers should be added to a gues IOn I . ' • -
, TI " t" n ma\" he difficult to an-';WL'r comparati\'l~ investigation, liS ques 10 
considering that political-ad '. r' 
numstratIve structures and responsibilities 
among subnational regions are t d' . . 
00 Iverse to press mto one comparatl\'e 
format. 
Chapter 2 has pointed out that EU environmental policy implementation 
is enormously complex and that it is difficult to conceptualise all aspects 
that constitute the subject matter into one framework (Schumann 
described this exercise as 'trying to embrace the whole elephant'). This 
research and its map have confIrmed that every conceptual framework 
has its limitations. It is hoped that this research serves as a starting point 
for further investigations and that it encourages others to take up some of 
the themes that still require clarification. 
7.4 A wider Outlook 
This research has contributed another facet to the complex picture of 
EU environmental policy. It has illustrated how environmental Directives 
have been particularly susceptible to political-administrative and, more 
importantly, economic interests. Despite reassurances from the EU 
Commission that economic and environmental considerations do not 
necessarily exclude each other (in fact, for a sustainable development they 
should merge), the research has confIrmed that the (perceived) conflict 
between these two interest areas is still very much alive and that it 
renders EU environmental policy implementation incredibly difficult. 
Apart from the conflict between economic and environmental interests, 
the EU has had to deal with a more general dilemma that concerns the 
balancing act between efficiency and democratic legitimacy. Follo\\'ing 
the principle of subsidiarity, the EU (and particularly the Commission) 
has tried to consolidate efficient and effective El: decision-making on the 
one hand with the views and (democratic) decisions of national. 
subnational and local actors on the other hanet. \\'hile the prineipk nl" 
subsidiarity as well as the Commission's etl()rts in minimising I: U Il\ llieie" 
have come some way in addressing the dilemma, the wider problem of 
accommodating all interests and government levels into a comprehensi\'t~ 
and well-functioning environmental policy framework still remains. 
In the light of clashing interests and questions surrounding the 
legitimacy with which the ED level adopts common environmental 
policies as well as the limited success with which these policies are 
implemented, the pressing question arises whether there is any point in 
pursuing EU environmental objectives. Another question would be 
whether many of these ED environmental policies are not merely 
statements of good intentions which lack 'real' commitment by ED policy-
makers and national! subnational irnplementors. In response to these 
questions it has to be pointed out that there are compelling reasons for 
tackling environmental problems at the ED level (e.g. transboundary 
pollution, see Chapter 1). Apart from major environmental problems, 
there are also economic considerations: Member States are interested in 
harmonising standards between environmental 'leaders and laggards' in 
order to strengthen the Single Market. The fact that many implementors 
will later ignore the level-playing field consideration behind many EU 
environmental Directives is another matter. There has been some 
progress in regulating and controlling pollution and protecting areas and 
species of environmental interest. It could be even argued that 
environmental conditions in Europe would be considerably worse without 
the ED's involvement in the policy area. In this sense, the EU is a 
legitimate and important policy-making level in environmental policy. 
Nevertheless, the ED environmental policy suffers from, \\'hat \\'eale I': 
would call, an inherent 'pathology': this research has demonstrated that 
the ED polity is by no means ideal for solving environmental prohlcms 
12 Weale, Albert 'Environmental rules and rule-making in the European llnio!l' 
(pp.594-611) Journal of European Puhlic Policy \01.3. NO.4. 1996. 
because it is so complex and diverse. There are no ideal solutions to fully 
tackle the above described problems and dilemmas that affect the EU in 
general and the EU environmental policy in particular. One can only hope 
that, by shedding more light onto EU environmental policy 
implementation, policy-makers and implementors will learn from past 
mistakes and take further steps (however small they may be) to narrow 
the gap between environmental policy intention and policy 'reality'. 
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Rhodes and Marsh: Policy Networks 
Policy/ Territorial Communities 
Characteristics: highly integrated and insular; vertical interdependencies: 
integrated 'service delivery responsibilities'; emphasis on communities' 
independence from other networks; limited articulation with actors 
outside communities. 
Issue Network 
Characteristics: large numbers of participants with a limited degree of 
interdependence; membership generally unstable; atomistic structure. 
Professional Network 
Characteristics: professions pre-eminent in policy-making; stable, highly 
restricted membership; substantial degree of vertical independence: 
limited horizontal articulation; insulated from other networks. 
Intergovernmental Network 
Characteristics: based on representative organisations; topocratic 
membership; limited vertical interdependence; extensive horizontal 
articulation; ability to penetrate other networks. 
Producer Network 
Characteristics: economic interests prominent; fluctuating membership; 
dependence of centre on industrial organisations for policy goals; limited 
vertical interdependence. 
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Introduction to Comparative Political Analysis 
Comp~rative political. analysis is a research tool which helps e\.plain 
observatIOns and provIdes a basis for concepts which predict future 
developments. When political phenomena occur, researchers cannot 
conduct. 'similar situation' tests which either confrrm or challenge their 
assumptIons. ~nd. hypotheses. The only way to test an assumption in the 
stu~y of politIcs IS by way of comparing two or more equivalents. These 
equIvalents may constitute states, regions, policies or other defmed areas 
under observation. Equivalents are usually divided into sub-categories 
which are then investigated in more detail. This subdivision refin;s the 
analysis and establishes factors which determine policy outcomes. Most 
comparative analyses comprise the combination of two key factors 
investigated in two or more states, although a larger number of factors 
ensures more accuracy and avoids generalisations which may not be 
correct. A researcher conducting a comparative analysis may accidentally 
or mistakenly ignore intermediate factors which determine the political 
outcome to a decisive extent (possibly because they are hidden or not 
obvious). I The researcher should therefore identify the research area as 
accurately as possible to avoid any scientific insufficiencies. 
The form and style of comparative analyses can vary along a spectrum 
of research priorities and preferences. Some researchers are highly critical 
of general assumptions and causal explanations which are presented at the 
outset and then followed by supporting facts. They rather concentrate on 
collecting empirical data which are then presented often without a new, 
challenging theory. Other researchers are more ambitious when it comes 
to the building of deductive constructions but often neglect the 
investigation of factual details. Not surprisingly, empirical data 
researchers tend to investigate a large number of cases while deductive 
theory researchers prefer to concentrate on only two 'paired' cases. 
Researchers can also choose between 'most similar' and 'most different' 
equivalents. 2 Again, the choice depends on the subject matter and the 
research objective. 'Most similar' cases are chosen when researchers wish 
to concentrate on one particular aspect without being distracted by other. 
contrasting factors. 'Most different' cases are chosen when researchers 
wish to highlight the characteristics of their equivalents under 
investigation and establish determinant variables. Obviously, the line 
between 'most similar' and 'most different' comparisons is often difficult to 
establish since state or policy units under investigation arc usually 
complex in that they contain both similarities and ditTeren~es. Ht)\\'t.~\'er, 
the combination of similarities and differences is not a disadvantage: It 
can provide interesting material for comparative research, too. . 
In sum, comparative equivalents and factors are selected to SUit the 
I P k' Ad 'The R')le of Theorv in Comparative Politics: :\ S\ mp()\ium' rzewors I, am - . 
(pp.1-49) World Politics \'01.'+8, No.1, October 1995. 
1 . T M h D '"d 'Tile Comp'lr'lti\t~ Method' (pp.1 n-I XX) \ LlI·sh. DaviJ: 
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G' Th d Methods in Political S(iencl' i\Li(\lll1an, Ib\lngstoke 144:--Stoker, erry eory an ' 
research objective. Moreover, researchers can emphasise either empirical 
evidence or observations with deductive value. The majority of 
researchers seek to strike a balance between the two approaches. 3 Ideally. 
a comparative analysis should balance theory, data and method in order 
to achieve a result which is satisfactory for a wider aUdience. 4 
For this research, two 'most different' subnational regions were selected 
for a 'paired' comparison. While some aspects were conveniently 'similar', 
Scotland and Bavaria featured a number of different characteristics which 
helped identify implementation obstacles in the EU environmental policy 
implementation process. This research does not represent an empirical 
study of comparative data, nevertheless the author was careful to avoid 
unsubstantiated generalisations. Instead, the author provided as much 
detailed evidence as possible to describe and compare Scottish and 
Bavarian conditions and implementation performances. 
f Th 'n Comparative Politics: :\ Symposium' (pp.14 '1) 
J Evans, Peter 'The Role 0 eory 1 ( 
World Politics vo1.48, No. I, October 19 )5. 
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M "K'lz'lncllTI ) e s -( 35-7 I) Dogan, alte), C c e' tr~<~tegies. Substance Black\\e1L Oxford 1<.)<,)4. 
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Appendix 2 
An Introduction to the ED, its Institutions, Po li n<\ laking 
Procedures, and Legislation . 
With the dev~lopment of European integration in the post-war era, the 
EU ha.s stead~~ acquired political and legal competencies and now 
deter~es POliCI~S an~ the every-day lives of EU citizens significantly. 
DespIt~ r.ec~nt dIScussIons on the principle of subsidiarity and the EU 
COmmISSIOn s latest strategy to restrict the number of new policy 
proposals, EU policies remain important. The study of the EU is 
therefore essential in order to understand political developments in 
Europe as a whole. 
The European Union of today fmds its roots in the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) which came into existence in July 1952 and 
involved the six founding Members - France, FRG, Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg. According to the Schuman Plan, the 
ECSC established co-operation in the coal and steel sector, but also 
promoted the wider goals of building-up post-war Europe and 
establishing long-lasting peace. This was done in the first instance by 
choosing one particular but decisive functional area of co-operation and 
common interest which would make any aggressive confrontation 
impossible. The European Economic Community soon followed the 
ECSC in 1957, expanding areas of co-operation and integrating the 
Member States further into a common political framework. The Member 
States accepted the loss of part of their national sovereignty in return for 
stability and economic prosperity and created a legal as well as 
institutional system to ensure the objectives of the treaties (ECSC, 
Euratom, EEe). The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) of 1997 
complemented the previous treaties and added new areas such as foreign 
policy, economic and social cohesion and the environment to the EC\EU 
competency. 
Today, the EU is a powerful and successful co-operation of Member 
States which is unique in its form. The EC\EU's success is ret1ected in its 
constant enlargement from six Member States to nine, to ten, to twelve 
and fifteen. Since 1 January 1995 the following states are Members of the 
EU: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, FRG, UK, 
Republic of Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, P~rtugal, Austr~a, Sweden 
and Finland. Further enlargement is expected m the near future WIth 
Central and Eastern European states in particular, expressing their 
interest in EU membership. 
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EU Institutions 
The Council of Ministers is a co-legislative institution which consists of 
the Member States' ministers. Attendance and the number of Council 
me~tings vary depending on subject matter and ministry departments. Up 
until the ~EA t.he Council was the only legislative body of the European 
Co~uruty: Smce the SEA the Council has had to share legislative 
functions WIth the European Parliament, though the Council still holds a 
dominant position. 
The European Council, although mentioned in SEA and TEU and in 
existence since 1974, is not a formal ED institution as such. Heads of 
Government or State, together with their Foreign Ministers and the 
Commission President, meet regularly to discuss new issues, respond to 
changes and launch reforms (the meetings are generally known as 
'summits'). 
The Commission is often referred to as the 'heart' or 'motor' of the EU. It 
follows a vast range of tasks: the Commission proposes draft legislation, 
monitors performance and commitment towards ED policies within 
Member States, safeguards EU objectives, mediates between Member 
States and ED institutions and represents the EU in international (trade) 
arenas such as GATT. Commissioners are not elected but nominated by 
the Member States' governments and then approved by both the Council 
and the European Parliament. Once Commissioners assume their roles, 
they 'become native' in Brussels and pursue policies for the EU as a 
whole. 
Since 1979 the European Parliament (EP) is a democratically and 
directly elected assembly which constantly seeks to increase its powers 
within the ED. It participates in the decision-making process via 
'consultation', 'assent' and 'co-decision' procedures.s It also shares 
budgetary powers with the Council and has developed various ways of 
influencing the other ED institutions. For instance, the EP lobbies 
individuals from other ED institutions during policy preparation and 
scrutinises their actions during question time. 
The European Court of Justice (ECl) represents the judiciary of the 
EU. When approached by Member States, institutions or national courts. 
the Court's task is to interpret ED law. Its rulings take precedence O\'l~r 
national law. With the TEU the ECl can impose fines on guilty partics. 
The Court of First Instance (CFI) \vas established following the SEA to 
share the judicial workload with the Eel.. Th~ C.FI ~OH~I_-~ area" such a" 
ECSC matters, competition cases and EU mstitutIons statt matters. 
S P . h A -t d"n1 Tre'lt)' of 1997 the European Parliament a\-..o participated in 
- nor to t e ms er u < , 
EU policy-making via the 'co-operation procedure'. 
2\)2 
The Court of Auditors monitors ED fmancial records. 
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) was established with the TEU 
and involves regional representatives in the consultation process. 
The Economic and Social Committee (EcoSoc) represents a 
consultative forum conslstmg of employers' and employees' 
representatives as well as other interest groups. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) provides fmancial support in the 
form of preferential loans to areas and social groups which require 
support in the competitive Single Market. 
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) prepared the monetary union 
for the EU which is now administered by the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank (ECB). 
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EU policy-making procedures 
Administrative and technical matters are processed by the Conmussion 
and do not necessarily require backing from the other EU institutions. 
However, the Commission is required to discuss and coordinate thest? 
'technicalities' with Member States' representatives within Committees 
prior to adoption. There are three types of Committees with various 
degrees of Member State influence: the administrative committet? the 
management committee and the regulatory committee. Member States' 
representatives enjoy most influence in the regulatory committee where 
they can veto decisions. 
Other legislation which requires approval from the Council and the EP 
is processed under four different procedures. The choice of procedure 
depends upon the policy issue and its importance. Prior to policy 
adoption, a policy proposal has to be processed through the Commission. 
Commission officials in the Directorates-General (DGs) prepare initial 
drafts which are then channeled to the Cabinets (the level of Commission 
officials who prepare the proposals to be discussed by the Commissioners 
themselves). Once the Cabinets approve the proposals, they are sent to 
the Chefs de Cabinet (quasi-chairpeople of the Cabinets) who meet once 
a week. If there are no objections, the Commissioners responsible for the 
policies in question ask the Secretariat General (the Commission 
'administration') to forward the proposals to the College of 
Commissioners. If there are no objections raised by Commissioners 
themselves, the proposals can be adopted and written approval is jLlst a 
formality. If there are problems, the proposals can be discussed at one of 
the Commissioners' meetings who can either make amendments, reject 
the proposals and refer them back to the DGs, or pass them on to the 
next decision-making level. 
Consultation Procedure 
After subn-utting a proposal to the Council of Ministers, the Council 
asks the EP for an opinion. In some cases the EcoSoc and/ or the CoR 
are asked as well to express their views. The EP refers the matter to one 
of its specialised committees which then assesses the proposal and 
presents its conclusions to the EP, either calling for a positive opinion 
(endorsement) or negative opinion (rejection). Once the EP has taken a 
vote on the proposal in question, the Commission and the COLlnul are 
informed of the EP's opinion. The Council can take into account the EP's 
. ws or it can ignore the EP's opinion and take an independent decision. vre . 
To retain some influence, the EP has frequently delayed a polIcy 
(Ie islation can only be adopted after the EP has issued an opinion) and 
ha; exercised pressure on Council and Commission m~mhers 111 the 
. 0 the EP has issued an opinion the CouncIl can proceed meantime. nce ' ' . 
with legislation. 
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Co-operation Procedure 
With the Amsterdam ~r~aty of 1997 the co-operation procedure is used 
only r~rely; the co-decIsIOn procedure is used instead. Under the co-
operat~on procedure, the Commission proposes a legislation and the 
Co.u~cil asks the E~ for an opinion (first reading). In view of the EP's 
opmIOn, the Council establishes a 'common position'. The proposal is 
referred back to the EP for a second reading. This time, the EP has to 
process the proposal within a 3 months time limit. 
- It can either approve the proposal and the Council's position, then the 
proposal can be adopted; 
- it may fail to process the proposal within 3 months with the result that 
the Council can adopt the legislation; 
- it can reject the Council's position by an absolute majority of all MEPs, 
the proposal would then enter another procedural stage; 
- or the EP proposes amendments which would also involve another 
procedural stage. 
If the EP rejects a proposal outright, the Council can only adopt the 
proposed legislation on the basis of unanimity. Considering that there are 
15 Member States often pursuing diverging interests, a unanimous 
decision is difficult to reach. The EP tends to lobby at least one of the 
Member States to oppose the proposal. If the EP puts forward 
amendments, the Commission must decide within one month whether or 
not to include the EP's suggestions. Whatever the Commission decides, 
the proposal is referred back to the Council. If the EP's amendments are 
incorporated, the Council requires only a qualified majority for adoption. 
If the amendments are ignored, the Council requires unanimity in order to 
adopt the legislation. The Council can also amend the Commission's 
proposals and adopt its own version by unanimity. If the Council fails to 
act within 3 months, the proposal lapses but can be taken up again if the 
EP agrees. 
Co-decision Procedure 
The co-decision procedure commences with a Commission proposal 
and the Council's request for an EP opinion (frrst reading). The Council 
establishes a common position which is then examined by the EP in its 
second reading. The EP comes to either of the following conclusions: 
_ it can approve the Council's position and the legislation can be adopted; 
_ it fails to issue an opinion within three months with the result that the 
Council can adopt the proposal; 
_ the EP can signal that it intends to reject the proposal: 
- or it can propose amendments. 
The latter two options involve further procedural stages. 
If the EP intends to reject the proposal, the Council can convene a 
meeting with the EP. Consisting of equal numbers of EP and Council 
representatives, the Conciliation CO~1I11ittee seeks to reach a 
compromise. If the EP still intends to reject th~ proposal, the. prop.o"~t1 
falls. If the EP suggests amendments, the CouncIl may t hen deCide \\ It 11111 
3 months to accept them and adopt the proposal on a l}ualitied Il1~\lOfit y 
basis. If the Council does not ~Iccept the d1l1cndments. another 
295 
Conciliati?n Committee is convened. If there is still disagreement and a 
comproIIllse cannot be reached, the legislation cannot be adopted and the 
proposal lapses. The Commission is indirectly involved in the process. If 
it delivers a positive opinion on the EP's amendments, the proposal can be 
processed with no problems. If the Commission delivers a negati\·e 
opinion, the Council can only approve the EP's amendments '-on a 
unanimous basis. 
The co-decision has been streamlined and simplified substantially with 
the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The new procedure allows for automatic 
adoption of policies whenever EP and Council agree on a proposal (or 
any amendments to the proposal). The new procedure also omits the 
process of notification whereby the EP expresses 'its intention' to reject a 
proposal~ a Conciliation Committee is convened immediately when the 
EP disagrees rejects a proposal (and the Council's common position). The 
Committee is required to reach an agreement within a six weeks time 
limit. The new procedure allows for more EP legislative powers but also 
accelerates the policy-making process. 
Assent procedure 
Finally, the assent last procedure allows the EP to either approve or 
reject a policy~ the EP cannot suggest amendments. This procedure 
applies to decisions on association agreements with third countries, 
accession treaties for states applying for EU membership and 'sensitive' 
issues such as EMU-related decisions and issues surrounding citizenship. 
The EP's decision in the assent procedure cannot be ignored, however the 
threat of blocking decisions is very rarely used by MEPs. 
The Amsterdam Treaty - Changes in Policy-Making 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (to be ratified by Spring 1999), 
simplifies policy-making procedures, sets stricter time limits, and transfers 
most policy matters to the co-decision procedure. U ~der th~ A~terdam 
Treaty, the consultation procedure should be applIed mamly for CAP 
matters, while policy areas for the co-operation procedu:e a:e reduced 
substantially to cover only EMU decisions. The majority of pohcy ma.tters 
(e.g. employment, social policy, health, freedom Of. movem~nt, ~m~l,e 
Market structural and cohesion funds, and most environmental mattel s) 
are no; processed under the more simplified co-decision procedure. 
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EU Legislation 
EU policies are formalised and adopted in the form of primary and 
secondary legislation which is binding on Member States and EC 
institutions. EU primary law refers to the Treaties signed by the \lember 
States while secondary law represents legislation adopted by the EU 
institutions taking the general principles and objectives of the Treaties 
further. The Treaties distinguish different types of legislation (ECSC 
Art.14, EC Art.189, Euratom Art. 161). Article 189 EC is relevant for 
this res-earch and outlines the different types of legislation. 
Regulations are directly applicable and binding for all and do not require 
translation into national laws. 
Directives are binding in their [mal objectives. However, the forms and 
methods to achieve these objectives are left to the Member States' 
discretion. Directives usually include a time table for implementation. 
Decisions are binding in their 'entirety' upon those to whom they are 
addressed. They may be addressed to Member States, undertakings or 
individuals. 
Recommendations and opinions have no binding force and are used for 
expressing views on particular issues. 
With the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, treaty articles have been 
renumbered. The new numbers for articles mentioned in this thesis are as 
follows: 
Previous numbering 
Article 2 
Article 3B 
Article 3C 
Article 100 
Article 130R 
l30S 
l30T 
Article 155 
Article 169 
Article 171 
Article 189 
Article 235 
New numbering 
2 
5 
6 
94 
174 
175 
176 
211 
226 
228 
249 
307 
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Appendix 3 
Evidence on ED E . nVlronmental Policy Implementation 
Performances 
In it~ 1:94 Annual Report to the European Parliament, the European 
Co~ssIOn addressed the problem of insufficient implementation of EU 
envIronmental legislation in Section G. From the information available. 
~he Commis~ion listed the most common insufficiencies and highlighted 
ImplementatIOn problems of individual Member States. According to the 
C?~ssion, the most common problems were: delays in transposing 
DIrectIVes, incorrect transposal and incorrect application. In many 
infringement cases, the Commission had to rely upon information from 
complainants. The Directives on 'freedom of access to information on the 
environment' (90/313IEEC) and 'environmental impact assessment' 
(85/337IEEC) deserved separate paragraphs in the Report since their 
insufficient implementation was particularly striking. (0.1.(1994) No C 
154/42) 
The Fifth Environmental Action Programme (EAP) outlines "some 
disquieting trends" which, "if not satisfactorily contained, could have 
significant negative consequences for the quality of the environment as a 
whole". Trends include a 20% increase in EC carbon emissions by 2010 
(reference year 1987), a 25% increase in car ownership and a 17% 
increase in mileage by 2000 (reference year 1990), a 63% increase in 
fertiliser use between 1970 and 1988, a 13% increase in municipal waste 
over the last 5 years, and a 60% increase in Mediterranean tourism 
projected by 2000 (reference year 1990). 
(OJ. (1993) No C 139/23) 
The Commission's 'Interim Review' of Implementation of the Fifth EAP 
concludes with "cautious optimism" on the progress of environmental 
measures in the EU. However, the Review also emphasises areas of 
limited success and problems in ensuring a sustainable environment in 
Europe. Problems include insufficient awareness of pollution and 
environmental deterioration, lack of willingness to adapt to environmental 
demands, and a general attitude that environmental matters only concern 
those who work in the environmental sector. (COM (94) .+53 final) 
In its 'Summary' of the Progress Report on the Fifth EAP, the 
Commission states the following: "Member States ultimately determine 
the effectiveness of Union measures, There are delays and failures in 
properly transposing directives into national law, and in some c,a:-e,", 
failure to enforce compliance with the transposed law, Late tran:-posltlon 
of legislation remains an endemic proh,lem ill a ma~l)\"it~' of \ 1,(,\1~hcr 
States." (p.19) (Taking European En\'lronment PolIcy mto the _1 :-1 
Century 1996) 
The Institute for European Environmental Policy (lEEP) examined 'the 
state of reporting' by the Commission. According to lEEP, the 
Commission failed to report on the progress of EU environmental policy 
implementation for several reasons: in many cases legislation had been 
poorly drafted and caused confusion; Member States failed to comply 
with their reporting obligations; the Commission conducted cumbersome 
internal procedures; the Commission lacked resources and, in some cases. 
lacked the will to follow up a policy; and finally other EU institutions 
failed to put pressure on the Commission to fulfill its obligations. IEEP 
included a comprehensive list of environmental Directives requiring 
reports. According to the list, most reports had not been submitted by the 
Commission at the time of publication. (The State of Reporting by the EC 
Commission in Fulfillment of Obligations contained in EC Environmental 
Legislation IEEP, London, November 1993) 
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Appendix 4 
Extracts from the Federal German Constitution 
Article. 23 (1) With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal 
Republic of. Germany shall participate in the development of the 
European Umon, C ... ). To this end the Federation may transfer sovereion 
powers by law with the consent of the Bundesrat C ... ). b 
(2) The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Lander shall be 
involved in matters concerning the European Union. The Federal 
Government shall inform the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
comprehensively and as quickly as possible. 
(3) C ... ). 
(4) The Bundesrat shall be involved in the decision-making process of 
the Federation in so far as it would have to be involved in a 
corresponding internal measure, or in so far as the Laender would be 
internally responsible. 
(5) Where, in an area in which the Federation has exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction, the interests of the Lander are affected, C ... ), the Federal 
Government shall take into account the opinion of the Bundesrat. Where 
essentially the legislative powers of the Lander, the establishment of their 
authorities or their administrative procedures are affected, the opinion of 
the Bundesrat shall be given due consideration in the decision-making 
process of the Federation; in this connection the responsibility of the 
Federation for the country as a whole shall be maintained. ( ... ) 
(6) Where essentially the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the L~inder 
is affected, the exercise of the rights of the Federal Republic of Germany 
as a member state of the European Union shall be transferred by the 
Federation to a representative of the Lander designated by the Bundesrat. 
Those rights shall be exercised with the participation of and in agreement 
with the Federal Government, in this connection the responsibility of the 
Federation for the country as a whole shall be maintained. 
(7) C ... ). 
S G "t Klalls' Clillen Peter (eds) Constitutional PoliL'\ in llnifiL'd ource: 0 z, . , , 
Germany Frank Cass, London 199). 
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Appendix 5 
Scottish Devolution - A Brief Outline 
On 11. September 1997, the majority of the Scottish electorate nlted in 
favo.ur of S~ottis~ devolution which involves the setting-up of a Scottish 
Parliament m Edmburgh with limited tax-varying powers. Elections for 
the Scottish Parliament are scheduled for 1999 and the Parliament will be 
fully operational by the year 2000. The Scottish Parliament will consist of 
129 Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs); 73 MSPs will be elected 
under the FPTP voting system, while the remaining 56 MSPs will be 
selected from party lists under a PR system. The Parliament will be 
headed by a 'Scottish Executive' chaired by the 'First Minister' for 
Scotland. The Scottish Executive and the First Minister will "co-operate 
closely,,6 with the Central Government in Westminster and particularly 
with the Secretary of State for Scotland who will continue representing 
Scottish interests in the Cabinet and in the UK at large. Detailed 
arrangements for resolving possible disagreements between the two levels 
are not yet established. The number of Scottish seats in Westminster will 
be reviewed and will probably be reduced to reflect more accurately the 
Scottish population share in the UK. 
The White Paper on Scottish Devolution7 sets out the policy areas 
where the Scottish Parliament will take over legislative powers: health 
(including the NHS, public and mental health); education and training; 
local government, social work and housing; economic development and 
transport; law and home affairs (including most civil and criminal law, 
criminal justice, police and prisons, fIre service, legal aid etc.); the 
environment (including environmental protection; air, land and water 
pollution; natural and built heritage; water supplies and sewerage; flood 
prevention and coastal protection); agriculture, fIsheries and forestry; 
sports and the arts; research and statistics. As far as relations with 
Scottish local authorities are concerned, the White Paper states that the 
Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive should not accumulate 
functions which would be more appropriately and effIciently delivered by 
other bodies. Decisions should be made as closely to the citizens as 
possible. The Scottish Parliament should provide a 'national' frame\\'ork 
within which local authorities and other Scottish bodies operate. An 
independent Committee is currently studying how to b~ild most e.ffecti\~ 
relations between the Scottish Parliament, the Scottlsh ExecLlt!\c and 
Scottish local authorities. The Scottish Parliament will be gi\L'n the 
power to increase or decrease the basic rate of incomc tax sc: by the. l' K 
Parliament by up to 3p. It will also be able to. altcr the form 01 the 
existing Council Tax, or even replace it if it so decIdcs. 
6 The Scottish Office Scotland's Parliament Presented to Parliament by the S~udary 
of State for Scotland by Command of Her i\lajesty, July 1997. 
7 ibid. 
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The following policy areas will '. W· . . 
remam m estmmster: constItutIonal 
matters; foreign policy; defence and national security: fiscaL economic 
and ~onetary policies; common markets; employme;t legislation: social 
secunt~; and ~ost of transport safety and regulation. Relations with the 
EU will remam the responsibility of the UK Goyernment "but the 
Scottish Executive will be involved as closely as possible in UK decision-
makin~ on ~urope".8 Ministers of the Executive will participate in 
Council meetmgs and the Scottish Parliament will be able to scrutinise 
EU proposals. A Scottish Representation office will be established in 
Brussels to complement UKREP. Its role will be separate from that 
which the Scotland Europa office currently fulfills. 
Details on the form and objectives of an environmental policy for the 
Scottish Parliament are currently considered by various discussion 
groups. Under the 'Governance for Scotland Project', representatives 
from Scottish local authorities, universities, the media and environmental 
interest groups presented an 'Environmental Agenda for a Scottish 
Parliament' in August 1997.9 Participants hoped that a future Scottish 
Parliament will take "the opportunity to adopt a radical and progressive 
environmental policy"IO which ensures sustainability and the involvement 
of all citizens in Scotland. Despite the fact that the full extent of 
environmental policy powers are not yet known, the authors of the 
Agenda already identified key areas for the Scottish Parliament: land use, 
transport, forestry, natural heritage, energy and conservation, water and 
marine matters. The authors expected the Scottish Parliament to bring 
together all interest groups and provide a national policy framework or 
common strategy. The Scottish Parliament should produce a national 
'State of the Environment Report' and set up a 'Round Table' as well as a 
'Scottish Parliament Committee on Sustainable Development' which 
should work in conjunction with SEP A, SNH, business groups and 
environmental NGOs. The decision-making process should be transparent 
and democratic, according to the authors. The Agenda also mentions the 
issue of EU environmental policy implementation: the Scottish Parliament 
should seek "to enforce European environmental standards to maximum 
degree" and should be liable for failure to do. II . 
The process of Scottish devolution may well have some less tangI?le 
impact on EU environmental policy implementatio~. Since the. ScottIsh 
Parliament will take over a number of pohcy areas mcludmg 
environmental policy, it is likely the increased decisio.n-ma~ing po\\"~r~ 
and a stronger 'national' identity will affect the way 10 whIch ScottIsh 
8 ibid.(p.x). 
9 J h Wh tl Centre Working for Sustainability: An en\ironmenta1 agenda for a 
o n ea ey - " d)' 1-' I' b h 
S . h P I' t FI'nal Report The Governance ot S(otlan I roJect, :'uln urg . coWs ar wmen , 
August 1997. 
10 ibid.(p.2). 
II ibid.(p.6). 
actors will process EU environmental policies within their 'territl)r\'. 
While links with the EU will remain essentially in Westminster, it is lik~ly 
that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive will pursue 
stronger and more direct ties - formal and informal - \vith Brussels. le 
Stronger ties in general could result in more Scottish participation at the 
EU level which, in turn, could result in more 'acceptable' EC 
environmental policies. Stronger ties could also result in more 
complicated procedures and 'confusion' which could then lead to 
problems of communication and co-operation. Scottish actors already 
envisage a special Committee on European Affairs which would 
scrutinise EU policies affecting Scottish competencies. Assumptions 
concerning a more complex scrutiny of EU policies, however, are 
speculative. It remains to be seen to what extent Scottish Devolution will 
change formal and informal relationships between actors at Scottish. UK 
and EU levels and to what extent it will change the way EU 
environmental policies are implemented in Scotland. Whatever impact. 
devolution can only enhance the importance of this subnational region 
when studying EU environmental policies and their implementation. 
I .. 1 .• the openin" 01 a S~ottish E\l'clltive 011ice 12 • D' 1(1 Tuh 1999)~ISOIllLII"S ::-
DevolutIOn . J). '11' . .- S. )tland Eurnpa In form S~·\)tland H\)use. 
111 Brussels which \\1 .10m Ll 
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Appendix 6 
EIA Case Study - Field Research 
The field research was conducted primarily during the first half of 1997. 
Having researched the EIA Directive and consulted various documents 
and texts on the policy, the first step was to identify relevant contacts. 
The author focused on planning authorities in Scotland and Bavaria, key 
environmental organisations, EU institutions, and subnation~l 
representations in Brussels. 
A Questionnaire was prepared in English and in German. The author was 
careful. to formulate the wording of both English and German versions as 
similar as possible to avoid divergent outcomes. In addition, the author 
placed emphasis on an equal number of questionnaires sent to Scottish 
and Bavarian actors. The distribution of questionnaires was spread evenly 
to take account of geographical differences as well as the different types 
of areas (agriculturall rurall urbani industrial areas, areas with high! low 
population density). Questionnaires were sent in March and May 1997 
and were backed up by telephone inquiries to addressees who had not 
replied in writing. 
Questionnaires were sent to -
Planning authorities in Scotland = County Councils (25); 
Planning authorities in Bavaria = Sectoral Departments at Bavarian State 
level (4), Districts (Regierungsbezirke) (7), Counties and Towns 
(Landkreise und SUidte) (10), local communities (kleine Gemeinden) (8), 
total of Bavarian addresses (29); 
EU institutions (Commission, COREPER for the Council of Ministers, 
European Parliament); 
Subnational Representations in Brussels (EuropabUro der Bayerischen 
Kommunen, EuropabUro der Deutschen Kommunen, CoSLA, Scotland 
Europa Ltd); 
The Scottish Office; 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium fUr Landesentwicklung und Um\V~ltfra~cn: 
. ~ th Protection of Birds (Scotland), Scotti~h '\atural Royal SocIety lor e 
Heritage; 
f ·· Y l' h tz in Bayern e.V., Bund '\aturschutl in Ibycrn Landesbund ur oge sc u 
e.Y .. 
Apart from distributing questionnaires, the author conducted interviews 
and made telephone inquiries. Information was extracted from \\Titten 
correspondence telephone Ct' .. . 
. . ' onversa lon, mtervlews dunmr research 
VISItS, and e-mail correspondence. Having gathered written ~and \"erbal 
statements and other information, the next step was to process and 
compare responses. The research fmdings are summarised in the Case 
Study, sources are indicated in the text or in footnotes. 
The following planning authorities replied to the questionnaire: 
Scotland - 9 out of 25 planning authorities (total of County councils 29): 
Glasgow, Argyll and Bute, Aberdeen, Scottish Borders, West Lothian, 
Perth and Kinross, Moray, Angus. 
= one third of addressees. 
Bavaria - 17 out of 29 planning authorities replied (among them :2 
Bavarian State Ministries, all 7 Districts, 7 Counties and Towns, I local 
community): StMLU, Bayerisches Staatsministerium fur Landwirtschaft 
und Forsten; Regierungsbezirke Schwaben, Unterfranken, Oberfranken, 
Mittelfranken (replied twice), Niederbayern, Oberbayern, Oberpfalz; 
Landkreise/ SUidte Rosenheim, Furth, Schweinfurt, Dachau, Bad 
Kissingen, MUnchen; kleine Gemeinde Dinkelsbuhl. = over one half of 
addressees. 
Other addressees and their interview details (such as places and dates) are 
listed in the Bibliography. 
Replies from Scottish planning authorities were generally shorter in 
comparison with replies from their Bavarian colleagues. Some Bavarian 
planning officers enclosed relevant documents and papers. The number of 
Scottish replies were disappointing when compared to the significantly 
larger number of Bavarian replies. Both sides complained equally about 
time/ work pressures which hindered them from providing more detailed 
information. Reactions to the field research varied between genuine 
interest and co-operation (and sometimes curiosity from Bavarian 
officials) to lack of interest and outright rejection to co-operate (one 
Scottish planning authority was most unhelpful: the author \\"as ad\"i,,~d 
by a Council official to visit the planning department., was then SL'nt to 
another part of the city only to find out that the Council was not pr~pared 
to answer any questions). 
Overall: it was striking how different Scottish and Bayarian actor~ haye 
dealt wIth EU environmental policies in general and the EIA Directive in 
particu~ar. The differences in reactions and responses made a comparativc 
evaluat.l0n of t~e research material difficult. Appendix 1 already outlined 
the va~lOus options of comparative political analysis and highlighted some 
of therr. advantages and disadvantages. It also stated that the 'paired' 
companson of Scotland and Bavaria would inevitably have limitation~. 
One limitation that became apparent during the course of the research 
was the difficulty in fmding a comparative format for two regions that 
feature entirely different political-administrative structures and cultures. 
Particularly cultural differences explain why Bavarian administrators ha\"c 
tended to be more 'outgoing' than their Scottish colleagues. Not only 
have they shown more interest in this research (they sympathised with the 
author), many of them had also conducted their own research and had 
published articles in academic journals. Scottish administrators were more 
willing to provide information on already well-publicised initiatives such 
as Agenda 21 projects which involved public participation. With regard 
to planning and other responsibilities that were perceived as 'exclusivc' 
areas of local government decision-making, Scottish administrators 
tended to be more secretive. The Scottish Office was by far the most 
secretive institution. As outlined in detail in Chapter 5, the Scottish Office 
has held a rather difficult position in Scottish politics (this is likely to 
change with Scottish devolution) which has had an impact on Scottish 
Office officials' attitudes towards inquiries from the public and from 
researchers in particular. With one or two exceptions, Scottish Office 
officials have tended to follow a strategy of caution and have avoided 
interview questions. While Bavarian StMLU officials have made no secret 
of their political views and opinions about EU environmental policies, 
Scottish Office officials presented either the official government policy 
line or they gave away unofficial information in strictest confidence. 
The author took these differences into account during the research and 
was careful to process the Scottish and Bavarian findings in a comparable 
format. For instance, questionnaires and letters were worded and 
structured coherently to avoid different responses at a later stage. Despite 
the differences that were unavoidable, the research has genera~ed 
evidence sufficient to compare EU environmental policy implemcntatlon 
in Scotland and Bavaria. 
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Questionnaires 
26 March 1997 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
Antje C K Brown 
13 Ashley Hall Gardens 
Linlithgow EH49 7D~ 
Tel. 01506 842542 
e-mail ackbl@stir.ac.uk 
I am conducting post -graduate research on the implementation of EU 
environmental policies in Scotland and Bavaria at the University of Stirling. 
I am particularly interested in the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
(85/337 IEEe) and its formal and practical implementation in both EU Regions. 
For my research it is essential that I am collecting 'first-hand' information from EIA 
practitioners. I have therefore prepared a questionnaire which will hope(ully generate 
valuable insights into the implementation (and possible problems) of the EIA policy. 
Please allow me to forward a questionnaire which I have tried to keep as short and 
precise as possible to save time and unnecessary work. 
I am aware that you have a busy schedule and that I am probably not the only researcher 
bombarding you with questions. However, I would be most grateful if you could . 
answer the questions enclosed. Any help or advice is much appreciated. Statements WIll 
be treated as non-attributable if you wish. 
I am looking forward to hearing from you. 
Yours faithfully 
Antje C K Brown 
The Implementation of ED Environmental Policies in Scotland and 
Bavaria. A Comparison. 
Tel: 01506 842542 
e-mail ackbl@stir.ac.uk 
Questionnaire for Scottish Local Authorities 
Question 1 
How easy/ difficult is the practical implementation of the EIA Directive (85/337IEEC)? 
Question 2 
How many planning projects have been identified in your area as 'Annex l' and 'Annex 
II' projects requiring EIA ? 
Can you provide any details of these 'Annex l' and 'Annex II' projects? 
Question 3 
When detennining whether a project under 'Annex II' requires EIA - what criteria do 
you apply? 
Question 4 
Are developers complying with the information requirements under 'Annex ill'? 
Question 5 
Apart from statutory consultees - are other interest groups consulted by planning 
authorities during the EIA procedure? 
Question 6 
Are there any planning applications whi~h were or~jected following an EIA? 
Does EIA make a difference when planmng deCISIOns are made? 
Question 7 0d 0 ') 
Which planning applications were ref~rre? to the Secretary of State for conSl eratIOn 0 
What were the outcomes of these applIcatIOns? 
Question 8 0 of the latest EIA Directi\'c Were you in any way consulted during the preparatIOn 
amendment? 
g~~~~o~i~ to see more guidance on EU legislation from the European Commission 
and / or the Scottish Office? " .' h h 1 al 
Would you be interested in more information exchange and cooperatIOn \\ It ot er oc 
authorities concerning EIA? 
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Question 10 
Do you think that a European EIA policy is necessary or do you think that other 
government levels should take care of this policy area? 
Do you have any suggestions for improving the EIA policy? 
Question 11 
Are there any other aspects I should consider in my research? 
Are there any organisations or individuals I should contact? 
I would appreciate any help you can provide. 
26 Maerz 1997 
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren 
Antje C K Brown 
13 Ashley Hall Gardens 
Linlithgow, EH49 7D~ 
Schottland 
Grossbritannien 
Tel Nr. 00441506 842542 
e-mail ackb1@stir.ac.uk 
Ich schreibe zur Zeit an meiner Doktorarbeit an der Universitaet von Stirling und 
befasse mich mit dem Thema -
Die Durchfuehrung von ED Dmweltpolitik in Schottland und Bayern. 
Ein Vergleich. 
Ich interessiere mich dabei besonders fuer die Richtlinie zur 
Umweltvertraeglichkeitspruefung (85/337IEEC) und deren fonneller bzw praktischer 
Durchfuehrung in beiden EU Regionen. 
Fuer meine Forschung benoetige ich nun Infonnationen aus erster Hand von UVP 
'Praktikern'. Ich habe deshalb einen Fragebogen fuer Schottische und Bayerische 
Gemeindeverwaltungen vorbereitet, der mir hoffentlich einen Einblick in die UVP-
Durchfuehrung (und deren Probleme) verschafft. 
Sie werden sicherlich sehr beschaeftigt sein, zumal ich bestimmt nicht die einzige 
Studentin bin, die Sie mit Fragen bombardiert. Lassen Sie mich dennoch anfragen, ob 
Sie bereit waeren, die beigefuegten Fragen zu beantworten. 
U m Zeit und unnoetige Arbeit zu ersparen, habe ich die Fragen so kurz und praezise 
wie moeglich formuliert. 
Fuer jegliche Hilfe waere ich Ihnen aeusserst dankbar. 
Mit freundlichen Gruessen verbleibe ich 
Antje C K Brown 
The Implementation of ED E . Bavaria. nVlronmental Policies in Scotland and 
A Comparison. 
Tel Nr. 00441506 842542 
e-mail ackb1@stir.ac.uk 
Fragebogen fur Bayeriscbe Regioneni Kommunen 
Frage 1 
Wie einfachl schwer ist die praktische Ausfuehrung der UVP-Richtlinie (85/337IEEC)? 
Frage 2 
Wie viele ~lan~ngsvorhaben fielen unter die Kategorien 'Anhang I' und 'Anhana II'? 
Koennen S Ie nur Informationen zu diesen Vorhaben zukommen lassen? b· 
Frage 3 
Be~ d~r Feststellung, ob ein Vorhaben unter 'Anhang IT' eine UVP benoetigt - welche 
Kritenen werden angewendet? 
Frage 4 
Folgen die Traeger der Vorhaben ihren Verpflichtungen nach Paragraph 6 UVPG? 
Frage 5 
Zur Einbeziehung der Oeffentlichkeit - wer wird von Ihnen ueber Vorhaben informiert 
und konsultiert? 
Frage 6 
Sind Planungsvorhaben aufgrund von Umweltvertraeglichkeitspruefungen abgelehnt 
worden? Beeinflusst das UVP Gesetz Planungsentscheidungen in irgendeiner Weise? 
Frage 7 
In Schottland kann der Traeger eines Vorhabens gegen eine UVP Beschwerde einlegen 
und bei dem 'Secretary of State' (quasi Ministerpraesident von Schottland) beantragen, 
dass keine UVP durchgefuehrt werden solI. 
Existiert eine aehnliche Regel in Bayem? (Vielleicht ueber Gerichte?) Falls ja, koennten 
Sie mir Beispiele nennen? 
Frage 8 . ... , 
Wurden Sie in die Vorbereitungen zur Aenderung der UVP-Rlchthme embezogen? 
Frage 9 . 
Waeren Sie an mehr Orientierungshilfe zur Ausfuehrung von El! G~se~zen \·o~ SC,lten 
der EU Kommission / Bundesregierung / Bayerisch~n Sta~tsreglerung mtc.rcsSlert? 
Waeren Sie an Informationsaustausch und KooperatlOn mlt anderen G~melI1den zu dcm 
Thema UVP interessiert? 
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Frage 10 
Glauben Sie, dass eine Europaeische UVP-Richtlinie notwendig ist? Oder glauben Sie, 
dass andere Regierungsebenen besser mit dem Thema umgehen koennen? 
Frage 11 
Raben Sie Verbesserungsvorschlaege fuer die UVP-Richtlinie und deren 
Durchfuehrung? 
Frage 12 
Gibt es noch andere Aspekte, die ich unbedingt beruecksichtigen soUte? 
Wer bzw welche Organisation! Institution koennte mir bei meiner Forschung 
weiterhelfen? 
Fuer jegliche Hilfe waere ich Ihnen aeusserst dankbar. 
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Amtsblatter: gazette 
Angst: anxiety 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium fur Landesentwicklung und U mweltfragen: 
Bavarian Ministry for Planning, Development and Environmental 
Matters. 
Beobachter der Lander: observer for the Lander in the EU. 
Beschleunigung von Genehmigungsverfahren: 'the speeding up 
of planning 
procedures'. 
Bezirkstag: 
B iokartierung: 
district assembly 
identification and regular assessment of 
natural habitats. 
B undes-Immissionsschutz-Gesetz: Federal Law for the Regulation of 
Large Combustion Plants. 
Bundesrat: 
Bundestag: 
B undesverw altungs-Gericht: 
Eigenverantwortung: 
Erntichterung: 
federfuhrend: 
Flachenstaat: 
Freistaat Bayern: 
Gemeinderat: 
gemeinschaftsfreundlich: 
Gesetz: 
upper (regional) chamber 
lower (Federal) chamber 
Federal Administrative Court. 
self-reliance, autonomy 
viewing developments with a certain 
soberness/ disillusionment. 
'in charge' 
'state' with large natural, farming and 
forestry resources. 
Free State of Bavaria 
Community Council 
'community/ Euro- fiendly' 
Act of Parliament 
Gesetzgeber: 
Gewerbeordnung: 
Grtine Punlet, Der: 
Grtinen, Die: 
jederman: 
konkrete Moglichkeit: 
Kreisfreie Stadt: 
Lander: 
Landkreis: 
Landtag: 
Ministerprasident: 
Musterverwaltung: 
nachvollziehen: 
Neue Soziale Bewegungen: 
NeutraliUitsverstandnis: 
Po litikverflechtung: 
Popularklagerecht: 
Rechtsverordnung: 
Regierungsbezirk: 
Senat: 
Spitzenverblinde: 
Stand der Technik: 
'the legislator', legislature 
trade ordinance 
German recycling scheme of waste 
packaging. 
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German Green Party (since merger with 
East German sister party 'Die Grunert! 
Bundnis 90'). 
'anybody' 
'defmite possibility' 
town 
Federal States 
County 
state parliament 
head of state government 
'example' or 'perfect' administration 
to 'comprehend' information 
new social movements 
'sense of neutrality' 
'political inter-connectedness' 
legal right for the general public to 
challenge decisions. 
Regulation 
district 
'Bavarian Senate of Elders' 
umbrella organisations 
state of the art 
stiefmutterlich: 
Uberreguliertheit: 
Umwelt: 
Umweltpakt: 
U mweltvertraglichkeitspriifung: 
'treating others like a stepmother treats a 
stepchild'. 
'over-regulation' 
(natural) environment 
'environmental pact' between the 
Bavarian State Government and 
representatives of the private sector in 
Bavaria. 
assessing the natural 
environment's 'ability to absorb' 
projects and their damaging 
impacts. 
Verwaltungs-Verfahrens-Gesetz: Federal Law regulating 
Administrative Procedures. 
Verwaltungsvorschrift: 
Waldsterben: 
Wirtschaftsstandort: 
Wirtschaftswunder: 
zumutbar: 
administrative instruction! regulation. 
'dying forests' 
economic location! 'powerhouse' 
Germany. 
'economic miracle' 
'reasonable' or 'tolerable' 
